THE WAFFEN-SS: Divisional Service History, Brigade/Battalion Unit List + Unit Notes.

[Christos]

Hello again and welcome to all! As a service to the site files, I present the following 'hard data' piece that describes the development and growth of the Waffen-SS as a fighting entity of the German Armed Services from 1939 to 1945. It includes notes for every 'Division' unit, and a list of the origin of the divisional names given to the various combat formations that reached 'division' status during this period, complex path that it sometimes is. This article does a fine job of keeping track of and summarizing the many name changes and organizational reshuffles. The piece originally appeared in the American wargamer's magazine "Strategy & Tactics" (Issue no. 26, Mar-Aprl 1971). Wargamers of the seventies, of which I was one, were notoriously picky about the standards of information presented to them in their hobby press. The demand for accuracy in their articles was paramount, as it was for the games that S&T produced, one per issue. This was a pure 'info' piece that I present to you now, for your reading, discussion and the source value that this article provides...as always, my own comments will be directly scattered through the text, denoted by ***asterisks, but with this one, there is not much left to argue about....the data for this article is carefully woven into the story, with notes.....Sources will be quoted at the conclusion of the piece, and as always, if you have a comment or would like to post a reply of any length, well, that's just what we are here for!.....
I Would like to point out, right off the bat before you read this article, that the original author of the body of the work, Steve Packman, was a staffer for the magazine that this article was published for. The motivation behind listing and rating the combat and human rights performances of each of the units was to do with the very purpose that the magazine was published for....wargames. In the 70s, American civilian designers and military theorists such as John Prados, John Hill, Dave Isby, Don Greenwood, and Ulrich Bleinhemann, started to design historically based games that were known to us as 'military simulations'. This article was like many others presented in the hobby press of the day. It's purpose was to inform those that might like to 'take the plunge' and design their own game on their favourite historical period. The readership, and hobbyists like myself who used to buy and play the games, were interested in historical ACCURACY as a matter of course. The demand for more and more information about everyone's favorite topic for a game, The Eastern Front in World War II, became such that these games became more and more sophisticated; some were so well designed that the American military started to look at the results, and siphon the principle designers mentioned above into their own fields of research. John Prados, for instance, started work on a tactical manual for the U.S. Army, a guide for theorists that may in future, publish military theorist literature in the style of Guderian's "Achtung Panzer!", or Rommel's "Infanterie Greiftan". The 'SS' were a natural interest for the hobby's "Ost-Front" afficiendos, and naturally, the subject of performance, composition and type of recruits that each division was composed of came with it. In games, this information was usually built into the game 'system', usually for combat resolution. People wanted "realistic" results (or as realistic as you could get from an armchair with cardboard and dice!).......some of the games, like John Hill's "Squad Leader", used to actually leave you hanging on these 'decision-trees', the branches of which would force you into tactical movements and actions that, sometimes, you did NOT want to do. When an attack like this failed, it used to leave your emotions quite up-set!.....well, we WERE looking for as much realism as possible....and John Hill's "Squad Leader', the largest selling tactical game of them all, gave it to us right on the nose!
And thats what good history should do......sit you up, and surprise the hell out of you!

So..........Hoping you find the following informative.........

THE WAFFEN-SS........by Steve Patrick.......***Additions to Information and text by CHRISTOS

PART ONE:......PARAMETERS
iIn considering the German forces in World War II, the Waffen-SS poses, or should pose, a problem.
This is due to the fact that the myth has out-stripped reality.
Perhaps the point can best be made by indicating several things which are NOT true of the Waffen SS:
It did not spring fully armed from the brow of Hitler and Himmler on September 1st 1939; it's growth and development was not the result of an organised, planned effort.
Hitler did not want a large Waffen-SS until late in the war, after he felt the Army had failed him.
By far the majority of Waffen-SS divisions were not armored divisions and, in fact, there were NO armored divisions in the Waffen SS until late 1943. The Waffen-SS was not composed of pure Nordics and, in fact, less than half of the divisions had a majority of German members.
The Waffen-SS was not a homogenous-thinking, super-political organization.
The slow growth of the Waffen SS is set forth elsewhere in this article and need not be rehashed here. Nonetheless, it should be underscored that no division-level Waffen-SS units fought in Poland: that Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH), infamous after Malmedy in 1944, was the only regiment (standarte), albeit a reinforced one, in 1939..... a brigade in 1940...a Panzer Grenadier division in 1942 and a Panzer division only in late 1943... At the outset of 'Barbarossa' there were only FOUR full strength Waffen-SS divisions, and the size of the Waffen-SS was at a fixed percentage of the regular army.
Of the ultimate 41 divisions which, at various times, were in the Waffen-SS, LAH...Das Reich...Totenkopf...Wiking...Hitler Jugend...Frundsberg... Hohenstaufen....these were called "elite" by the Waffen-SS themselves, but some, such as 'Kama', were so bad as to be discarded without seeing a shot fired in combat due to unreliability. 'Polizei' which reached division level in 1939, was always a second class division, being an infanterie division when 'Das Reich' and 'Totenkopf' were motorized infantry and a panzer grenadier division respectively, when the rest of 'Polizei's' contemporaries were panzer divisions....in fact, 'Polizei' was the only panzergrenadier division formed of the first ten.
The image of the Waffen-SS as the elite of the Panzer arm....is false.
To be sure, they were better trained than the average motorized infantry division, but when Rommel ran through France, the Waffen-SS was no more than a motorized infantry division. Some of the most important fighting was done prior to becoming armed as panzer divisions. In fact, there were NO panzer divisions in the Waffen-SS until the tide began to turn against the Germans, the order officially coming in October, 1943. Of course, the American contact with the Waffen-SS was in France where we faced 'Hitler Jugend' in Normandy, and 'LAH', among many others, at "The Bulge".
While one likes to think of the Nazi Party as having an idee-fixe concerning anti-semitism and racism, and also that the SS, in controlling such organizations as the Gestapo, was the acme of this whole Herrenvolk spirit..............
........the FACT remains that as fast as the German Army overran foreign countries, the Waffen-SS began recruiting in those countries, in contradiction to preconceptions of 'normal' anti-German non-bias. First, it was the Germanic peoples, such as the Danes, the Norwegians and the Dutch, as well as the Flemish. Then the French speaking parts of Belgium and the French themselves were accepted, and before long, the Italians and even the "untermenschen" of Croatia, Galicia, the Baltic countries and Hungary. In the end, even the Russians were formed into Waffen-SS divisions, not to mention Turks, Indians and Cossacks......
Whether this wholesale adoption of non-Germanic peoples, and, indeed, the very peoples whom the Nazis predicted they would reduce to slavery into a major element of the Wehrmacht ever caused philosophic confusion among the Nazi hierarchy is unclear.........It should have................................But stranger things than this happened in the Third Reich.
In any event, those who pushed the policy of making the Waffen-SS a European Army may have done Hitler a favor if the zeal with which they gave their lives as the war ended is any measure.........
By way of background, it should be pointed out that the origins of the Waffen-SS have been traced by some back to the progenitor of the Sturmabteilung, and the Stosstruppen. In fact, the genuine origin was no earlier than 1933, and the Waffen-SS was a product of three seperate trends which intertwined to produce in 1939 the core of the Waffen-SS as it was to become known. The first element began in 1933 with the creation of the 'LAH'. This unit was created, as it's name suggests, to guard Hitler's life. This, of course, was the function for which the SS itself had originally been formed. It is interesting to note that this inflation of "Der Chief's" body guard did not end with 'LAH'; as 'LAH' became involved in the war, Hitler created a new body guard, the 'Fuhrer Begleit Battalion', formed October 1st, 1939 which, in turn, became part of the 'Grossdeutschlandverbande'in 1940 and was expanded to brigade and division level. In 1944, the 'Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade'was formed and this, too, became a division in 1945.
One wonders where it all would have ended, since by 1945, 'LAH' was at Corps level!
In 1934, with the creation of the concentration camps and the assumption of their control by the SS from the SA, the 'Totenkopfverbande' was created to run them. In 1935, two SS-Standarten, 'Germania' and 'Deutshland' were raised and combined with 'LAH' to be called 'VERFUGUNGSTRUPPEN'. With the Anschluss, the threads began to be drawn together..........
On a coldly practical basis, however, one can make some estimate of the relative values of these units.......
The Waffen-SS Panzer Divisions were as well equipped and as fully manned as any units in the war. Accordingly, they should be assigned the maximum strength in determining the relative values of the various German units.
On the other hand, the remainder of the German Waffen SS divisions were little better than their regular army counterparts and, in some cases, decidedly inferior.....
'Polizei', for example, was the only one of the first divisions which was never raised to a panzer division. Whether this was a tribute to the calibre of the men in the Nazi controlled police or due to other factors is not indicated. In any event, even from the date of it's formation, 'Polizei' was not a very good division.
'Prinz Eugen' was not a very good division but, since it was fighting partisans, it was as good as it had to be. The quality of the men in 'Prinz Eugen' is indicated by the number of men tried for war crimes in Yugoslavia- more than any other Waffen SS division. 'Kama' and '29 (Russ)' were so poor, they were disbanded prior to seeing any action.
In general, the non-German (ie.Germanic and non-Germanic) divisions were not as well equipped as their German Waffen-SS counterparts and, in many cases, as their German regular army counterparts as well. Yet, before writing off these divisions as somewhat worthless, there is a factor to consider which is difficult to include in a combat factor but which, despite that, renders these non-German divisions of military significance. In late 1944, and particularly in 1945, all but the most fanatical of members of the Waffen-SS saw defeat in the offing. For many, it was the ultimate in stupidity to die in a war that was soon to be over, and so survival became more important than military accomplishments. As was indicated above, this was the case with even so loyal a Nazi as 'Sepp' Dietrich and his VIth SS-Panzerarmee. The prospect of peace made the German Waffen-SS divisions less anxious to win the honor of death in the closing months of the war.
This was not the case for the non-German Waffen-SS............
In that regard, the same factors which diluted the Waffen-SS when dilution should have been avoided, helped prolong the war. The reason was simple....... For a German, peace meant taking off the uniform and going back to the Stanntisch at the Gasthaus.
For the Russian, or Pole, or Hungarian who had joined the Waffen SS and who now found he had backed the wrong side,.....
........ ..It was another matter altogether...........
Most realized that the collaborators would be persecuted and certainly none more than those who had actually, publicly worn the Hakenkreuz. Therefore, the motivation of the non-German Waffen-SS increased at the very time when the motivation of the German Waffen-SS declined. Indicative of this is the number of non-German units which were destroyed, rather than surrender. The effect, in the end, might not have been great, but for Hitler, every soi-disant division of regimental strength that was selling itself to the last man along the Oder meant that much longer before the end came.
It is this factor, the increase in hardness with which the non- German Waffen-SS divisions staved off the end at the very time that supplies should have been forcing them to surrender without a fight. That makes for a difficult evaluation which, at the same time, must be accounted for in order to assess the part the Waffen-SS played in World War II.

