Market Garden

[mattgibbs]

(sapper @ Dec 7 2005, 12:50 PM) [post=42797]Sometime the postings seem to forget there are two sides in a war, and both want to win. You win some, you lose some.
Sapper [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img]
[/b]

Sapper, that sentence about sums up the point of apportioning blame and arguing about it from 60 plus years distance, in my opinion. I didn't expect to hear it from you as a veteran but you're right!
I was going to add some details about the german strengths but I seem to have lost the word doc I had. [img]images/smilies/default/mad.gif[/img]
Kind regards
Matt Gibbs

[sapper]

Hi Matt things go wrong in war...many times. but on the whole, from the landings onwards to Bremen where my mates finished up, the whole thing went almost perfect, seriously.

looking back, I took part in every single one of those battles until the Bstrds caught up with me near the German border. Overloon in Limbug Holland.
I know it is very unusual to find a genuine veteran, able of capable of recalling those days.
Sapper

[jimbotosome]

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
Who is looking to blame the 82nd for Son? It was in 101st sector and anyway was just the fortunes of war, but in spite of it XXX Corps lead elements were at Grave on the morning of 19th, under two days from the start of the operation.[/quote]

I don’t get where you got the idea that I “blame the 82nd for Son. I never said anything to the kind. If you watched Band of Brothers you see what happened when XXX Corps got there. Those airborne troops were not going to do anything without armor. Rock, paper, scissors Angie. You can’t ignore that. The GARDEN had to be there at all three bridges to hold them under pressure.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053'] I am arguing that from the two PIRs deployed on the Groesbeek heights, at least a battalion could have been used for a coup de main operation to secure the Waal bridges. Both they and the units on the Groesbeek could, in my opinion, have held for 24 hours until reinforced by the second landing on 18th. I am not arguing for the Waal instead of the Maas, but for both. Otherwise, the probability of failure was always there. [/quote] The probability of failure WAS always there. The attempt to take Nijmegen was to be made that afternoon but they ran out of daylight. The city of Nijmegen (not just the bridge) was blocked by 9th SS Panzer on the 18th. Get a map Angie and follow this closely. Draw a line from where you knew 9th SS was at Arnhem and then draw a line to the middle of Nijmegen where they were the second day. Can you tell me what bridge these tanks that include Tigers would have crossed? Now draw on top of bridge on lift of 82nd Airborne troops. Now using the map you drew on, can you draw the position of the dead paratroops that would have stood in the way of that kind of armor without any kind of cannon or anti-tank gun that had to come over it if they could have survived the 88s pointing anti-personnel rounds and 20mms of “flak alley” that are so devastating to infantry pointing straight at it? I think you have a much distorted view of the defenses at Nijmegen or just how defenseless simple soldiers are against such weapons and tanks. Like I said there were TWO SS Panzer groups that crossed that bridge by the end of the 18th. Even if their rifles and grenades had been perfectly placed when these weapons were firing, you still would have had to have cleared the corpses off the bridge to get the tanks over. It was not that they didn’t desire to get the bridge at Nijmegen. After 10 SS arrived, 9 SS left because they were not needed there. With your wildest imagination, using all your tactical knowledge, and most radical idea, how do you take a bridge covered by 88s (remember this area was called “Flak Alley” AND why they were dropped 15 km away from these bridges as evidenced by the fact they had to cross the river on the 20th under fire of these 88s and 20mms) while SS Panzer groups are to cross it? I am open to any kind of suggestion you have or theory you would have as to how such a monumental tactical feat could be done even by a group with the reputation of the 82nd. I would be grateful if you could teach me how scissors would ever break rock. Call it serendipity or whatever but if the 82nd had taken Nijmegen on the 17th, they would not have held it on the morning of the 18th and 9 SS Panzer would STILL be in Nijmegen blocking the road to the town only the first lift would not be their to greet the second lift nor to help cross the river on the 20th (dead men are terrible fighters).

