Stereotypes About The Red Army And Russia

[Owen]

Picture on page 1 or 2. ZR.

[Za Rodinu]

Thank you, Owen, I had missed the small thumbnail.

I'm no shermanologist, but to me that's an American tank! It has a white star, and on the glacis I think I can read on the port side the lettering 15 (or is it only 5?) followed by a triangle, which denotes 5th or 15th Armored Division. On the port side it clearly reads USA (another clue!) and the serial no. below, and the tank commander has what appears to be an Armour Flash (you know, the red-yellow-blue triangle on the upper arm.

The lettering on the building under the presumably red star ("Is this a Red Herring?" "No, this is a Krasnaya Zvezda!"*) is not in Cyrillic, ends with Tito, therefore It logically puts the scene in Yugoslavia !!!

So here we have a late war Yank Sherman M4A3 76mm HVSS in 1945 in Yugoslavia!

http://www.752ndtank.com/M4A3.html


* ok, ok, Red Star

[lancesergeant]

Za Rodinu, thanks for that. It crossed my mind about the Trans Siberian but I thought it was only one/two tracks from one end to the other. I wasn't aware of the line splitting and going into China as well. But from the West to about China it only seems to be one line. Would this line in itself be able to cope with the quantity of potential traffic. The Allies didn't use either weighing up the possibilities one way or the other. Would/ was China against allowing the use of the line on their territory. Do you know how many lines go directly across Russia by any chance? Thanks for the input, much appreciated.

[Za Rodinu]

The China line is a postwar development, I think. The Tr. was for most of it's length single line, so it was quite common to see sequences of trains running end on end! It had to be that way, or they wouldn't be able to cope with the cornucopia being poured on Vladivostok plus the massive output from the Siberian plant.

Those Russians sure must have had some damn good dispatchers to cope with traffic this thick!

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Given that some people are referring to "General Winter" and that it stopped the Germans I thought I'd bump this thread and particularly the first part which included this quote about Stereotypes to do with the Eastern Front:


The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows:

- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

- Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

- Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

- The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

- Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

- Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.
__________________

[T. A. Gardner]

In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows:

- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

Weather effected both sides to a great degree and for the most part equally. However, during the 1941 - 42 period through possibly early 1943 the Soviets did have some advantage in that much of their equipment was more suited to the weather in Russia than the Germans.

- Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

This is more true than false. Significant, yes quite frequently. Overwhelming, rarely.

- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

The Soviets had more manpower than the Germans but, it was hardly "inexhaustable." I do think the Soviets did more with their available manpower and population than the Germans did until Hitler began to recognize that he might not win the war in the East.

- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

This really is more of a conflation of ideas than an absolute truth. The problem with Soviet leadership is often more one that is founded in a lack of communications and inability to react on the battlefield to events than simply poor leadership at lower levels.
If a Soviet infantry company has just a handful of officers, all of whom except the company commander, are expected to fight at the front and the commander has no radio, telephone, or even runners for messages and, he was given very explicit orders his leadership ability is going to have a very minimal impact on events once his company engages the enemy.
Likewise, if an artillery battery commander has just field telephones for commuication and has to direct his battery as its FO the capacity of that battery to effect the battle is limited in scope.

- Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

To a great degree this was actually true. Why? Because of the above. The Red Army lacked the means to rapidly implement changes to planning once the action started. When you rarely find radios below regiment level in infantry divisions, rarely find field telephones below battalion and, the overall level of rapid communications is often near non-existant how can a plan be executed in anything but an inflexible or unimaginative way unless you give a huge degree of initiative and freedom to officers and leaders at every level.
The Germans did this but had the advantage of education, a social system, and training of their leaders that allowed it. The Soviets did not have a similar level of training or the luxury of taking the time to make such training happen.

- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

To a degree this is correct. But, most armies at some point relied on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment was a common Soviet strategic objective and often it was met. Stalingrad is classic example.

- The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

This is incorrect. The Soviets usually have mulitple echelons and attacked along mulitple axes in order to have the best chances of achieving a breakthough. Specialist units were frequently attached to combat units at many levels as needed to achieve a particular objective. An infantry division in an attack might get say, a tank battalion or brigade attached, a sapper (mine and obstacle removal) battalion, and possibly more artillery attached to ensure it succeeded in its mission.

- Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

Again, this is true in some areas but not others. There were lend-lease items that were critical to Soviet victory. What lend-lease was not critical to was preventing a Soviet defeat early in the war.

- Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

Definitely not true. There were poor German generals and officers in many units. The OKW and staffs at lower levels made planning and logsitics mistakes that were very costly and in some cases repetitive in nature. Hitler alone was not a singular reason for either the success or defeat of the German military in WW 2.

- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.

I think the Soviet soldier was much like his Lanser, Tommy or GI counterpart in capacity for adversity and hardship. On the other hand, the society from which the Soviet soldier was drawn made him less capable of some things than his Western counterparts were education and access to technology in society in general made it easer for them to learn the technical side of soldering.
For example, the typical British or US soldier could drive a vehicle without any military training. They had done so as a civilian. Most could also work on such vehicles to some degree without training. A Soviet soldier from a more rural area of the Soviet Union might never have even seen a vehicle let alone learned to drive one.
Morally and physically, no difference. Socially, educationally, and technically yes.

[deadb_tch]

Hmmmmmm, I've read topic but... not ready to comment something. Only this: poor user stalin with such truly russian heroism - u banned for motherland.
Anyway I've to denote about lend-lease shortly - if u trying to deicide was lend-lease significant or not - just find statistics of produced soviet analogs of vehicles leased from West, and then compare. I think u'll make a right resume.
According to history most impressive vehicle from lend-lease that printed in history of Great Patriotic War is.. jeep Willis - this was vehicle truly covered with respect in soviet army just because there were no such jeeps in soviet army before and in war. After war was debeloped UAZ - .