PART TWO: WAFFEN-SS DIVISIONS..... Their Growth and General Operational Record, 1939 to Late 1943:
The Waffen-SS grew slowly......
Being only three regiments in strength at the time of the Anschluss ('LAH', 'DEUTSCHLAND' and 'GERMANIA'). All were motorized infantry regiments and organized essentially on the same lines as the army regiments. As a result of Anschluss, a fourth regiment 'DER FUHRER' was raised in Austria, and 'LAH' was gradually separated from the 'SS Verfugungstruppen' (SS-V). Therefore, prior to the outbreak of war, the SS units under arms were in three groups- 'Liebstandarte', the three standarten of the 'SS-V' , and the 'Totenkopf' standarten.
By 1939, the 'SS-V' had been augmented by an artillery regiment and, in effect, had the necessary combat power to be organized as a division. "Das Heer" was opposed to this.....and that is the reason why the Waffen-SS was not employed anything larger than a regimental unit during the Polish campaign.
However, the ZEAL with which they applied themselves bore fruit after the campaign. 'SS-V' was formally organised as a division during the winter of 1939. So too were the 'TOTENKOPF' units organized on a division level. Finally, the Police contributed '1 & 2 POLIZEI' regiments to the Polish campaign. They too were organized on a division basis. In the case of the Police the change was less due to the manner in which they served in Poland and more to do with the desire that the Police served the Party before they served the Army.
By the time of the French campaign of 1940, 3 divisions existed plus the brigade strength 'Liebstandarte'. Again, the Waffen-SS units showed their eagerness for combat to the point that, while many regular army commanders considered the Waffen-SS approach to battle to be, very much,
a butchers outlook ,.........................................
..............they had to concede that the Waffen-SS had achieved objectives regular units were unable to gain, though the cost was terrific..........(***Von Manstein is usually quoted at this point in other SS literature, praising the SS for their "..verve in attack."...***)

After the French campaign, the Norwegians and Danes were formed into an SS regiment called 'Nordland', raised 30th April, 1940, and the Belgians and Dutch into SS Regiment 'Westland' raised June 6 1940. These two regiments were later combined with 'Germania' in 1941, into a new division, initially called Germania and then 'WIKING' . During this same period, the unwieldy name 'SS-V'was replaced by 'DAS REICH'under which it is better known. To replace the lost 'Germania', the 11th SS-infantry regiment formerly a 'Totenkopf' standarte, was assigned to 'Das Reich' under the name 'Langemark'. At the end of 1940, the Waffen-SS total strength was 100,000 men.
In the first half of 1941, several more "Germanic" units were raised from the occupied countries in Scandanavia and the low countries. Freiwilligen 'Nordwest', Freiwilligenverbande 'Danemark', Freiwilligenlegion 'Niederland', Freiwilligenlegion 'Flandern', and Freiwilligenlegion 'Norwegian'. In the same period, two SS-infantry brigades were raised, as well as a separate infantry regiment, formerly a 'Totenkopf' standarte. In addition, a brigade strength kampfgruppe called 'Nord' and two cavalry regiments, combined in a Cavalry Brigade. This rounded out the units which the Waffen SS had available at the time of "Barbarossa". It should be pointed out that the divisions were as yet unnumbered and regimental numbers in each division were redesignated in the latter part of 1943. So, for example 'Deutschland' was SS Infanterie Regiment 1 in 1941 but in 1943, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 3, while SS- Panzergrenadier Regiment 1 was now one of a number of the regiments in 'LAH', which had previously been unnumbered.
At the time of "Barbarossa", strengths of WAFFEN-SS units were...
'LAH'.................................................. .................................10,796
'DAS REICH'............................................ ............................19,021
'TOTENKOPF'....................................... ...............................18,754
'POLIZEI'.................................................. ........................17,347
'WIKING'.................................................. .......................19,377
KG'NORD'.................................................. .....................10,573
FWstandarte 'NORDOST'.................................................. ...904
FWstandarte 'NORDWEST'...............................................2,500
FWlegion 'Flandern'.................................................. ........875
The overall strength of the Waffen-SS by the end of 1941 was up to 222,000 men.
In the latter part of 1941, more "racial" German units were raised. Freiwilligenverbande 'Danemark', 480 strong, which, to carry the story out, was expanded to become Freikorps 'Danemark',with 1,164 men and ultimately a regiment in the 'NORDLAND' division. In addition, there was Freiwilligenlegion 'Niederlands', numbering 2,559 which also became a regiment in 'Nordland'. Freiwilligenlegion 'Norwegian', numbering 1,218, the third regiment of 'Nord'.
And a number of rather interesting failures.
Among these vain attempts to draw foreign nationals for the Waffen-SS.....
The SWEDISH Legion.......which collapsed when the German officers were too harsh to a few of the soldiers.
An AMERICAN Legion which collapsed after collecting only 6 men!
BRITISH and INDIAN legions.......
An enterprise that faired better than the American unit. They got to the stage of a distinctive uniform insignia..........
These days, all fall into the same catagory in people's minds as Werewolfs!
By the end of 1941, 'Neiderland' and 'Flandern' were combined into 2nd SS-Infanterie Brigade and posted to the Leningrad front. The other 'Germanic' units were similarly distributed along the Eastern Front
From December, 1940 to September, 1942, only one division level unit was formed in the Waffen-SS: 'PRINZ EUGEN'. The most brutal sector of the war was the partisan war in Greece and Yugoslavia. It tied down more and more of the German Army to the point that, at the beginning of 1944, there were 28 divisions and some 600,000! men in the Balkans, all of whom could have been a help on the collapsing "Ost-Front". In addition to 'Prinz Eugen', raised March 1st, 1942, 3 other Waffen-SS divisions were formed (or attempted to be formed), in the Balkans:
'HANDSCHAR'(13th) A Moslem division which wore a Fez and had an official Iman. 'SKANDERBERG' (21st) and 'KAMA' (23rd).
All were raised from local, non-German populations and ALL were quite brutal. In all, the performance of the Waffen-SS in the Balkans was the most brutal of the war.
Interestingly, these divisions in the Balkans were all mountain divisions and only two of the six Waffen-SS mountain divisions put their major service in areas outside the Balkans. In effect, the Balkans tied down 1/9th of all Waffen-SS divisions raised. In addition, 'Polizei' and 'Reichfuhrer SS' both served major tours in the Balkans, as did both COSSACK Cavalry divisions (units that were under Waffen-SS control, but not, strictly speaking, Waffen-SS units.) The point MOST to be made from the Balkan campaign was that here, even more so than anywhere else and earlier than most other fronts, the Waffen-SS banner was not only not carried by Germans, but by non-Germanics. The men of 'Skanderberg' were the very "untermenschen" which supossedly were to be dominated as a result of an ultimate German victory.....The practice of using Slavs and other non-Germanic peoples became widespread as the Waffen-SS expanded. No historian commenting on this development has ever really resolved the question of how, ideologically, the Nazi's were able to accept these peoples in the most politically oriented part of the armed forces and, at the same time, preach the annihilation of these nations as NATIONS.
Probably a great portion of the reason is due to the fact that the ***National Socialist Deutscher Arbeit Partei (***or N.S.D.A.P, as it was known to it's contemporaries***) did not attempt to solve this problem. It remained one of the many curious contradictions which regularly crop up in the Third Reich.
1942 also saw the beginning of a change of the major Waffen-SS divisions from straight infantry into armored units. In June, February and May 1942, respectively 'LAH', 'DAS REICH' and 'TOTENKOPF' were assigned armored battalions, though not fully organised as panzergrenadier units. It was not until further along in 1942 that these units were again reorganized as full-fledged panzergrenadier divisions. In any event, by the end of 1942, the Waffen-SS had some 300,000 men under arms. Yet, as December of 1942 came, it was still only of a modest size.....it had 10 divisions and only 3 of them were panzergrenadier. It had NO armored divisions.
Essentially it was in the last two years of the war that the Waffen-SS developed into the organization which is incorrectly considered 'typical' of them throughout the war!
This rapid development in the last part of the war was due to the decline in German fortunes. As the Army failed to do the job, Hitler turned more and more to the Waffen-SS. In 1943 alone, 10 divisions were raised. More importantly, by the end of 1943, 6 CORPS had been raised. Hitler had, heretofore, strongly resisted Waffen-SS expansion. To a great extent this was in order to avoid offending the still victorious Army. When the army began to lose, the need was gone. It was Hausser's SS-Pionierkorps which re-took Kharkov in February 1943 and the Waffen-SS units in "ZITADELLE" were the ones which gained the most ground and did the most damage to the Russians. More and more, Hitler regarded the Waffen-SS as his "feuerwehr" or "Fire Brigade". As a result, in October, 1943, the so-called 'elite' units were created by transforming 'LAH', 'DAS REICH', 'TOTENKOPF', 'WIKING', 'FRUNDSBERG', 'HOHENSTAUFEN' and 'HITLER JUGEND' into 'full' panzer divisions .......this up-grade was not unexpected. LAH, DR, and T had all been recieving first-line tanks ahead of the regular Army panzer divisions for over a year, even before their formal designation as 'panzergrenadier'. If the peak for the regular army came in mid-1942, the peak for the Waffen-SS fell around the end of 1943. It had strong divisions (the brigade strength soi-disant divisions were yet to be formed), good morale and, while in retrospect one could call the war lost by 1943.
It was only in 1944, when no Spring offensive occurred in the East and Italy and the Balkans were draining more and more troops: only....
ALL but the most sanguine could tell that the END was at hand.

