[angie999]

All the beaches were much harder than when they were chosen by the COSSAC team in 1943, because once Rommel took command of Army Group B he directed a lot of effort into strengthening beach defences. This was not done equally everywhere, because in any given sector there were only so many suitable beaches.

Omaha Beach itself was only marginally suitable and I don't think it would have been chosen except as the right flank of the Caen sector. It fell to the Americans and not the British simply because of the way the two armies were located in Britain (Americans mainly on the western side of the country) and the need once the bridgeheads were established to resupply the American army with ships arriving direct from the US. It was not desirable to have either invasion forces or shipping crossing paths.

There were two difficulties at Omaha which did not apply elsewhere:

1. The beach itself forms a gently curved bay, slightly banana shaped, meaning that German weapons could lay down enfillading fire along the entire length of the beach from positions offset from the sea and difficult targets as a result (at least one of the surviving concrete fortifications is invisible from the sea, yet has embrassures looking along miles of beach).

2. Overlooking the beach there are bluffs up to 170 ft high and the only exits are a series of draws, only two of which, heavily barricaded, were suitable for tanks. This meant that unless the Americans could force the exits quickly, they were in a German killing zone.

Also, the disposition of the German forces was different at Omaha than elsewhere. The Caen sector, including Omaha, was in the sector covered by the German 716th Division, a static coastal defence division of generally poor quality. The nearest reserves covering the British beaches, 21st Panzer Division, were some miles back. At Omaha beach, however, the German 352nd Infantry Division, a good quality field division, had been moved close to the beach and was in a position to directly intervene when the landing were taking place.

In the Mediterranean landings, such as during Operation Torch (North Africa) and Operation Husky (Sicily), British practice had been followed of landing in darkness to achieve tactical surprise. This meant that there was limited scope for preparatory bombardment. In the Pacific, where generally the Americans were invading islands which had no hope of reinforcement, the practice was to sacrifice surprise in favour of increasingly extended bombardment. For Neptune, the landing phase of Overlord, a hybrid doctrine was used, a partical sacrifice of tactical, but not operational, surprise to allow a short bombarment in the hour or so after dawn (a little longer could be taken in the British sector where landings were an hour later due to tide/beach features).

A Omaha the bombardment failed to inflict sufficient damage. The main reason was the failure of the bombing by the US 8th Airforce, the main American stategic bomber force, which bombed the invasion beaches that morning. RAF Bomber Command had bombed ten specific battery positions the night before and not the actual beaches.

The American bombers dropped thousands upon thousands of 100lb fragmentation bombs, designed to destroy wire obstacles, trenches, etc. and produce small craters to provide cover for the invading troops. Large bombs would have produced large craters which would have been obstacles for vehicles. As the landing craft were already coming in when they bombed, they were under strict orders not to bomb short. However, the sky was overcast, they couldn't see the beaches and their H2X radar failed to give a clear enough target picture, so the bombing was up to 3 miles inland. This was not their fault, it was simply beyond their capability. They had had no special training for D-day and they were not trained as a tactical bombing force. It did mean though that a major part of the planned beach bombarment did not happen. This was more crucial at Omaha than elsewhere, as the defences were stronger.

Also, the naval gunfire available was insufficient for the time allowed and the rocket ships in the main fired short. For instance, there was only one battelship off Omaha, compared with two at more lightly defended Utah. Naval gunfire, magnificent though it was, was generally insufficient for the task on D-day.

Finally, almost all the American Sherman DD amphibious tanks, launched 6000 yards offshore, sank at Omaha in the rough conditions and the Americans did not employ the specialist British armour designed to deal with beach obstacles, which had to be attempted by engineers exposed to murderous fire.

Once all this had happened, the infantry, landing without support or adequate preparation, were slaughtered. The plan had gone badly wrong.

The day was saved by improvisation and the initiative of a handful of outstanding leaders, such as Brig Gen Norman Cota, deputy commander of the US 29th Infantry Division and the senior officer on the beach. The survivors of the assaults from the US 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions, supported by members of the 2nd and 5th Rangers, infiltrated up the bluffs to take the German positions in flank and rear and by evening they had secured positions on the high ground. It was a precarious foothold, but fortunately the Germans could not mount a powerful counter-attack that night.

"Saving Private Ryan" gives the impression that the beach was cleared in about 20 minutes. In reality, it took from 6.30 am to sunset for the Americans to secure their positions above the beach.

Omaha Beach was a disaster and nearly a failure, but this takes nothing away from the bravery and tenacity of the American who overcame adversity and won in the end.