Why Did Russia Sign The Nonaggression Pact?

[ghvalj]

Was it simply because they weren't ready for war? I don't understand this part of history very well so anyone who can explain this to me will go to bed knowing they helped a poor fool further his knowledge repertoire.

[smc66]

To buy time, Stalin wanted both Germany and the West to destroy each other so he could then move in and get what he wanted. To a degree Marxist-Leninist ideology states that capitalism will destroy itself and Stalin believed that this was the moment that it was happening.

Secondly, the USSR were still fighting Japan in Manchuria/Mongolia a conflict that did not end until the middle of August 1939. Stalin did not wish to commit himself to any fighting in Europe until the danger of Japanese invasion from the East had completely cleared up.

[Kiwiwriter]

Also, Stalin did not believe the British and French were serious about fighting Germany, so he sought to make an accommodation to make sure his nation survived. Stalin's specialty was the iron fist at home, the flexible glove abroad.

[Michal_Dembinski]

Greetings from Warsaw.

I subscribe to the Viktor Suvorov line that the USSR signed the non-aggression pact as a step towards the invasion of Nazi Germany. Stalin needed a direct land border with the Third Reich. I entirely agree with Suvorov that 'The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945' is a myth concocted after the war; the Soviet Union kicked off WW2 alongside Hitler in September 1939.

Between Sept 1939 and June 1941, Hitler invaded western Poland, France, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Greece and was repulsed by Britain. Stalin invaded eastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, eastern Slovakia, Moldavia and was repulsed by Finland.

Today I toured the River Bug Valley (two hours drive east from Warsaw) looking at the Soviet-built bunkers from 1940. The Soviets were on the aggression trail from 1939 onwards.

Suvarov is good on materiel - the myth of 'obsolete' Sovet tanks - anyone fancy taking on a BT-7 (diesel engine, 45mm main gun) with a Pzkpfw I or II? And the numbers too... the Red Army had armour superiority of four or five to one against the Wehrmacht.

Michael

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Originally posted by Michal_Dembinski@Mar 28 2005, 09:07 PM
Greetings from Warsaw.

I subscribe to the Viktor Suvorov line that the USSR signed the non-aggression pact as a step towards the invasion of Nazi Germany. Stalin needed a direct land border with the Third Reich. I entirely agree with Suvorov that 'The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945' is a myth concocted after the war; the Soviet Union kicked off WW2 alongside Hitler in September 1939.

Between Sept 1939 and June 1941, Hitler invaded western Poland, France, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Greece and was repulsed by Britain. Stalin invaded eastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, eastern Slovakia, Moldavia and was repulsed by Finland.

Today I toured the River Bug Valley (two hours drive east from Warsaw) looking at the Soviet-built bunkers from 1940. The Soviets were on the aggression trail from 1939 onwards.

Suvarov is good on materiel - the myth of 'obsolete' Sovet tanks - anyone fancy taking on a BT-7 (diesel engine, 45mm main gun) with a Pzkpfw I or II? And the numbers too... the Red Army had armour superiority of four or five to one against the Wehrmacht.

Michael

Quoted post

I'm not quite sure what you mean about the "myth" of "obsolete" Soviet tanks. For a start the Germans didnt use the pzfkw I in Operation Barbarossa, it was replaced after the invasion of Poland from front line service. And the PzKfw II was being reduced from service at that time too. And I'd take a Mark III over a BT-7 any day, especially when the Soviets were lagging seriously behind in areas such as command and control . The German High Command considered the Red Army to be a Rotten Structure, one kick and it will come tumbling down! Especially after the purges removed such commanders as Tukhachevsky who had studied and understood the need for a modernised and efficient force. It was proven during the Initial invasion that the Red Army was woefully ill prepared for the attack that was about to happen and I dont mean changing to a defensive force as Suvorov asserts. If I am correct Suvorov makes the point that Stalin had prepared his army to be used in an offensive capacity only. I find it hard to believe that an army is prepared for a purely offensive role only and that the defeats the Red Army suffered was due to the fact that it could only attack!!!! If that was the case then surely it would have defeated the Finns far quicker and with less casualties!

