Why Is Stalingrad So Important?

[ghvalj]

Can anyone explain why that battle was so significant?

[Kiwiwriter]

Well, that would take a book or a Master's Thesis, but Stalingrad erased the largest single Army in the German arsenal from its inventory, obliterating scores of divisions and their men. It was the first time a Field Marshal went in the bag. It was the end of the Germans controlling the initiative and offensives in the East. After that, they were limited to counterattacks -- big ones, like Manstein's and Kursk, but counterattacks all the same. It had a huge impact on German morale, bringing the first cracks in the Nazi facade. After Stalingrad (and very much too late), Goebbels called for "Total War" in a Germany that was still producing Bechstein pianos. Stalingrad was part of a crescendo of Axis defeats during a 90-day period that turned the war around: Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Alamein, and the Barents Sea. I would have to say that the big point in Stalingrad was that before that battle, Nazi propaganda was about Germany's "New Order" for Europe and the world. After Stalingrad, the tone shifted. Suddenly Germany was now the defender of Western civilization against Bolshevism. Even Goebbels recognized that Germany as on the defensive after Stalingrad.

[Friedrich H]

Stalingrad frustrated all the German strategy for 1942, which was meant to seize the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, thus depriving the Soviets of this very important resource, and the Germans acquiring it.

In summer 1942, the enormous Army Group 'South' fought back and defeated a Soviet offensive in the II Battle of Khárkov, then moved on Rostov and then split. Army Groups 'A' and 'B' were created. Army Group 'A' headed south, towards Bakú, whilst 'B' group advanced towards the Don plains and River Volga, thus forming a defensive northern flank for 'A' group.

Army Group 'B', under colonel general Von Weichs, was short of manpower and could not actually defend all the Volga-Voroznieh line, and it had to be reinforced with Allied armies: II Hungarian, VIII Italian, III and IV Romanian. This group, however, had the largest field army of III Reich: the German VI (under general Friedrich Paulus), which comprised almost 22 veteran regular German divisions (3 Panzer) and was reinforced by IV Panzer Army.

The problem was German weakness, because there was not enough air nor armoured power to support both groups simultaneously. Thus, the IV Air Fleet, covering the entire southern front, when focused at Stalingrad, left all Army Group 'A' to the Red Air Force. Also, I Panzer Army, heading south, could not encircle any large Soviet force on its own. IV Panzer Army was sent south to assist I Panzer Army, but then was re-called northwards to assist VI Army to encircle the defenders of Stalingrad in open ground. The final result was that IV Panzer Army did not support any army and the Soviet defenders broke through and withdrew, saving the bulk of their forces.

Stalingrad was the largest and most important industrial city of the region, but it was soon bombed and destroyed by the Luftwaffe. After that, it didn't have much military value, in fact, it made the front longer and created a dangerous salient in the German line. But Hitler wanted the city because of its name, and Stalin wanted the city for the same reason.

Now, once the fierce urban fight at Stalingrad started, Hitler became more and more obsessed with its capture, and forgot about the general German strategy; once the Caucasus offensive was halted by the Red Army, it was forgotten, and all German attention focused on that miserable heap of ruins called Stalingrad. Stalin, in the other hand, even if interested in keeping the city por propagandistic aims, did not buy Hitler's game and left the German Army bleed itself in that place of no value, whilst the Red Army strenghtened and organised worth offensives.

At the city, a WWI-like fighting erupted, in which the Germans had every possible disadvantage, except numbers.

The German command structure worked with divisions. The Soviets worked with 12-men squads.

German all-arms co-ordination was impossible at Stalingrad, since Panzer and air crews had not been trained in urban fighting. Besides, all radio and telephone personnel, messengers and artillery and Luftwaffe observers were shot at the spot by Soviet snipers. These Soviet snipers were observers too, and they provided Soviet artillery (quietly laying in the opposite bank of the Volga) with valuable information. Therefore, when the Germans massed troops for an attack, enemy artillery soon destroyed their concentrations and disrupted or weakened attacks.

Also, the Luftwaffe's bombardments had made the terrain perfectly suited for defence, and it miserably failed at cutting the Volga communications and neutralising Soviet artillery.

The fighting in the city, from August to November 1942 costed the VI and IV Panzer German armies 150.000 casualties.

On November 1942, a series of Soviet offensives started, having all possible advantages on their side and performing incredibly well, and rapidly encircled 250.000 German and Romanian troops. On February 1943, only 110.000 remained and surrendered.

More Soviet offensives in winter 1942 against Army Group 'B' destroyed the armies: II German, II Hungarian, VIII Italian, III and IV Romanian and created gaps 100 km long. Army Group 'A' didn't suffered as much, and it was only when field marshal Von Manstein, commanding the improvised Army Group 'Don', managed to stabilise the front and prevent collapse and destroyed the Soviet offensive at the III Battle of Khárkov in early 1943.

In all, Army Group 'South' lost 700.000 men from summer 1942 until spring 1943. This was, without a doubt and definately, the momment when the tide of the war went agaisnt Germany.

