Luftwaffe Schrage Musik and RAF losses

[The Aviator]

Apparently the instigator of the adoption of Schräge Musik by the Luftwaffe was Oberleutnant Rudolf Schönert, who started advocating this in 1941.
The first installation was made late in 1942, in a Do 17Z-10 that was also equipped with Lichtenstein radar. The results were inconclusive, and development was shelved for a year. Nevertheless it is reported that in the summer of 1942 Schönert, then commanding II/NJG 5, received three Do 217J nightfighters for operational testing of this form of armament. (Schönert had his first combat success with Schräge Musik in May 1943, and then not in a Do 217J but in a field-modified Bf 110.) Wide-scale adoption followed in late 1943, and in 1944 a third of all German nightfighters carried upward-firing guns.

There was more to Schräge Musik than just fitting a few angled-up cannon, usually MG 151/20 or MK 108. These were put in the rear of the cockpit of the Bf 110, in the aft fuselage of the He 219, and behind the cockpit of the Ju 88 and Do 217. It was important to attack undetected, and therefore tracers were not used. Special ammunition with a faint glowing trail replaced them. The guns were given flash reducers. An additional gunsight was installed in the cockpit to aim the guns. The attack from below had the advantage that the nightfighter crew could observe and identify the silhouette of the aircraft before they attacked. At the same time the bomber crew could not see the nightfighter against the dark ground, nor defend itself: The belly turrets of British bombers had been removed because of their limited effectiveness and to reduce drag. The nightfighter usually aimed for the fuel tanks, not for the fuselage, because of the risk that exploding bombs would damage the attacker. Schräge Musik soon produced devastating results. It was at its most successful in the winter of 1943-1944. This was a time when losses became unacceptable: The RAF lost 78 of 823 the bombers that attacked Leipzig on 19 February, and 107 of the 795 bombers that attacked Berlin on 30 March.
RAF Bomber command compensated for the German lateness to adopt this form of armament by reacting slowly to it. Reports of bomber crews gave no indication, because the German nightfighters managed to stalk their preys without being perceived. Only an analysis of the damage done to returning bombers demonstrated that the Germans were firing from below. This seems to have been understood fairly quick, for the problem was already reported in April 1943. However, it took considerable time to implement a satisfactory solution. Initially, a downward observation window was provided, and Canadian bombers again received belly turrets. But the effectiveness of these measures was small, because the attackers were very hard to see.

207 Squadron RAF Association - Museums links

[Erich]

several things, the first mission that the SM was officially used on any scale was the Penemunde raid in August of 43.
the guns in any form whether 20 or 30mm never had flash reducers except as a very experimental fitting applied by the warts-mecanics for the crews wishes, what the guns were fitted was a very faint tracer called glim-spurr

Allied night bomber crews in more cases than not never found out what hit them from below except possibly flak. even with as you mentioned a window or two or a twin or single belly gun it was not a deterent at all to the Nachtjagd they kept attacking from down and below till wars end inf act many top aces preferred this "safer" arrangement for attacks

good post

[freebird]

Hi Erich, did the British ever try to counter the very deadly "Schrage Muzik"? Did they ever try escorting the bombers with a trailing NF? (Beaufighter or Mossie perhaps) I would think that trailing NFs might have a better chance to pick up the interceptors on radar?

[Erich]

the RAF did put up Mossie escorts but not as we think of them as the day light sorties for the RAF and US heavy bomber formations.

it was much more freelance trying to pick up German radar emissions to the RAF R/O then following them in a good attack pattern or following them back to their own airfields where they could hit them as they landed, and then hang around the airfield for any other LW a/c approaching. This was very common as the LW airfield had to continually keep lights out

as the counter threat to SM yes as previously mentioned by Aviator in the article, a belly gunner sometimes was put in or if the RAF had B-24's in their lot and not the usually heavy array of internal radar and jamming electronics then the belly turret could still be left installed and used.

I have to admit after chatting with members and families of the 2641st group of the US 15th AF whom attacked targets in the south of the Reich in all black B-24's the belly turrets were removed and the crews were hit over and over again by Ju 88G-6 and the dreaded 2cm SM installations

[freebird]

Do you think it would have been more effective defence if they had some of the Mossie's following the bombers?

[The Aviator]

Mosquitos did some great work patrolling major Luftwaffe airfields. Hours of circling and not allowing any take offs was a very effective deterant.

[Christos]

Mosquitos were TOO IMPORTANT as photo recon and PATHFINDER sorties...the limited supply of these amazing aircraft dictated that they be used in the operational roles that gave the most benefit to the Bomber offensive,,....and NOTHING was more important than target indication and photo recon for results......IF we had lots of them, Im sure they would have been used in this nightfighter role a whole lot more....Supply and demand !

Dont forget the raid on NUREMBURG of Nov(?) '44....95 British bombers bit the dust for the best performance of all....

[The Aviator]

After a month's layoff the intruders and rangers resumed operations in July, making 20 sorties. Early in the month the Squadron received six type VI Mosquito bombers for use on this work and a special flight was formed under F/L Murray for night rangers and patrols over enemy aerodromes.

The History of 410 Cougar Squadron Page 3

[Erich]

well let me mention that the Mossie intruders had different tactics than the Lw nf's. in 45 when the primary LW radar sets were jammed until spring of 45 when the AI came available the Lw used the FuG 350Z naxos which was never jammed, at least for the LW when there was an abundance of disturbance on the single screen the R/O could send the pilot to the area of heaviest interference and most likely he would be successful or at least have a 4-engine mount in his view.
Because of the limitations then of picking up radar emissions within the Mosquito intruder R/O set the 2 man crew really had to look hard and many times it was the result of the Lanc/Hali being shot down that a squadron Mossie could take advantage of the fire and illumination and possibly see a German nf still in the area witnessing the shoot down as a victory, follwo the LW fighter shoot it down in air combat or try and follow it back to it's airfield if there was not ground illumination nor searchlight or ground elevation interferences to throw the Mossie crew off.
Radio/light beacons were always of note to the Allied air crews and it was always a good place to lurk and wait for the Lw nf's to form and bank until vectored to the area of contact with a bomber stream, though stream is not the correct wording.
Again I point out the almost uselessness of trying to compare Mossie protection squadrons of the RAF 4-engines to day time operations. you can do only so much on a dark night even with ID red glasses or being illuminated by ground searchlights and fires from cities far below, flares, even illuminated candles from Pathfinders.

many combat reports from both sides gave the ID wrong for both fighters and twin and 4 engine bombers at night

[The Aviator]

Think we are talking about two different things here.
I am really talking about standing patrols over alloted known Luftwaffe airfields to make them keep their heads down.