The Soviet Dispositions at the border in 1941 were set up with a view towards forward defense, rather like the NATO strategy for the defense of western Europe. Stalin hoped to counter any possible attack as close to the Russian Border as possible in order to minimise the effects of a war on Russian Soil. The idea of defense in Depth was not high on Stalins Agenda. Suvorov states that Stalin was about to Attack Germany and yet his biggest force, the Southwestern Front, which was stationed in Ukraine was deployed moreso with a view to attacking Rumania rather than an attack into Germany. Why concentrate your biggest forces away from your only direct point of attack against your enemy??? Suvorov indeed concedes that an operation against Rumania was on the cards but to be honest it seems unlikely that if the Red Army was about to take on the best army in Europe, it would concentrate its biggest formation against the lowly Rumanians, even if the objective was the Ploesti oilfields.

[Friedrich H]

I agree with the reasons mentioned above by Smc and Kiwi, but I also will add that:

Stalin loved the idea of destroying Poland, a traditional enemy of the Russians, Ukrainians and Bielorrussians, and an even greater enemy of communism. Personally, Stalin had yet fresh in his memory his defeat in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920.

Getting a common border with Germany and a window to the West, getting power over half Poland and the Baltic States were too great to despise a Pact with the ideological arch-enemy.

Suvarov is good on materiel - the myth of 'obsolete' Sovet tanks - anyone fancy taking on a BT-7 (diesel engine, 45mm main gun) with a Pzkpfw I or II? And the numbers too... the Red Army had armour superiority of four or five to one against the Wehrmacht.

A tank is more than just a balance on paper of armour, speed and gun calibre. The tactical doctrine, the use given to the tanks, the communications and crew dispositions make the difference. The perfect example of that is the Battle of France and the early war in North Africa, where Allied supperiority in quantity and technology were outmatched by German performance.

For a start the Germans didnt use the pzfkw I in Operation Barbarossa, it was replaced after the invasion of Poland from front line service. For a start the Germans didnt use the pzfkw I in Operation Barbarossa, it was replaced after the invasion of Poland from front line service.

Not really. These light tanks served all the way from Poland, the Low Countries and France, Scandinavia, the Balcans and the Soviet Union. And, at least the Mk II, could very well take most Soviet tanks of the time.

[Michal_Dembinski]

Originally posted by Gotthard Heinrici@Mar 30 2005, 01:32 PM
The German High Command considered the Red Army to be a Rotten Structure, one kick and it will come tumbling down! Especially after the purges removed such commanders as Tukhachevsky who had studied and understood the need for a modernised and efficient force.

Quoted post

Hi Gotthard... Good to have a debate with someone who's actually read Suvorov!

Stalin could not believe that Hitler, lacking in supplies, transport, oil and winterised equipment, would dare attack the USSR. He considered (prior to Barbarossa) that such action would be suicidal - and was subsequently proved right.

Stalin dismantled the Stalin line - for defence in depth - and moved his force to the jumping off points. I go along with Suvorov that Stalin was weeks - maybe even days - away from launching 'Operation Groza' - the planned 'liberation' of central and western Europe - when Hitler struck.

If Stalin was not preparing offensive warfare against Nazi Germany, what did he need so many paratroopers, amphibious tanks and other equipment that had little relevance in a defensive war?

Michal from Warsaw

[Friedrich H]

If Stalin was not preparing offensive warfare against Nazi Germany, what did he need so many paratroopers, amphibious tanks and other equipment that had little relevance in a defensive war?

To date, there's no actual proof of that. There certainly were many plans in the minds of military leaders like marshals Timoshienko and Zhúkov, who in 1940 had developed a plan for a pre-emptive attack on Germany in summer 1942 or 1943. But Stalin refused to consider any plan hostile to Germany. No document to date has suggested that Stalin had any intentions of attacking Hitler.

Saying the contrary is thinking about Stalin's own thoughts…

[Friedrich H]

As stated by David M. Glantz:

'On 15th May 1941, General G. K. Zhúkov, then Chief of the Red Army General Staff, sent Stalin a proposal for a preventative offensive against German forces concentrating in Eastern Poland. Although Defense Commissar S. K. Timoshienko initialed the proposal, there is no evidence either that Stalin saw it or acted upon it. The proposal and other fragmentary evidence provides the basis for recent claims that Stalin indeed intended to conduct a preventative war against Germany beginning in July 1941 and that Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa preempted Stalin’s intended actions. Current evidence refutes that assertion. As subsequent events and archival evidence proves, the Red Army was in no condition to wage war in the summer of 1941 either offensively or, as the actual course of combat indicated, defensively.'

