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LONDON TOPICS OF THE WEEK
Gloomy Effect of Conflicting Advices from South Africa.
LORD ROBERTS'S RECEPTION
Alleged to Neither as Great Nor as Significant as the Papers Said.
The Daily News an Anti-War Organ Again.
Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES, copyright, 1901.
LONDON, January 5, 1901. - "Now is the Winter of our discontent" the new year has not opened very auspiciously for us. Afflictions abound, and it is no use for us disguising the fact that our mental attitude is one of profound discouragement. We try to hope for the best about a new development in the South African conflict, but bitter experience has taught us to distrust information form the front, and Lord Kitchener is more sparing in his facts even that was Lord Roberts. We are assured many times a day that the raids into Cape Colony by the northern farmers must come to nothing, that the Cape Colony Dutch are not joining them, that the invading columns are being headed back or are returning northward on their own accord, after having looted farms and provided themselves with stores. Against this, however, we have to place the proclamation of martial law over more than half the colony and Milner's call to arms, which, in the circumstances, means civil war. So great is the contrast between the military assurances and the actions of the civil Government that we are mystified and unable to think the best, even when inclined.

Out-and-out war partisans are offended at Lord Kitchener's latest movement toward conciliation. This, they say, will only encourage resistance by the leading burghers, who suppose we are getting tired of war; and it must be admitted that the contention is plausible. I fear the time is ill-chosen for making advances to the fighting burghers with a view to their surrender on some kind of reasonable terms. Had this been done immediately after Paardeberg, when we could have assumed the position of a triumphant conqueror dealing generously and humanely with our beaten for, there seems to be a probability that, at least a patched-up peace might have been attained, and that a better order of civil life might then gradually have arisen all through South Africa. Our Government deliberately took a provocative course, and, as I warned you at the time, in so acting made a prolongation of the war certain. As Botha said to his commandos, "We have nothing to lose and everything to gain by continuing the struggle." Yet what could Lord Kitchener do but palaver?
ATTITUDE OF THE COUNTRY.
However our newspapers may objurgated and breathe threatening slaughter there is no denying that the country is becoming thoroughly sick of this country or that a very influential and increasing body of citizens bitterly resent the barbarities into which some of our commanders have been betrayed. Unless this feeling is in some way met, the storm that was smothered when Parliament assembled, in December, may break out with uncontrollable fury in February. Passions are getting to a white heat on both sides, and the Government simply dares not continue to farm-burning-deportation system of pacification. Not only has that proved an intolerable measure for driving the burghers to continue fighting, but it has become disastrous to ourselves in depriving our troops of valuable local sources of food supply. For these reasons alone Kitchener has no choice but to try to come to terms. I only wish it were possible to hope his efforts may be crowned with success, but I fear the contrary.

If I have accurately described the feeling of the country, how comes it, you may say, that Lord Roberts had such a magnificent reception on his return? By reading the newspapers you would imagine that no conquering hero of England ever welcomed back from the field of his triumphs had been received with greater enthusiasm. The explanation is twofold but simple. First, enthusiasm was not visible to anything like the extent the newspapers allege, and disappointed the jingoes alike in mass and sound. A jingo lady of my acquaintance naively complained that the crowd did not cheer "Bobs" any more enthusiastically than the Prince of Wales. There was a crowd, however, and much organization was devoted to working it up and keeping the enthusiasm boiling. Also, and this is the second reason for the good reception, most reflecting people blame Lord Roberts much less than the home Government for the troubles into which our arm fell after he had triumphantly conducted it to Pretoria.
ROBERTS NO POLITICIAN.
The old man is no politician, does not understand the rudiments of politics and therefore simply obeyed the hints or orders from home in his earlier proclamations of annexation and surrender out of which all his later afflictions arose. Had the nation really blamed this Anglo-Indian soldier for all the deeds of rapine laid to the charge of his subordinates he would have met with a very mixed reception indeed. As it is, the great majority is willing to think kindly of him. It is in manner a satire upon our civilization and a grim commentary on the progress of mankind that his Lordship's fitness to act as Commander in Chief should have been the issue of the appeal to the nation to come to the assistance of the starving wives and families of the soldiers at the front. That is the reverse side of glory's shield and the one I do not care to dwell upon.
We have been called upon this New Year to enthuse about the Federation of Australia, and I am afraid that also has been poorly done. We are all very glad that the new Commonwealth promising great things for the future should have been formed pacifically and amid tokens of mutual good will, but it cannot be said that we are deeply interested in the change or that any but the vaguest conception has entered the public mind as to what the step implies. In the colonies themselves the joy has been immense, particularly in Sydney, and I hope that the fruits will not belie the extravagant ideas evidently prevalent among the colonists. I, however, see many rocks ahead for the new Government, and not the least is the rock of colonial debts.
A JOURNALISTIC EVENT.
An interesting journalistic event has happened since I wrote last. The Daily News has been recaptured by the anti-war party, or, as I would prefer to call it, the old Liberal Party. What happened is briefly this: After Walsingham and his colleagues left The Daily Chronicle friends interested in him began efforts to get capital together to start a new morning penny newspaper. They had but indifferent success for some considerable time, but lately Liberal capitalists have been coming forward and the project looked like early realization. The it was discovered that The Daily News was in the market cheap. Its circulation had been falling off because while it offended many of its old adherents, it had gained few new ones. It had only been beating the same drum nearly as all the other papers pounded it. Although retaining many of its distinctive and always excellent features, it could not hope to entice people who were satified with the other performers to leave them and come to it. Then, as one of the principals in the negotiation tells me, the proprietors were divided, a majority of them in number, though weaker in financial stake, being opposed to the paper's present policy. The end of a long story was that last Saturday a preliminary agreement for transfer was signed and next month the paper will revert to its old function. Who will edit it I do not know, but it will unquestionably be recruited from most of the brilliant members of the old Chronicle staff. Nevertheless it is an up-hill fight to recover lost ground.

