German Air Operations Against Convoy PQ16. May 1942.

[Peter Clare]

May 1942

Convoy PQ16

Reference – The Diaries of Luftflotte 5.



Reports of the preliminary gathering of PQ16 had been received by the German War Staff. The United Kingdom portion, on its way to Iceland, had been sighted by a FW.200 on the 5th May thus confirming an agents report of a Murmansk bound convoy having sailed from North Scotland. Agents in Canada reported the gathering of Russia bound shipping in Canadian harbours between 5th and 7th May. It was considered, therefore, that the complete convoy would sail from Iceland soon after the 17th May. This appreciation was strengthened by a FW.200 sighting of a British task force consisting of one battleship, one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and several destroyers on the 16th May about 70 miles east of Iceland. Increased air reconnaissance was instituted between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island but owing to persistent foggy conditions it was 1600 hours on the 23rd before the task force was again observed and not until 0645 hours on the 25th May was the main convoy sighted about 120 miles east of Jan Mayen Island. U-boats had picked up portions of the convoy late on the 24th but W/T interference had corrupted their early shadowing signals. Continuous position reports were made by air and U-boat shadowers for the next six days. From these the convoy was estimated to number up to 50 merchant vessels escorted by five cruisers, 14 destroyers and nine corvettes.

Between 2022 hours on the 25th and 1730 hours on the 30th May a total of 21 separate attack waves of torpedo carrying and bomber aircraft were launched. He.111s and 115s carried the torpedoes, Ju.88s the bombs and Ju.87 dive bombers were used as the convoy neared Murmansk. Low cloud and misty conditions in the target area prevented many of the aircraft from locating the convoy and this with the increasingly unserviceable condition of the runways on the airfields at Banak, Kirkenes and Petsamo upset the planed strong concentrated attacks. In all, there were dispatched 42 – He.111s, 9 – He. 115s, 227 – Ju.88s and 33 – Ju.87s. Against the loss of one He.115 and 6 Ju.88s there were claimed 16 merchant vessels sunk, a further six probably sunk and 24 damaged. (This compares with the actual British loss of six merchant ships and damage to three others by air action) The shadowing and reconnaissance duties were performed by 86 sorties consisting of 29 – FW. 200s, 24 – BV.138s, 29 – Ju.88s and 4 – He.115s.