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053'] As for Browning, after Market-Garden he was shunted off into a command where he could do little harm operationally. He was considered a bit of a failure and I agree. [/quote] So was Monty’s. The Dutch Resistance said they could not risk another liberation by Monty. But you have to remember that Browning’s role according to Patton was the head of the Paratroops even from Sicily. He was not a general purpose general, he was a specialized general. Just incase you had forgotten that was the last parachute drop of the war. I would have thought the lessons of the Battle for Crete would have clarified the need for more than paras.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053'] XXX Corps did not take their "sweet time". Considering the obstacles and the restriction to a single road, they moved extremely quickly. It must be realised how many thousands of vehicles and how many miles of road were involved in the advance of a sinlge armoured division, let alone a corps? And any single mishap, such as one tank destroyed, blocked the road until cleared. [/quote] All of this was known by Monty when he campaigned for the plan. 30th Corps went only three hours on the 17th. Why? Why did they not travel at night? Patton did in the relief of Bastone and that was in a blinding snowstorm. He moved a whole Army through mountains and forests.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053'] No, there was simply no opposition to speak of until the evening of 17th and even that was limited. 82nd put in a company size move into Nijmegen late on 17th and the Germans just stopped it. They could not have stopped a battalion. And it is an entirely different matter defending a line against the small number of German tanks deployed compared to attacking against them. [/quote] Hmmm, sounds like you think they were stopped by someone shouting out the window. On one hand you say that all the other history is wrong which said that they fought constantly until 30th got there. Of course the next day 9th SS was IN the town of Nijmegen cutting off access to the bridge. But this company failed to take an “unprotected bridge” with all the Flak guns of “Flak Alley” that was so dense the transports would not drop them within 15km of the bridges, all because of a lack of “resistance”? Good theory, go with that. It goes well with your theory that Browning’s execution was the problem with Market Garden.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
But just a part of 1st Airbourne, reinforced elements of one battalion, held out longer than two days at Arnhem. And what two aroured divisions? After Normandy, 9 and 10 SS Panzer were divisions only in name. The 9 SS Panzer battlegroup was deployed at Arnhem and the 10 SS Panzer battegroup, with such additional tanks as 9 SS still had, were sent towards Nijmegen. Maybe it would have meant the sacrifuce of troops from 82nd, but what was the assault river crossing on 20th if not a sacrifice? [/quote] You sound like Monty. “Those tanks are probably not functional, let’s go with the plan”. Let’s see, no resistance held back the 82nd, two non-functional sorry panzer groups killed 1st Airborne and drove a whole army Corps into retreat and abort of their plan rather than going another 10 miles to Arnhem to complete the mission with the 82nd. BUT the fleeing 15th Army on highway 67 put up tough resistance to an armored corps to delay them into completing 57 miles in a couple of days. No bias or hyperbole in that. As far as a sacrifice, I think you are talking more about a suicide. Without the armor, it would be suicide, with the armor it was a sacrifice. You had only one lift on the 17th. The bottom line here is that the Germans would have liked to cut them off at Son, but the tanks were not in position to do that. The bridges at Arnhem were taken easily on the 17th and unopposed until late on the 18th because the armor was going to Nijmegen to cut them off and to stop the tank support that by definition has to be coming to support paratroopers. Arnhem wasn’t assaulted at first because the objective is to cut them off first, which they did. Every commander knows you don’t drop in paratroops without a plan to relieve them. They were clear what was coming and what the move was to stop it. Cut off their reinforcements and supplies and the airborne troops can be destroyed at leisure.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
No, but have you never heard of "hold until relieved"? I think they could have held the bridges and then there would not have been the nearly two days of fighting before they were taken on 20th. [/quote] Yes, and how did that “hold until relieved” thing work out for 1st Airborne Angie? Was it such a success in retrospect that Browning is criticized in retrospect for not exposing the 82nd to the same hopeless fate? I don’t doubt that the 1st Airborne put it on the line in Arnhem. You probably would not have seen more fierce fighting anywhere else in the war, any side, any country, but their effort was doomed from the start. I don’t believe they were told the risks ahead of time and the improbability of the plan’s success known by all of the command ahead of time. Hat’s off to Frost. But all Monty did was waste some elite soldiers with the hearts of lions, and I think that simply makes it all the more reprehensible.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
