Market Garden

[JeremyScott]

I was watching A Bridge To Far last night and they were talking about a raiding party that was set up intially to race for Arnhem bridge. Was this a spin off of the SAS jeep section?

Also they said that the reason that 1st Division wasn't able to contact sub ordinate units was because they were given the wrong crystals. I didn't understand this. Iwatched it twice to try and figure out, but it never went into any explanation.

Because of this movie I have become very interested in the action and I think I am going to make this my area of study.

Jeremy

[spidge]

(Jeremy @ Nov 3 2005, 07:06 AM) [post=41010]I was watching A Bridge To Far last night and they were talking about a raiding party that was set up intially to race for Arnhem bridge. Was this a spin off of the SAS jeep section?

Also they said that the reason that 1st Division wasn't able to contact sub ordinate units was because they were given the wrong crystals. I didn't understand this. Iwatched it twice to try and figure out, but it never went into any explanation.
Jeremy
[/b]

British radios did not work because their long-range VHF sets were delivered with the wrong crystals, thus operating on a frequency no one was listening to . The shorter-range sets for use between the brigades did not work, and the various battalions were completely cut off from each other.

[Des1]

I found - as usual - that Martin Middlebrook's account of Arnhem was exceptional. Strongly suggest you get a copy. Browse for 'Middlebrook Arnhem' and that should provide you with a precis.
Also believe it or not ... the 'Close Combat' game 'Bridge too Far' proved an excellent way to get a better understanding of the overall area.
As history .. very far from perfect ... but nevertheless a good little sideline.
Des

[Doug Lewis]

Jeremy
The raiding party-the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron commanded by Major Freddie Gough with a troop of RE's were given the Coup de Main task to get to the bridge by the shortest route possible remove any demolition charges and hold the bridge until reinforced.

Regards Doug.

[mattgibbs]

WIth regards to the communications problem, no one really seemed to think of using, or asking about, one good system, the Dutch Telephone Network! This was mostly intact and hardly supervised by the Germans, sadly it wasn't really used until just before the surrender.
Regards
MG

[angie999]

I think that any study of Market Garden runs into problems if it only looks at Arnhem. Middelbrook's book does this and i would certainly recommend it, but there is much more to the whole operation.

To me, although things at Arnhem did not go according to plan, I think the delays in taking the Nijmegen bridges were in the end crucial. I do not, though, go along with the line in "A Bridge Too Far" that the British tanks "stopped for tea" rather than press on after they were taken. To me, this covers up the failure of the 82nd Airborne's plan, which led to the failure to take the bridges on 17 September.

I would suggest also reading the German side of the operation in "It Never Snows in September", Robert J Kershaw, Ian Allan 2004.

[mattgibbs]

Thanks for the book suggestions angie.
To risk a little intended humour, I take it these guys are real historians?!
[img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img] [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img] [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img]
regards
MG

(angie999 @ Dec 4 2005, 05:33 AM) [post=42607]To me, although things at Arnhem did not go according to plan, I think the delays in taking the Nijmegen bridges were in the end crucial. I do not, though, go along with the line in "A Bridge Too Far" that the British tanks "stopped for tea" rather than press on after they were taken. To me, this covers up the failure of the 82nd Airborne’s plan, which led to the failure to take the bridges on 17 September.
[/b]

Angie, I you keep saying this but I have no idea where you get it. The 82nd was given the objective of key bridges at Grave and Nijmegen as well as some subsidiary bridges over a canal to the east of Grave. Despite the fact that the bomber groups called this "Flak Alley" and the fact that they were outnumbered by 4000 SS soldiers, they completed their first day objectives and held the bridges after only four hours from drop to completion. They held these bridges for two days despite intense resistance and counterattacks and the bridges were in Allied hands (except for rail bridges which they were not tasked with taking). After hold these bridges, they were then ordered to take the bridge at Nijmengen again in broad daylight but this time having to cross the river 400 yards wide against heavy 88mm and 20mm and machinegun fire. They did such an incredible job of this that not only did one soldier get the medal of honor but your own Miles Dempsey in watching the 82nd overcoming such heavy defense of the bridge remarked with a single word "unbelievable".