[mason]

Originally posted by ghvalj@Mar 28 2005, 02:57 PM
Can anyone explain why that battle was so significant?

Quoted post

stalingrad was important because germany needed the oil feilds. I think thats why they wre also fighting in the desert.

[morse1001]

Originally posted by mason+Apr 17 2005, 05:42 AM-->

stalingrad was important because germany needed the oil feilds. I think thats why they wre also fighting in the desert.

Quoted post

[/b]

What must be remembered was that Stalingrad was taken because of Hitler's orders, otherwise military thinking for centuries said that it is better to leave fortresses and cities alone until ready and the germans were in no way ready to take the city.

By diverting troops to take the city, Hitler weaken the forces assigned to the Oilfields and effective ensured that the important oilfields were not taken and Stalingrad could not be taken.

The German Army did leave pockets of Russians , who the Germans thought, were trapped and would be left to starve. The Russians trapped there carried sorties into the rear of the Germans and were a very sore thorn in the side of the Germans who had to divert troops to either capture or destroy the pockets of resistance.


Von Paulus was made a Field Marshal by Hitler for the simple reason that since no german Field marshal had been captured then that concept would spur Von Paulus onto a victory.

[nolanbuc]

Excellent explanations! Nothing to add.

[Friedrich H]

Kiwi:

First, Friedrich Paulus was not a 'von'. In fact, he was refused a post in the Navy because of 'lack of social status'.

Second, it is important to mention that neither Army Group 'A' at the Caucasus nor Army Group 'B' in the northern flank had both enough armour or air support to achieve victory.

Paulus' VI Army needed Hoth's IV Panzer Army to rapidly encircle and destroy all Soviet forces in the Don steppes before they could take shelter in the Volga. Hoth's support was not there and the Soviets withdrew their forces and prepared for the defence of Stalingrad: the city then had to be taken.

Now, Von Kleist's I Panzer Army also needed Hoth's Panzers to reach Bakú's oil fields. But, again, Hoth was not there. IV Panzer Army was held as reserve and constantly transferred among both Army Groups. Same happened with the IV Air Fleet.

In other words, German strategic incompetence and Soviet improved tactic knowledge decided the early parts of these campaigns.

[Harry Ree]

Victory in the Battle of Stalingrad was important the Russians in that it represented the first major defeat of the Axis forces in on the wider continent of Europe.It was the stepping stone to the final act of Germany's homeland being embraced in the Russian bear hug from the East.

It dismissed the notion of the invincibilty of the Wehrmacht and SS soldier on the field of battle.Moreover it indicated the quality of military leadership Hitler could muster.His obsession with the capture of one of the hallmarks of communism which the city of Stalingrad represented by the mere reference to Stalin's name led to the driving of his forces beyond their strength.I

It proved to be the start of Hitler's lack in confidence in Goring and his Luftwaffe.Goring had been the "can do" man who promised he could keep the Stalingrad pocket supplied against a critical background.

Hitler demonstrated to the Allied powers that his fundamental military strategy was to hold on to conquered ground no matter the cost and available resources.This strategy resulted in the tying up of over 260 divisions across all fronts at a critcal period beyond Stalingrad when German occupied territory on all fronts was being threatened.

The defeat at Stalingrad made some of the German military thinkers assess their position with a degree of rationality regarding the outcome of the war.Hitler was proved to be no Genghis Khan as Paul Reynaud had referred to him in the dark days of the summer of 1940 but a politician whose luck was at the point of starting to run out.Hitler's popularity was based on delivering the rapid victory on the battlefield and the maintenance of prosperity of the German heimat.He had never known adversity from the days of asssuming power.He could not promise the Germans only"blood, tears, toil and sweat" that Churchill had offered to the British people or the cry of Mother Russia that motivated the Russians to resist the invader.

Germany's industrial weakness was exposed in the long term even though Speer when he assumed the responsibility for Armaments and War Production, tried to keep Germany's head above water in terms of armour arms and ammunition output, the material losses at Stalingrad were hugh and resulted in the serious reductions of available stocks.The German High Command estimated that Stalingrad cost the Wehrmacht the 6 months production of armour and vehicles,3 to 4 months production of artillery and 2 months supply of small arms and mortars.

[Kiwiwriter]

Originally posted by Friedrich H@Apr 18 2005, 11:04 AM
Kiwi:

First, Friedrich Paulus was not a 'von'. In fact, he was refused a post in the Navy because of 'lack of social status'.

Quoted post

I didn't say Paulus was a "von." Morse did. Anyway, I know Paulus was not a "von." What's more, his wife was Rumanian nobility, and she complained bitterly to him about the Nazi policies of aggression and enslavement, particularly the anti-Semitic policies. He loved her dearly.

After Paulus went in the bag, and headed the pro-Soviet German forces, he never saw his wife again.

[WorldWarFreak]

Another thing that helped the Russians win was the fact that Stalingrad had some major emotional value to Stalin himself. If Stalin had lost the city that was named after him it would be terribly humiliating, therefore he used whatever resources he could to defend that city. It may have been a small factor but indeed it helped in some ways.