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Peter Clare · 23-05-2006, 03:16 PM

In September 1939 Britain had 58 submarines but there were only 21 boats in home waters and five of these were more than 10 years old. A futher 11 boats were building but British submarine strentgh, in terms of availalbility where it was most needed was less than that of Germany. Most pre-war exercises involved boats performing in the role of a loyal opposition: but commanding officers, especially on the China Station, had seized every opportunity of practising submerged attacks so that at the outbreak of WWII the majority were highly skilled professionals. It took time to call the eastern veterans back but when they returned they quickly made their mark.
The strategy and tactics adopted in the Royal Navy by Rear Admiral Submarines were diametrically opposed to those of his German counterpart. Doudtless he would have liked more boats but numbers meant less than they did to Doenitz. Rear Admiral Submarines had no intention of embarking on surface pack-attacks like Doenitz who intended to direct groups of U-boats on to convoys; fast warships were the principal targets for the Royal Navy and the British War Plan disposed submarines along lines in individual patrol arears where, far from chasing targets, they waited for the enemy to come to them. Thus, in the Royal Navy of 1939 submarines were in the Admiralty mind, little more than mobile mines.

Regards

Peter.

23-05-2006, 03:16 PM	#3 (permalink)
Peter Clare Legendary Member Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: Neverland Posts: 5,552	In September 1939 Britain had 58 submarines but there were only 21 boats in home waters and five of these were more than 10 years old. A futher 11 boats were building but British submarine strentgh, in terms of availalbility where it was most needed was less than that of Germany. Most pre-war exercises involved boats performing in the role of a loyal opposition: but commanding officers, especially on the China Station, had seized every opportunity of practising submerged attacks so that at the outbreak of WWII the majority were highly skilled professionals. It took time to call the eastern veterans back but when they returned they quickly made their mark. The strategy and tactics adopted in the Royal Navy by Rear Admiral Submarines were diametrically opposed to those of his German counterpart. Doudtless he would have liked more boats but numbers meant less than they did to Doenitz. Rear Admiral Submarines had no intention of embarking on surface pack-attacks like Doenitz who intended to direct groups of U-boats on to convoys; fast warships were the principal targets for the Royal Navy and the British War Plan disposed submarines along lines in individual patrol arears where, far from chasing targets, they waited for the enemy to come to them. Thus, in the Royal Navy of 1939 submarines were in the Admiralty mind, little more than mobile mines. Regards Peter.