How you can deduce that they "failed" other than they were given an impossible objectives in an infeasible plan and somehow still accomplished this in the daytime of all things in only three days, is beyond me. This sounds like a likely story of a British historian trying to cover for claims of armor "stopping for tea" that he is shocked at. I don't believe that but they did but I can envision someone defending them by attacking others. They fought well from the moment they hit the ground until they were withdrawn and relieved 56 days of combat later.

All I have ever read about the 82nd was accolades for above and beyond. It is shocking to hear criticism of them especially from someone of your caliber. It was by someone bitter about the accusations I could understand them taking a cheap shot at the 82nd but that is not in your character.

[angie999]

Jimbo, I recently posted the piece below on another forum where Nijmegen was the subject. If it does not read 100% in context here, it is because it was a reply to an earlier post on that forum, rather than written for posting here.This is it:

Three regiments from 82nd Airborne landed on 17 September. One of these captured the Maas bridge and two were deployed onto the heights to the south east of Nijmegen to deal with expected counter attacks from that direction.

In fact, a fairly weak counter attack went in on 18 September in the form of the German 406th Division, a hastily assembled force which was a division in name only. Some troops were older depot personnel from Germany who had not seen action sine WWI!

It was beaten off without too much trouble, although from German accounts some of the Americans were firing high. This is usually taken as an indication of nervous, inexperienced troops and indeed after Normandy 82nd Airborne contained many inexperienced replacements.

At the time of the initial landings, there were effectively no German forces in Nijmegen and even a coup de main force of battalion strength could have taken the town and both the road and rail bridges over the Waal. However, when an attempt was made that evening, in a lot less than battalion strenght, sufficient forces from 10 SS Panzer and other hastily assembled units had arrived to form a defensive perimeter inside the town and secure the bridges.

This German position in the town was then strengthened over the next day.

The lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at about 0820 on 19 September, well within timetable to reach Arnhem had the road ahead been clear. Instead, they had to fight alongside 82nd Airborne to capture the town and the bridges, securing the road bridge at about 1830 on 20 September and the rail bridge shortly after that. In total, about five tanks were across, together with the remnants of the battalion which had carried out the river assault, it was nearly dark and they all needed resupply.

The Germans by then had established a new, although weak, position at Ressen and were preparing another up the road at Elst, where later quite a sharp action was fought.

The tanks could not operate off road in that particular terrain and the total forces available were insufficient to attack. Any advance that evening was frankly "not on".

The real question is, why didn't 82nd Airborne take the town and bridges on 17 September?

.................................................. .......................................

Back to current post - my position is that too large a proportion of the 82nd was posted to guard the Groesbeek Heights, for possibly two reasons:

1. An overestimate of the strength of any possible German counter-attack from the Reichwald.

2. Browning had decided to locate his corps headquarters there - totally unnecessary and he had no useful work to do in Holland anyway - and this put pressure on Gavin tpo provide protection.

On the "tea" thing, which has been followed by some US historians, I think Cornelius Ryan shares a lot of the blame.

Do not get me wrong. I am not criticising the performance of the soldiers of the 82nd and I think the assault river crossing by Maj. Julian Cook's battalion on 20 September was outstanding. I am criticising the plan they were following and I do not know whether Gavin had the freedom to devise his own plan, or whether it was imposed on him, in whole or in part.

[angie999]

(Colonel Gubbins @ Dec 4 2005, 07:55 PM) [post=42637]Thanks for the book suggestions angie.
To risk a little intended humour, I take it these guys are real historians?!
[img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img] [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img] [img]images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif[/img]
regards
MG
[/b]

I would say that they are both talented amateurs, but Middlebrook has a long and respected track record and Kershaw's book is very well researched.