Market Garden

[Kiwiwriter]

I agree with Middlebrook's reasons. If 2nd SS Panzer Corps had not been there, I think 1st Airborne would not have been annihilated, but it still would have hard a hard time, and still likely not have held Arnhem Bridge. The big problem for 30 Corps was trying to shove three divisions and 40,000 men up one road. I also blame absentee leadership for Market-Garden's failings. Normally, Montgomery was a hands-on general. After launching Market-Garden, he was not. Horrocks was down with the flu. And Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey, who commanded 2nd Army, only showed up to order 1st Airborne to withdraw. If either of these three generals had been more forceful, things would have been different. Another factor was the failure of 30 Corps and 11th Armoured Division to cut off the Scheldt Estuary. That gave the German forces in the Scheldt an escape hatch. Many of these outfits fought at Oosterbeek in the ad hoc kampfgruppes that gave the attack so much trouble. There are aspects of the planning for and execution of Market-Garden that remind me of Lee at Gettysburg, who did not plan or execute that battle well, either.

[plant-pilot]

Even though the Operation seems to have been doomed to failure from the very start, the same sort of plan has been tried, albeit on a smaller scale, since (Kosovo for example) with diferent outcomes. This would point to the plan not being as flawed as most would suggest.

With a little more intelligence provided or even correctly interpreted and a more 'can-do' attitude from the RAF Command, things could have been tipped in the favour of the allies.

Nobody can doubt the bravery and skill of the aircrews involved in the assault, re-supply and support of the operation, but without the ability to drop the whole of the 1st Airborne Division in one day, and the refusal of selecting DZs closer to the bridge on the south side of the river porting the reason of 'having to ensure the minimum loss of aircraft', left the whole operation in doubt from the start.

I think it's that old problem of the service provider forgeting that they are providing a service for the customer, not the other way round.

[sapper]

It always amazes me how the crap is thrown about 60 years after the event. AS one that took part in the "Market Garden" operation, Was it right to take the high risk at that time...Too damned right it was! If it had succeeded then the war may well have been over months earlier. many thousands of Allied troops lives would have been saved...

No matter the risk, this was a "Diamond" prize, had it worked GREAT! but the rewards were such that any risk was worth the try. Besides that, Why not? What are fighting men for? Obviously to fight...

If anyone thinks that wars are won without any setbacks, then they live in cloud cuckoo land, Wars are often "two steps forward, one step back"

Monty, often accused as being "Unadventurous" despite beating the daylights out of the Africa Corps over a thousand miles or more, and achieving Victory in Normandy ten days ahead of schedule. Yet, when he took a high risk operation with the chance to finish the war quickly, every one gathers around tut tutting!

Heaping blame and worse on this man. He at least, took the chance, not matter how small of it coming off..to finish it. It failed... If I recall? that was his only defeat.

But looking back after 60 years with all the rubbish written in that time, it is now easy to lay blame, If it was left to you that cast about for blame.. Then there would have been no great military endeavours. in war men fight, sometime win, sometimes lose. Monty never threw mens lives away easily, and had the mens respect for that
Sapper

[John Benson]

Omar Bradley: "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into SHAEF with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished than I was by the daring adventure he proposed. For in contrast to the conservative tactics Montgomery ordinarily chose, the Arnhem attack was to be made over a 60-mile carpet of airborne troops. Although I never reconciled myself to this venture, I nevertheless freely concede that Monty's plan for Arnhem was one of the most imaginative of the war".

In my view it failed because:

1. Troops weren't landed on either side of the bridge. Failure fully to realise the role of airborne troops? Lee-Mallory said it would be too highly defended. Yet the Poles were scheduled to be landed there.
2. In the anxiety to get airborne forces into action little account was taken of intelligence sources. Arrogance? Dutch officers for instance tried in vain to point out that before the war they had tried to advance up the road on an exercise and that it had failed - for precisely the reasons that were experienced in 1944. The road had to be used because tanks couldn't get off it.
3. Lack of a sense of urgency.
4. Weather
5. Equipment failure, particularly radio. People in the UK simply didn't know what the true position was.

But the Press - particularly Stanley Maxted of the BBC - were able to get their reports through. What I've never understood is why - with the radios out - some effort wasn't made to utilise these facilities? Maybe they didn't know that Maxted was able to get through?

I've also never understood Monty's claim that Market Garden was 90 per cent successful. The whole aim was to take the bridge - and that was 100 per cent unsuccessful.

Bradley's right - it was a gamble. Had it paid off the war might have been shortened. But the war might also have been shortened had we shown some urgency in taking the banks of the Scheldt. After all, taking and using the deep sea port at Antwerp had been identified very early on as a priority, but it wasn't working until November. Even Monty acknowledged later that he'd made a mistake. As things turned out, opting for Market Garden rather than Antwerp possibly lengthened the war.

