Quote:
Originally posted by Dpalme01@Dec 3 2004, 01:05 PM
I agree completely with the funnies part.X The Americans were almost as bad as the french- stuck in a rut and refusing to use any thing new.X They were lucky to have accepted the landing craft
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Well, you might call it a rut, but the reason (-ing) behind the US rejection of the Funnies lies partly with the peculiar circumstances surrounding American mobilisation, partly with US doctrine.
The architects of the Army, personified by Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, on the one hand wanted a lean and flexible army, on the other envisioned modern war as basically an infantry/artillery slugging match with armour and airpower in the supporting role. At the same time, the high priority afforded US service- and air force troops encouraged McNair to economise.
This lead to train of thought whereby the creation of specialised units were avoided if possible - McNair in fact proposed to disband both the airborne- and armoured divisions because their functions were thought to situation specific and thus wasteful of resources. Instead of the former he proposed light divisions (infantry with fewer motor vehicle and less artillery) which could be made glider-borne as needed. Instead of the latter a pick&mix concept of putting together armoured task forces of independent tank battalions, motorised infantry, and armoured cavalry as the need arose - in doctrinal terms, the armoured division was perceived as a weapon of exploitation only, and thus not needed very often.
As can be imagined, the concept of investing in units not only with a specific function in mind but a specific mission, didn't go down well with McNair et al. In fact the thinking behind the Funnies was about as far from the American philosophy as you can get. The American reasoning was something like this: Invest 800 men in a battalion of Funnies which will save us 400 casualties on D-Day but then be useless for the rest of the war = equals net loss of 400 men. That US units would later on several occasions request and recieve the services of Funnies, in particular the flail tanks, is another story.
Also, with reference to D-Day, it should be borne in mind that the Americans were throwing two reinforced divisions onto Omaha, supported by vast air- and sea-power, and with a good chance of tactical surprise. Expecting succes was thus not unreasonable, Funnies or no Funnies.
As it happened, V Corps suffered about 2,200 casualties on D-Day - 1,200 by the 1st Division, 700 by the 29th, the rest by corps troops, or about 0.25% of total US Army battle casualties during WWII. Omaha was bloody, but far from uniquely so, and by no means the worst comparative action fought by the US Army in WWII. In strategic terms, it was a slight cost compared to the benifits reaped.