A.J.W.

Published NY TIMES, January 6, 1901
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LORD ROBERT'S REPORTS.
Buller Said to Relieve Ladysmith Was Impracticable, but Was Told He Must Do It - Kitchener Praised.

LONDON, February 9, 1901. - Earl Roberts's detailed mail dispatches, ranging from Feb. 6 to Nov. 15, 1900, were gazetted last evening. They fill 157 quarto pages, and make up the official history of the war.
Hundreds of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men are favourably mentioned, including Lord Kitchener, who is referred to in warm terms. Sir Redvers Buller comes in for criticism.

The first dispatch undertakes to "give a concise account of the state of affairs in this country [South Africa] on my arrival, January 10." It describes the forces as much scattered. Lord Roberts decided to leave Gen. Buller with a free hand in Natal, but otherwise to remain on the defensive until reinforced and until transport had been organized. He found no transport had been organized. He found no transport corps existing. The colonial forces had not been sufficiently used. Cape Colony was restless.

Writing from Jacobsdal, Feb 16, Lord Roberts says:

"Gen. Buller, on Feb 6, wired that the had pierced the enemy's lines, but that to give his artillery access to the Ladysmith plain would cost from 2,000 to 3,000 men. I replied that he must relieve Ladysmith even at that cost. Buller telegraphed, February 9, that he was not strong enough to relieve Ladysmith without reinforcements, and regarded the operation in which he was engaged as impracticable. I replied that my instructions must hold."

In the course of a sketch of the capture of Gen. Cronje, the occupation of Bloemfontein, and the long wait there, Lord Roberts wrote:

"The enemy knew exactly how we were situated and had accurate information as to the conditions of our supplies, transport, artillery, and cavalry horses, and they regained courage."
The marches to Johannesburg and Pretoria were uneventful as described by Lord Roberts, his chief concern being to provision the army. "We were practically living from hand to mouth," he wrote, "and at times had not even one day's rations to the good."

The Field Marshall finds that no specific blame can attach to Col. Broadwood in the Sanna's Post affair, as "the disaster was mainly due to the failure of the patrol at Boesman's Kop to warn their comrades that an ambush was prepared."

The officer who was place in command of the patrol is not mentioned.

Writing from Johannesburg November 15 Lord Roberts said:

"With the occupation of Komati Poort and the dispersal of Louis Botha's army, the organized resistance of the two republics may be said to have ceased"; but, he added, "there still remains much for the army in South Africa to do to meet the conditions of guerrilla warfare with forces broken up into small columns and operating over an area larger than France, Germany, and Austria combined."

Looking at all the circumstances, Lord Roberts says the campaign is "unique in the annals of war," and he pays the highest tribute to the gallantry and worth of the troops, declaring that "no finer force ever took the field under the British flag."

Lord Roberts asserts deliberately that the permanent tranquillity of the republics "depends upon the complete disarmament of their inhabitants, a task difficult, I admit, but attainable with time and patience."

Lord Roberts's dispatches are not regarded as giving any further elucidation of the conduct of the war, but they are interesting as proving that throughout the campaign he never had sufficient men, horses, or supplies to cover such a vast field of operations.

There is a general idea that the dispatches have suffered considerable excision at the hands of the War Office. They do not throw any further light on the summary retirement of Gen. Colville or many other matters regarding which the public is anxious to hear.

Incorporated with the dispatches are reports from subordinate commanders, including the narrative of Gen. Baden-Powell, who says the newspaper correspondents gave him much trouble, as the enemy "derived a great deal of information as to our circumstances in Mafeking form the newspapers." Sir George White gives an account of the siege of Ladysmith and of the struggle of the population and the garrison against starvation and enteric fever. Gen. Buller mentions favourably Col. Steele, Major Jarvis, Major Belcher, Capt. Mackie, and Lieut. Magee of Strathcona's Horse.

Commenting upon the dispatches, The Times says:

"The most vivid impression produced is that on its fighting side the British Army need not fear comparison with any troops in the world. A second, and less agreeable, impression is that the army is less strong on its business than on its fighting side. It splendid qualities have been largely neutralized by want of foresight, initiative, organizing ability, common intelligence, and common sense on the part of those whose business it was to utilize the fighting qualities to the utmost."

Published, NY TIMES, February 9, 1901.
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SURRENDER OF BOTHA REPORTED IN LONDON

No Confirmation, but Dispatches Locate Him Near Kitchener.

British War Office Does Not Believe, Even If the Report is True, that Hostilities Will Be Ended.

LONDON, Feb. 28, 1901. - The Daily Chronicle has received a report, which it believes to be trustworthy, that Gen. Botha has surrendered to Lord Kitchener. The paper says:
"According to earlier information Gen. Botha was to be received at Lord Kitchener's camp about the end of this week, but if the foregoing report is correct events have ripened with unexpected rapidity."

Dispatches from Pretoria locate Gen. Botha, with a small force, north of Middelburg. They point out that he is probably making Viljoen and the seat of the Boer Government beyond Roosenkal.

