| In March 1938 the British Chiefs of Staff reported on the implications of a war to support France if France supported the Czechs. They feared Germany could win a short war against the UK by launching a bomber attack lasting about two months. It was decided in April and November 1938 to give priority to the RAF and that the French would have to cope alone while Britain warded off the bombers and imposed a naval blockade while building up a bomber force.
This strategy was not what the French wanted to hear and it would leave the British open to the jibe that they would fight to the last Frenchman. It was feared that if France found itself at war with Germany and Italy it could give up. The French insisted on a larger British land contribution than the two divisions proposed in 1938 and from February 1939 the British army started to be re equpted and expanded.
It seems political considerations drove the allied decision to move into Belgium. One proposal was to advance to the Scheld and hold the extreme western corner of the country protecting the Lille industrial area. It was decided to hold the German forces as far east as possible and to save as much of the Belgium and Dutch armies as possible.
According to General Allan Brooke the Belgians wanted all the information on the allied plans but would not give any about their plans and refused to offer any facilities untill they were attacked. They refused to allow the allies to reconnoitre their line of advance to the Dyle but did let some British officers in plain clothes visit the Dyle. As was to be expected there were problems of liason between the British and Belgian forces.
Brooke recounts an interesting anecdote of the retreat, it seems General Montgomery sent a messenger to Brooke a Colonel Brown known for having a short temper, the road was jammed by retreating French so he got out of the car to try and clear it and was shot dead. |