"I know. The thought of it turns my stomach!!"

[Gotthard Heinrici]

So Hitler said when he thought about the idea of launching Operation Citadel or as is more commonly known, the battle of Kursk. Field Marshal Model was against it ,Manstein was uncomfortable with, Guderian was opposed to it. For once the was near unanimity amongst the German High Command yet they went ahead anyway. The only person chiefly advocating it seemed to be Kurt Zeitzler.
Given that even had they broken through the defences they would not have had the forces to keep the Russians encircled never mind forcing them to surrender.

Manstein was in favor of a “Backslap” offensive, drawing the Russians into the Don bass and attacking southwards towards what would be an overextended Russian front and entrap any Russian divisions contained there.

I suppose I am asking two questions here

• Why do you think that they still went ahead with it?
• Could the Germans have refrained from attacking in the East in 1943 or were they in a no-win situation?

Here is a link to a page about the battle:


Kursk Page

[Zoya]

Ok, this will probably be more my 'feeling' than historical 'fact', but I think the answers lies in more than just military terms. Hitler was fighting a war on three fronts in his head: military, ideological and psychological. One could argue that on a military level, Kursk was a disaster waiting to happen from the start. If Hitler had been coming at it from this angle only, then he may not have commited himself to another offensive.

But, ideologically, Hitler could not accept deafeat, nor reatreat from an enemy whom he classed as inferior and "untermensch" in every way. To do so would have wiped out the idelogical foundation upon which the Third Reich was built. In a sense, Hitler was commited to a fight to the death, whoever went down with him. He saw the Wehrmacht, and eventually the German citizens, as dispensible in the fight for supremacy, as can be seen in his attitude to the impending fall of Berlin. For him the war against the Bolsheviks was a religious crusade. One can see this attitude reflected in the following quote:

If the war is lost, the nation will also perish. This fate is inevitable. There is no necessity to take into consideration the basis which the people will need to continue a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it will be better to destroy things ourselves because this nation will have proved to be the weaker one and the future will belong solely to the stronger eastern nation [Russia]. Besides, those who remain after the battle are only the inferior ones, for the good ones have been killed.
Adolf Hitler
On his infamous March 1945 'scorched earth' directive that Germany be made one vast wasteland, explaining it to Albert Speer

Psychologically, Hitler was probably on the edge of a syphilis-induced insanity (which also explains his tremors), was possibly suffering from borderline personality disorder and was obviously a narcissistic personality. All of these things would have affected the nature of his military decisions. In short, Hitler's belief in himself as the saviour of Germany, a God-like figure, would have re-inforced his constant theme in rhetoric, of 'no capitulation'. This is most likely why, even until the 11th hour, Hitler was virtually incapable of ordering a retreat, even when the evidence in front of him screamed that all was lost, and victory was a hopeless dream.

Add all these things together, and Operation Zitadelle, despite the thought of it turning Hitler's stomach, makes terrible sense.

Thanks for the link, GH. I found another Soviet War Poem for my thread!

[kfz]

Attack somewhere else, go back for Moscow, anything rather than attack a well prepared defense. By this stage Hitler was just blind to the truth. Crazy.

[4th wilts]

would it have been possible for the whermact to withdraw to a strong defensible position,while it at least had some strength,a river perhaps.ukrane was still in german territory,so the living space of mein kampf was in fact still under hitlers rule.yours.lee.

[Za Rodinu]

Originally Posted by Gotthard Heinrici

Manstein was in favor of a “Backslap” offensive, drawing the Russians into the Don bass and attacking southwards towards what would be an overextended Russian front and entrap any Russian divisions contained there.

Backslap my backside. You are referring to the Kharkov offensive May '42. Von Manstein's victory here was facilitated by deficient strategic cooperation, where Southwstern Front in the direction of Kharkov became isolated and was left without the active support of adjacent fronts. This enabled the enemy to deliver strong attacks at the flanks of the attack group of SW Front, wich resulted in the defeat of its offensive forces. That mistake was studied and hardly repeated.

[Herroberst]

What about hitting the Russian line in areas away from the Kursk Salient? I like the Manstein tactic. The Russians seemed to overextend quite a bit. But if the line could be hit in weak areas the Russians would have to reinforce and slow their offensive. However tactical retreats would be the order of the day and this of course would not be to Hitler's liking. Hitlers inability to adapt to the flow of the battlefield pretty much doomed any chance of victory or possible negotiated peace.

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

Backslap my backside. You are referring to the Kharkov offensive May '42. Von Manstein's victory here was facilitated by deficient strategic cooperation, where Southwstern Front in the direction of Kharkov became isolated and was left without the active support of adjacent fronts. This enabled the enemy to deliver strong attacks at the flanks of the attack group of SW Front, wich resulted in the defeat of its offensive forces. That mistake was studied and hardly repeated.

Za, I'm not referring to the 1942 operation. It was a proposal by Von Manstein that is referred to in the book "Battle of Kursk" by Robin Cross.

[Za Rodinu]

Originally Posted by Gotthard Heinrici

Za, I'm not referring to the 1942 operation. It was a proposal by Von Manstein that is referred to in the book "Battle of Kursk" by Robin Cross.

And I'm telling you that Manstein's Backhand Victory worked because the Stavka had let SW front overextend, without giving consideration enough to flank support. They didn't fall for the same error again.

[Za Rodinu]

Originally Posted by Herroberst

What about hitting the Russian line in areas away from the Kursk Salient?

Are you nuts? With the masses the Red Army had concentrated in the Kursk Salient and behind? They were just waiting for the German offensive to peter out so they could launch their own counter-offensives: google up Operations Kutuzov and Rumiantsev, what happened after Zitadelle lost steam. If the front would remain stable the Red offensive would be launched anyway, and this time without the losses suffered during the Kursk battle.

Then the GERMANS would have a problem, not the other way round!

By the way, while the battle of Prokhorovka still raged, Op. Kutuzov was already in full swing, on the north shoulder of the Kursk salient 9th and II Pz Army were cracking up already, hit by three Fronts!

And Ruminatsev was started after the Stavka created a little diversion expressly for the purpose further south on the Mius river, diverting the remainder of II SS PzK (minus LSSAH gone to Italy). Please give the Red Army some credit

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

And I'm telling you that Manstein's Backhand Victory worked because the Stavka had let SW front overextend, without giving consideration enough to flank support. They didn't fall for the same error again.

I completely agree with you Za. No arguments from on this one.