Lord Kitchener has been at Middelburg for the last few days, but there is no indication from any quarter other than that relied upon by The Daily Chronicle that Botha has surrendered.

Lord Kitchener, telegraphing from Middelburg, under date of Feb. 27, says:

"The following additional captures are reported by French up to Feb. 25: Three hundred Boers, surrendered; a nineteen-pounder Krupp, one howitzer, a Maxim, 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 153 rifles, 388 horses, 834 trek oxen, 5,600 cattle, 9,800 sheep, and 287 wagons and carts."

Whether or not it be true that Botha has surrendered or is about to surrender, Gen. French's most recent success, combined with the other advantages gained by the British forces in South Africa, have created a most hopeful feeling in the War Office here. Lord Raglan, Under Secretary of State for War, described French's work as being "the thin edge of the wedge," and this also is the opinion of the military critics, who reiterate that, while the war cannot be expected to end with a sudden stroke, this constant capturing of men, guns, supplies, and horses means that the operations will soon be reduced to a Dacoit stage. Gen. French is quite the hero of the hour in Pall Mall, though, of course, Lord Kitchener's controlling hand is recognized under every circumstance.

It is not believed to be at all likely that Gen. Kitchener will grant any armistice as a preliminary to peace, or, if he does, he will not let the War Office know of it until he learns the result. In fact, small reliance is placed on such an offer, for even if Gen. Botha has given in, the War Office is inclined to consider that his action will only affect the force under his immediate individual command, and that the same policy which is now being pursued will have to be continued against the other Boer forces operating in vicinities far removed from the Boer Commander in Chief.

Published NY TIMES, February 28, 1901
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LONDON TOPICS OF THE WEEK

Campaigns Against Botha and De Wet Explained and Criticised.

KITCHENER'S ALLEGED PLIGHT

Said to Lack the Ability to Manoeuvre Large Bodies of Troops.

Signs Which May Foreshadow a Change of Attitude Toward the Boers - How the Cost of War Has Advanced

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES Copyright, 1901

LONDON, March 2, 1901 - Is it peace? No, but it might be a truce. Thursday several f the lest reputable of our evening newspaper flamingly published the assertion that Gen. Louis Botha had surrendered to Lord Kitchener, and one of them, controlled by the notorious Bottomly, went so far as to declare the story official. It was absolutely untrue, and from the fact that every newspaper in London of any standing had received a communication Wednesday night to the same effect, but couched in somewhat indefinite language, the inference that might be drawn is that the tale was concocted for Stock Exchange purposes. It certainly had the effect of raising prices for the Kafir shares, and caused quite a flutter not only in the City, but among all the speculative groups of the West End.

Is it wholly a lie, then? I am inclined to think not. As far as surrender goes it is pure untruth, but there may be a foundation for the story in the resumption of negotiations with the Boer leader by Lord Kitchener. This is the theory prevalent to-day, and support for it is found both in some mysterious words of Secretary Brodrick about "better terms than could have been looked for were offered the fighting Burghers," as well as in the fact, no longer concealed, that Lord Kitchener has once more failed and failed lamentably. I have never believed much in this man's capacity as a fighting General, and think that he has been rather cruelly used by fame. Most of the narratives of his campaign on the Nile I have read, and the impression they left on my mind was that, however good as an organizer of transport or as a constructive engineer, Kitchener is entirely ignorant of the art of handling and manoeuvring large masses of troops in the field, and is rash to an astonishing degree. Either Stevens's book or Winston Churchill's demonstrates this, and one cannot study the plans of the battle of Omdurman without shuddering at the thought of what might have happened if MacDonald's Black Brigade had not stood firm against the second dervish army that, unknown to Kitchener and unheeded by him, came sweeping round some hills full upon the loosened ranks of his troops, who had been ordered by him to march on into the town in the full belief that the battle had been won. The same impression is conveyed by this week's belated Paardeberg dispatches, scanty and badly clipped though they may be, Kitchener ordered it, and it was the most deadly for us in all the war. The truth is, Kitchener never had any experience in handling a large army on a campaign, and it is his misfortune rather than a crime to have left to him to complete the task which was too heavy for Lord Roberts.

KITCHENER'S FAILURE.

We had all been reading about the wonderful enveloping movement organised in January, the object of which was, by means of seven columns marching into the east and the southeast of the Transvaal, to surround the largest of the Boer armies under Botha and force it to surrender. The whole thing was to be over ten days ago. It is not over now. On the contrary, these columns have been baulked of their purpose. We have been entertained with catalogues of the numbers of beeves, sheep, horses, carts, guns, and human beings captured by these columns or those of them immediately under the command of French, Smith, and Dorrien, but since the latter General had a sharp fight with Botha on his way east there has been no fighting worth speaking about and no foe visible.

The ones surrendering then are peaceful farmers with their wives and families, and the ammunition captured was no more than what farmers living on the lonely veldt would inevitably keep in their houses, This is no the worst of it either. Louis Botha was never hunted down into that southeast corner of the country where we have been told to expect his capture between the column coming up from Natal and converging to the east and that sent out from Pretoria. When he withdrew northward away from our line of march we cannot tell, but it seems probable that he never went east in force at all, and the situation therefore now is that he, with the bulk of his army intact, seems free to fall upon the eastern lines of communication essential to the subsistence of those very columns. Possibly, also, he holds control over the Delagoa Bay Railway in the neighbourhood of Knomati Poort. It is admitted that supplies cannot get through to French because of floods, and therefore Kitchener has seemingly landed all his available Transvaal movable forces except a division under Methuen, in a mountainous and partially desert country about the size of England and Wales north of the Thames, a country very scantily peopled except by blacks with only a few villages in its entire compass, and the problem before him is how to get these columns back without serious loss.

