The Red Army and its rise from the Ashes

[Gotthard Heinrici]

They were indeed Lee and yes the battle of Kharkov showed that the Russians were still incapable of holding the strategic initiative against the Germans. However Kursk changed all that forever.

[deadb_tch]

Originally Posted by 4th wilts

it must be remembered even after stslingrad,that the germans were still very capable of kicking the russians in the face,so to speak.the recapture of kharkov springs to mind.lee.

But after that re-capture were re-re-capture by soviet forces and that was real mark of their strong

[Za Rodinu]

Originally Posted by 4th wilts

it must be remembered even after stslingrad,that the germans were still very capable of kicking the russians in the face,so to speak.the recapture of kharkov springs to mind.lee.

It springs to mind as an exercise of overconfidence, but please remark that as time wore on such opportunities were getting scarcer and scarcer.

[drgslyr]

Originally Posted by Gotthard Heinrici

funny you should bring up Von Manstein as a source on this.

I have posted a link to an interesting article about Von Manstein. Note that the author does not give a whole lot of credence to Von Manstein's biography

Axis History Factbook: Erich von Manstein: His Life, Character and Operations – A Reappraisal

Yes, the author wrote a nice anti-Manstein propaganda piece, in which nearly every sentence has something negative to say about Mantstein. I'm sure that the author was being completely objective and impartial when he wrote the article; and of course everything he has written should be taken for granted because... well, because he says so.

I can't find a passage in the article where the author accuses Manstein of lying in his autobiography, where the author has anything other than unsubstantiated evidence or hearsay to support his claim. I'm not supporting the idea that Manstein was perfect (which I don't believe he ever claimed to be), but I'm pretty sure he wasn't promoted time and again throughout his military career because he was an incompetent lout.

Manstein was a military genius who had his hands tied by Hitler's bungling interference in strategic matters, and it will take more than a hack writer to convince me otherwise.

[Gotthard Heinrici]

I'm not so sure that Manstein was a military genius, he was certainly a brilliant general but the word genius is a word bandied about far too much when talking about some Generals. I'm not saying that he was an incompetant lout, he was by far one of the best Germany had. Comparing him to Rommel or even Guderian and he comes out very favourably. But as regards his book "Lost Victories" he certainly paints a very high picture of himself and I'm not sure I would put him on the same pedestal as he would put himself on. Its universally accepted now that the German General's memoirs, whilst fulfilling the task of providing great insight into the minds of the Wehrmacht High Command, can also be seen as self-serving too. "I was shackled by the lunatic in Berlin" was a theme that runs through many of the memoirs and, yes there is absolutely no question that Hitler impeded his generals. But its also easy to place the reasons for defeat on the head of a dead man, for he cannot refute the allegations. You will also notice in many of these works that the Soviet army is referred to as a Horde, they speak of positions being overrun by "waves and waves" of Soviets "who just kept coming". They give very little credit to the strategic operations that the Soviet army was beginning to develop and towards the end the generals always blame the poor state of the Wehrmacht as opposed to their foe being a better enemy who was better equipped, more numerous and better Commanders. The likes of Rokossovski, Malinovsky and Vatutin would give any German General, yet you wont find any of these being mentioned in a German General's memoirs. I'm not saying that these works are wrong, but you must read them in a particular context and read between the lines. The Eastern Front was not Black and White, and taking any memoirs at face value can be dangerous.

[von Poop]

Manstein was certainly no great shakes as an author... Lost Victories is one of the most turgid books by a WW2 commander I've ever read.

[Capt.Sensible]

Originally Posted by von Poop

Manstein was certainly no great shakes as an author... Lost Victories is one of the most turgid books by a WW2 commander I've ever read.

Mellenthin's Panzer Battles is also rather dull but does have it's moments...

Amazon.com: Panzer Battles : A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War: F. W. von Mellenthin: Books


H

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Originally Posted by Capt.Sensible

Mellenthin's Panzer Battles is also rather dull but does have it's moments...

Amazon.com: Panzer Battles : A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War: F. W. von Mellenthin: Books


H

His description of the attack to relieve Stalingrad is very readable but again it sinks into the common themes that I have outlined already. Good mention though Capt!

[Za Rodinu]

Originally Posted by Gotthard Heinrici

They were indeed Lee and yes the battle of Kharkov showed that the Russians were still incapable of holding the strategic initiative against the Germans. However Kursk changed all that forever.

However if you read Mar. Sokolovsky's "Soviet Military Strategy" you'll find on the chapter on the Great Patriotic War that this Khakov débacle was caused by one single Army (can't rememeber which and I'll only get the book back tomorrow!) that not only was given an excessively optimistic mission without being properly supported by paralell armies. This lesson was learnt wand you don't hear again of any 'Manstein Backhand Slaps" again. What happened to Tank Group Popov was that it was employed as a primitive Operational Manouevre Group with an unrefined technique. Again another instance for Lessons Learned.

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

However if you read Mar. Sokolovsky's "Soviet Military Strategy" you'll find on the chapter on the Great Patriotic War that this Khakov débacle was caused by one single Army (can't rememeber which and I'll only get the book back tomorrow!) that not only was given an excessively optimistic mission without being properly supported by paralell armies. This lesson was learnt wand you don't hear again of any 'Manstein Backhand Slaps" again. What happened to Tank Group Popov was that it was employed as a primitive Operational Manouevre Group with an unrefined technique. Again another instance for Lessons Learned.

I would agree with you Za, it seems that Tukhachevskii's legacy started to bear fruit around this time with the Soviet Armies beginning to apply the theories he espoused about Deep Operations. Two examples of this would be Operation Bagration which destroyed Army Group Centre and the Vistula/Oder Operation.