[Gotthard Heinrici]

In response to the assertion that the Red Army was about to attack Germany and that Germany was about to beat them to the punch, well I am inclined to disagree.

Between 1935 and 1940 the Red army held large scale exercises, all of which were concerned with the DEFENSE of the Soviet union if attacked by a hostile force. In the 1935 wargames the scenario envisaged USSR being attacked by a combined force of Germany and Poland. In 1940 it changed only in that Poland was wiped off the map. The Russians never believed up to 1939 that Poland would collapse and be integrated by Germany. After all, Poland had quite a substantial Army herself and had allied herself with France and Britain. Russia expected that Poland would be part of an attacking force. The Red Army had not undertaken any large scale wargames which envisaged a large scale offensive on the part of the Red Army. Not once did they hold wargames pertaining to an attack of Germany. Friedrich H makes reference to the one and only document that corroborate Suvorov’s evidence and this is the cornerstone on which he hangs his theory. If you are going to attack someone, it normally requires immense planning and usually documents exist to back this up in the form of minutes of meetings, plans, proposed orders of battle and this doesn’t exist.

Soviet Military Doctrine ground to a halt following the show trials of 1938. It remained virtually the same as Tukhachevski’s introduction to the 1936 field service regulations. This presumed that any future war would be a “Imperialist coalition” directed AGAINST the USSR, “Bringing a protracted conflict necessitating total mobilization” (Keegan, Road to Stalingrad). There were arguments between Tukhachevski and Vorisholov (as Defence Commander) over the most practical way to pursue this. Tukhachevski envisaged that the offense would take pride of place in any future doctrine and believed that this should be the dominant approach. The Theorists of this investigated offensive breakthrough operations at army and Front Levels. They began to expound upon the ideas of the USSR having 2 armies in 1, the first would be a powerful striking mobile force and the second the conventional “steamroller”. This argument lasted until 1937 when it was cut brutally short by the purges and Vorisholov found himself in the ascendancy. A revised version of the 1936 regulations was published in which the offensive was assigned a primary role, in the event of an enemy attack. In this case, the Red Army would take the offensive and carry the war to the enemy. As John Keegan states in “The Road To Stalingrad”: “Victory would be achieved by the complete destruction of the enemy. Decisive victory at low cost”
It is crucial to note that the regulations stated that this was to happen only in the event of an enemy attack, not preceding one as Suvorov states.

Suvorov makes the point that the Red Army was being trained purely in an offensive role and points to the fact that the Red Army had 1 million men trained as parachutists. This stems from a directive from the Central Committee instructing the Peoples Commissariat for War and Naval Affairs to draw up plans for organising partisan cadres to operate behind enemy lines and the building of rear bases from which the partisans could operate. These partisans would be trained in the use of foreign weapons, the use of high speed communications and the use of prpachutists. The idea was expounded by Marshal Yakir and was shelved following his execution in 1938. Indeed the whole “Partisan Bases” idea was shelved including the parachutists, once the “Victory at low cost” doctrine held sway. Once Barbarossa started and Stalin agreed to use partisans, the plans that were used dated back to the Civil War of 1919, not the partisan parachutists that Suvorov refers to.

I have already made reference to the deployment of Soviet forces and stand by this. The Southwestern Front was Russia’s biggest, yet it was not deployed to attack Germany. Why not? Yes the Russians had their forces deployed in forward areas but this related to the doctrine that I have outlined earlier. The Soviets saw what the Germans did to the Maginot Line and decided that the Stalin Line was a white elephant, which was the reason for the dismantling of it.


Friedrich, I take your point about the PzKfw I and having consulted Bryan Perrett’s “Knights of the Black Cross” I stand corrected. They were still in service and used in Russia and North Africa.

Great posts Gentlemen, I am enjoying our discussion!!!