Two Different Wars

I was watching the battle of Iwo Jima on the Discovery Channel and it began to hit me that when you speak of WWII, depending on which theatre you are in, it is virtually two completely different wars, completely unrelated other than contemporaneous execution. Not simply from a geographical perspective but the warfare was so vastly different that it seems like you are talking about two different wars.

In the MTO/ETO/NATO it was all about the best tanks, the best planes, the best howitzers, the best radar, the best recon, best supply, the snazziest new weapon or innovation. It's the glorified war and was more about machines and the application of those machines than it was about the men. I am not saying that men were not important in the ETO but they were rarely the decisive factor of the battle, whether good or bad soldiers.

But the other WWII, the Pacific, was a quite a different animal altogether. Having the best weaponry meant virtually nothing; the Allies had virtually everything better. WWII in the Pacific was all about the soldiers crawling up mountainsides, hidden in strategic positions, dug out of the ground, the conservation of ammo and supply, never knowing when or if you would be re-supplied, concern of water, not being reinforced by armor, malaria and other diseases, tremendous heat in full gear, etc. Ruthless fighting, with an enemy that was uniformly brutal and fanatical, clever and resourceful as well, in a situation where surrender on both sides is out of the question, one because of a moral code, and the other because of the infamous brutality of potential captors. In the PTO, the soldiers really “earned their pay”. I am not saying that occasionally the ETO soldier did deal with desperate enemies on a hand to hand level but by and large he was a mop up tool rather than the deciding factor in the ETO campaigns.

In the Pacific, I believe that uncertainty was far more prevalent than the ETO. In the ETO, you knew you would usually be getting relief, you knew you had aircraft near, access to hospitals, food, etc. It was not a continuous battle without interruption like battles against the Japanese were. The ETO boys were like the “rich kids” who had resources and contact with something most of the time. They could afford to waste ammo much more than the PTO counterpart. They never faced the guerrilla warfare the Marines, Aussies and New Zealanders did. I would think that man for man, by the end VJ day, the ETO soldier would be out of his league in a hand to hand fight of those that served in the in the ETO, including the best of the SS and other elites of the ETO armies. There were times when the fights in the ETO were brutal like D-Day, Bastone, Arnhem, etc. But they were more the exception than the rule. In the Pacific, you would have to think that the fighters quickly became grizzled experts in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, hand to hand and digging the enemy out of a hole in the side of mountains on a small island with nowhere to go if you get overwhelmed. They didn’t just do an amphibious assault like D-Day but their who battle on the island stayed as though they were on the beach because they were constantly exposed to the enemy dug in with no plans to come out alive.

I wonder how many would prefer to have fought in the Pacific. I would guess that would be a very low number. I would be interested to hear of soldiers from NZ or “down under” who fought in the other campaigns and were then withdrawn to defend their homelands and thrown into a far more brutal war. The only way I would have fought in the Pacific would be in a plane, and hopefully from a carrier. No way, I would have wanted to be on the ground. Hats off to those guys who get forgotten in the goosebumps discussions of how this “weapon was better than that weapon” or “this gun than that gun” discussions that pervade the discussion of the European campaign. Seems like the boys fighting the Japanese never got the short end of the stick and were never really given a fair share of recognition. Perhaps man for man they deserved it even more. Is there anyone that could visualize a scenario where they would have preferred to fight in the Pacific or WWII-Mk II?

[Herroberst]

Jim, I think the Japanese being a very disciplined people were able to cope with Jungle fighting better than the Americans and British early on. This was proven in Burma. Merrill finally had some effective jungle fighters latter on. Guess it took the Anglos longer to climatize to the jungle conditons than the Japanese.

Terrain had alot to do with it being 2 different wars. Airpower was the common denominator.

[Exxley]

(jimbotosome @ Feb 11 2006, 05:41 AM) [post=45605] Seems like the boys fighting the Japanese never got the short end of the stick and were never really given a fair share of recognition. Perhaps man for man they deserved it even more.
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And I wonder why that image at Mount Suribachi is that famous then if those guys were never given a fair shair of recognition ? Not to mention that memorial at Washington.
And I wonder how vets of the Big Red One, of the Screaming Eagles, of the AA, would liked to hear that they deserved less of the recognition they got.

[spidge]

(Herr Oberst @ Feb 11 2006, 03:47 PM) [post=45607]Jim, I think the Japanese being a very disciplined people were able to cope with Jungle fighting better than the Americans and British early on. This was proven in Burma. Merrill finally had some effective jungle fighters latter on. Guess it took the Anglos longer to climatize to the jungle conditons than the Japanese.

Terrain had alot to do with it being 2 different wars. Airpower was the common denominator.
[/b]

When you speak of the Pacific and not just Burma, you do need to break down the combatants by country.