SITUATION IN CAPE COLONY.

In the south, matters do not seem to be really much better, but it is not so much the wanderings of De Wet or the junctions of his force with other Boer forces, as the condition of Cape Colony as a whole that excites apprehension. The so-called Loyalist British colonists are becoming thorough dissatisfied with the state of affairs as disclosed in the inability of England to protect them. The plague, too, is raging in Cape Town, and although we are assured it has not yet attacked our troops, the mere mention of such a disease excites apprehension and proves detrimental to recruiting everywhere.

To crown all, this morning the army estimates for the coming financial year were presented to us, and they are perfectly staggering, especially the assumption that the state of war in full swing will only last four months into the year. The total is £88,000,000: add that to the figures for the current year including supplementary estimates, and we arrive at a military outlay of £180,000,000 actual or estimated, within a period of two years, all but £40,000,000 being for the war. What a contrast is this with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's presentiment of his first supplementary war estimate in October, 1899! "We may want £10,000,000," he said, "I will take powers to raise £8,000,000 on Treasury bills, but in reality I expect to require only £7,000,000." No wonder the country begins to doubt whether the policy that has been pursued was the wisest possible.

THE WAY OUT.

Everything thus conspires to urge upon the Government and nation a change of attitude toward the majority of white inhabitants in South Africa, and I think it probable that attempts are being made to come to terms of some sort with the chief Boer commander. That Milner has gone north with this object in view is a prevailing theory. On what terms could a solid peace be arranged? I really am unable to formulate a plan. We shall have to abandon many pretensions and make up our minds to submit to many losses and to suffer much in our imperial pride if a healing peace is to come in that vast territory now all in confusion with brethren in arms against each other. A truce, however, that might grow into such a peace is conceivable enough, and it might
be arrived at on the basis of withdrawing from the Burghers all control over the Witwatersrand mineral sources, leaving them with full rights of self-government in the rest of the territory, subject merely to a nominal suzerainty of England and disarmament.

Until this unfortunate quarrel broke out the Cape Colony Burghers were becoming proud of their English connection. They may never be that again, but their leaders are sharp enough to recognize that with all her faults England is capable of dealing, her fit of passion of over, more generously with them than any other European power. Also, they recognize that their own national strength is not yet enough to enable them alone to defy the world or the marauders thereof. Add compensation to the farmers for the loss of stock and buildings, together with some advances of money to enable those who have been stripped of everything to resume their old life and the necessity for further fighting might be ended. A truce of this kind would be cheap at £10,000,00, aye, £20,000,000, and I therefore hope for a chance of reducing the monstrous war estimates by some such patch-up. At the same time I am only conveying to you the hopes and impressions prevailing in the more enlightened political circles. We have absolutely no
facts to go upon, and for all I know to the contrary, the Cabinet may still be pig-headedly determined to pursue the conflict to the bitter end, and no matter at what cost. Indeed, Chamberlain said as much yesterday in conversation.
Published NY TIMES, March 3, 1901
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BRITISH LOOK FOR SURRENDER OF BOTHA

Kitchener and Boer General Are Discussing Terms.

If Surrender is Made it Will Be Only of the Forces Immediately Under Botha's Command.

LONDON, March 7, 1901 - Private information received in London this morning confirms the rumours of negotiations between Lord Kitchener, Sir Alfred Milner, and Commandant General Louis Botha. Nothing is known as to the actual presence of the Boer Commander in Chief at Pretoria, and no more London paper publishes a statement that he is there, but it is reasonably certain that Gen. Botha is in either personal or very close touch with Lord Kitchener.

To-day Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman will endeavour to extract some information from the Government on the subject in the House of Commons.

It is asserted that Sir Alfred Milner has gone to Pretoria with the object of assisting Lord Kitchener in these negotiations, the length of which appears to be due to Gen. Botha's desire to consult with Acting President Schalk-Burger at Pietersburg, and to make terms applying to the whole Boer forces, but militating against this is Lord Kitchener's doubt as to Gen. Botha's ability to control Gen. De Wet and other leaders, as well as the internal opposition best-informed South African authorities said last evening:

"We have little doubt that Gen. Botha will surrender. The question now is as to what forces he can bring with him. We have private information tending to show that Lord Kitchener and Sir Alfred Milner have decided to accept his surrender on the basis that he is merely an individual commander rather than Commander in Chief of the enemy's forces.

"Gen. De Wet and Gen. De la Rey, as well as the other leaders, will probably have to be dealt with individually on similar terms. If the negotiations with Gen. Botha reach a successful termination it will be - to use an expressive Americanism - just 'one of the bunch.'"

It is also understood that Dr. Leyds was recently negotiating to secure peace terms, but when it was discovered that he was merely acting a farce, not being in communication with Gen. Botha or able to live up to the tentative suggestions made, the British Government, having learned his views, quickly ended the proceedings, especially when it was found that Lord Kitchener was treating with Gen. Botha, while Dr. Leyds was unable to speak authoritatively for the forces in the field.

