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| Battle Specifics Topics relating to particular battles or operations. From Army and Corps movements down to skirmishes. |
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| | #1 (permalink) |
| Junior Member ![]() Join Date: Aug 2005
Posts: 20
![]() | Having recently completed my MA on British and German airborne troops, I have unsurprisingly conducted a substantial amount on the battle for Arnhem. One thing I have been considering is the likelyhood of the operation succeeding. Not Monty's "90% successful', but the successful capture and relief of Arnhem. I would be interested to see what other views people hold on this, what changes would need to be made (ones that do not benefit from hindsight!) and what would have been the likely outcome of a successful operation? For me the fundamental changes would have to be made at the planning level to achieve the greatest chance of success and these are all options available to the planners at the time. Failing that the operation may indeed have had better chances of success had things been done differently on the ground once the 1st Airborne had landed. I will post my ideas later... want to see what other people think first before influencing peoples ideas. |
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| | #2 (permalink) |
| WW2 Veteran ![]() Join Date: Nov 2004
Posts: 1,429
![]() ![]() | Ok Mate here it comes...... For all that is written, and all the conjecture, the constant reading of battle plans, the apportioning of blame. if there ever was any? What everyone has completely not taken into account, was the mood of the time. For here at Arnhem, was that one great magnificent chance to finish the war before Christmas..To run riot on the Northern plains of Germany, to spread out in one great overwhelming wave, to get to Berlin, and take the best part of Germany as ours! All that great prize lay before us...what glittering treasures....many thousands of young lives saved. All that we strived for since 1939, now lay just ahead. Victory, and Germany would be ours....A hell of a long shot. a hell of a small chance of it succeeding. But if it did? What then? Indeed, what then. Think now of the battles that were to come after Arnhem, the many thousands that were to be killed and maimed. Now let me ask you....You know the risk you know the prize, What would you do? Me? I would take that long risk, for if it had come off? what treaures what treasures! Sapper |
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| | #3 (permalink) |
| Senior Member ![]() Join Date: Jun 2005 Location: British Columbia, Canada
Posts: 120
![]() | I think the presence of the SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area precluded any chance of success in the Market-Garden operation. Although the two SS divisions present were under strength, they possessed more than enough combat power to make life very difficult for the lightly armed troopers of the British 1st. Airborne Division. More anti-tank batteries could have been included in the British drop, but the problem of resupply still remains, in what Allied commanders should have seen was going to be more than just a 3-4 day battle. The availability of close air support would have made up for much of the lack of fire power the Airborne forces suffered, but considering the British radio problems, FAC would have been difficult. Fighter-bombers also would have conflicted with the large number of transport aircraft in the area. I personally don't see that there was any hope of success in Market-Garden when the SS Panzer Corps was acting like the cork in a bottle. The Allies needed to deliver enough combat power to remove that cork, and it wasn't possible under the conditions present at that time and place.
__________________ "Retreat Hell! We're just attacking in a different direction." (Major General Oliver P. Smith USMC responding to reporters when asked why the 1st Marines were withdrawing from the Chosin Reservoir, December 1950.) |
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| | #4 (permalink) |
| Senior Member ![]() Join Date: Jan 2005
Posts: 949
![]() | It was never going to be an easy operation, no matter how big the potential prize at the end of it. There are two things that could possibly been done differently although none would have seemed too good an idea at the time. Firstly, the plans as they were broke what has become one of the golden rules of airborne operations. All the troops need for the operation need to be inserted on the same lift. Difficult as the RAF and the US Air Force said that they were short of aircraft. In hindsight, if they and put the whole division in on the one lift, they may have needed more aircraft, but they wouldn't have lost as many because they had lost the element of surprise on the second lift. With the whole division on the ground at the same time they wouldn't have had to leave so many troops to defend the DZs & LZs ready for the second lift and the chances are that they could have got more of a hold on the bridge. Secondly, they should have got at least a brigade down on the area to the south of the bridge. The area was classed as unstable for gliders and was rejected as a DZ because of the areas of flak that the aircraft would have had to fly over. If the general thought was that which Sapper describes then the risk should have been worth taking, possibly if this area was the first to be used the element of surprise could have possibly kept losses to a minimum, and if enough paratroopers could have been dropped a lot closer to the bridge they could possibly have at least got the bridge, and waited for their heavy equipment to arrive the Landing Zones. I know it's easy after the event, knowing that they were facing more than they expected, but the question was asked.
