D-day:the Significance To The Wwii

[Kiwiwriter]

Originally posted by Markus+Oct 13 2004, 06:10 PM-->

I disagree in some respects. IIRC the 352. was not fully alert, IIRC just one regiment was manning the beach defences against two reinforced division. And I´m convinced the 352. was under strength. Furthermore the average age of the enlisted men in the 352. was 30, for the officers it was close to 35. Compare that US division.

Quoted post

[/b]

No, the 352nd had two of its regiments on the defense line, with excellent strongpoints and resistance nests in place. One of the reasons Omaha succeeded was that the 352nd had nearly everything up front and had no reserve for a counterattack.

[morse1001]

No, the 352nd had two of its regiments on the defense line, with excellent strongpoints and resistance nests in place. One of the reasons Omaha succeeded was that the 352nd had nearly everything up front and had no reserve for a counterattack.

What also helped was the fact that many of the wounded from the eastern front were sent to Normandy for a "rest cure" and their experiences of the eastern front were incorporated into the defences.

Also, the fighting skills of the former wounded did come in handy when the invasion started.

[Friedrich H]

I disagree in some respects. IIRC the 352. was not fully alert, IIRC just one regiment was manning the beach defences against two reinforced division.

The division was going through an invasion drill that day. Besides, as Kiwi pointed out, there were two regiments at the front.

And I´m convinced the 352. was under strength.

Of course it was! It s support units didn't practically exist, there was no reserve nor artillery support. German regular divisions of the time were all pretty much in the same lousy state.

The Russians would have found it quite different, had they to face the German units in Normandy, Far, far, different.

No, not far different. The Red Army would have simply annihilated the élite German units as it had done several times (how many times these divisions actually ceased to exist in the fighting at the eastern front?) As Morse put it, by summer 1944 the Red armed forces has reached an amazing level of excellence and efficiency in combat. The Red Army was much bigger than the Wehrmacht, better equipped, better led and highly experienced.

[Kiwiwriter]

The Russians would have found it quite different, had they to face the German units in Normandy, Far, far, different.

No, not far different. The Red Army would have simply annihilated the élite German units as it had done several times (how many times these divisions actually ceased to exist in the fighting at the eastern front?) As Morse put it, by summer 1944 the Red armed forces has reached an amazing level of excellence and efficiency in combat. The Red Army was much bigger than the Wehrmacht, better equipped, better led and highly experienced.

Quoted post

[/quote]
Also, don't forget that the British 2nd Army (and the US 1st Army) ran smack into some of the toughest outfits in the German inventory in a short time after D-Day. 12th SS (Hitler Youth) Panzer Division was first behind the 21st Panzer. While 21st Panzer built itself up from the ground as a tank-repair outfit and became a fine outfit with the number and survivors of the Afrika Korps Division, 12 SS had a surfeit of equipment and highly-motivated men, mostly from the outfit that bore its name, the Hitler Youth. 12 SS was soon followed by the Panzer Lehr Division, made up of the demonstration troops from the various Germany Army training schools. It also had organic companies of Tiger and Panther tanks. 17th SS Panzer Grenadier lacked tanks, but its men were no slouches, either. Neither was the capable 2nd Panzer Division. Finally, the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions and 1st SS Panzer Corps rolled up to Normandy loaded for bear. The Soviets had a hard time with those divisions and their counterparts in the East -- famous German units like 5 SS Viking, 3rd SS Totenkopf, fore example -- but their operational art and tactics were far more willing to expend lives and equipment to achieve objectives. The Allies, conscious that their armies were conscripted civilians in wartime, were a little less wasteful in policy, if not in practice. The British and Americans did emphasize logistics far more than the Soviets.

[Friedrich H]

Here are the rest:

Also, don't forget that the British 2nd Army (and the US 1st Army) ran smack into some of the toughest outfits in the German inventory in a short time after D-Day.

Of course I am not forgetting this, but these very units had received severe defeats and faced almost annihilation previously in the eastern front, except for the 12th SS, which was new at the time of the Normandy invasion.

Check the facts:

Panzer Division/Eastern Front/Western Front/Mediterranean Front

• 1st SS/41-42; 43; 43-44; 45/42-43; 44-45/43
  
• 2nd SS/ 41-42; 43-44; 45/42-43; 44
  
• 3rd SS/41-45
  
• 5th SS/41-45
  
• 9th SS/44/43-44; 44-45
  
• 10th SS/44; 45/43-44; 44-45
  
• 12th SS/45/43-45
  
• Hermann Göring/44-45/ /42-44
  

Besides, the bulk of the German Panzer divisions, élite and regular, were always fighting the Red Army.

The Soviets had a hard time with those divisions and their counterparts in the East -- famous German units like 5 SS Viking, 3rd SS Totenkopf, fore example

But they annihilated these units several times, along the regular Panzer divisions.