Curiously enough, the War Office seems genuinely without definite information regarding the exact status of affairs. The great financial firms whose interests in South Africa are almost equal to those of the Government, believe, from their private advices, that the present situation is likely to result in the surrender of Gen. Botha and the forces under his immediate command, while the other Boer units will remain in the field.

The Daily Mail publishes the following from Colesberg, dated March 5: "A big movement is being prepared to clear the whole of Orange River Colony, from north to south, of Boers."

Published, NY TIMES, March 7, 1901

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TERMS TO THE BOERS.

The official announcement by Mr. Chamberlain that the conference with Gen. Botha of Lord Kitchener had ended in a rejection by the Boer leader of the British General's terms of peace has evidently produced a profound sensation in England. The most irrational manifestations of this sensation have been made by those organs of public opinion which profess shame that it should have been Great Britain which, as they express it, "sued for peace." That is a very wrong way of putting it. The United Kingdom counts something between forty and forty-five millions of people. The British Empire, which has been largely drawn upon for its own extension by means of a South African war, counts something like a quarter of the population of the planet. Whatever the geographical difficulties may have been of the subjugation of less than half a million of remote farmers and herdsmen, as soon as this vastly preponderant Power had gained a respectable measure of military success over the distant and belated republics, it was the dictate, not merely of magnanimity, but of humanity and decency, for it to hold out to them its imperial olive branch. That any Briton should take such an offer for a confession of weakness is only another proof how his nerves have been shaken by the unexpected obstinacy of the Boer resistance.

Whatever happens, Great Britain will have no occasion to reproach herself for her generous efforts to put a stop to such a war. But how far the hatred of the British for the Dutch in South Africa has gone, we have another instance in the extraordinary proposal reported to have been made by Gen. Ian Hamilton. It is the more extraordinary because its author was himself a soldier in South Africa, and a brave one. Yet he proposes, as the cable reports him, that the Boers captured in arms shall be sent to Canada to do forced labour on the railroads.

It would be more gratifying to have such a proposition as this made by some Briton who had never smelled powder, in South Africa or elsewhere. The proposal shows that Gen. Ian Hamilton, whatever he may be as a soldier, is not much of a statesman. It also shows how much the war has "got on the nerves" of the British people in general. For this is a proposal to establish a new Ireland in South Africa, and that is a consummation which every Englishman with the least pretensions to the character of a statesman must be particularly anxious to avoid. We have no idea that Lord Kitchener's proposal to Gen. Botha was conceived in any such spirit. The precise terms which he was authorized to propose, and which Gen. Botha felt bound to reject, have been laid on the table of the House of Commons. The publication of them will be awaited with great interest.

Published NY TIMES, March 22, 1901
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WHAT THE BOERS REFUSED

Kitchener Said to Have Offered Immediate Self-Government.

Also £1,000,000 for Property Destroyed by Burghers - Botha Wanted Jews Discriminated Against.

LONDON, March 22, 1901. - The Daily Chronicle, professing to be able to give an outline of the negotiations between Lord Kitchener and Commandant Gen. Botha, says:

"The chief obstacle to a settlement was Lord Kitchener's refusal to grant complete amnesty to the leaders of the rebels in Cape Colony. He offered self-government on the lines of Jamaica immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, with legislative bodies
partly elected by the burghers.

"The Government agreed to provide £1,000,000 to compensate the Boers for property destroyed and articles commandeered by the Boers
on commando, provided the signatures of the officers who commandeered the goods were forthcoming. It also offered to grant loans on
easy terms for rebuilding and restocking farmsteads.

"Moreover, it agreed that children should be instructed in English or Dutch at the discretion of their parents. The Government undertook to make no claim on church property or funds or upon hospitals or hospital funds or upon private investments.

"No burgher of either State was to be allowed to possess a rifle except by special license.

"Gen. Botha was generally in favour of these conditions, but he dissented strongly from a proposal to give full privilege of citizenship to properly domiciled and registered blacks. He was also greatly concerned about the position Jewish capitalists would occupy in the country, and was told that Jews and Christians would enjoy equal rights, no distinction being made in the matter of concessions."

The Parliamentary papers on the subject are still delayed, but will probably appear to-day, (Friday.)

The Times, commenting on the Kitchener - Botha negotiations, says:

"The event shows that the Boers are still hopeful of something turning up to their advantage. It is difficult otherwise to understand their rejection of Lord Kitchener's terms, which the Parliamentary papers on the subject will no doubt show were lenient to the verge of weakness."

Published NY TIMES, March 22, 1901
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KITCHENER AND BOTHA.

The terms proposed by Sir Alfred Milner and Lord Kitchener and rejected by Gen. Botha, for the speedy publication of which we were wishing yesterday, are now made public. The differences between the two positions do not seem to be irreconcilable. If they are not, it behoves both parties to reconcile them. For if the Boers are fighting in absolute desperation, the condition to which the war has reduced the British Empire is, "Imperially" speaking, not so far from desperate. When President Krueger said that, under
pretence of wanting more privileges for the Outlanders, what the British really wanted was "the country," he said words that have since been abundantly verified. In fact, the war had scarcely begun when The London Times announced its main object to be the establishment of British as against Dutch supremacy in South Africa. That object has been attained. It is idle for the Boers to pretend that it has not been. As Mr. Morley said, at the beginning of hostilities, quoting Swift, it must be agreed that ten armed men are an overmatch for one man in his shirt. But it is none the less true that the charges as to the objects of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and those whose representative he was, charges indignantly disclaimed by no less important a British politician than
the Duke of Devonshire, have been amply sustained. The British have bought their triumph at a frightful cost in men and money, and a still more frightful cost in loss of prestige throughout the world. They simply must be sincerely anxious to put a stop, on any terms not intolerable, to the prolongation of a war which, as Mr. Frederic Harrison reminded them at the beginning of it, "could have no triumphs.

