[Slipdigit]

I propose that the Western Desert campaign was far more important than generally accepted. I have often read that it was chosen as a theater of war by the Allies (in actuality the UK at the time) because it was the only place available to fight Germany and Italy following the close of the Norwegian and French/Low Countries campaigns of June, 1940.

Herr Schnicklgruber apparently viewed North Africa as a sideshow in light the parsimonious manner in which men and equipment were dispatched there in 1940, 41 & 42. Initially, OKW only sent the 15th Panzer and the 5th Light (later the 21st Panzer) Divisions, plus a smattering of smaller units. Despite the repeated requests of Deutsch Africa Corps and later Panzer Army Africa, insufficient troops and equipment were transferred to the local command until it was too late. By early 1943, large numbers of troops were finally placed under the command of Panzer Army Africa, just in time for von Armin to surrender them to British, US and French forces at Tunis in May. This came just after the German 6th Army surrendered at Stalingrad the previous February and was almost as great of a debacle in terms of men lost (in excess of 250,000 men) as Paulus’ siege and surrender.

Hitler apparently did not feel that the Wehrmacht could spare the necessary men and material from Barbarossa and expected the DAK to accomplish its mission with inadequate forces. His narrow-sighted decision would have adverse effects in following years (as did many of his other directives).

I propose that had the Axis command supplied the commanders (Rommel and von Arnim) of the North African forces the necessary troops to expand control from the Pillars of Hercules to the Sinai (yes, taking control of French-controlled areas), that ultimately more troops would have been available for operations against the Soviet Union in 1943 and 44. There would have been no Operation Torch and Tunisian Campaign as we know it because the Allied North African landings would have been far more difficult. The lack of large, usuable harbors on the Atlantic side of Morocco would have made supplying forces difficult.

It is likely that both ends of the Med Sea could be have held by 10-15 divisions and other supporting forces. As it was, the northern coast of Africa was lost and the Axis, fearing landings almost anywhere on southern coast of Europe was forced to garrison almost the entire length of the northern Mediterranean Sea to the tune of 40+ divisions. Can you imagine what a difference in 1944 to OKH 25-30 divisions plus the 250,000 lost in Tunis would have been?

I am not proposing that the war in the East would have been won by the Axis powers, but I suspect that the precipitous defeats such as what happened to Army Group Center would not have occurred, at least not in the summer of 1944. Also, it is possible that the extra troops would have given the Germans the additional forces to continue the Kharkov counter-offensive (Third Battle of Kharkov) to include the reduction of the Kursk salient in Feb-Mar 1943, thus removing the obvious bulls-eye so evident to Russian planners in the Summer of 1943.

Germany would not have been so hamstrung by the lack of forces that so limited its freedom of action in late 1943 and 1944 and onto 1945 or possibly 46...