Why didn't the USAAF bomb at night ?

[canadiancitizen]

A simple question, but with, I think, a complicated answer.

My opinion? It was a matter of a lack of well trained USAAF navigators, plus a doctrine that sacrificed bomb load, for defensive firepower, and the comfort of that flying block of planes.

On the other side, the RAF and the RCAF flew both day and night, and at night the individual aircraft HAD to have a well trained navigator, who could get to the target AND back home, in the dark, without a "lead navigator " that everyone else followed like sheep.

Of course as I tell people at the air shows, "the Yanks flew during the day so they could find England before it got dark ".

OK serious discussion . Why didn't the USAAF bomb at night, in your opinion ?

Jim Bunting. Toronto.

[Owen]

I started a thread here on that topic.
http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/war-air...o-decided.html

Welcome to the forum, Jim.

[Slipdigit]

Originally Posted by canadiancitizen

A simple question, but with, I think, a complicated answer.

My opinion? It was a matter of a lack of well trained USAAF navigators, plus a doctrine that sacrificed bomb load, for defensive firepower, and the comfort of that flying block of planes.

On the other side, the RAF and the RCAF flew both day and night, and at night the individual aircraft HAD to have a well trained navigator, who could get to the target AND back home, in the dark, without a "lead navigator " that everyone else followed like sheep.

Of course as I tell people at the air shows, "the Yanks flew during the day so they could find England before it got dark ".

OK serious discussion . Why didn't the USAAF bomb at night, in your opinion ?

Jim Bunting. Toronto.

Your assertation that navigators alone got the plane to the target and back is not entirely accurate, as the British developed a large number of navigational aids thoroughout the war, such as Gee, Oboe & H2S in respone to atrocious target locating & bombing accuracy in the early years of the war. As late as Aug 1941, less than 1 in 4 bombers got within five miles of the target. This number is for aircraft that actually attacked the target. Only one in three actually made it to the target area, with the numbers for the Ruhr being 1 in 10. (Brute Force, Ellis, pg 171). So what you have is 25% of 33%, which is 8.25% of dispatched aircraft actually hitting the "target", which at that time was anything with in a 5 mile radius of the target (78 sq mi). If you factor in 33% of 10%, then then you are looking at 3.3% of dispatched aircraft actually bombing the target area (78 sq mi) in the Ruhr.

There were times that the Germans were left wondering what the target was for a given raid. (pg 175)

Up through 1942, there was heavy discussion by the RAF as whether or not to discontinue night time bombing (pg 177-178) because of large number of RAF bombs (50%) landing in open countryside.

Bomber Command's accuracy did not improve until the Pathfinders and there are still instances of them lighting up the wrong target area.

What was the Pathfinders's role, if not to herd the following bombers to the lit up target area "like sheep?"

I am not addressing or comparing Bomber Command's and USAAF's bombing results in this post, only your assumption that individual navigators were able to direct aircraft to the target and back.

[canadiancitizen]

Slipdigit:

My point was this.....

The American doctrine was based on daylight bombing, combined with the designs of their aircraft, which had small bomb loads, and large numbers of defensive machine guns. All those Browning 50 cals and the ammo for them, reduced the possible bomb load.

The British designed their aircraft to carry larger bomb loads, and with a minimum of crew ( one pilot not two ) and less guns. Compare the 33 foot long bomb bay on a Lancaster, to a 17, or 24.

AS to the NEED for a well trained navigator, in each plane......

Tell me how an entire USAAF bombing group could bomb a neutral country ( Sweden ) not just once, but dozens of times?

Did you know that at one time there were more than 1,000 USAAF aircrew being held in Sweden , after being shot down, by the Swedish airforce, during bombing attacks on Swedish citites, and factories? To me that it either horrible navigation, or a deliberate attempt to wreck the Swedish industrial plants, to reduce their output. The US Ambassador was in the Swedish capital city, conducting negotiations to get your aircrew released, BUT the USSAF bombed the city, again so the talks fell thru, and the USAAF guys stayed in the camps until the war was over.

Yes the PFF did mark the targets, but the bomber stream still had to get there, and home again, in the dark . No escorts, and no formation flying, either.

Jim Bunting. Toronto.

[Slipdigit]

Jim,

I'm not interested in getting into a "your country did this, but my country did that" tit for tat. Did I do any comparison of the respective airforces?

You made the assumption that Bomber Command was hitting targets based soley on the ability of the individual navigators to find the target and I showed you that it was not true during the time the US was implementing it's bombing campaign. The US commanders had to make their decisions on the route to take at the time and from what was evident, night-time bombing was an ineffective means of bomb delivery, with 92-97% of bombs never hitting the intended target and some 50% of them landing in open fields. So a bigger bomb load at the time meant what, aircrew sent on meaningless missions or more agricultural bombing? I am sure that US commanders looked at their bombers, over armed as you apparently claim, and thought that with all of the guns they had, the the B-17 and B-24 could get through in daylight where the lesser armed Haifaxes, Lancasters, etc could not. They had to use the information they had at the time, not what we have nearly 70 years later.

Tell me how an entire USAAF bombing group could bomb a neutral country ( Sweden ) not just once, but dozens of times?

I don't know, I guess the same way the RAF did to Basel and Zurich in Feb 1941 and Renes and Geneva earlier. I would think a fully illuminated city at night would dramatically stand out more so than during the day, when it would not be contrasted against blacked-out surroundings because of the daylight? A total of three UASAAF raids (one hitting multiple targets) were directed at German cities near the Swiss border, but hit Swiss territory instead.

Did you know that at one time there were more than 1,000 USAAF aircrew being held in Sweden, after being shot down, by the Swedish airforce, during bombing attacks on Swedish citites, and factories?

I think that the number you are groping for is one hundred (100) air crew, composed of 1700 men. Refuge from the Reich: American Airmen and Switzerland During World War II, Stephen Tanner. Not all, by a long shot, were all shot down by the Swiss. Many, if not most, deliberately landed damaged aircraft and not all were bomber crews. Your attempt to accentuate the "air battles" over Switzerland appears to be disingenuous to me.

To me that it either horrible navigation, or a deliberate attempt to wreck the Swedish industrial plants, to reduce their output. The US Ambassador was in the Swedish capital city, conducting negotiations to get your aircrew released, BUT the USSAF bombed the city, again so the talks fell thru, and the USAAF guys stayed in the camps until the war was over.

It can be to you whatever you want it to be. Apparently the Swiss were assuaged by the $14,000,000 in damage reparation they accepted in 1949. I can come up with conspiracy theories about the RAF or German bombings of Switzerland also, if you want me to.

Why is formation flying an anathema to you?

As far as losses are concerned. Even by Oct 1943, Bomber Command and USAAF losses in bombers were the same at 177 that month and continued to be so, even up to Feb 1945. Brute Force, page 187

Here is an interesting article on the bombing of Zurich
The Bombing of Zurich