And, as a matter of fact, the terms offered the Boers are, from the British official or the British unofficial point of view, not only tolerable, but handsome. The deportation of many Boer prisoners of war and the deportation of others suggested by Gen. Ian Hamilton, might be worth consideration as a military measure. As a political measure it is nugatory, unless it is carried further than the most earnest British imperialist has thus far proposed. The whites of Dutch descent in South Africa far outnumber the whites of British descent. To remove the majority would require "more men from England," even if it were not intolerable to even British Christians. Some way must be found of enabling the two races to live together. And Sir Alfred Milner and Lord Kitchener must have sincerely sought for such a method. The alternative is to keep in South Africa, a British garrison, drawn from Britain, of at least two hundred thousand men, for and indefinite time to come, at an indefinite but enormous expense to the British taxpayer. The British taxpayer has already begun to ask, and he is likely to continue with increasing urgency to ask, whether this kind of "foreign conquest and subjugation" pays.

There are two apparent sticking points in the negotiation. The Boer leaders desired that Boers who had advanced money or supplies to the Boer cause should be reimbursed. To that end they desired that the British Government should assume the debts of the two republics. This proposal seems to have been most emphatically declined. And, in a sense, quite rightly. The expenses incurred in good faith, before the war, for the development of the two republics are of equal value to their subsequent possessors. No doubt some arrangement should be arrived at to transfer these obligations, so that creditors in good faith and for value should not suffer. But all Boers and non-Boers within the territory of the republics have been requisitioned for supplies for the Boer armies. The proposition of the British Government is, while entirely rejecting any liability for such debts, to set aside a million sterling, as an "act of grace," to make good those who have fulfilled requisitions in good faith and given value This is more than the Boers could have expected, and more than could have been expected of the British. It is not only a very conciliatory proposal, but, we repeat, a very handsome proposal.

It may be assumed that this is not the real sticking point of the negotiations. It may equally be assumed that the real sticking point, upon which the negotiations broke, was the demand of the Boers that the Boers of Cape Colony and Natal who had borne arms against the British should receive the benefit of the amnesty offered to the Boers of the two republics. In refusing this demand we believe that the British negotiators were ill-advised. Although Great Britain has claimed the sovereignty of Cape Colony for almost a century, and that of Natal for more than a generation, that sovereignty has never been acquiesced in by the agricultural population of the two colonies. That population cherished a hereditary loathing for the British which had never been mitigated or complicated by any practical experience of British rule. They had never been in any effective sense British subjects. Blood was, with them, thicker than water. When the test came, they went with their own people. Such expressions of British irrigation as Mr. Rudyard Kipling's silly deliverance on the "Sin of Witchcraft" have no real applicability to the situation. If the British continue to insist upon punishing people on one side of a geographical line for what they pardon to the kinsmen of those people on the other side of the line, they are simply perpetuating the race hatred in South Africa, and making impossible any other government of it than by the sword. If they are wise they will extend their offer of amnesty to all Dutch speaking inhabitants of South Africa, without exception. That course would disarm Botha by leaving him no further substantial object to fight for. To insist upon the present British position would create an Ireland in South Africa which would give the British Empire great trouble for generations to come.

Published NY TIMES, March 23, 1901
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BOTHA OBJECTED TO MILNER.

The Only Reason Mr. Chamberlain Can Give for the Rejection of the Peace Terms.

LONDON, March 24, 1901. - The Colonial Secretary the Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, in the House of Commons yesterday, replying to a question, said no specific objections had been made by Gen. Botha to any of the peace terms offered by
Lord Kitchener, and Gen. Botha made no counter-proposals.

Mr Chamberlain added that the only information in the possession of the Government, outside of that published in the papers, was contained in a private telegram from Lord Kitchener saying that Gen. Botha had a strong objection to Sir Alfred Milner.

Published, NY TIMES, March 24, 1901
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Pigeon Carrier Service in Africa.

From St. Nicholas.

The pigeon post at Durban, in South Africa, was the beginning of the pigeon experiments conducted in recent campaigns between the English and Boers, and scores of messages were carried from one part of the English Army to another by means of the birds. Col. Hassard of the Royal Engineers, a staff officer at the Cape, had made a life study of the carrier pigeons, and before the war broke out the had established pigeon posts between most of the beleaguered cities. From Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, pigeons early in the sieges regularly brought messages from the English soldiers cooped up in the towns. Sir George White's first message from Ladysmith was carried by a pigeon, and this means of communicating with the outside world continued until the number of birds in the city was exhausted. It was only a short time before that The English Government had decided to establish a service of carrier pigeons. In the navy pigeon posts were recognized means of carrying information as early as 1896, and there are over a thousand birds recorded on the books of the royal navy. The first naval loft was at Portsmouth, and now there are two others. In the English Army the posts have been confined almost exclusively to the Cape, where the nature of the country makes the homing pigeon service of more value than in England.

Published NY TIMES, June 16, 1901.
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MR. KIPLING ATTACKS WAR OFFICE METHODS.

Denounces Giving of Commands to Gens. Buller and Wood.

