Heinz Guderian

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Whilst browsing through an article on the origins of Blitzkrieg (Jimbo will know why I was searching )

I came across this interesting biography of one of Germany's most Charimsatic Generals as well as one of their most astute Strategists.

so do you think he was overrated? Was his book Panzer Leader completely self serving?? Let me know what you think .

Here is the article from the Houghton Mifflin College by Gerhard L. Weinberg




1888-1954, German World War II General

Heinz Guderian had served as an officer in World War I and in the 1920s. In the years after 1933 he pushed for the creation of separate armored units. After a period in charge of all German armor, he commanded a corps in the invasion of Poland.

Guderian played a key role in the armored thrust through the neutral Low Countries in May 1940 and the subsequent breaching of the French line south of the breakthrough. Promoted to full general, Guderian commanded the German Second Panzer Army on the central portion of the Eastern Front (see Operation Barbarossa). A man who held and voiced fixed ideas, he was frequently in conflict with his superiors. Though an admirer of National Socialism and an extreme nationalist, his conflicts with his army group commander, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, as well as with Adolf Hitler, contributed to his relief during the German defeat before Moscow in December 1941.

Hitler remained an admirer of a man devoted to himself. In addition to the monthly bribe Hitler arranged for field marshals and four-star generals, Guderian was to get a huge estate to be stolen from its Polish owners; Guderian spent much of his involuntary relief looking over such properties. He was allotted an estate worth 1.25 million marks but did not consider it adequate. Soon he had other worries: in February 1943, Hitler called him to a new command.

German armor, like the country's whole military system, had been designed for war against the western powers, the assumption being that the Soviet Union could be conquered quickly and easily. But the Germans had miscalculated. Under the pressure of difficulties and defeats, they built tanks (the Mark V Panther and Mark VI Tiger) for the east; but Stalingrad showed that the new tanks were arriving none too soon. In hopes of pushing the new program forward, Hitler appointed Guderian as inspector general of armored forces in February 1943.

Guderian's enormous drive helped revive Germany's armored forces during 1943 and 1944, at a time of defeats. Two factors kept Guderian from getting the huge numbers of tanks he wanted: enormous allocations of resources to the building of submarines, and similar allocations to new weapons to destroy London (the V-1 pilotless plane, the V-2 ballistic missile, the V-3 supergun, and the V-4 rocket). Guderian's memoirs suggest that he never understood this.

Guderian was called upon in the crisis of the attempted coup of July 20, 1944 (he had had neither the good sense nor the moral judgment to join in that effort). On July 21, 1944, Hitler made him chief of staff of the German army to rebuild the crumbling Eastern Front. Guderian devoted his talents to this task. As he anticipated the final Red Army offensive, he struggled to secure reserves; instead, these were wasted in the Battle of the Bulge.

When the Soviets began their 1945 winter offensive, the Eastern Front collapsed. The Germans slowed and briefly stalled the Red Army. Guderian hoped to assist the slowing down by evacuating German forces cut off in western Latvia. Hitler, following the advice of Admiral Karl Dönitz, preferred keeping them there to protect the central Baltic as training ground for new submarines. Over this issue, Guderian repeatedly argued with Hitler, and over it the two parted company on March 28, 1945. Although deeply involved in the shooting of captured Red Army political officers and aware of other atrocities on the Eastern Front, Guderian was not tried after the war (see War Crimes Trials).

Gerhard L. Weinberg

[Kiwiwriter]

No, I don't think Guderian was overrated by any means. He was a superb tactician and theorist, but seems to have lacked a moral compass. However, most of Germany also lacked that compass from 1933 to 1945.

Yes, his book is self-serving, but most German generals' memoirs are...they put the blame on Hitler and deride the Soviet military.

[Exxley]

Guderian's best place IMHO was when he was appointed Inspector-General of the Panzertruppe. As a field commander, he was inspirational, bold, but those qualities were useful only when Germany had the initiative. His conduct during the Soviet counter-offensive in December 1941 was disastrous to say the least.

[spidge]

Guderian was very successful however he also proved that he was a "loose cannon".

An extract from ...........http://vanrcook.tripod.com/guderian.htm

General Halder would come to regret the unleashing of Guderian. Guderian was an extremely confident man and took advantage of any opening given him. He was also one of Hitler's favorites. Hitler had long resented the German officer corps and Guderian was a soldier who, like Hitler, had risen from the ranks:

"The German officer corps was the last stronghold of the old conservative tradition, and Hitler never forgot this. His class resentment was never far below the surface; he knew perfectly well that the officer corps despised him as an upstart, as "the Bohemian Corporal" and he responded with a barely concealed contempt for the "gentlemen" who wrote "von" before their names and had never served as privates in the trenches."

Guderian was not above using (or threatening to use) Hitler's influence when things did not go completely his way. Even as he and his panzer group won battle after battle in Russia, he was becoming a difficult man to deal with. He would not tolerate "temporarily" loaning out one of his corps or panzer divisions or critical equipment as some, on occasion, wanted him to do. His panzer divisions were not to be touched. He was intolerant of other's views. Halder and the other German generals had to always consider what Guderian was going to think when they planned actions. They had to "walk on eggs" around him.

The situation in Russia eventually reached the point that Guderian's forces were fighting almost independently - going where they wanted to and not bothering to cooperate with other German forces in Russia. Almost a "mad dog" army as per some childhood games we used to play long ago. Guderian's behavior had to be tolerated because he kept scoring one success after another. Eventually, as some alleged, it may have been partly responsible for the failure of the Germans to capture Moscow in 1941.

Although Guderian agreed with the other German generals in Russia, that Moscow was to be the major target in 1941, they had been unable to convince Hitler to give up his quest for the Ukraine. So when he was directed to keep at least part of his forces in place to help prepare the assault on Moscow, and to take the remainder to attack Kiev, a key to the Ukraine, Guderian refused to comply and requested of Hitler that he be allowed to keep his forces together. Hitler agreed. When Halder heard of this, he was infuriated and, according to Guderian, "suffered a complete nervous collapse" and began to heap all sorts of abuse on him.

While General Halder fumed, Guderian headed south with his entire panzer group and helped encircle Kiev and score another huge victory. As many as 600,000 Russian prisoners were taken. Very impressive but the clock was running and winter was approaching. The capture of Moscow might give the Germans a victory in the war (or at least a stalemate) and it certainly would have given them shelter for the winter. Any delay in the attack on Moscow, even for the chance to take 600,000 Russian prisoners, could not be tolerated. The Russians had plenty of replacements for manpower losses but there was only one Moscow. Guderian may have been partly responsible for Moscow staying in Russian hands.