PART THREE:.....WAFFEN-SS "FEUERWEHR" : ..........Late 1943 to Gotterdammerung.

The "Feuerwehr" concept should be kept firmly in mind when considering the Waffen-SS in the last two years of the war.
Hitler had kept a firm hand on the Waffen-SS until "ZITADELLE".......
There are a number of reasons for this, but the shift to an almost fully mechanized force in early 1943 indicated that the Waffen-SS were more and more favoured. By mid-1943, all except the mountain divisions were panzergrenadier divisions. On the other hand, to underscore the 'late-bloom' of the Waffen-SS, those who delight in pointing out the percentage of total German armored units in the Waffen-SS ignore the fact that 27 regular army panzer divisions were formed before the first Waffen-SS panzerdivision was organised. On the other hand, from mid-1943 , 7 Waffen-SS panzerdivisions were formed while only an equal number of regular army panzerdivisions were raised. (this is in addition to 9 so-called panzerdivisions formed in the closing months).
A brief digression into the basis of the Waffen-SS is essential in order to understand why they were chosen to fill the vacuum created by the inability of the army to sucessfully prosecute the war.......
First, there were ideological factors.
The Waffen-SS was led by "the people". Only 5% of the officers were from military families while 90% came from farmer and peasant classes. In the regular army, the percentages ran 49% and 2% for the same classes. In Shleswig-Holstein, Neidersachsen, Franken and Saar (the farmer peasant strongholds of Germany) 1 out of every 3 sons joined the Waffen-SS. Then, too, it was a Party army, not truly responsible, in theory, to the army chain of command.
On the question of who controlled the Waffen-SS?.......... there is some serious debate.
Those seeking to tie it in as tightly as possible to the Nazi Party will point to formal ties between the two. Paul Hausser, at Nurnberg, alleged that the Waffen-SS was actually "sub-ordinate" to the Army in the field, and only looked to Himmler for personnel, replacement, military justice and fundamental organizational matters;
"All divisions of the Waffen-SS were incorporated into the army and fought under their command, and, in the final analysis, under the responsibility of the Army."
That was Hausser's testimony at Nurnberg. That it may have been self-serving does nothing to change the fact that, it essentially remained unrefuted at the trial.
The twin factors of the Party ties and the source of it's leadership allowed the Waffen-SS to avoid some of the traditions which were so strong in the regular army. Steiner and Hausser were able to introduce some significant innovations; no preference was given for education, future officers served two years in the ranks. Officer and NCO competition was encouraged and closeness between these two Corps arose which was unheard of in the regular army. The real key, however, remained the 'elan' of the Waffen-SS. The temptation to analogize to the US Marines is great but whatever the US Marines have to set themselves apart from the army, the Waffen-SS did with a vengeance.
Whereas the US Marines are known for high espirit and readiness to fight against harsh odds, the Waffen-SS held the ideal of the mission before anything, including life itself. If the objective was a hill, the Waffen-SS unit assigned the objective would either take it...or die to a man trying. The fact that they were better trained and, in most cases, better armed than their army counterparts, allowed them to accomplish missions that other units could not. Unquestionably, Waffen-SS losses were higher than army losses, and probably unnecessarily so. But, their mission completion rate does act as a mitigating factor. By November of 1941, for example, 'Totenkopf' reported a loss of 60% of their officers and NCOs. In effect, the old feudal concept of honor became paramount: he who was NOT under fire was a 'coward'. The indoctrination that at any loss, no mission was too great to accomplish, or that any act was justifiable IF it accomplished the mission, when coupled with laxer discipline, unquestionably made possible the atrocities of Le Paradis in 1940 and Oradour-sur-Glane and Malmedy in 1944 . To give the devil his due, however, though these were undoubted atrocities, and not accidents of war; there is no real indication that they were committed in responce to some deliberate doctrine. On the other hand, they were the logical result of the Waffen-SS training and indoctrination. Heinz Hohne described the Waffen-SS best when he said,
"As a result of the introduction of un-soldierly types drawn from the cesspool of political fanaticism.....combined with the fury of battle and a certain relaxation of discipline, the Waffen-SS became apt to use all types of inhuman methods of warfare."