Other Criticisms of the Government - The Spectator Wants Roberts to Return to South Africa.

LONDON, October 5, 1901. - "In spite of the pledges of the Government, the whole army machine is to be hauled back as soon as it may be to the old ruts of impotence, pretence, and collapse," writes Rudyard Kipling in a striking letter to The Spectator upon the appointments of Gen. Sir Redvers Buller and Sir Evelyn Wood to command corps.

This pungent sentence voices the national feeling that has prevailed this week without regard to party politics.

"Men see," adds Mr. Kipling, "that the chosen commanders are not quite in touch with the real army, which, with a little tact and a little seriousness, might so easily survive. It is not the triviality or ineptitude displayed in this matter that appals, but the cynical levity.

"The English people have paid no small price in money and in blood that there might be born an army handled by fit and proven leaders."

Very much on these lines, all the weeklies, regardless of politics, take the Government to task. The Spectator, although among the most cautious of the Government's supporters, comes out bodly, not only with a declaration that the appointments of Gens. Buller and Wood are absurd, but also with a demand that Lord Kitchener be recalled. This demand is carefully but unmistakably worded.

"From the moment Lord Roberts left South Africa we seemed to lose our strategic grasp upon the country," says The Spectator, and it urges, though without much hope, that its suggestion be adopted, and Lord Roberts be send out again. According to The Spectator, Lord Kitchener "has accomplished nothing in a year except by process of attrition." It compares his methods with those of Grant, but does not believe that "a hammer-man" is the man to command in South Africa, although it thinks Lord Kitchener would make and excellent Commander in Chief at home. It suggests that Lord Roberts should go back for six months. Lord Kitchener either relieving him in London or acting again as his Chief of Staff in South Africa.

"If Lord Roberts went out to finish the war," says The Spectator, "he would, we believe, finish it by making the best possible use of the material in hand."

Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, speaking last night at Oldham, delivered himself of another severe censure of the war policy of the Government. He declared that the military situation in South Africa was now "not less momentous than when the Boer armies threw themselves into Natal at the beginning of the war," and that the empire to-day "confronts difficulties and dangers more embarrassing than those which hung over it in the black week of December 1899."

Published NY TIMES, October 5, 1901.
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BOTHA LIKELY TO ESCAPE

Part of His Force May Elude the British Cordon.

THE BATTLE AT FORT ITALA

Gallant British Defence - That Action and the Defence of Fort Prospect Saved Natal from Invasion.

LONDON TIMES - NEW YORK TIMES
Special Cablegram.

LONDON, October 10, 1901. - A dispatch from Durban to The Times says there has been silence lately regarding Gen. Lyttleton's operations on the border of Natal, which have been directed against the desperate attempt of the Boers to extricate themselves from the critical corner in which their bold dash on Zululand placed them.

Though he is still in an unsafe place, it seems as though Commandant Gen. Botha is likely to escape the inner cordon of British troops, put in the field to intercept his retreat, but he will be obliged to leave part of his force behind. With the troops at his disposal it was impossible for Gen. Lyttleton to blockade the whole distance from the Natal border across the Vryheid.

Gen. Botha, moving north on Sunday, passed the British line with half his force. Leaving their wagons and cattle in laager, the Boers made a night march under Botha and Emmett. They were caught up in Northeast Vryheid by Gen. Kitchener (Lord Kitchener's brother,) and an engagement followed, the Boers retiring north. Four of their number are known to have been wounded.

The operations are not finished, but Gen. Botha has secured a wider and less restricted area for his future movements.

A dispatch to The Times from Dundee gives fuller details of the Boer attacks on Forts Itala and Prospect on Sept. 26.

The Boers who attacked Fort Itala numbered from 1,800 to 2,000. Their operations were conducted under the direction of Commandant Gen. Botha, by means of the heliograph and dispatch riders. It is estimated that the Boers lost 128 killed and 270 wounded. Commandant Potgieter was killed with a revolver by Lieut. Lefroy.

Major Chapman, in command at Fort Itala, had been warned of the Boer advance in the afternoon. His force comprised the Fifth Division of Mounted Infantry, two guns of the Sixty-ninth Battery, and one Maxim. Some mounted infantry under Lieut. Lefroy of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Lieut. Cane of the South Lancashires, occupied the highest point of the mountain, away from the camp. At midnight the Boers opened fire on this post, and two hours later they rushed the position, the few defenders who were not wounded escaping to the main body of the British.

The action now became general, the Boers attacking on three sides. They were led by Chris Botha, Scholtz, and Potgieter. The attack ceased toward the morning, and recommenced soon after dawn, continuing all day. The garrison were exposed to a terrific fire, and were without food and water. The guns were in action only early in the day, as it was found that they were too great an attraction for the enemy's rifles. Between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening the Boers retired. Major Chapman withdrew at midnight to Nkandhla, leaving a Lieutenant and twenty men, with field hospital appliances.

In the flight at Fort Prospect the Boers were led by Commandant Grobelaar and numbered 500, while the small garrison was commanded by Capt. Rowley Mosely of the Durham Militia Artillery. The attack began at 4:30 A.M. and the fighting lasted all day. The garrison lost 1 killed and 8 wounded.

The defences of Forts Itala and Prospect are regarded as among the finest performances on the part of the British in the course of the entire war. They saved Natal from invasion, and greater loss was inflicted upon the Boers than in any engagement of the campaign except Paardeberg.

Published NY TIMES, October 10, 1901
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GEN. BOTHA GETS AWAY.