One of the "best" Australian divisions...the 9th, were the first to defeat the Germans in WW2 at Tobruk and and their commander, an Australian General (Morshead) who exposed Rommel's Blitzgrieg for what it was...

and I quote "a highly overated tactical manoeuvre" and denied Tobruk to the Germans for 8 months.

This division came back from the desert and into the battle for New Guinea.

Milne Bay was where the Australians were the first to defeat the Japanese on land.

These were the 55th Australian Infantry Battalion and the 46th United States Engineer Battalion. The 7th Australian Infantry Brigade Group (ACMF), made up of the 9th, 25th, 61st Battalions plus anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, arrived on 11 July. These forces were joined by II/43rd US Engineer Regiment and other groups of Australian ground forces. This was bolstered by the inclusion of the 18th batallion /7th division who also had just came back from the middle east.

"Australian troops had, at Milne Bay, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land.

Some of us may forget that, of all the allies, it was the Australians who first broke the invincibility of the Japanese army".

Field-marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory

(spidge @ Feb 11 2006, 02:23 AM) [post=45613]

When you speak of the Pacific and not just Burma, you do need to break down the combatants by country.

One of the "best" Australian divisions...the 9th, were the first to defeat the Germans in WW2 at Tobruk and and their commander, an Australian General (Morshead) who exposed Rommel's Blitzgrieg for what it was...

and I quote "a highly overated tactical manoeuvre" and denied Tobruk to the Germans for 8 months.

This division came back from the desert and into the battle for New Guinea.

Milne Bay was where the Australians were the first to defeat the Japanese on land.

These were the 55th Australian Infantry Battalion and the 46th United States Engineer Battalion. The 7th Australian Infantry Brigade Group (ACMF), made up of the 9th, 25th, 61st Battalions plus anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, arrived on 11 July. These forces were joined by II/43rd US Engineer Regiment and other groups of Australian ground forces. This was bolstered by the inclusion of the 18th batallion /7th division who also had just came back from the middle east.

"Australian troops had, at Milne Bay, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land.

Some of us may forget that, of all the allies, it was the Australians who first broke the invincibility of the Japanese army".

Field-marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory
[/b]

Well, my statement is a more general statement of the types of fighting by theatre and intended to include all PTO soldiers fought a viscous guerrilla warfare who would have been more grizzled and resourceful since the enemy they fought was ruthless, determined an dedicated to living or dying where he was assigned. Most of the weapons like ship artillery and aerial bombing were useless on the islands because the Japanese dug tunnels out of the ground and simply went into them when heavy attacks started and would come out when the Allied infantry started advancing. Some of these battles were executed almost entirely from the crawl position in a "hamburger hill" type fashion. I bet if you asked the soldiers in the 9th which was a tougher battlefield, they would probably indicate that Milne Bay or some hand-to-hand battle like that was more difficult than desert warfare in Africa. That was my point. Because hand-to-hand or guerilla warfare is not as glorious, they seem to get "back-paged" in their respect relative to their European counterparts.

[Glider]

I would certainly agree with the view that the PBI had a harder time of it in the Pacific/Burma than almost anywhere else in the war. They were most of the time on their own and the only people to help you when you needed it would be the people with you. The risk of disease was massive, help if you were wounded far away and any wounds would fester at an alarming rate.

Hats off to them all, Australian, American, New Zealanders, Indians, British and a large number of other countries who took part.


The only area that I think would come close would be Russia in the Winter.

(Glider @ Feb 11 2006, 12:50 PM) [post=45644]I would certainly agree with the view that the PBI had a harder time of it in the Pacific/Burma than almost anywhere else in the war. They were most of the time on their own and the only people to help you when you needed it would be the people with you. The risk of disease was massive, help if you were wounded far away and any wounds would fester at an alarming rate.

Hats off to them all, Australian, American, New Zealanders, Indians, British and a large number of other countries who took part.


The only area that I think would come close would be Russia in the Winter.
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Yeah, I thought about Stalingrad too. But if you look at my original statement, you'll notice two things that deal with that, first I did acknowledge that I spoke of the majority of battles versus the occasional hell-on-earth battles of the ETO. The other and primary point was the relative respect and reliance on men. Stalingrad doesn't fall into the category because it is not a "back-page" news battle. But, you are exactly correct in saying it was everybit as miserable as the most miserable one in the Pacific perhaps the single worst of all modern era battles. It is the #1 place I would not have wanted to be.

[spidge]

(Glider @ Feb 12 2006, 04:50 AM) [post=45644]I would certainly agree with the view that the PBI had a harder time of it in the Pacific/Burma than almost anywhere else in the war. They were most of the time on their own and the only people to help you when you needed it would be the people with you. The risk of disease was massive, help if you were wounded far away and any wounds would fester at an alarming rate.

