Dunkirk/The RAF

[Bodston]

The current (November 2007) edition of 'Flypast' magazine has a feature on a Hurricane pilot who ditched at Dunkirk and includes excerpts from his book. He was the late Sqn Ldr Ken McGlashen AFC and his book is called 'Down to earth'. His Hurricane was resurected from the sand in 1988 it is still being restored to flying condition.

[von Poop]

McGlashan snippet & photograph here:
Battle of Britain Photographs


Don't ground troops always complain about the lack (or perception thereof) of air cover? Seem to be reading mostly memoirs at the moment & while one side complains of no friendly planes and harrasment by the enemy's, the other, in the same campaign, is doing exactly the same thing.

[Owen]

Might be worth having a read of what the Offical History says.
Hopefully it's not tainted by " positive spin".
HyperWar: The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940 [Chapter XXII]

In the fighting to cover evacuation from Dunkirk, the squadrons of Fighter Command played a splended part, setting out day by day to find and fight an enemy in greater strength. Had the Luftwaffe been allowed to circle unhampered over Dunkirk, as it had done over Warsaw and Rotterdam, evacuation might well have been stopped. Instead German reports constantly record our fighters' interference and only in two days out of nine could the Luftwaffeseriously hinder the Navy's work. If our fighters could not do all that the Army and Navy wished, they helped substantially to make evacuation possible

.

[Owen]

Also,from an earlier chapter.
HyperWar: The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940 [Chapter XVI]

The German Air Ministry situation report says that 'Throughout the day waves of aircraft attacked troops assembled for embarkation, the harbour of Dunkirk and warships and merchant vessels off the coast and in the sea area between Dunkirk and England'.2[7] Both German air fleets were employed in these attacks.
The Royal Air Force flew eight fighter sweeps at a strength of three to four squadrons and Coastal Command flew patrols over the route between the North Goodwins and the French coast, but no one could foresee the timing of the enemy's attacks and there were inevitably spells when none of our aircraft could be over the area.[8] The enemy's air attacks began soon after four o'clock in the morning—they had, indeed, endeavoured to bomb ships using the harbour during the night.
Our first patrol had been ordered to be over the area soon after five, and they were heavily engaged on arrival. Others followed shortly after six, nine, ten and eleven o'clock and all were involved in fighting. There was then a lull in air activity by both sides during the middle of the day, but soon after three o'clock in the afternoon our patrols was again in action and Coastal Command's patrol intervened to help. At four o'clock our aircraft found the enemy engaged in a renewed attack and again Coastal Command's patrol joined in the fight. The light was beginning to fail but further seeps soon after five, six and eight o'clock all engaged the enemy after which failing visibility led to a decline of air operations. It was the heaviest day's fighting and though our fighters could not keep the Luftwaffe away they did much to scatter and destroy attacking aircraft and to disrupt the enemy's plans. The Royal Air Force lost thirty-one aircraft on this day, but the German return admits that ten of their fighters and nineteen bombers were lost and thirteen aircraft seriously damaged, making a total of forty-two enemy aircraft destroyed or put out of action in this day's operations.[9]

[Harry Ree]

I have to say that I have never heard of the the RAF being nicknamed the Royal Absent Force.The RAF were criticised for not being adequate enough over the invasion beaches.

I think it was Dowling who laid down his firm opinion that no further squadrons should be deployed in the Battle of France and that was a response to a request for further help to the French made to Churchill. His request to attend the War Cabinet meeting on 15 May 1940 to present his case was surprisingly granted and he reminded the Cabinet that the RAF required 52 fighter squadrons to guarantee the air Defence of Great Britain.Dowling argued that any fighter aircraft sent France and these were predominately Hurricanes were for all intent and purpose out of the reckoning for the defence of Britain.Despite this and he was down to 36 fighter squadrons,due to Churchill's efforts to prop up the French,Dowling lost a further 10 squadrons, 4 already dispatched and a further 6 in response to Churchill's request from his meeting with the French Premier,Paul Reynaud.In the absence of Churchill,the Cabinet although not daring to reject Churchill's order, compromised and stipulated that the 6 squadrons operating from French bases by day must return to their home bases each night.

Churchill does not record Dowling's input to the decision not to send further fighter squadrons to France although Dowling had given a presentation showing Hurricane rate of losses and the liklihood of fighter strength falling to a point where the RAF would be capable of being overpowered over British skys.

Research by the historian A.J.P Taylor has revealed this different account from that recorded in Churchill's memoirs.In the memoirs,Dowling is not credited with attending a meeting at No 10 or that he conveyed an urgent warning to his superiors regarding the critical state of British air defence.

Dowling was proved right for his extreme caution for in the end of the Battle for France, of the 261 Hurricanes deployed to assist the BEF and the French, only 66 returned to home bases.

Later while Fighter Command broke the back of the Luftwaffe atttempt to command the skies above Britain, Bomber Command carried the war to the Germans and accounted for the hurriedly put together invasion barge force being assembled in the French and Belgium ports.During this period Bomber Command lost nearly 800 aircrew.

[Owen]

Here's an interesting snippet from Air Battle Dunkirk (page 57-58.)

Flight-Lieutenant Sir Archibald Hope, Bt force landed on the beach near Gravelines May 26th and with the help of some locals made it to a British Brigade HQ at Bergues.
The soldiers raised the air-raid alarm and took cover, Sir Archibald stood out in the garden watching a flight of RAF fighters fly over. The soldiers were amazed that he knew they were friendly and when he pointed out that at that time RAF fighters had their undersides painted half in black and half in white. The soldiers were astonished as they'd seen lots like that and assumed them to be Germans.
Sir Achibald is convinced that there was extraordinary failure in British Intelligence in a Brigade HQ didn't even know standard RAF markings leading the Army to think RAF planes were infact German.

[von Poop]

That makes sense to me, there is something teutonic about the black/white.
I used to love those half black half white Hurricane belly schemes as a kid, but still have no idea why they did them like that?

Cheers,
Adam.

[Marina]

This Forum is a goldmine of information!
Marina

[Owen]

Also reading of lots of "friendly fire" on RAF planes from both British AA units and Belgiums, basically they didn't have a clue who was who.

[Owen]

From The Battle Of France by Col. A Goutard, page 241.

Kesselring observes: "Because of the condition of our air squadrons, which were worn out and were having to make more sorties than ever , the losses inflicted by the Spitfires increased steadily...Really it was they who made the sea evacuation possible."