John

[angie999]

After the spectacular success of the Normandy campaign and the breakout, September 1944 was a period of failure to achieve objectives:

1. Market Garden itself.

2. Failure to seal off and clear the Scheldt.

3. Failure at Metz and Aachen.

All along the front, the German forces were in disarray and had lost unit cohesion and much of their equipment, although they were dealing with this throughout the month.

I don't think that anyone planned or expected such a spectacular advance in August and early September. I think that both Montgomery and Patton were right to argue for a single, well supplied thrust, because the allies had simply over-reached and were in need of a major administrative pause if a general advance was to continue before the winter.

This is sometimes overlooked.

[sapper]

Having been there, at that time it was a great chance. Since the war we have had so many authors spouting about something they know nothing about...And each one writing with his own personal prejudice.

At that time it was that one great chance. Only Monty was bright enough, and clever enough to set it in progress. 90% of it was a complete success, it failed at the last hurdle all the others were a complete success...., should it have been attempted? Too damned right it should. Typical of Monty's thrust and drive and willingness to go for the throat of an enemy given an outside chance.

If you think not of Monty? Then you should have had the experience of the inside of the Falaise pocket, any doubt of Monty's skilland control of the battlefield would quickly be dispelled. For here was the ultiimate defeat of an army. many got away. But Oh dear, the carnage visited on the German army was nothing short of horrific.
Sapper

[Gotthard Heinrici]

How far exactly were XXX Corps from the bridge when the advance stopped and why didnt they try to punch through to take the bridge. I have yet to find a clear explanation for this. It all seems very vague. Were XXX Corps fought to a standstill or was it a case of the infantry stuck in the towns along the route still trying to clear out pockets of german resisntance???

[Kiwiwriter]

Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Mar 9 2005, 10:06 AM
How far exactly were XXX Corps from the bridge when the advance stopped and why didnt they try to punch through to take the bridge. I have yet to find a clear explanation for this. It all seems very vague. Were XXX Corps fought to a standstill or was it a case of the infantry stuck in the towns along the route still trying to clear out pockets of german resisntance???

Quoted post

30 Corps was five miles from the bridge at Elst, where the Arnhem-Nijmegen Highway is an elevated embankment, where vehicles are easily silhouetted against the sky. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade was stalled there by Kampfgruppe Knaust, a collection of Tiger and Panther tanks led by one-legged Oberst Hans Peter Knaust, and jammed up the road. The 43rd Infantry Division slide left around the block, through the polder and hooked up with the Polish paratroopers at Driel and the British 1st Airborne, but also found they were blocked by the rest of 2nd SS Panzer Corps and KG Knaust. With the Germans cutting the highway at Veghel, 30 Corps' supply and administration system was pretty fragile. At this point, with the 1st Airborne hanging on by a thread and the offensive stalled and nearly out of supply, Dempsey (and Horrocks to a lesser degree) made the call that a further push would just lead to the annihilation of the 1st Airborne and no ground gained. Dempsey said it was time to halt and "consolidate" the offensive's gains, and pull out the 1st Airborne. "It was the one bloody road...to Nijmegen," as the generals say at the end of "A Bridge Too Far."

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Originally posted by Kiwiwriter+Mar 9 2005, 03:28 PM-->

30 Corps was five miles from the bridge at Elst, where the Arnhem-Nijmegen Highway is an elevated embankment, where vehicles are easily silhouetted against the sky. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade was stalled there by Kampfgruppe Knaust, a collection of Tiger and Panther tanks led by one-legged Oberst Hans Peter Knaust, and jammed up the road. The 43rd Infantry Division slide left around the block, through the polder and hooked up with the Polish paratroopers at Driel and the British 1st Airborne, but also found they were blocked by the rest of 2nd SS Panzer Corps and KG Knaust. With the Germans cutting the highway at Veghel, 30 Corps' supply and administration system was pretty fragile. At this point, with the 1st Airborne hanging on by a thread and the offensive stalled and nearly out of supply, Dempsey (and Horrocks to a lesser degree) made the call that a further push would just lead to the annihilation of the 1st Airborne and no ground gained. Dempsey said it was time to halt and "consolidate" the offensive's gains, and pull out the 1st Airborne. "It was the one bloody road...to Nijmegen," as the generals say at the end of "A Bridge Too Far."

Quoted post

[/b]

Thats brilliant Kiwiwriter and well put too. I didnt know about Kampgruppe Knaust. Thank you!

[Kiwiwriter]

Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici+Mar 9 2005, 11:51 AM-->

Thats brilliant Kiwiwriter and well put too. I didnt know about Kampgruppe Knaust. Thank you!

Quoted post

[/b]

No worries, mate. KG Knaust is well-described in "A Bridge Too Far." I have a bunch of books on the Market-Garden campaign, listed on my web page. And I've studied the terrain from my game "Highway to the Reich," which re-fights the battle at company level from the Belgian border to downtown Arnhem. I think I can see that road in my sleep!