Hats off to them all, Australian, American, New Zealanders, Indians, British and a large number of other countries who took part.
The only area that I think would come close would be Russia in the Winter.
[/b]

An example of that from DiggerHistory .com

The Buna, Gona & Sanananda Campaigns in New Guinea

Although the fanaticism of the Japanese commanded respect, their barbarism was appalling. Not one of the Allied soldiers taken prisoner by them in the whole six months of the campaign had been allowed to live. Moreover, a number of those captured were found to have been eaten, tortured, or used for bayonet practice.

NOVEMBER 1942-JANUARY 1943

As the northern end of the Kokoda Trail came down to the coast the terrain changed to a mix of dense jungle, foetid swamps and eight-foot high kunai grass in which the temperature was about 50 degrees Celsius. These conditions were host to new health threats. The 2/1st alone lost 17 men from scrub typhus, and all were plagued by malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery for which little medicine was available.

The opposing forces also had changed. The Japanese had fought stubbornly in the battles on the Trail, but now they had their backs to the sea and had been instructed to fight to the death. And they were doing so from their base where, until the final stages, reinforcements and resupplies were continually arriving. There they had strongly fortified defences containing concealed bunkers with deep overhead cover. These bunkers were sited in mutually supporting positions which produced a devastating crossfire.

Approaching them were Australian units which were much depleted and suffering the effects of two-and-a-half months of continuous fighting on the Trail. Their maps were inaccurate and they had virtually no knowledge of the enemy's defences which were in three main areas-Gona, Sanananda, and Buna to Cape Endaiadere. Air photographs were not received until 18 December-and then only in inadequate numbers.

The first contact at Gona was made by a patrol from the 2/33rd Battalion on 19 November 1942. The 2/31st, which was leading the 25th Brigade, swept into the attack-but suffered 32 casualties. A brigade attack was launched on 22 November, but it gained only about 50 metres and cost the 2/31st 14 killed, 45 wounded and 8 missing. Repeated attacks incurred relatively high casualties for similar small gains. The Japanese were so well protected that a six hour air bombing achieved little.

The 25th Brigade was reinforced by the 3rd Battalion, and then the 21st Brigade arrived, followed by the 39th Battalion. Gradually, the Australians closed in. On 9 December, the commanding officer of the 39th Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Honner, sent the now-famous laconic message: 'Gona's gone' . At that stage, the 2/27th Battalion had only 92 officers and men left, and the position was far from secure-for there was a significant enemy force in the Amboga River area.

This force was made up of reinforcements for the main battle, who had been forced by air attacks to land further north, and of survivors of earlier fighting in the mountains who had escaped down the Kumusi River. On 10 December, the 39th Battalion moved west to deal with the threat. Post after post was taken out, and the battalion linked up with the 2/14th Battalion which was on the coast. Finally, in a dawn attack on 18 December, they over-ran the last defences.

On the Sanananda front the 2/1st made solid contact on 20 November. Its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Cullen, sent two of his (by then small strength) companies in a flanking movement aimed at cutting the tracks behind the opposition. After a nine-hour approach march, they came across a strongly held important section of the main track. Without hesitation, they attacked and captured it but, of the 90 man force, 31 were killed and 36 wounded.

The Japanese were forced to retire, and the 2/1st closed up. The 30th Brigade commenced to relieve the 16th Brigade on 6 December, and its 49th and 55th/53rd Battalions went into the attack almost immediately. Considerable penetration was achieved in places but, by day's end on 7 December, 359 casualties had been sustained, and the brigade was unable to consolidate its gains. Reinforced by the 36th Battalion and the 7th Division Cavalry Regiment on foot, the brigade tried again on 19 December but after three days' fighting-remained unsuccessful.

The 39th Battalion rejoined the 30th Brigade but there was still insufficient strength for a major attack. Although a whole American division had been injected into the campaign, it had not been properly prepared, both mentally and physically, and it required training and changes of command.

Finally, the experienced 18th Brigade-with tanks and artillery brought in from Milne Bay-tipped the scales. They were first employed on 18 December attacking north to Cape Endaiadere and west to Sinemi Creek. It was a hard-fought battle, and of 87 men who crossed the eastern end of the start line, 47 were shot down in less than 10 minutes.

In the 2/9th Battalion, of seven sergeants who had been commissioned three weeks before the battle, five were killed and one wounded.

The year of 1943 opened with fighting as fierce as any in the campaign. On New Year's Day, in an infantry and tank advance, the 2/12th Battalion suffered 45 killed and 127 wounded, but the advance reached Giropa Point. On the following day, the Buna Government Station fell.

As the Australians set about burying their mates, it did little for their morale to learn that the communist-led waterside workers in Australia had gone on strike for 'danger money' in return for loading ammunition.