Such tanks as it had were attached to 10 SS. The bulk of the 9 SS Panzer battegroup operated against the British at Arnhem. [/quote] 9th SS Panzer was at Nijmegen on the 18th blocking access to the town. That is the 82nd Airborne side of the Nijmegen bridge. 9th SS did not leave Nijmegen until the arrival of 10th SS Panzer seeing that there was no Allied armor there to oppose them. Had the 30th have been there like they were supposed to have been then 1st Paras at Arnhem would not have faced them and could have easily held out.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
No they were not. They had not even secured the town. That happened on 19th and 20th, once XXX Corps arrived. [/quote] Wait a sec, it took another day once the armor had arrived to allow the fighting to go house to house which they say happened, but you say didn’t. I get the impression that you and those that espouse similar theories, believe that Germans fled the area, taking troops (which you called depot workers) SS Panzer groups, 88s and 20s AAA, mortars and machine guns and fled to Arnhem.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
Why not? First, they were as expendable as British 1st Airborne and, second, 1st Airbourne was expected to do just that. [/quote] Again, where was the wisdom in suicide? Since when are elites expendable? Since when are any expendable. That’s the whole idea behind kamikazes isn’t it? All the 1st Airborne did was prove that it could not be done and that the 82nd would have suffered a similar fate had they have succeeded in taking the bridge in front of the 9th SS and 10th SS coming. They would not have lasted through the night.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
Actually no. Army Group commanders do not work out details. And by all accounts, Monty was somewhat "psychologically absent" during Market-Garden. He did not apply his famous "grip" at all. [/quote] This plan was Monty’s. He forced it down Ike’s throat. Ike lacked a backbone. This is becoming very clear when I see what Patton wrote when reading his diaries. Monty ran all over Ike. Patton said he was like a spoiled child that demanded everything his way. Patton wrote these in his diary because the US generals were not allowed to criticize their allies under threat of court marshal. Patton believed that Monty should have been court marshaled for insubordination. Monty made the war grievous on US generals but since Churchill ran WWII, he let Monty get away with murder. If Monty was “psychologically absent” then he should have been relieved from further field command, not just strategic command.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
There is a section here I am not responding to, because it just bears no relation to the realities of military operations in NW Europe. I would just ask one thing. Why "Horrocks" in quotes? Horrocks was his surname, not a nickname. [/quote] Horrocks’ actions as I said bordered on cowardice. He allowed 8000 brave men to die to save even a little risk to his own tail. He stopped after they crossed the Nijmegen bridge and REFUSED to go further until the opposition that you said could not happen and therefore securing Groesbeek Heights was of no value, did come on the other side of the river from the east. The 82nd and the Cold Stream Guards beat down the counterattack. If Market Garden is a strategic error, they the blame goes to Monty, you could say Ike because he allowed Monty to badger him into agreeing with it. If Market Garden failed because of tactical errors, then you have to assign that blame to Horrocks alone. Horrocks didn’t have the option of caution. Not in this battle. I am not certain that Market Garden could have worked if Patton had been called up to execute it, but I can tell you that they would have been at Arnhem when they were supposed to be. A high risk mission such as this needs someone with nerves of steel when commanding. Anyone afraid to take the risks that 1st Airborne (and the others too) should never have been leading the relief effort.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
What is this rubbish? Don't you dare ever use sarcasm or misquote me. Go back and do some reading of German sources. I don't think you know what a military depot is. [/quote] Your use of the depot worker was condescension. It was meant to illustrate how little the resistance was in order to denigrate the fortitude of 82nd for not taking the “suicide” bridge at Nijmegen. The 82nd Airborne never gave up a single yard of territory they took in the entire war. This was their legacy. They were the same men that went house to house in Nijmegen on the 19th and the men that risked the river crossing under such heavy fire on the 20th to get several DSC winners and one congressional medal of honor winner. These men also lost 2000 men to this little resistance you imply they were apprehensive to challenge when they “failed” to get the bridge at Nijmegen.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
What use would Patton have been? When did he ever advance quickly when there were Germans in the way? [/quote] El Guettar, the drive to Polermo, the drive to Messina, the Falaise gap, the Avaranches, the Britainny Penensula, the “first” taking of Metz, the dash to Bastone, established the bridgeheads across the Meuse River (then he took a little break, any idea why?), the cracking of the Siegfried Line with his Ghost troops, drive across the Rhine with Hodges, drive to the “National Redoubt”. Patton could move so fast not because of the British myth that the Americans faced little armor but because he didn’t let his enemy “dig back in” after “digging him out”. This minimized the losses to his men, maximized the losses to his enemy and bought him a lot of territory in a hurry. But, since you asked the question, when did Monty ever move at all when there were Germans in the way without the help from Patton or TAC?

