Battle Of The Bulge

[angie999]

The German Ardenes offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge commenced on 16 December 1944 and reached its line of maximum advance on 24 December. By early February 1945, the American forces had recaptured the lost ground.

Starting on 16 December, I will try and put together a series of posts summarising developments up to that point as a stimulus to discussion and we will see where it takes us.

To start, though, lets look at one aspect.

The Ardennes sector was weakly held by the American, who had rightly concluded that they lacked the resources to be strong everwhere. They had concluded, wrongly of course, that the ground was unsuitable for a German attack. They themselves had avoided an autumn offensive in the Ardennes, opting instead to attack north and south of the area. These offensives, by Patton's Third Army around Metz and by Hodges' First Army in the dreadful battles of the Hûrtgen Forrest, had gone badly.

Yet, not only was this the very sector which the Germans had attacked through in 1940, but also according to German generals interviewed after the war, this was just about the weakest sector of their own front in September 1944, defended by only a few weak battalions and wide open for an allied breakthrough.

Why do you think the Americans were so blind to the possibility of a German counter-offensive and why did they discount the Ardennes as a location?

[Kiwiwriter]

Originally posted by angie999@Dec 13 2004, 09:27 AM
do you think the Americans were so blind to the possibility of a German counter-offensive and why did they discount the Ardennes as a location?

Quoted post

Allied intelligence failed hugely. One factor: the Germans avoided giving the game away through ULTRA by heavy use of land lines in communicating the plans. They also took a lot of good measures to protect secrecy, ranging from a code-name that suggested defense to moving up vehicles on beds of straw. There were some leaks: like loudly advertising Skorzeny's request for English-speaking troops, but the Germans did a great job of concealing the offensive. The Ardennes was not completely discounted. Gen. Monk Dickson, the intelligence officer for the 1st Army and staff pessimist, kept warning of an attack in the Ardennes, and was ignored to the point that he was on his way back to Paris for a rest when the offensive broke open. The thin line was the result of a worn-down US Army and a green one. New divisions needing to get "blooded" and old ones needing a rest were sent to hold the "Ghost Front" in the Ardennes, while Hodges kept expending men in the Huertgen and Patton built up for his drive into the Saar. The German offensive hit a "seam" in army and corps commands, a dangerous place. But Petain had it right..."The Ardennes is impenetrable...if certain preparations are made." The German offensive was a surprise. But it did not advance as quickly as its makers hoped, and within days, it was clear it would never reach the Meuse and Antwerp.

[Gnomey]

The offensive was called Wacht am Rhein (Defense of the Rhine in English I think). The Americans discounted the Ardennes as unsuitable for their tanks and so not suitable for offensive operations. It was a large orversight and poor intelligence which resulted from the German secrecy involving land lines instead of radio communications etc. However when the attack did come the Americans did well to slow the Germans down and managed to blow-up the fuel dumps that Hitler was planning on use to fuel his panzers on the offensive this led to low fuel and a slow down in the advance which halted on the 24th of December.