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Originally Posted by Za Rodinu  However if you read Mar. Sokolovsky's "Soviet Military Strategy" you'll find on the chapter on the Great Patriotic War that this Khakov débacle was caused by one single Army (can't rememeber which and I'll only get the book back tomorrow!) that not only was given an excessively optimistic mission without being properly supported by paralell armies. This lesson was learnt wand you don't hear again of any 'Manstein Backhand Slaps" again. What happened to Tank Group Popov was that it was employed as a primitive Operational Manouevre Group with an unrefined technique. Again another instance for Lessons Learned. |
I would agree with you Za, it seems that Tukhachevskii's legacy started to bear fruit around this time with the Soviet Armies beginning to apply the theories he espoused about Deep Operations. Two examples of this would be Operation Bagration which destroyed Army Group Centre and the Vistula/Oder Operation.