One of the worst problems with the Waffen-SS was Himmler's inclusion of genuine scum under the Waffen-SS blanket. On April 27, 1941, such units as the concentration camp guards were made part of the Waffen-SS; Whatever was bad about the Waffen-SS, and there were many things, the addition of the concentration camp guards and the Hoher SS und Polizeifuhrers was an unfair smear on the already tarnished reputation of the Waffen-SS. Some 1,500 men were taken from the Waffen-SS for the Einsatzkommandos and certain other reserve units, such as Kaminski's Brigade , were involved in the liquidation of the WARSAW GHETTO , which did no good to their reputation as well. But in defence of the Waffen-SS, at least as far as such units as Kaminski's were concerned, these organizations were not of the same 'character' of such divisions as 'WIKING', and in reaching that conclusion on the Waffen-SS, fairness requires that such units be discounted.
The profligacy of Waffen-SS commanders with human lives was underscored in January, 1942, when 'Der Fuhrer' standarte was used as a screen in minus 52 degrees centigrade against the Russian counterattack in front of Moscow, while Field Marshal Walter Model (IX Armee) mustered his counterattack forces. When relieved in mid-February, 'Der Fuhrer' could muster only 35 men.
In any event, this do-or-die spirit, coupled with the success of Huasser's deceptively named SS-Pionierkorps in 1943, left Hitler with the opinion that these were the ONLY troops which could win. The irony was that the core of the Waffen-SS which had carved the reputation of the Waffen-SS was gone. For example, the Waffen-SS lost 1,239 officers and 35,377 men, 13,037 of which were killed between June 22 1941 and November 19 1941. That was enough to man two divisions and represented only losses from six divisions. In breaking out of the Cherkassy Pocket at the end of 1943, Wiking lost all it's equipment and tanks and half it's men. The replacements did not have the length nor intensity of training of the lost men, nor were they as well indoctrinated. In fact, they came to be drawn from the same replacement pools as the regular army and while they may have been the cream of the crop, they were no longer purely 'partei' men. They tended to think of themselves as less of a 'party' army, and more of a fourth branch of the Wehrmacht. Men like Hausser, Steiner, Bittrich and Phelps not only refused to die for their Fuhrer as the war went on if they could, by withdrawl, fight another day. They took to excluding the non-military Nazi observers from their counsels and ignored Himmler totally (***no more than he deserved!**). Bittrich was relieved of command from II SS-Panzerkorps by Himmler when it was in Normandy, and he refused to give up his command until his superior in the army chain, GFM Model, told him to. Model refused to relieve him...so Bittrich stayed on!
It was the July 20 1944 Plot which actually put Himmler in the position of absolute power, which many people claimed he had had all along. By the end of June, 1944, the Waffen-SS was 594,443 men strong. But in the last 10 months of the war, Hitler ordered Himmler to form 15 new Waffen-SS divisions. To do so, Himmler began to 'scrape the bottom of the barrel', running a second 'comb' of the Police and turning out training schools. In point of fact, Himmler out-did the demands of Hitler as he created 17 nominal divisions (often no larger in actual strength than 2 regiments.) The 17 were....2 mountain, 4 panzergrenadier, 2 cavalry and 9 infantry divisions. Few of these rose above their initial strength. In addition, the Ostturkische Waffenverbande der SS, Kaukasisiche Waffenverbande der SS, Serbiches Freiwilligenkorps, Waffengrenadier regiment der SS (Rumanische 1 and 2 and Bulgarische) were all raised.
Finally, plans were laid for.....
Gebirgsdivisions 'Andreas Hofer', SS-Freiwilligengrenadierdivision 'Feldhurrnhalle', Finnischestabatallion 'Kalevala', SS Division 'Neidersachsen', SS-Panzerdivision 'Reichsmarschall', SS -Panzergrenadierdivision 'Wallenstein', and Germanische SS-Division 'Warager'.
At the end, the Waffen-SS had some 900,000 men doubled in strength in less than a year, of which 1/3 to 2/3 of recruits were Reich Germans.
The story of the only SS Army, Deitrich's 6th SS-Panzer, is well told in numerous accounts of "Bulge". Similarly, Himmler's two commands, HG Oberrhein and HG Weishsel , can be found in the US Army's "Lorraine Campaign" and "The Last 100 days". These were the only larger than Corps units which could be considered Waffen-SS. If only Himmler was as well!
The Waffen-SS endured the war well. Except for the debacle of Budapest, which effectively knocked out 3 Cavalry divisions, and several near brushes with the Russians, up to the last weeks of the war, no Waffen-SS division was destroyed in combat. Those which did not see the end of the war, excepting Cavalry, were disbanded by the Waffen-SS or surrendered during the last week or so. In the end, the free discipline and the free-booter attitude may have proven Hitler's undoing for the German units. While the foriegn units had to fight to the end to keep from being tried as war-criminals, the German units knew they could return home (or at least they thought they could), without being punished. Of the 34 divisions which lasted to the end, though only 3 were actually facing West, half surrendered to U.S. and 5 to British. Only 12 couldn't escape the Russians. An interesting sidelight on the impact of the Waffen-SS on the Russians occurred at Nurnberg...the Russians were clearly sceptical when Paul Hausser denied the existence of 134 SS division and 97 SS division ('Golden Lily'). That the Russians were suficiently decieved to think that 2 more divisions existed on the Waffen-SS rolls than actually did is indicative of the IMPACT it had made on Russian minds.

CONCLUSIONS.
In the final analysis, The Waffen-SS cannot be measured against any other body.
It was unique in history in that it cut across traditional military values and practices and yet existed side by side with one of the most traditional military army's in the world. The fact that for four of the six years of the war, no more than 13 divisions were in the Waffen-SS .......that at the same time 'Das Heer' had over 300! divisions is over-looked due to the IMPACT of the Waffen-SS.
To put the matter more precisely in focus, the true reputation of the Waffen-SS was founded on it's 4 and later, SEVEN elite divisions....
'Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler'
'Das Reich'
'Totenkopf'
'Wiking'
'Frundsberg'
'Hohenstaufen'
'Hitler Jugend'
These units existed as 'Panzer' divisions for only a year and a half of a six-year war.
In the end analysis, no matter how one evaluates the Waffen-SS, mis-guided idealists, base criminals, or somewhere in between.....
This small group of divisions ensured the WAFFEN-SS a position in military history along with the Praetorian Guard and Napolean's "Grognards".
DIVISIONS OF THE WAFFEN-SS - Source list with Notes.........by Steve Patrick
***PRINCIPLE OFFICERS OF THE WAFFEN-SS and UNIT HISTORYS ........by CHRISTOS

(** = Unit was nominally a division and had an actual strength of less than that.)
(***COLOR SCHEME RATING SYSTEM- From best to worst and Why..............by CHRISTOS)

GREEN : Premier Division. .................................................. ....................................."Feuerwher" core Division capable of any operation.

BLUE: Good rating.................................................. ....Color shows recruitment base was Germanic, and or highly rated for a 'foriegn' unit.

BLACK : Dependable,................................................. ............ Same operational completion standard as a run of the mill 'Heer' Division. Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian based divisions all recieve this rating for dependability, if not for actual combat performance.

GOLD : Fair rated. Low Countries recruitment base. The sometimes mixed quality of units recruited from this region is reflected by the seperate colour. ........Ranging from Superb to average level reliabilty/performance, the mixed bag that these units were is reflected by their patchy combat performance.

BROWN : 2nd Rate. Divisions in this color have poor to sometimes bordering on bad combat ratings, using the 'Poleizei' division as the bench mark..................Cossacks are an exception here, not due to a poor combat record (they fought well in German service), but for their known tendancy for ill discipline and outright independence, privileged military class under the Czars that they were, the Revolution had put them in a terrible position with Stalin. Many Cossacks faced a grim fate on their return 'home' to Russia)

RED : Fourth Rate............ Undependable, with many examples of units reaching cadre strength then failing to form..may well mutiny if not
handled 'correctly'.

Black Thin - Paper division .................................................D id not reach cadre strength.

DAY-GLOW GREEN: Scum : the truly worst troops to be found anywhere in the German Armed forces...the HURT that these units dished out deserves no more than passing comment, monstrous and barbaric that it was....pond scum glows in the dark....so does this trash.

(Oh yes, I just could not resist a couple of quick words to say about the PENAL BATTALION OF THE WAFFEN-SS.................They existed!)

***PRINCIPAL GENERAL OFFICERS AND EXPANDED NOTES.......by CHRISTOS
SS-GENERAL Paul Hausser, Corps Commander: Aged 62 by the time of Kursk.....taken prisoner by the Americans 1945.
"Papa" Hausser, was perhaps the only senior oficer of the Waffen-SS to demonstrate any real brilliance. He'd trained in the Imperial German Army BEFORE WWI, in which he served on 6th Army Staff headquarters, before a transfer to the Air service. After Reichswher service, he retired in 1932 with a rank of brevet Lieutenent. Selected shortly thereafter to organize the SS Academy at Bad Tolz, in 1936 he became Inspector General of the Verfugungstruppe (Dispositional Force). He commanded the V-SS during France, following which he led the formation of the 'Das Reich' division, built as they were around former regiments of V-SS. Serving on the 'Ost-Front' he was seriously wounded in October 1941. Appointed to command the newly created SS Panzer Corps in May '42, Hausser led the unit in Russia and the West before being given command of the 7th Army on 28th June 1944 for the Normandy campaign. He was badly wounded again on August 20, losing an eye, but he recovered sufficiently to take command of Army Group G on 23 January 1945.