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
It was never a bridge too far. As an operation, it was all or nothing as far as finishing the war by Christmas is concerned. Without the Neder Rijn as on objective, the operation would be a bit pointless, in my opinion. [/quote] Again, why did they have to be that deep into Holland? He wasn’t going anywhere until Antwerp was opened. On the side south side of Arnhem where they were counterattacked, 30th Corp was past the Siegfried Line. Blow the bridges at Arnhem and head east. I think the objective was Berlin not Neder Rijn. At the south of Arnhem, Germany was east not north. Also if Market Garden had a chance to succeed as planned, it could have done so by retaking the bridge at Arnhem with 82nd and 30th Corps. Why would pay that price and back out at the victory line? This made the 13000 troops lost die in vain.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
I disagree, because it would have not been so simple an operation but this was not in 21st Army Group's sector. I have long argued for the Aachen gap as an objective in place of Market-Garden, but it would have been US 1st Army. I back the "northern thrust" strategy, not Market-Garden as such. [/quote] It does not matter which army had done it. As you know Patton wanted to continue so he could do just this. He was almost to the Siegfried Line. He made light work of it.

[quote name='angie999' date='Dec 7 2005, 06:46 AM' post='20053']
My view is that the airborne concept demonstrated in Market-Garden was flawed. There is no case in war for deep operations by parachute and I think that the bulk of the allied airborne forces would have been better used as light infantry in the line, but that is another story. [/quote] Airborne forces were specialized. They could never operate in the open. They are not designed for that. They are a pin prick in the heart rather than a bullet though the abdomen. The use of them without Armor is to waste them. This was the argument of Patton and Monty. They did not believe that you could risk leaving them high and dry. There are just too many things that do always go wrong. It was never worth the risk. The rate at which Patton was moving, he would have just about beaten Monty to Berlin with a successful Market Garden by his current plan. You could say that it would have shortened the war by 6 months, but that would be simple conjecture which could be easily countered. I believe it could have saved about a month tops, if any at all. Dropping those same paras at the Rhine crossings might have been a better plan. Market Garden had more risk than just failure of the operation itself. First of all because you still have the chance of being cut off by the offensive Hitler was planning. Second was the fact that Patton would have been across the Rhine faster than he was if the Germans had not been given the time to drop back behind the Siegfried Line and regroup. There is no point where an army is weaker than in retreat that is moving so fast they are having to abandon their armor and artillery as they were in fleeing Third Army.

I engage you on these issues Angie because I respect your knowledge. You are a typing encyclopedia. If someone else spins their biases in their statements, I am less inclined to engage them than you because hearing something I think is rubbish sounds worse coming from you. Imagine Geoff (spidge) telling you that there was little armor at Caen. If someone else says it you would probably think oh well, that’s the prating of a madman and disregard it, but with someone of his caliber (just like with yours) you expect more. I think you have biases about Market Garden. Not sure why because I have rarely heard you carry the banner for Monty or anyone else for that matter. So, in a way this is personal but not in the way you might think.

Jim

[jimbotosome]

(sapper @ Dec 7 2005, 07:50 AM) [post=42797]I often marvel at the accusations of failure levelled at the British. Was it a long shot? Too damned right it was! Was it worth it? again, too damned right it was. had we cpmpleted the whole of that thrust we would have been in Berlin first, there would have been no cold war as it turned out. Germany would have lain mainly in our hands.... Now with aftersight? market garden was a blasted master stroke. It failed on one element only, all the others were achieved. The Eastern thrust took all its objectives...100%
[/b]

You might think it was worth the risk Sapper because you returned to state that. The 11,000 men that died who were there also and I think they are the only ones really able to make that call. Not to mention the fact it opened the door for the Ardennes offensive where a crap-load of men were killed. There is a big difference between high risk and outright insanity.

To say that it was a blasted master stroke leaves me shaking my head. There is no success in the loss of more men than your enemy without having a single gain. That’s like betting a bunch of money on a roulette table, building it up to a large fortune, and then losing everything on the last turn of the wheel. How is that a victory? Sounds more like a rationalization to me.

[Gotthard Heinrici]

Jimbo

Are you arguing in defense of armor?????????? You are saying that Airborne Troops need Armor?? I thought you said that Air Power rules armor?????

Just think that it is ironic considering your posts to me in the "If Germany won in Russia Thread" [img]images/smilies/default/tongue.gif[/img]

[Kitty]

