Did the Japanese deserve the Atomic Bomb?

[James S]

I heard that MacArthur wanted to go nuclear in Korea ?
To the best of my knowledge it was only two bombs , but where would you drop a third ?

The animals pictured murdering POW's and civilians by bayonet and sword are they truely representative of the Japanese people , the people who died in the blasts of the bombs or who died in subsequent years following ?

Surviving the bomb brought problems both physical and psychological - not least guilt at being a survivor when so many died - for the most part ordinary people.
( There was quite a good article in the Sunday Times on this in 2005 - I have it somewhere).
I don't think all Germans were Jew killing monsters , unfortunately the mentality drilled into the Japanese soldiers saw them fighting a racialist war in Korea and China .

[Drew5233]

There's a rumour amongst some locals that one or parts of one that was destined for Germany, are on the SS Robert Montgomery in the mouth of the River Thames .

[Slipdigit]

Originally Posted by Stig O'Tracy

Perhaps we're all lucky that the Bombs were dropped on Japan. My understanding is the two they dropped were all they had at the time.

There is a thread, either here or over at WW2F that debunks that. Apparently there were plans for upwards of 10 to be ready to drop before the end of the year, on a schedule of 2-4 per month, kicking off in September.

[brndirt1]

Originally Posted by Stig O'Tracy

Perhaps we're all lucky that the Bombs were dropped on Japan. My understanding is the two they dropped were all they had at the time.

This is incorrect, but a widely held belief, so don't feel too bad.
Just as the Hanford Plant and Oak Ridge Plant were finally "hitting their stride" by mid-June of ’45 (they only reduced production after Japan surrendered), the generally cautious General Groves had made a prediction of bomb production numbers and mentioned them in this "memo" to General Marshall. These may not have been too far out of the realm of reality.

And while the "plutonium core" of the next implosion type "Fat man" style bomb was completed before Aug. 9th, 1945 it was sitting awaiting shipment at Los Alamos and could have been "air-shipped" in two separate four-engine transports just as "Fat Man’s" was originally. The "Little Boy" core was also shipped in two sections, one part (the target) with its case was aboard the USS Indianapolis, and the other (the plug) aboard a transport aircraft. At the time of the Nagasaki drop, the "case" for the next bomb was already on Tinian, completed in assembly, but awaiting its core which was interupted in shippment at San Francisco, and sent back to Alamagordo. Here is an excerpt from that "memo" to Gen. Marshall:

Leslie R. Groves' Memo to the
Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall)
30 July 1945
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(two paragraphs after Groves describes the successful Trinity test to Marshall)…


3. There is a definite possibility, [sensitive information deleted] as we increase our rate of production at the Hanford Engineer Works, with the type of weapon tested that the blast will be smaller due to detonation in advance of the optimum time. But in any event, the explosion should be on the order of thousands of tons. The difficulty arises from an undesirable isotope which is created in greater quantity as the production rate increases.


4. The final components of the first gun type bomb have (already) arrived at Tinian, those of the first implosion type should leave San Francisco by air-plane early on 30 July. I see no reason to change our previous readiness predictions on the first three bombs. In September, we should have three or four [more] bombs. One of these will be made from (U) 235 material and will have a smaller effectiveness, about two-thirds that of the test type, but by November, we should be able to bring this up to full power. There should be either four or five bombs in October, one of the lesser size. In November there should be at least five bombs [more], and the rate will rise to seven in December and increase decidedly in early 1946. By some time in November, we should have the effectiveness of the (U) 235 implosion type bomb equal to that of the tested plutonium implosion type.

5. By mid-October we could increase the number of bombs slightly by changing our design now to one using both materials in the same bomb. I have not made this change because of the ever present possibilities of difficulties in new designs. We could, if it were wise, change our plans and develop the combination bomb. But if this is to be done, it would entail an initial ten-day production setback which would be caught up in about a month's time; unless the decision to change were made before August 1st, in which case it would probably not entail any delay. From what I know of the world situation, it would seem wiser not to make this change until the effects of the present bomb are determined.


R. GROVES
Major General, U.S.A.
Source: Manhattan Engineer District -- Top Secret (de-classified), Manhattan Project File, Folder 4, Trinity Test, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Backtracking to the whole procedure, these are from Oppenheimer’s notes;

July 16: At 5:29:45 a.m. The "Gadget" is detonated in the first atomic explosion in history. The explosive yield is 20-22 kilotons (initially estimated at 18.9 kt), vaporizing the steel tower.

July 19: Oppenheimer suggest to Groves that the U-235 (target and projectile) from Little Boy be reworked into uranium/plutonium composite cores for making more implosion type bombs (4 implosion bombs could be made from Little Boy's core alone). Groves rejects the idea since it would delay combat use.