SS-GENERAL Wilhelm Bittrich: Corps Commander:.......................
'Willi' Bittrich was appointed to command his two famous divisions for his tenacity as much as anything. A lot of the quality that came from the 9th and 10th SS divisions was not just due to their reliability or national origin, it was because that in this role and level of command, Bittrich was very well suited, and more and more he was called on to deliver the goods with his two fine divisions......At Normandy, however, both units suffered heavily, leaving the majority of their vehicles in the Falaise Pocket, and being sent to rest from this cauldron to a quiet Dutch town, with a "good billet and a good road net" as Bittrich put it. The town was Arnhem in Holland....and there, far from the front, Bittrich found the cutting edge of WW2 dropped right on his doorstep....eyeing the situation, he made his dispositions and had affairs virtually in hand by the time his superior, Walter Model, arrived. But Model was thinking ahead too far, and ordered that Arnhem bridge be left standing....contrary to Bittrich's advice. As the attacks failed against the British, Model demanded an explanation, "In all my years as a soldier," he told Model, ..........I have never seen men fight so hard." Model was unmoved and still required the bridge to stand in place...Bittrich was a 'dapper' and well kept officer (as accurately portrayed by Maxmillion Schell in the Pinewood Studios production of "A Bridge Too Far'), but he was also "decisive and brilliant" as described by British historians, and he dug his heels in and finished off the 1st Airborne division before it's relief elements could arrive...it had been a near run thing. So intence was the street fighting at Arnhem, that it caused a ripple of admiration throughout the German Army, and for the SS in particular, as demonstrated by an RAF prisoner .................................................. ...........Geoff Taylor at Stalag IVb , who witnessed this event in late 1944 ......
Silence. A Dixie of potato-peel soup bubbles on the stove. the owner sighs heavily.
"Roll on the goddamn K-rations" he mumbles.
Waiting one dying summer's day by the barrack door, with a gusty wind down from the Baltic chilling the sun-shine, you are idly watching British airborne troops from the opposite barrack door draw their 'skilly' ration for the day. They are some of the survivors of the Arnhem operation. It seems years, not a few months, since the secret radio brought us the BBC news that British airborne forces had landed at Arnhem and, surrounded and outnumbered, were fighting desperately in the old Dutch town in German occupied territory. Even the German newspapers that came into the Stalag confirmed the BBC claim that the British troops were making the best of a sticky wicket. Commented a war communique' in the Berlin Volkischer Beobachter:
"Our crack SS troops and strong formations of armoured units are engaged in bitter and bloody fighting at Arnhem with a force of elite' British paratroops"
Whether the word "elite" was used unconciously or as a face-saver in the event of German failure to hold Arnhem, the communique was a compliment to the fighting ability of British troops at Arnhem.
When the first batches of British prisoners from Arnhem came marching through the western gate of the stalag many were still suffering from battle-shock, despite the fact that they had spent weeks after capture being shunted and jolted around the bombed and strafed German railway system in overcrowded box-cars on the tail-end of a freight train.
Unwashed, unshaven, hungry, thirsty, and gaunt they looked down, way down, but not out. The red berets with the winged parachute insignia were soiled but worn jauntily and the mottled camouflaged jump-jackets, though stained, filthy and ripped, were worn with a kind of cockey aggression. Though prisoners, they had no reason to be downcast about their battle record. At Arnhem they had fought until they had nothing left to fight with, and some fought on in the crumbled Arnhem houses wielding billets of wood and pieces of furniture in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. They could have thrown away their weapons when they realised how hopeless the situation was and still become prisoners, but had stayed with it. Few of these men in the barracks across the road had fought for a gracious home and in the country, a block of west-end flats or a flourishing business in the city. Talking to them, you came to the conclusion that they fought on at Arnhem simply because it never occurred to them to do otherwise.
Standing at your barrack door, watching the airborne boys line-up for their mug of watery pumpkin soup (may you never see pumpkin soup again), you ponder over the fierce fire that consumed the hearts and souls and minds of these men, an abstract flame of something to do with duty and love of country and self-preservation which made them fight like devils possessed.
If you ever met any of these men in civilian clothes, back in an English pub, they would probably impress you no more than you would impress them, and you consider the inevitable fact that, after this war is won and we are all home again, these men will return to their families and factories and fields and nobody will be un-duly excited about what they did at Arnhem, because nobody but those with them was there to see how they fought.
As you watch them shuffling patiently forward to the big iron bucket of slops, the heroes of Arnhem, you find youself aghast at the grand all embracing stupidity of poets who sing of the true glory of war.
No sooner have you got thinking about this.............
than you glimpse a flurry of colour coming along the stalag road towards the paratroopers. At the head of the cavalcade, surrounded by a group of officers in the sombre service dress of the German Army in the field, is a high ranking officer. He is enveloped in a Wagnerian cloak or greatcoat that swirls at his heels and frames his arrogant face in lapels of startling crimson. From the gilt-encrusted tip of his unswept peaked cap to the glittering toes of his immaculate jackboots he is the walking personification of the German High command.
"Christ!", says someone behind you, moved to emotion by the sight of so much Teutonic splendor, "It's bloody Goering himself!" It's not Goering though. This man is too lean, too hard.
The group halts by the paratroopers and, for the next ten minutes, you witness the amazing spectacle of an immaculate German brass hat moving amongst a crowd of battle dirty, piratical British paratroopers, talking with them, occasionally smiling and sometimes solemnly nodding his head. Meanwhile, the queue, nevertheless, moves inexorably on to the bucket of skilly.
Then .....the informal inspection is over, and without even a flicker of curiosity in the tens of thousands of other prisoners in the stalag the gilded general with his comet's tail of followers sweeps back up the road to the gate.......and is gone.
The airborne boys apparently earned themselves quite a reputation at Arnhem. Even with the Germans. There is, it seems, some glory after all in battle".............Geoff Taylor, "Piece of Cake", pages 190-191.
The General officer in question, from his VERY dapper appearence, lack of monical (not Walter Model therefore) and peculiar interest ONLY in the Red Devils, that General was none other than Wilhelm Bittrich. "Willi' Bittrich, in the manner of Gen. Max Hoffman at Tannenburg, singlehandedly, by his orders, stabilized the fluid front AND prolonged the war by months. Model is often descibed by historians as "The Fuhrer's Fireman", but at Arnhem, Model clearly failed to realize the strategic situation.
For Obergruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich, it was both his and the 'Red Devil's' finest moment of the war.

SS-GENERAL Karl Wolf: "Desk General":
The term 'desk-general' is a little misleading in this instance. World War II is full of German desk generals that had little or no influence. Keitel, Jodl and others were known as 'lackeys' ( Wilhelm Keitel's nickname, "Lackeital", was a army wide joke on this very observation, and Hitler referred to the rubber-stamping Keital as having "...the brains of a cinema usher."....Jodl once caught Kietal writing a letter with pistol in hand....Keital was a bit of a tragic figure, for at least Jodl could stand up to Hitler when he felt on firm ground....Keital had no such courage, ...He was hanged at Nuremberg.). But SS-General KARL WOLF is one individual desk general that was different........in a lot of ways, Karl Wolf remains an 'enigma', a definate puzzle, and a very dark puzzle it is in the shadows of the German High Command, for he was everywhere, this General in power circles, and there is a lot of historical evidence that he played both sides against the middle in his role as Himmler's Adjudant, and before that, and more importantly, adjudant to Hermann Goering in 1934.
General Wolf was the very man that sat with Herman Georing as he made one telephone call after another to co-ordinate his activities. The purpose was a 'purge' of the leadership of the Sturmabteilung ( and other so-called "enemies of the state" like Communist Social Democrat Gregor Strasser and Baron Kurt von Schleicher, Minister of Defence, 1932), or the 'brown trash' as they were referred to by the army. Goering, as head of the Prussian Gestapo, was tagged as the planner of the "Night of The Long Knives" ( or OPERATION HUMMINGBIRD as Wolf tells it). He said that on 30th of June, 1934, the telephone wires literally glowed, as Goering co-ordinated the activities of an officer that was to become a truly menacing presence in the SS heirarchy, and in Europe itself.............. Reinhard Heydrich, the executioner of 'Operation Hummingbird'......The SS were only fledgling, and the million strong SA where not trusted by the Army, or the industrialists that backed the Nazi Party with funds, and by this, virtually guaranteed the financial stability of the regime......The High Command Generals had publicly disassociated themselves from the SA and in particular their leader, a former great war and Munich Freikorps veteran, an old crony of Hitler's....ERNST ROHM. Rohm had signed his own death warrant by making a 'tour' of SA establishments and units in the period of that summer leading up to June 30th, making speeches in which he proclaimed that a 'second national revolution' was now the job of the SA, and that the Army should adopt the SA wholesale as it's recruitment base for the soon to be expanding Reichswehr. The commanding General in charge of building the '100,000 man Army' was General Hans von Seeckt, a Berlin Staff College graduate tasked with reforming the Army from the organizational mess it was in in the wake of the Feikorps and the Versailles treaty (about to be thrown out entirely by Hitler in less than 12 months). "The Sphinx" was not impressed with this scenario at all, wanting instead to train every one of the 100,000 men allowed to him by Versailles as OFFICERS or senior NCOs of excellent quality. When the time came for expansion, Von Seeckt would have just that much easier a time fleshing out the cadre strength formations that the 'Reichswher' was at this very time experimenting with on exercises.
In the measured gaze of "The Sphinx", Ernst Rohm wanted to leave the SA holding all the cards.
And,in the words of the Krupp armaments Chief;
"Re-armament is too serious an issue to be left in the hands of drunkards and homosexuals."
Rohm had to be gotten rid of (something his decendents have never forgiven the German government and the Nazi's for.....Rohm's widow called Hitler "eine kliene man" for his treachery of Roehm). Concocting a phony story of armed insurrection, and surprising the SA at their mountain holiday retreat, Heydrich's men struck, with Hitler arresting Rohm personally. Goering was expansive and hosted a Berlin press conference that was attended by the narrator of the documentary that I saw. Goering is said to have joked to the journalists gathered, saying,
"I Know you boys like a STORY.....well I've got a STORY for you alright!"
....Rohm was murdered in his cell by another SS man who would become notorious, EICKE, then commandant of 'Dachau'.
Most of the information we have first hand of this is only because of SS-General Karl Wolf, the man watching it all from Goering's office in Berlin.........
The career of Karl Wolf is a blank from here. Most historical reference or general histories make little mention of him, either in political or military terms......
But Wolf was the man that was secretly negotiating with the Americans for a final surrender in the war's last months, and sounding out the Russians in the early 'Barbarossa' days.. It seems of all the Generals to pick for this work, Karl Wolf was the choice, an SS-General. Hardly the sort of man you would send to any peace negotiation. Wolf was tall, over six-feet and still with a very full head of white hair when interviewed. His piercing gaze had not changed one bit from photos taken of him in wartime, as the British journalist questioned him about his role in the "Night of the Long Knives". Wolf remains as the 'hidden' side of Waffen-SS politics that will probably never come to light. The question of who exactly DID control the Praetorian Guard in the Third Reich could have been answered by this General, and whole bunch of other important historical events that he could have shed light on (**note below). But General Wolf has not to my knowledge, published a memoir, and his only personal comments concerning his entire period of service are confined to his role as Goering's adjudant in 1934....
Some time in the furture, somebody may dig up something that sheds light on the whole issue, but for now, SS-General Karl Wolf remains the largest puzzle to be confronted by historians, a very curious and sinister place to hold in any annals. Karl Wolf was imprisoned at Nuremburg but released .
**..The literal translation of 'Verfugungs Truppen' was, after all, "Troops available (to carry out tasks required of them by the Party)."


