Could Operation Market-garden Have Succeeded?

[morse1001]

Needless to say, the Dutch knew of it's importance as did the Germans.... so why didn't we?

Put it down to arrogance, in the same way they failed to pick up on the tanks in the photo

[jimbotosome]

Ignore this post.

[Mark Hone]

The new book by Robin Neillands on the Arnhem/Rhine battles makes some interesting points. He has little time for the 'gun-to-the-head' story. He also puts much of the blame for the failure of Market Garden onto Gavin for not capturing Nijmegen Bridge at the start. His view is that the Americans have subsequently tried to offload responsibility onto the British, and most particularly Guards Armoured, for a job that they should have done in the first place, as a top priority. I hope I haven't misrepresented his argument, and he does praise the fighting qualities of the Americans but criticizes their planning and leadership. Rather turning the tables on the normal 'idiotic British' school of eg the film 'A Bridge Too Far'.

[angie999]

(Mark Hone @ Oct 19 2005, 06:26 AM) [post=40216]The new book by Robin Neillands on the Arnhem/Rhine battles makes some interesting points. [/b]

I think the most important thing in this new book, which I would strongly recommend, irrespective of where you stand on the issues, is what Neillands argues in the lack of a clear strategy once Eisenhower took over the role of ground force commander.

Specifically relating to Market-Garden, he points out that not only did 82nd Airborne not capture the Nijmegen bridges, they delayed taking Nijmegen town. Their priority was to take the Groesbeek heights to protect their flank in the event of a German counter-attack from the Reichwald, which did develop, but not for several days. He also points out that Groesbeek had been chosen by Browning as the location of his corps headquarters - when there was no role or purpose in the corps HQ being there in the first place - and I wonder how much pressure this put on Gavin, newly promoted to divisional commander and the most junior in rank, to divert an extra regiment there, which could easily have taken Nijmegen and the bridges on 17 September or early on 18 September.

Neillands, Robin: The Battle for the Rhine 1944, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 2005 (£20 UK price)

[sapper]

I know I am in danger or repitition here, but there are times in battle when it best to throw caution to the winds and go for the objective "hell for leather" No matter the odds! no matter the casualties! Go for it...

That was Arnhem....Everyone knew that the chances were slim...but at that time having chased the enemy across France, Belgium, and Holland, there was that one chance. I have heard many times about the single thrust up through the narrow roads Holland...That is blatantly incorrect. I know this for sure being I took part in the eastern thrust North. Via Lille St Hubert. Weert, Euvelwegen. up through to Mook ETC. Nijmegen.

It failed. but in the process we took a great deal of Holland, central and Eastern Holland.
Fortune favours the brave.

sapper

[plant-pilot]

(sapper @ Oct 19 2005, 11:56 AM) [post=40223]I know I am in danger or repitition here, but there are times in battle when it best to throw caution to the winds and go for the objective "hell for leather" No matter the odds! no matter the casualties! Go for it...

That was Arnhem....Everyone knew that the chances were slim...but at that time having chased the enemy across France, Belgium, and Holland, there was that one chance. I have heard many times about the single thrust up through the narrow roads Holland...That is blatantly incorrect. I know this for sure being I took part in the eastern thrust North. Via Lille St Hubert. Weert, Euvelwegen. up through to Mook ETC. Nijmegen.

It failed. but in the process we took a great deal of Holland, central and Eastern Holland.
Fortune favours the brave.

sapper
[/b]

I agree totally Sapper. But the question still has to be asked why, when there was obviously time to prepare the operation in some detail, why some really fundimental things were not even considered or advice ignored.

No denial that the men on the ground did their very best in the circumstances, but if your agument that it is sometimes worth taking a risk when the prize is high enough is taken as correct, then it also stands that if the prize is really that high then the planning as to be bold and take into account all possible eventualities to give the men on the ground the best possible chance of getting that big pirze.

