| A belated welcome Jeff,
I also agree this was a very interesting post.
In my opinion however, neither side initialy had a strategic interest in North Africa. Hitler was only interested in Barbarosa and Britain was only interested in rebuilding it's forces and defending the homeland.
At the begining, North Africa was only the preocupation of Musollini with his "empire" in Libya and Abbysinia. In fact I doubt they took the Italian forces seriously at the begining as they were mainly Black Shirt militia divisions (who mostly surrendered during Compass). That is why they onlt earmarked the 7th Armoured Division (and its precursors) to defend the western frontier. Their main concern was with the large Italian forces in Abbysinia under the Duke of Acosta.
The Australian Division was originaly intended for Britain but was sent to Egypt only because there was concern about feeding another division in the homeland.
The original intention of Operation Compass was only to take the Italian forts at the frontier. Even after Cunningham took over most of Libya, his forces were taken from here to go to Greece and in the case of the 4th Indian Division, to Abbysinia.
As for the Germans, Rommell was only sent with a token force to prevent Mussolini from being disgraced with a defeat (the same reason he postponed Barbarosa to conquer Greece).
Not being strategicaly importan was also the reason for the lack of supplies and strong reinforcements on both sides.
The reason that the Comonwealth was driven from El-Aghelia both times was due in a large part to the long supply route back to the delta. And the same can be said to Rommels defeats during Crusader as well as Alemein.
I would say that Churchill probably first realized the strategic importance of North Africa after Rommels breakthrough to Alemein, when most non military people thought that he would take the oil fields of the Middle East in no time. Hitler realized it even latter when the allies were driving towards Tunisia. |