WAFFEN-SS DIVISION LIST..........Notes by the original author of the text story, Steve Patrick will be shown bold and unitalicized.

EXPANSION NOTES AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS....... Notes by Christos will be prefixed with 3 *** and appear italicized

1st SS-Panzerdivision 'Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler': Commander Otto 'Sepp' Deitrich (1892-1966), then Brig.Gen Mohnke.
Formed Oct'39. Originally a regiment (standarten) and only became a brigade in Summer '40. Still, it's strength was 10,796 in June '41. Became a Division later that Summer, gained a tank component in '42. Officially a Panzer division early '43.
*** Contained SS-PzGrenadier Regiments 1 & 2 and SS-Pz Regiment 1 (commander at Kursk, Major Martin Gross).
***One of LAH's TIGER plattoons at Kursk was commanded by the most famous Tank crew in the German armed services. Hauptsturmfuhrer Micheal WITTMANN, and his gunner Balthazar WOLL. Their score at Kursk alone was 30 Soviet machines. Wittman's Tiger single-handedly brought an entire operational thrust to a halt outside the Norman village of Villers-Bocage, destroying most of the Cromwell and Stuart tanks of the British 4th County of London Yeomanry, 13th July, 1944. 'LAH' First saw service in Poland and France as a motorized (truckborne) infantry regiment, later going into the Balkans and Southern Russia as a motorized infantry unit. Sent to occupied France in August 1942, it was rested, refitted, reinforced and reorganized into a panzergrenadier division. Returning to the Eastern front, it took part in the Manstein counteroffensive, suffering heavy losses in the house-to-house fighting for Kharkov and losing 4,540 men. New equipment, including Hummel (Bumblebee) and Wespe (Wasp) self propelled artillery, and replacements from the Luftwaffe, made good some of the losses, but there were insufficient tanks to re-equip the 1st battalion of the division's Pz regiment, and that unit did not take part in the Kursk offensive. In August a transfer to Italy found them disarming surrendering Italian divisions. While in Italy it gained full division status, recieving it's first 'Panther' tanks, and reforming it's battered 1st battalion. Returning to Russia in autumn '43, and after almost continous heavy fighting, another rest and refit. There followed a stint in Normandy, after which at the Ardennes they were the spearhead of the counteroffensive, with Joachim Pieper (assisted by Skorzeny's 150th Brigade of 'English speakers' in American uniforms), they boldly plowed forward to their objectives only to run out of fuel and be forced to make their retreat on foot! Now Sent south for the defence of Hungary, and the final battle for Vienna, they found themselves surrendering to the Soviets.
Commander 'Sepp' was the Third Reich Waffen-SS 'wonderboy'; squat, thick-necked and with the face of a 'bouncer', who is on record as protesting to Hitler personally several times about his unit's involment, or lack of it, in atrocities against Jewish "bandits". If 'Papa' Paul Hausser was said to be the 'father' figure of the Waffen-SS, Otto 'Sepp' Deitrich was described as instilling the Waffen-SS with 'spirit'. At his funeral, no less a Third Reich personage than Otto Skorzeny made the now famous comment "He gave to the Waffen-SS a style and an espirit-de-corps which may possibly be compared only with Napolean's Imperial Guard." On the other hand , Colonel von Der Heydte, when briefing Dietrich for his drop during 'Bulge' said that he was "obviously drunk", and Obergruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich said, "I once spent an hour and a half trying to explain a situation to Sepp Dietrich with the aid of a map. It was quite useless. He understood nothing at all." Runestedt called him "Decent but stupid". Goering was more sympathetic, and felt that as an Army commander, Deitrich was untrained, inexperienced, and "He had, at the most, the abilty to command a division."

2nd SS-Panzerdivision 'Das Reich': (formerly SS-Verfugungsdivision and SS-Division "Reich") Commander Lt. Gen. Walter Kruger at Kursk. Succeeded by Gruppenfuhrer SS Heinz Lammerding for 1944, Himmler's Chief of Staff, still wanted in relation to Oradour-sur-Glane. Sentenced to death in absentia Bordeaux 1951.
Formed Oct '39 with SS-Regiments 3 (Deutschland), 4 (Der Fuhrer) and 9 (Germania).
*** Development similar to 'LAH'. Took part in Balkan campaign and Barbarossa. Lost 60% of manpower during Soviet winter counteroffensive. After summer of '42 spent resting in Fransce, returned to Ost-Front winter 42-43. Also suffered heavily around Kharkov/Belgorod. Looses so heavy it was down 1st Panzer regiment for Kursk as well (filled with captured Soviet T-34s). More heavy losses around Kiev (November). Sent to France, where it committed the Oradour-Sur-Glane atrocity on it's march to the front zone, in reprisal for one of it's officers killed by French partisans. After being ground down once more, partially rebuilt in time for 'Bulge', before the Ardennes fighting found them spent again. Confusion in the early months with conflicting oreders from OKW scattered the different regiments of this division. The three elements ended up in Budweis (4).....(3) was in Linz (near Hitler's birthplace)..and (9) was slated to relieve Berlin....3 & 9 were ground down and forced to surrender where they where...but, along with most of the other elements and vehicles from Das Reich, sent the third element 'Der Fuhrer', on a rescue mission for Prague....after a brief drive, which swept Czech partisans aside who were holding the city with rogue German Cossack elements, ' Der Fuhrer' advanced into Prague. Collecting the more loyal elements of the German garrison, a convoy of over 1000 vehicles evacuated Prague on 8th of May,'45...at Rokiczany they were trapped and forced to surrender by the US. 2nd Inf. division, who stripped them of all medals and regalia, before lumping them into other formations of prisoners, something the proud survivors of the regiment had hoped to avoid on capture with a prideful display....at least they did not have to surrender to the RUSSIANS!