You may say that the intelligence recieved of the number and types of German forces was ignored because the risk was concidered worth taking. But then much advice from the Dutch was ignored, even though it would have made the chances of getting and holding the bridge better. The decision to land 8 miles away from the bridge in order to save aircraft, the idea that the southern bank of the Rhein was too soft for gliders (in winter maybe, but not in September), the choice to split the insersion into three lifts over three days....... all examples that show inconsistencies in the 'go for it at any cost' idea.

If these inconsistencies point to anything other than the Division having planned to ignore all risk in order to get the bridge at any cost, the only other conclusion has to be that there was a failure in the planning to some extent.

And I would hope that everyone would agree that the troops on the ground that are expected to take those risks deserved the very best planning and commitment from the planners and leaders at all levels right to the top.

[sapper]

Lovely aint it? WE chase the enemy half way across europe, full tilt ..full bore..go for it, never mind the intellgence. Why stop with your trousers half down? Go for the full monty mate.. When you talk about planning,the war was at a highly fluid state. it was a real scramble. given the same chance today, would you take that outside chance? or would you sit on your hands waiting for something to happen???

If that would be your attitude? its a damn good job you were never in my Company..believe me! Colonel Tiger Urquehart RE would have had your guts for garters. And then some.......
Sapper

[plant-pilot]

Once again I agree with you to a point. But the operation WAS planned in great detail, and on the whole Market Garden achieved most of what it set out to do. No argument there. I'm in no way saying that it went badly, it could just have gone better. But to deny that mistakes were made at the planning stage is to deny that with a little more care during the recce and planning there could have been more success.

If the prize was so big, it was an oppertunity wasted by not planning it better. As a serving Engineer I know that the old saying 'time spent on recce is never wasted' is true and the same goes for planning. You may disagree, and I respect that, but there is a time for rushing in to get the bridge in, or the job done, but if you rush in with a flawed plan, in most cases you might as well not waste the resources.

You quote the saying 'Luck favours the brave'. I could paraphrase it by saying 'Luck favours the brave with the best plan'.

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[jimbotosome]

(Mark Hone @ Oct 19 2005, 01:26 AM) [post=40216]The new book by Robin Neillands on the Arnhem/Rhine battles makes some interesting points. He has little time for the 'gun-to-the-head' story. He also puts much of the blame for the failure of Market Garden onto Gavin for not capturing Nijmegen Bridge at the start. His view is that the Americans have subsequently tried to offload responsibility onto the British, and most particularly Guards Armoured, for a job that they should have done in the first place, as a top priority. I hope I haven't misrepresented his argument, and he does praise the fighting qualities of the Americans but criticizes their planning and leadership. Rather turning the tables on the normal 'idiotic British' school of eg the film 'A Bridge Too Far'.
[/b]

That's strange that he would take that attitude. Sounds like an attempt at blame shift.

Following the 82nd's action in Holland, Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey, British Second Army Commander, paid this tribute to Gen. Gavin:

"I'm proud to meet the Commanding General of the greatest division in the world today."

Doesn't sound like Dempsey agrees with Mr Neillands on Gavin. Do you think Mr Neilands knows something fundamental about the campaign that Dempsey didn't? It is amazing how suddenly brilliant book writers become when the people that saw what happened are gone and sixty years clicks off the calender.

[angie999]

(jimbotosome @ Oct 20 2005, 02:40 AM) [post=40281]
That's strange that he would take that attitude. Sounds like an attempt at blame shift.

[/b]

On the contrary, he argues that historians, particularly American historians, unfairly shifted the blame onto the Grenadier Guards - and in particular Major Carrington (who, incidentally, is still alive and well) for not advancing, unsupported by infantry, with a few tanks, at night, on a single road with deep ditches on either side, into a prepared German position after Nijmegen.

He is pointing out that in fact XXX Corps had to spend a lot of time and effort, together with 82nd Airborne, not just taking the Nijmegen bridges, but also the town. The purpose of dropping 82nd Airborne should have been to take the town and bridges and give XXX Corps a clear run.

He is in no way critical of the fighting qualities of 82nd Airborne. He is critical of the plan under which two of their regiments established positions on the Groesbeek Heights instead of taking the town.

Please just consider whether he has a point without jumping into the usual chauvanism in which US forces are beyond criticism.

Why don't you read the book?