LONDON, October 11, 1901.- Lord Kitchener yesterday wired that Commandant Gen. Botha had crossed the Pivaau River, twenty miles north of Vryheid, which means that he has again escaped the British cordon.

Published NY TIMES, October 11, 1901.
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SYMPATHY FOR GEN. BULLER.

Cheers for Him in London Music Halls - Many Indian Newspapers Support Him.

LONDON, Oct. 26 1901 - It is learned that Gen. Buller, after delivering the speech which resulted in his retirement, received a personal letter from King Edward, disapproving of his utterances and clearly intimating that his Majesty would be glad if Gen. Buller would resign. The War Secretary, Mr. Brodrick, summoned Gen. Buller and point-blank demanded his resignation. It was a stormy interview, ending in Gen. Buller's flat refusal to resign.

It is said that the General, even then, did not believe the War Office would venture to retire him. After the interview, however, Mr. Brodrick went straight to King Edward, in Scotland, and the result of his visit was the action which has now so stirred up the country.

It is undeniable that the Liberal leaders, in common with the majority of the sober-minded public and most of the army officers, believe that the War Office acted correctly in retiring Gen. Buller. The efforts made by several of the London daily newspapers to create a feeling in Gen. Buller's favour are patently due to their desire to make party capital, as these papers, previous to the action of the War Office, could scarcely say anything bad enough about the General, for whom they have now taken up the cudgels. They have succeeded in working up a certain amount of popular enthusiasm, which finds vent in music hall demonstrations whenever Gen. Buller's name is mentioned.

A great meeting of sympathy in Hyde Park is now under consideration, and there is talk of the presentation to the General for a sword of honour as a national tribute. In the West of England, where Gen. Buller's home is situated, feeling runs high. Frequent meetings have been held to denounce the Government's action.

The Right Hon. Walter H. Long, President of the Local Government Board, in the course of a long speech at Liverpool yesterday afternoon, said the Government would defend Gen. Buller's appointment to the command at Aldershot on the grounds of policy and justice. His dismissal was solely because his recent speech was subversive of military discipline. Agonized consideration had been extended to the case and the Cabinet unanimously supported Lord Roberts's action. Probably no man possessing the traditional qualities of the British to a greater degree than Gen. Buller ever wore the King's uniform, but a greater mistake than his no soldier could make.

The Daily News makes the interesting statement that when the Liberal Government was overturned in 1895 by a snap division, a document was actually ready for signature appointing Sir Redvers Buller Commander in Chief.

Published NY TIMES, October 26, 1901
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Hunting Gen. Botha's Men.

NEWCASTLE, Natal, October 26, 1901. - Commandant Gen. Botha, with a small escort, has rejoined Schalk-Burgher, whose movable Government is established to the westward of Amsterdam, guarded by 100 horsemen. Gen. Botha's forces have separated into small commandos, which are operating in a rough, bushy country well adapted to Boer tactics. Several British columns are hunting them.

Published NY TIMES, October 27, 1901
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BULLER'S DISPATCH TO WHITE.

Controversy Over the Terms of the Famous "Spatch-Cooked" Message.

LONDON, October 31, 1901. - The National Review recently published the alleged essential terms of the "spatch-cooked" dispatch of Gen. Sir Redvers Buller to Gen. Sir George White, when the latter was in command of the beleaguered British garrison at Ladysmith. According to this authority, the message ran as follows:

"I have been repulsed. You will burn your ciphers and destroy all your ammunition. You will then make the best terms you can with the Boers after I have fortified myself on the Tugela."

Gen. Buller in the speech which led to his dismissal from the command of the First Army Corps, challenged The National Review to publish the complete dispatch, and to explain how it was obtained, declaring that he would then publish a certified copy of the original and allow the public to judge the matter.

The editor of The National Review now explains that he obtained the dispatch from a civilian who was in Ladysmith at the time of the siege, and who said there was nothing secret about it. The editor asserts also that he understands that both Gen. Buller and Gen. White have officially asked permission to publish the authorized version, and he cannot conceive why permission has been withheld.

The civilian alluded to giving an alleged explanation of the fact that there was no co-operation between Gen. Buller and Gen. White during the battle of Colenso, says Gen. White was informed that the attack was fixed for December 17, but Gen. Buller began the attack on December 15, to the dismay of Gen. White, who had not completed his preparations.

The Morning Leader characterizes The National Review's version of Gen. Buller's dispatch to Sir George White as "imaginary and misleading."

Published NY TIMES, October 31, 1901.
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BULLER'S MESSAGE TO WHITE.

Alleged Authentic Version - Buller Did Not Instruct White to Surrender.

LONDON, November 5, 1901. - The Daily Express, on the authority of Dr. Miller Maguire, a famous military coach, gives what it alleges to be the authentic version of the heliogram sent by Gen. Buller to Gen. White at the time of the siege of Ladysmith. It is as follows:
"I have failed. Unable to try again without siege operations taking a month. Can you hold out so long? If not, I suggest your firing away as much ammunition as possible, and finally making the best terms. If you have any other alternative to suggest, I can remain where I am as long as you like."

"Further dispatches were exchanged," adds The Daily Express, "and learning that Sir George White was able to hold out. Gen. Buller settled down to prepare to force the Tugela."

Dr. Maguire, through whose hands half the officers of the British Army have passed for study, professes to have acquired the information, without seeking for it, some months ago.

Published, NY TIMES, November 5, 1901.