3rd SS-Panzerdivision 'Totenkopf': Original Commander SS-Gen. Theodore Eicke, killed February '43 when his recon plane was shot down during Manstein's "Backhand-Blow"....Commander for Kursk was SS-Gen Max Simon.....Post war commanders of the unit while in captivity of the Soviets kept dissappearing, including it's last commander SS-Major Gen. Helmuth Becker.
Also formed Oct'39. Recieved tank element mid-'42. SS-Regiments 5 (Thule), 6 (Theodor Eicke) and 3 SS-Panzer.
*** Formed firstly from concentration camp guards, fought in France 1940, performance there marred by a number of atrocities against Allied prisoners. During Barbarossa, the month of September saw Totenkopf's withdrawl, with all it's regiments suffering an average of 80% losses, mainly as part of Manstien's flank attack against Leningrad. At Karkhov and Belgorod, Totenkopf sustained far fewer losses than other SS-divisions in Hausser's corps, so was in better shape for Kursk. It spent a lot of time in the East, but was transfered for the Ardennes like a lot of SS units, before playing a major role in operation "Konrad', shoulder to shoulder with 'Wiking'; surrendered to the Americans after the failure at Lake Balaton,, they were promptly turned over to the Soviets for a long 'stretch' in their prisons.

4th SS-Polizeigrenadierdivision.'Polizei':
Formed from non-SS Policemen October '39. Always a poor quality division. Contained SS-Regiments 7 & 8.
***Towards the end of the war, it also received 4 SS-Panzer batallion). This Division was the only one of the original 4 formed that did NOT go through the SS training school at Bad Tolz; this may explain it's susequent poor performance . Elements of Polizei were trapped in Budapest at the conclusion of the war, but the majority of the division ended up as part of Army Group East Prussia in the last month of the war. Otherwise, this unit spent a lot of it's service time fighting partisans, and assisting in other security 'aktions' appropriate to it's Police recruitment base. The last months of the war saw it listed as part of Army Group East Prussia's 'Hela General Command' batch, so it must have been caught up in the German reteat from Jugoslavia and surrendered to the Russians.

5th SS-Panzerdivision 'Wiking' ( formerly SS-Division 'Germania')
Formed December'40. Scandinavian volunteers, although not enough of them came forward and never more than 20% of the division consisted of non-Germans . Regimental numbers follow usual SS pattern. Contained 9 & 10 Regiments (PzGren) and (5 SS-Panzer regiment. Reg. Commanders Lt. Col Fritz Darges and Lt. Col Hans Dhor).
*** Leon Degrelle refers to this division as the best of the lot, his Walloon Legion having served a period of time under Wiking. Interestingly enough, he says that his service time as part of the Wiking division was in the Ukraine. 'Wiking' was one of Manstein's divisions for the proposed relief of Staingrad ('Wintersturm') The only 'foreign' unit to be made a 'full' panzer division and not designated as an 'auxilliary unit', it was named to appear as though the composition was predominantly German.. A battle group from this division is listed as available to the 4th SS-Panzer corps of Army group South's 6th Army for Jan '45......so it seems that some elements of Wiking were shipped to Germany just like the people of 'Nord' were for the Ardennes offensive. 'Wiking' spearheaded Operation 'Konrad' in Hungary in the war's last weeks, but like the rest of the Sixth Panzer Army, probably surrendered to the Soviets, for this was part of Army Group South.

6th SS-Gebirgsdivision 'Nord'- Commander... SS Brigadefuhrer Richard Hermann, Commander during training and posting Brigf. Karl-Maria Demelhuber (17th Jun41, 20Apr'42), last Commander on surrender SS Gruppenfuhrer Brenner.
Formed June 1941. Originally a mountain infantry brigade in Finland, raised to division status early'41 (after approx. 6 months as a brigade). SS-Regiments 11 ('Reinhardt Heydrich'), and 12 ('Michael Geissmair')
*** Further research indicates the original commander of this unit was "not impressed" with this unit's standards of training, or it's possible performance. Officers in this division are listed as reservists, mainly, with artillery components having no experiance in firing in support of Infantry, even after time spent at Juterbog, the Army Artillery School. It seems that Hitler and Himmler were loath to admit that some Waffen SS elements were sent into battle less than fully prepared for the coming ordeal. NORD, despite these handicaps, performed well. served in Lapland until the German withdrawl, whereupon it was shipped to Germany to take part in the Ardennes offensive.- with no particular distinction. Cut off on the western side of the Rhine in March 1945, the division- now only 6,000 strong- put up a spirited resistence, taking several days before overwhelming US forcesto ran it to ground. The division commander was finally captured on 2 April, with approximately 800 survivors, bringing it's organized resistence to an end. A battle group from 'Nord' turned up at operation 'Konrad', as part of something called "Group Pape";.....a small battle group from 'NORD' were present at Berlin. They took part in an attempted breakout on May 1st, after Hitler was dead. Commanded by Franz Kempka, the group, which included Martin Bormann, and Neumann, propaganda minister's aide-de-camp.. Their single tank was supposed to escort the party slowly up the Freiderichstrasse towarsd the Zeigelstrasse. A Russian shell destroyed the tank, also killing Bormann and Neumann....The rest of the group returned and surrendered with the Berlin garrison on May 2nd, 1945.

7th SS-Freiwilligengebirgsdivision 'Prinz Eugen'
Mountain unit Formed in Serbia March'42 from local Germanic "volunteers". SS-Regiments 13 ('Arthur Phelps') and 14.
*** Perhaps the most infamous and best performing of the Balkan divisions, with a good standard of equipment used. In an attempt to control the growing partisan problem in Yugoslavia, the SS raised the 7th to combat them in their own environment. During it's tour of duty, the 7th took part in many operations, including the attempt to snatch Tito and the destruction of the 1st Jugoslav Partisan division. By the end of 1944, they were fighting a Bulgarian-Russian army invading Jugoslavia. At Cilli, the last elements were overrun and scattered by partisan forces. The unit was composed of Banat-Swabians, mainly from Jugoslavia, but also from Hungary and Romania. The spring of 1943 saw it transferred to the Bosnia-Dalmation coast on anti-partisan ops. In October it was shifted to the eastern flank of a general withdrawl in the Belgrade area, in which it suffered heavily. Losses were made good by December, when some of the more reliable elements of 'Skanderberg' were absorbed. This division earned one of the worst reputations for the commission of atrocities of any body of troops in World War II, and it's actions provided the primary rationale for the postwar expulsion of about 250,000 Banat- Swabians from Jugoslavia. The tens of thousands of German troops who took part in the savage last year of the Balkan campaign, were authorized to wear a commemorative shield on their uniform sleeve (reading "Balkan Campaign 1944-1945"). In the confusion of the last days, however, it's estimated no more than 250 of those authorized recieved them before surrender.........one can't imagine too many of them wanting to wear it anyway....memories of the entire campaign are barbaric, to say the least! Over 150,000 troops and auxiliaries surrendered to Jugoslav forces, 100,000 of which did not return home.

8th SS-Kavalleriedivision 'Florian Geyr'- Commander: Hermann Fegelien, promoted to Hitler's Headquarters as SS Liason Officer, executed by Hitler a few days before his own death; unit at surrender commanded by Major General Jochen Rumohr (killed at Budapest).
Formed March'42. Cavalry unit from two SS-Cavalry brigades late'42. SS-Regiments 15, 16, 17 and 18.
*** With a nucleus of tough professionals, about half the 8,000 men were ethnic Germans from Hungary, Bessarabia, Transylvania and the Banat. Key combat multipliers were it's anti-tank battalion, which inlcluded 10 Hetzer assault guns for Budapest, and one 150mm and two 105mm towed artillery battalions. This division also had an effective flak battalion comprised mostly of the dreaded (towed) 88mm guns......these reinforcement units for Budapest reflect the reliability factor placed on this unit my it's German leaders, but it should be kept in mind that SS-Cavalry divisions were much better equiped than their Army counterparts. So reliable was this division seen to be, that in 1942 Bach-Zelewski especially visted the original regiment commanded by Fegelein (whilst Fegelien was on leave) to exhort their efforts in the extermination of the local Jewish population, a task Fegelein's troops performed. Surrendered to Soviets at Budapest

9th SS-Panzerdivision 'Hohenstaufen'- Commanders Brigadier General Stadler, then Obersturmbanfuhrer Harzer.
Raised December '42 as a panzer division. SS-PzGren Regiments 19 & 20. 9 SS-Panzer regiment.
*** The second stage growth of the Waffen-SS had been deliberately postponed by Hitler, with an eye on the post war role of the service branch and in an attempt to preserve some exclusion. He also wanted to deter "show-off" volunteers....But after Stalingrad he abandoned his objections and authorized the raising of two new Pz divisions, 'Hohenstaufen' and 'Frundsberg'. To raise the troops for both Himmler was forced to conscript young native Germans for the first time, over the protests both of their parents and the Army. November of 1943 saw both divisions finish training and equipping in France, followed by a pure 'fire brigade' rush to bail out the entire 1st Panzer Army (of LAH, Das Reich, and Totenkopf) at Tarnopol. No sooner relieved than to go racing back to the Western front for the build up against invasion Europe, turning up at Arnhem for a rest from Falaise. The resulting fight against paratroopers was said to be the hardest fighting they came up against for the whole war! After 'Bulge' they finished up as part of Army Group South in the 1 SS corps of the 6th Pz Army, which means they were at the Lake Balaton fiasco, before a probable surrender to the Americans in the retreat into the Harz Mountains and Czechoslovakia generally.