I'm sorry Jimbo, but I just can't hack it any more. I am disgusted by the way you talked to Sapper. This man fought in WW2, he was at Arnhem and all the way through. So how dare you say he doesn't know what he is talking about? He saw it and knew that at the time it was the only chance. You were not there. I was not there. I very much doubt Angie was there, but I would rather take her word for it than yours. She at least is ready to admit if she has something wrong. You just keep banging away, even after your argument has been proven wrong.
I beleive you owe Sapper an apology.
And as to opening a ten mile corridor with heavy bombers, how exactly?
The RAF were specifically told not to bomb within a ten mile parallel line to the front. This was to protect our tropps, as the top brass were well aware that unforeseen winds could cause bombs to go absolutely anywhere. Would you prefer us to have dropped a few hundred tons of HE on your heads?
And what about accuracy? The Allies were perfectley capable at this time of accurate bombing, and mostly at night as well. But what of the USAAF? Sorry Jimbo, but they were just naff at accuracy. They would have blown your own people straight into local folk lore. As they said at the time "The RAf precision bomb area targets, but America area bombs precison targets".
As such, Market Garden had to happen to take the important bridges, and only Arnhem failed because essentially the paras could no longer hold out without food and water from the air drops, that were being shot down by the ack-ack and fighters. Please remember that the FW190's (Butcher Birds) were still trading at this time, as well as even faster fighters.
As such, Market Garden was a success. It just happens that we didn't manage to take Arnhem.
Because of this I never had the chance to know my great-unce, a very good man. His 18 year old widow was left caring for a two month old baby. And I say that we had to try at Arnhem. And as to XXX Corps fannying around? I don't bloody think so. They got there as fast as they can, but armour on single track roads takes tims to move. Yes, a tank can do 29mph. In clear countryside with no obstacles. That is never the reality in war. So get your head out of the sand and aply a little common sense to the issue. I know this is a rare commodity in America at the moment, but DO IT!
And I expect an apology to Sapper before I revisit this forum. Else I shall personally come over there and start breaking bits of your appendages.
Sweet dreams.

[img]images/smilies/default/mad.gif[/img]

[sapper]

Simplistic in the extreme Jim. It goes to show how little real understanding of war you have, (Thankfully) and just what it is like. In war men are killed, no one wants that, in fact we all thought that it would not happen to us!

taking your ideas forward about the loss of life, If we were to go along the idea of not losing life there would have been no D day, or come to that any other battles.

In war, men on both sides are killed, and maimed, (sadly, I do know about that!) Every battle that you are involved in...everytime you stand ln the "Start" line you have no idea of what will happen, you have no idea if the battle will go your way,,or if you will take a terrible beating...It did happen.

Just try listening to the voices of experience, of those that lived through those traumatic times and lived with the day to day horrors, the whole electric atmosphere that is in the air, the everpresent dangers.

take one simple fact; we had beaten the enemy, and had him on the run all the way across France Belgium and Holland, Now it seems perfectly sensible to me to chase him until we could go no further.

Or should we have stopped and said "Thats enough for one day" He was persued until we could go no further, and that was at Arnhem. No one knows in battle what the outcome will be. If we had not gone in with Paras all the way up through Holland, we would have had to have a infantry slogging match where many thousands would lose their lives. It was was a great thrust, but one that petered out at Arnhem.
What you are saying, is that we should have stopped somewhere along the line. Then What?
sapper

[Kitty]

I bow to you Sapper. I only wish I knew you personally, I am sure you have some truly amazing stories to tell.
And as to Jimbo. I think it is time you went to Arnhem, stood in the middle of the graveyard and explained your argments to the men lying there.

[sapper]

Thanks for all that friends, but let me add a bit here. First...There is nothing special about me, thousands of men had got their knees brown long before I came on the scene....I am just a very ordinary soldier with no great claim to fame. I experienced the fortunes of war, luckily, despite being wounded twice, always on the winning side.

Again there is nothing very unusual about being wounded on two occasions, oddly enough, it was quite common. so again, nothing out of the ordinary.

What is extraordinary, is that being quite severely wounded, and 80 years of age, I am able to write and post about those times. That is simply because of my ancestral Genes.

An old friend said once, "Brian my old fruit , we have a duty to write and speak about those times while we are able, when we go, it all goes with us"

What I am doing is to keep the memory alive of all those that fell in battle, nothing else. No need for apologies. None at all.
Best regards to all here.

Sapper
[img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img] [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img] [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img]

[angie999]

To Jimbo,

I spent about an hour working on a reply to your last post and then did something stupid and lost it before posting. I am not going to repeat all that work.

You are particularly wrong about the German order of battle, especially 9 and 10 SS Panzer and deployments in Nijmegen.

I suggest you read Kershaw's "It Never Snows in September", which will correct you on these points.

I maintain that the bridges at Nijmegen could have been taken by a coup de main on the afternoon of 17th and then held until 19th/20th against the opposition then in action.

But I would just finish with a word about your style. You often seem to answer facts and opinions with polemics, which will not do. Think about it.