Back on the Sanananda front, another major attack was mounted on 12 January. The 2/12th was the principal unit used and it suffered 99 casualties without succeeding.

However, the attack-coming after the weeks of ordeal that the Japanese had endured put an end to their resolve, and they commenced to withdraw. The 18th Brigade quickly followed up.

Cape Killerton to Sanananda Point remained to be cleared, and a large number of casualties was the price paid in doing so. Finally, by 22 January, the Japanese defences had been overcome-although mopping-up was to take more time. Those entering the Japanese bunkers were confronted by the nauseating presence of unburied dead, suppurating wounded and body wastes.

Although the fanaticism of the Japanese commanded respect, their barbarism was appalling. Not one of the soldiers taken prisoner by them in the whole six months of the campaign had been allowed to live.

Moreover, a number of those captured were found to have been eaten, tortured, or used for bayonet practice.

Australian casualties were heart-breaking. The 39th Battalion had been the first battalion into action on the Trail and, when it was finally flown to Port Moresby on 25 January 1943, it took up only 32 places.

Sadly, many Australian casualties were due to the American general commanding the South-West Pacific Area-Douglas MacArthur-who had fled the Philippines and arrived in Australia on 17 March 1942. MacArthur had outstanding military ability, but he was not a soldiers' soldier. He never ventured beyond Port Moresby, and never took the trouble to familiarise himself with either the terrain or the enemy's defences. Yet, for his own publicity purposes, he applied great pressure for quick results-which were quite impossible in the circumstances. He caused attacks to be mounted without adequate preparation, without adequate support, and astride approaches that held no hope for success.

See Geoff, you make my point exactly. Looking at the miserable fighting conditions of the Pacific, it not only contrasts the average conditions in the ETO, but even opens debate about whether these battlegrounds in their class of miserable conditions were worse that Stalingrad and its class of miserable conditions.

Yet, no one laments the conditions of the PTO like they do when you mention Stalingrad. Most people pull their hat off and put it over their heart when they speak of the conditions at Stalingrad, but you dare mention the New Guinea campaigns and the average WWII lover says "the Allies fought in New Guinea? Are you sure?". For the boys at Stalingrad and other harsh ETO battles (Kirsk, D-Day, Bastone, etc) you simply have to mention the initials of those battles and the reverence meter pegs and goose bumps reach their apex. It just seems to me that the PTO fighters never truly got the respect for the kinds of war they waged and the conditions they dealt with.

Heck even in the “crumb” of props the US Marines were tossed with the photo of the “Mount Suribachi” flag-raising, most people don’t know that six of those guys raising the flag never made it off that island alive. It just seems to me there is a disparity of proper credit for the soldiers of the two theatres.

The unfortunate losses of Aussies you mentioned was sort of shown in the Macarthur movie. They were unfortunately caught in the ignorance and frustration of his most embarrassing moment as the PTO commander, being chased out of the Philippines. His impatience was evident. But then again it was coming down from above too. If I remember correctly, there was pressure to relieve him possibly coming from FDR and Curtin. So often do soldiers become victims of circumstance and die for no good reason. Which may underscore my original point in the fighting conditions of the PTO were so primative relative to the ETO that resultant confusion often influenced the causualties of the theatre. Recon is and intelligence are much harder to obtain in a jungle area. What do you think?

[spidge]

(jimbotosome @ Feb 12 2006, 03:46 AM) [post=45641]

Well, my statement is a more general statement of the types of fighting by theatre and intended to include all PTO soldiers fought a viscous guerrilla warfare who would have been more grizzled and resourceful since the enemy they fought was ruthless, determined an dedicated to living or dying where he was assigned. Most of the weapons like ship artillery and aerial bombing were useless on the islands because the Japanese dug tunnels out of the ground and simply went into them when heavy attacks started and would come out when the Allied infantry started advancing. Some of these battles were executed almost entirely from the crawl position in a "hamburger hill" type fashion. I bet if you asked the soldiers in the 9th which was a tougher battlefield, they would probably indicate that Milne Bay or some hand-to-hand battle like that was more difficult than desert warfare in Africa. That was my point. Because hand-to-hand or guerilla warfare is not as glorious, they seem to get "back-paged" in their respect relative to their European counterparts.
[/b]

Jim,

I should have prefaced this with "out of the frying pan and into the fire" as I agree that the ground war was different in the PTO. War is war and death is death and there is no difference where or how a soldier fighting for his country is killed.

The Pacific was a different war no doubt.

The 9th at Tobruk were in flea infested holes in the ground, being bombed incessantly, where in those
8 months there was only one 24 hour period that they were not bombed. The heroes of Tobruk instead of coming home for a well deserved rest, they then found themselves in some of the worst conditions imaginable in Papua New Guinea.