10th SS-Panzerdivision 'Frundsberg'- Commander: Heinz Harmel
Similar composition and recruitment to the 9th. SS-Regiments (PzGren) 21 & 22, Panzer Regiment 10 ('Langemark').
*** 'Frundsberg' was the twin division of 'Hohenstaufen', whose Service record is basically the same. Last listed AGC, 4th Panzer Arm, OKH Reserve. These divisions were in the same corps, commanded by Obersturmbanfuhrer 'Willi' Bittrich. 'Hohenstauffen's' Recon element at Arnhem, Captain GRABNER as commander, (SS Recon battalion of Pz 9,) was ordered on recon drive south of the bridge, which his unit crossed...Having conducted his recon, Grabner's unit headed back across the bridge, still assuming it was held by Frundsburg, and ran head on into Colonel Frosts elements of the 1st Airborne. Frost described the resulting massacre of Grabner's unit as "A lovely action..."

11th SS-Freiwilligenpanzergrenadierdivision 'Nordland'
Formed March '43 from elements of the 5 SS-Division and Finnish Ski troopers.. SS-Regiments 23 ('Norge') and 24 ('Danmark'). SS-Panzer Batallion ('Hermann von Salza'), (which was in late'44 joined by SS-Heavy tank battalion 503 to form SS-Panzer Regiment 11).
***......Listed in OKW records in Jan45 as (Reserve "resting"), part of Army Group Vistula's batch in the North of the country.Remnant of this division turns up fighting in the final battle for Berlin as part of 'alarm-groups' of bits of other units. 'Nordland' was part of Weidling's 56th 'corps', with the regular 18th remnant alongside them...The Battle of Berlin only lasted 9 days with the city divided into two zones by the German commanders were also at odds, with Goebbels as Gauleiter of Berlin as a bitter enemy of neighbouring Gauleiter Sturz, the very man whose co-operation he NEEDED to make anything happen in Berlin at all. This pair themselves had not briefed Weidling as to his proper role (ie. he 'assumed' he was in command!) Resistence, chaotically organised as it was, was actually quite TOKEN until day five, when the outer 'zone' had been swifly penetrated by Soviet forces....The fighting is progressively more intence as Russian positions close in on the 'second zone' or 'zitadelle', one of the mapped areas the high command had divided Berlin into for defence, with FLAK towers acting as major sticking points, and Hitler Youth fighting desperately harder and harder, until by April 29, the Chancellery and Reichstag are within 100 yards of Soviet lines. The Soviets pause, and send a patrol in to plant a flag on the Reichstag, one of the most famous pictures of the war....'Nordland' was understrength for Berlin, but it was 'operational'. Other units in Berlin less so.

12th SS-Panzerdivision 'Hitler Jugend'- Commander, Brigadier General Kraas.
Formed June'43. Cadre from the 1 SS Division. SS-PzGren Regiments 25 & 26, Panzer regiment 12.
***Last listed as part of Army Group South, 6th SS Panzer Army, I SS PzCorps, so the final elements probably surrendered to the Russians.
***During the same post Stalingrad expansion that saw 'Hohenstaufen' and 'Frundsberg' appear, a third division was raised from the 1926 Class of the Hitler Youth. It's then 17 year old soldiers were to become notorious for their ferocity among the Allies in Normandy the following year. In it's first major action, the HJ division staged a tricky holding operation which kept open the Falaise-Argentan Gap long enough to allow 20 divisions to escape the pocket, though certainly not all. It was a praiseworthy performance, tarnished by a reputation gained in Normandy and the 64 Allied prisoners they were certainly responsible for killing in their first three weeks in the 'Bocage'. The HJ entered Bulge at only 90% full strength and chronically short of junior officers. After Bulge in which they acted as the spearhead of the attacking German forces along with LAH, they finished up along the West Wall...but, for the Battle of Berlin, at least, some of these fanatics stuck it out to the end....The very last decorations distributed by hand from 'Der Fuhrer' were in the last days at the 'Bunker'...and that ceremony was for members of the Hitler Youth; youths and boys that had been blasting Russian tanks at the 'zitadelle'. Hitler is shown patting one of these boys on the cheek as the newly medaled child smiles for the camera......haunting piece of footage and a living testimony to the fanaticism of these "Flintenweiber". Sporodic and fanatical resistence by young uniformed soldiers were part of the last days resistence in the so-called Alpine Redoubt, something which existed only in Goebbels mind. Operation 'Wehrwolf' caused much trouble, but ultimately failed as all other attempts did to reverse the fortunes of the regime.

13th Waffengebirgsdivison der SS- 'Handschar' ( Kroat No.1)
Raised from Croatian volunteers and Balkan Moslems in Jan'43 for anti-partisan work.
*** Possibly the worst regular combat unit in the Waffen-SS, this unit was formed as the "Bosnian-Herzegovinian" or "B.H" division. It first consisted of Bosnian moslems and Croat volunteers formed around cadres drawn from 'Prinz Eugen." When volunteers began to run short, Roman Catholics and Croatian Home-Guardsmen were induced to join. The 13th had many trappings of the Moslem regiments of the old Austro-Hungarian army, including a grey Fez and regimental Imams to lead prayers. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a refugee from British justice, was installed as the division's religious overseer. Sent to south-central France in mid-'43 for training, the 13th mutinied, a rebellion the Grand Mufti helped to quell. Nazi officers failed to exhibit the Hapsburg 'touch' when dealing with this ethnic group. Steadfastly refusing to operate outside it's own area, the unit had to be returned to Jugoslavia in late'43. Once back in the Balkans, it refused to operate in coordination with other German and Croatian units, generally avoiding combat with partisans. Instead, the 13th SS confined it's activities to massacring Christian Serb villages, whilst also racking up record desertion rates. In October '44, during the general German retreat from the Balkans, the 2nd Panzer army disarmed these well equipped but highly unreliable troops for redistribution to German troops. Finally committed to combat against the Soviets later that year in Hungary, it performed so poorly it had to be withdrawn to Jugoslavia. The beginning of '44 it was still listed as "(remnant) 68 corps, 2nd PZ Army, before it was finally
disbanded shortly into the new year.

14th Waffengrenadierdivision der SS (Galicische No.1)
Formed July' 43 from Ukrainians with German officers. One of the better "foreign" units. SS-Regiments 29, 30, 31.
*** The name of this division was a wistful reference to Austria's Ukrainian possessions of pre-1918. These enthusiastically anti-communist soldiers provided 100,000 recruits when first called up in April 1943. The division was destroyed in it's first battle in the Brody-Tarnov Pocket...The survivors never fought again. It must have been reconstituted with fresh levies, because it is listed for the last month of the war as part of the 1st Cavalry Corps for Army Group South's 2nd Panzer Army, so it probably surrendered to the Russians.

15th Wafefengrenadierdivision der SS (Lettische No. 1)
Formed from Latvian Police and civilian volunteers, Feb'43. SS-Regiments 32, 33, 34.
*** First to rally to the cause in the early heady days of 'Summer Barbarossa'; Baltic leaders from Latvia and Estonia flocked to the Waffen-SS banner with 22,000 volunteers two months after the call, and by mid-1944 there were three available; two Latvian, and one Estonian., though by that time Himmler had imposed conscription. All fought well until their homelands were overrun, not least perhaps because they were all part of General HILPERT'S trapped Army in the Courland Pocket. These divisions in Courland are still kicking right up till May 9th, so this one is listed as a Reserve for Couland Army Group, Jan 45...surrendered to Soviets.

16th SS-Panzergrenadierdivision 'Reichsfuhrer SS'
Formed Corsica Oct'43 from the SS-Sturm brigade 'Reichsfuhrer SS' (RFSS) which had originally been formed as Himmler's bodyguard. PzGren Regiments 35 & 36.
***Accompanied 'Horst Wessel' and 'Florian Geyer' into Hungary to forestall an anti-German coup. Seems to have spent the majority of it's career fighting partisans. Just to put you in the picture as to the attitude of the average German soldier to the Balkans, Gen. Rendulic, on assuming command of anti-guerilla operations in the Balkan region in 1943, recieved over 1,000 requests for a transfer to ANY OTHER FRONT, EVEN RUSSIA, rather than stay in Rendulic's command. Sobering to realise that the war in this region affected both sides morale, brutal and bloody that it was......Also listed for the last month of the war as part of the I Cav Corp, 2nd Panzer Army, Army Group South....surrendered to Russians.

17th SS-Panzergrenadierdivision "Goetz von Berlichingen"-
Formed France October'43, mai