-- but their operational art and tactics were far more willing to expend lives and equipment to achieve objectives.

This is slightly true, but it can be very easily misconcieved, because people tend to think that the Soviets massed men and matériel and sent it in a frontal attack to break through by sheer brute force and it isn't true, nor is it true that the commanders didn't care for men losses —some didn't, of course, as did most German generals, as well as Clark or Patton. Marshall Konstantín K. Rokossovski was the Monty of the Red Army, caring for every detail and for his men's lives. The Soviets did care for men losses because human resources were limited, specially after the apawling losses of 41 and 42. The casualties were so high because the fighting was simply too enormous and too damned brutal.

The British and Americans did emphasize logistics far more than the Soviets.

Indeed, but the Soviets did very good at logistics and building-up for battles, 100 times better than the Germans on their best day. The Red Army, having a far better intelligence system, managed to deceive the Germans at every single offensive, making them reinforce useless frontline areas at the expense of the threatened ones, thus giving the Red Army, which had already massed artillery, tanks and planes in complete secrecy, a tremendous advantage. The front was easily broken and the Red Army kept sending more and more reserves, fully eqipped and rested, withdrawing the frontline units for refitting and re-equipping to throw them back into combat as soon as possible. The Soviet's logistical crisis were not because of lack of planning, they were the result of the long distances of the eastern front and the German scorched earth policy. Exactly the same thing the Allies faced in the western front in late 44.

[Kiwiwriter]

Originally posted by Friedrich H@Dec 7 2004, 01:34 PM
Here are the rest:

Of course I am not forgetting this, but these very units had received severe defeats and faced almost annihilation previously in the eastern front, except for the 12th SS, which was new at the time of the Normandy invasion.

Check the facts:

Panzer Division/Eastern Front/Western Front/Mediterranean Front

• 1st SS/41-42; 43; 43-44; 45/42-43; 44-45/43
  
  
• 2nd SS/ 41-42; 43-44; 45/42-43; 44
  
  
• 3rd SS/41-45
  
  
• 5th SS/41-45
  
  
• 9th SS/44/43-44; 44-45
  
  
• 10th SS/44; 45/43-44; 44-45
  
  
• 12th SS/45/43-45
  
  
• Hermann Göring/44-45/ /42-44
  
  

Besides, the bulk of the German Panzer divisions, élite and regular, were always fighting the Red Army.

But they annihilated these units several times, along the regular Panzer divisions.

This is slightly true, but it can be very easily misconcieved, because people tend to think that the Soviets massed men and matériel and sent it in a frontal attack to break through by sheer brute force and it isn't true, nor is it true that the commanders didn't care for men losses —some didn't, of course, as did most German generals, as well as Clark or Patton. Marshall Konstantín K. Rokossovski was the Monty of the Red Army, caring for every detail and for his men's lives. The Soviets did care for men losses because human resources were limited, specially after the apawling losses of 41 and 42. The casualties were so high because the fighting was simply too enormous and too damned brutal.

Indeed, but the Soviets did very good at logistics and building-up for battles, 100 times better than the Germans on their best day. The Red Army, having a far better intelligence system, managed to deceive the Germans at every single offensive, making them reinforce useless frontline areas at the expense of the threatened ones, thus giving the Red Army, which had already massed artillery, tanks and planes in complete secrecy, a tremendous advantage. The front was easily broken and the Red Army kept sending more and more reserves, fully eqipped and rested, withdrawing the frontline units for refitting and re-equipping to throw them back into combat as soon as possible. The Soviet's logistical crisis were not because of lack of planning, they were the result of the long distances of the eastern front and the German scorched earth policy. Exactly the same thing the Allies faced in the western front in late 44.

Quoted post

No question on those. The Soviets are commonly perceived to have won battles through sheer numbers. Not so. They were superb at the operational art, and mastered the uses of surprise and reserve forces. It's one thing to have numbers. It's another thing to know how to use them. It's too bad Westerners don't know that much about Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Yeremenko, Chuikov, and Koniev.

[Friedrich H]

Actually, if the US would have made its military service wider, then the US would have had an impressive recovery rate and almost unlimited strenght to launch continuous and endless offensives like the Soviets.

What Ike didn't have in the western front were that: reserves. Let's remember that during the Battle of the Bulge he threw unready units to plug in the line —in one of the swiftest and better exectued re-deployments in military history— because he didn't have a strategic reserve.

The Red Army divided its forces in tree groups: the frontline group, which was to make the breakthrough; the second group, which was to keep the pressure on the enemy; and the reserve, which would sweep all enemy resistance, in time for the frontline group's —now rested and re-fit— new offensive. That's a magnificent way to use numbers and there's no enemy which can bear such endless pressure.