July 23: Secretary Stimson, in Potsdam, receives a new target list. In order of choice it is: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki, and Niigata. He also receives an estimate of atomic bomb availability: The uranium gun-type "Little Boy" will be available for delivery on Aug. 1st. The second plutonium implosion-type "Fat Man" should be ready for use on Aug. 6th , and a third implosion-type will be ready between Aug.17/24th. Additionally, since the production plants were finally approaching reasonable efficiency, three more cores should be available in September. With more being produced each month, topping off, or reaching seven a month or more by December.

July 30; The nuclear components are inserted into "Little Boy", bomb unit number L11.

July 31; The assembly of Little Boy is completed. It is ready for use the next day.

August 1; A typhoon approaching Japan prevents launching an attack with Little Boy. Several days are required for weather to clear.

August 2; "Fat Man" (implosion type) bomb cases F-31 and F-32 arrive on Tinian, and Fat Man assembly begins. Oppenheimer cables Groves with a shipping schedule, and Groves reports that the next plutonium core would be ready for shipment on August 12 or 13, with a bombing possible on August 17 or 18.

Aug.11; Oppenheimer believes that the third implosion case will arrive in the Pacific at this time (he missed by a day).

August 12; un-named (implosion type) bomb cases F-33 and F-34 arrive on Tinian, but the plutoium core is recalled from shipment when it arrives in San Franciso and returned to Los Alamos, and not used until the Bikini Island "Operation Crossroads" test. It most likely would have been used on either Kokura arsenal or Niigata. The possibility of dropping it on Tokyo do exist, but seem unlikely. This core and case becomes the "Able" bomb which is air dropped in 1946.

Aug.14; a fourth implosion case is completed made up of F-35 and F-36 case halves, and this unit eventually becomes "Baker" in the Bikini "Crossroads" tests of 1946.

(me again) Although Kokura was the primary target of the Nagasaki mission, neither it nor Niigata were included on the new target list submitted August 14. That list, in order of priority was: Sapporo, Hakodate, Oyabu, Yokosuka, Osaka, Nagoya. (see Downfall, Richard Frank; p.303)

As to MacArthur wanting to use the atomics in Korea, that is true. He (and everyone else) was so ignorant about the atomic bomb (he wasn't in the loop until after they had been dropped), he also wanted to use up to NINE of them to "soften up" Kukura if the invasion of the home islands remained necessary. Can you imagine our troops landing on a radioactive waste-land? Of course what we (or anybody) knew about radioactivity until the sixties is scary as all get out. We didn't stop testing in our Nevada desert for years, and sending unprotected troops into the blast area as soon as possible to see how fast they could do the job. Thousands of American soldiers were subjected to this "testing", and a great number of them died later of cancers.

[Kruska]

If it would have been a limited nuclear precision strike on Tojo's house and friends I might find the term "deserved" agreeable and applicable.

The Japanese civilians certainly did not deserve it - they already suffered for their governments wrongdoings and most of their homes and families were already in heap and ashes.

Regards
Kruska

[James S]

Tojo got what he deserved.

[Formerjughead]

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

Can we keep on topic?

Sorry Za

[Bob Guercio]

Originally Posted by Kruska

If it would have been a limited nuclear precision strike on Tojo's house and friends I might find the term "deserved" agreeable and applicable.

The Japanese civilians certainly did not deserve it - they already suffered for their governments wrongdoings and most of their homes and families were already in heap and ashes.

Regards
Kruska

This is probably the first post in this thread that really makes sense!

[Za Rodinu]

Originally Posted by Kruska

If it would have been a limited nuclear precision strike on Tojo's house and friends I might find the term "deserved" agreeable and applicable.

Oh? Please define "limited nuclear" (a contradition in terms, innit?) and "precise strike" in WW2 terms. No JDAMs etc back then.

Originally Posted by Kruska

The Japanese civilians certainly did not deserve it - they already suffered for their governments wrongdoings and most of their homes and families were already in heap and ashes.

When production of subcomponents for war materials is made in mini workshops in private houses then it's difficult not to consider the civillian population as economical agents.

[Bob Guercio]

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

Oh? Please define "limited nuclear" (a contradition in terms, innit?) and "precise strike" in WW2 terms. No JDAMs etc back then.



When production of subcomponents for war materials is made in mini workshops in private houses then it's difficult not to consider the civillian population as economical agents.

At the stage in the war in which the atomic bomb was used, Japan was no longer a realistic military threat outside of the home islands. Japan was down and out and the only reason for the continuation of the conventional bombing was to force a surrender. Therefore, further conventional bombing and usage of the atomic bomb was not used for military purposes but was only used to force the surrender.

I'm not saying that we were wrong to force an unconditional surrender because there were excellent reasons for it with which I wholeheartedly agree.

I'm also not saying that it was wrong to force a surrender as quickly as possible. It was the right thing to do.

Bob