__________________ M3... the ship of the desert 2003
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| | #5 (permalink) |
| Junior Member ![]() Join Date: Aug 2005
Posts: 20
![]() | Sapper - Agree wholeheartedly! Dac - Not sure I can agree with you on the presence of the SS in the area as being the main reason for failure. On the whole the tanks that were available to them were obviously limited in urban combat while the paras remained supplied and required close support from their grenadiers to be used effectively. As for close air support, I think its usefulness would have been limited in an urban area where it would have been difficult to distinguish one side from anither. My feeling is that the plan, although risky, was well worth the attempt. With a few minor changes the chances of success can be dramatically increased... Some quick examples... Fly two drops on day one allowing the 1st Airborne to land complete and advance to Arnhem 'en-masse' without the need to retain security over the drop zones. This was suggested at the time, but rejected over fears of the strain it would place on transport pilots and crews. Release the infomation that the SS Pnz Korps was in the area to the battalion commanders. Frost states that had he know of the opposition he would have made adequate preparations to face them. He felt that if he had know he could have changed his equipment allocations and taken more A/T weaponary at the expense of mortars. He states that he feels confident that had more A/T weaponary been taken then the possibility for success would have increased. This is an interesting point, but somewhat at odds with other facts. There was a reasonable supply of PIAT ammo for most of the battle, what may have been the problem was the unsuitability of the PIAT launcher for airborne drops. It was noted during Normandy that the PIAT was easily damaged during parachute and glider drops. My first change would be to land all of 1st Airborne on Day One. This would have allowed the force much greater local superiority and would have allowed a far stronger position in Arnhem to be maintained. Re-supply still remains a problem, but not an insurmountable one. Further to this the decision to advance into Arnhem on a three battalion front was to prove unwise. What may have been a better option was to have chosen a single battalion advance, with the rest in support, to push a corridor through to the bridge. Had this method of advance been utilised, with a 'charger' like Frost at the head then it is a possibility several battalions would have reached the bridge with a line to the drop-zones. Whether this could have been held till the rest of 1st Airborne and the Poles arrived is difficult to ascertain. Of course had the whole of 1st Airborne arrived on Day One this would not be an issue, nor would the bad weather in England. |
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| | #7 (permalink) |
| Junior Member ![]() Join Date: Aug 2005
Posts: 20
![]() | Plant-Pilot - The problem with the landing areas south of the bridge were not known to the British. While the flak at Deelen airfield was over estimated, most was dummy positions, and the ground was suitable for landings, the actual area suggested was occupied by several SS Alarm companies. Had the Paras landed there then the element of surprise would have been quickly lost! There may have been the possibility of a glider 'coup de main' onto the bridge, as at Pegasus Bridge, but this would have required months of preparation and training for the glider pilots. Without such time to prepare the 'coup de main' may have suffered severe loss on the way in. Ironically, the German commanders Student and Kesselring commented that landing a distance from the objective was not a mistake and that it was sometime before the German defence was clear as to the British objective. Von Der Heydte also commented that a properly equpped parachute force could have dropped over the town itself! On the whole, all things considered, it does seem strange that no risk was taken to land a force at the South end. Especially after the operations in Normandy, but the short time frame has to be considered as precluding any difficult landing operations without the chance of training options for the pilots. |
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| | #8 (permalink) |
| Senior Member ![]() Join Date: Jun 2005 Location: British Columbia, Canada
Posts: 120
![]() | There's no doubt that the rapidity with which Market-Garden was planned and carried out played a key role in the problems that its' forces later encountered. The situation in the field was very fluid in the weeks leading up to M-G. The German forces were in full retreat and I'm sure it looked to many Allied commanders in Sept. 1944 that organized German opposition had crumbled. The German forces on the other hand rallied quickly under Von Rundsted and I think the conditions under which M-G was originally conceived no longer existed when it was mounted. As for the SS Panzers at Arnhem their use in the city itself was limited but they were able to control the area around the city including drop zones and the southern approaches to the bridge. Their artillery and assault weapons were also used to bring heavy fire on the battalion holding the north end of the bridge.
__________________ "Retreat Hell! We're just attacking in a different direction." (Major General Oliver P. Smith USMC responding to reporters when asked why the 1st Marines were withdrawing from the Chosin Reservoir, December 1950.) |
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| | #9 (permalink) |
| WW2 Veteran ![]() Join Date: Nov 2004
Posts: 1,429
![]() ![]() | What is apparent to me, is that no one can understand the atmosphere of those times.......That one glorious chance? Worth a thousand Lives? No one would have a word to say in your favour if it went wrong. But there on the horizon stood the glittering prize. The prize for those brave enough to grasp it. I should have thought that the Americans with their traditional "Gung ho" would have applauded that. Just think, there would have been no Berlin air lift or a cold war, Germany would have been in Allied hands We tried! I went over Nijmegen Bridge just after it was taken, and went some way towards Arnhem. Sapper |
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