Controversy at high command
As the Ardennes crisis developed, Montgomery assumed command of the American First and Ninth Armies (which, until then, were under Bradley's command). This controversial move was approved by Eisenhower, and was intended to prevent communication and control problems between Bradley and the North flank command.
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On the same day as Hitler’s withdrawal order,
7 January, Montgomery held a press conference at Zonhoven in which he said that he had “
headed off ... seen off ... and ... written off” the Germans. “
The battle has been the most interesting, I think possible one of the most tricky ... I have ever handled.” Montgomery said that he had “
employed the whole available power of the British group of armies ... you thus have the picture of British troops fighting on both sides of the Americans who have suffered a hard blow.”
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Montgomery also gave credit to the “
courage and good fighting quality” of the American troops, characterizing a typical American as a “
very brave fighting man who has that tenacity in battle which makes a great soldier,” and went on to talk about the necessity of Allied teamwork, and praised Eisenhower, stating that “
Teamwork wins battles and battle victories win wars. On our team, the captain is General Ike.” Despite these remarks, the overall impression given by Montgomery, at least in the ears of the American military leadership, was that he had taken the lion’s share of credit for the success of the campaign, and had been responsible for rescuing the besieged Americans.
His comments were interpreted as self-promoting, particularly his claiming that when the situation “began to deteriorate,” Eisenhower had placed him in command in the north. Patton and Eisenhower both felt this was a misrepresentation of the relative share of the fighting played by the British and Americans in the Ardennes (for every three British soldiers there were thirty to forty Americans in the fight), and that it belittled the part played by Bradley, Patton and other American commanders. In the context of Patton and Montgomery’s well-known antipathy, Montgomery’s failure to mention the contribution of any American general beside Eisenhower was seen as insulting. Focusing exclusively on his own generalship, Montgomery continued to say that he thought the counter-offensive had gone very well but did not explain the reason for his delayed attack on
3 January. He later attributed this to needing more time for preparation on the northern front. According to
Winston Churchill, the attack from the south under Patton was steady but slow and involved heavy losses, and Montgomery claimed to be trying to avoid this situation.
Montgomery subsequently recognized his error and later wrote: “
I think now that I should never have held that press conference. So great were the feelings against me on the part of the American generals that whatever I said was bound to be wrong. I should therefore have said nothing.” Eisenhower commented in his own memoirs: “
I doubt if Montgomery ever came to realize how resentful some American commanders were. They believed he had belittled them—and they were not slow to voice reciprocal scorn and contempt.”
Bradley and Patton both threatened to resign unless Montgomery’s command was changed. Subsequently Bradley started to court the press, and it was stated that he would rarely leave headquarters “without at least fifteen newspapermen”; it has been suggested that he and Patton began to leak information detrimental to Montgomery. Eisenhower, encouraged by his British deputy
Arthur Tedder, had decided to sack Montgomery. However, intervention by Montgomery’s and Eisenhower’s
Chiefs of Staff,
Major-General Freddie de Guingand, and
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith allowed Eisenhower to reconsider and Montgomery to apologize.