The Sherman Tank what an amazing vehicle!!

[Slipdigit]

To the Japanese, it was the equivalent of a Tiger, Panther, T-34 or JS-2, seeing as how they really had nothing to defend against it, except pole bombs, molotovs and the lucky artillery hit. I can't remember if they had anti-tank mines are not. I guess I need to look that one up in my book. But that is something for tomorrow, my eyelids are getting heavy.

[machine shop tom]

"I remember reading somewhere once that the Pershing could have been ready in similar numbers as the M4 by 1944, had the decision to produce them had been made. The Armor board keboshed that. It was a slower and heavier tank, but it had lower weight to ground pressure ratio than the Sherman due to wider tracks, actually resulting in better off-road ability. It was larger and in 1942, shipping was a concern, but that 90mm gun would have been a god-send when facing 75mm/L70 and 88mm/L56 guns."

It was Patton himself that blocked the deployment of Pershings. He mistakenly believed that the heavier Pershing was less agile than the Sherman, and would not be as effective in cavalry tactics. His misunderstanding of the Pershing's advantages doomed a lot of Sherman tankers to horrible deaths.

tom

[Slipdigit]

I agree with you on that now that you mention that was Patton that had a hand it delaying the Pershing. I wished that I could remember where I read it, I think it was a book called Death Traps, by Benton Cooper. I guess I could look back through and try to find the passage, but I just don't feel like re-reading that book.

Regardless, it was McNair that pushed the tank destroyer theory, resulting in a low velocity gun in the M4.

[von Poop]

We touched on this here:
http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/weapons...ershing+patton
My thoughts at the time:

Originally Posted by Von Poop

The T26E1, the theoretical pershing was only created in the form of 10 unproven vehicles by june 44 (DDay), Actual Pershing Prototypes (t26e3)were only 'ready to go' (approved for limited procurement) in december 1944, 20 were availabe as production had actually begun in November. After the ardennes finally convinced the Army board of Shermans inadequacies 20 were shipped in Jan 45. .......... The delay in the Pershing project were caused at the highest levels, the Army board not wishing to divert production until the design was fully proven (though she gained 'combat approval' very rapidly if the design had shown more flaws the loss of Sherman production could have been disastrous for the heavy fighting in 44 & 45). Pershing could never have been ready for DDay

(haven't double-checked any of that, apologies if there're some errors, I was mildly irate at the time but still stand by the thrust of it. )

The wide belief that many Pershings could have been combat-ready for Dday always strikes me as a pipe-dream. It simply wasn't ready, and if this was down to the army boards decisions I think they were right to do so. A few running prototypes is a long way from a mass force of useful vehicles.
I also doubt that Patton had anywhere near enough influence, particularly by that point in the war, to influence such important aspects of design or production.

Death Traps is an interesting read but It seems to have had more effect on opinion than one mans point of view really should.

Cheers,
Adam.

[Slipdigit]

I found this here:

http://www/knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/armormag/

You will probably not be able to get to it unless you are on a DoD login, but here is what it says:

While researching the development of the M26, this author examined the records of the Ordnance Department, Army Service Forces, Army Ground Forces, War Department G-4, and European Theater of Operations. There is nothing in those records associating George S. Patton with the development, production, or introduction of the M26. - Charles M. Bailey, "Armor Magazine," Issue S-O 01, pg 36.


I thought it odd when I read in Death Traps,(Cooper, 1998) 6 or 7 years ago that GS Patton was involved in early Pershing development, because he was at Fort Benning and in North Africa in 1942. But I should have smelled a rat when it had a foward by Stephen Ambrose. I guess Mr Cooper had a burr under his saddle for George Patton for some reason or another. I remember that his tone when writing on Patton was rather harsh.

I still think that larger numbers of Pershings could have been available earlier had the right people had gotten behind it and started lighting fires under the butts of whoever needed to feel the heat. Look at how quickly the M4 got into production, not to mention other weapons, including aircraft. But if a frog had wings...

[kfz]

Originally Posted by Slipdigit

I found this here:

http://www/knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/armormag/

You will probably not be able to get to it unless you are on a DoD login, but here is what it says:

While researching the development of the M26, this author examined the records of the Ordnance Department, Army Service Forces, Army Ground Forces, War Department G-4, and European Theater of Operations. There is nothing in those records associating George S. Patton with the development, production, or introduction of the M26. - Charles M. Bailey, "Armor Magazine," Issue S-O 01, pg 36.


I thought it odd when I read in Death Traps,(Cooper, 1998) 6 or 7 years ago that GS Patton was involved in early Pershing development, because he was at Fort Benning and in North Africa in 1942. But I should have smelled a rat when it had a foward by Stephen Ambrose. I guess Mr Cooper had a burr under his saddle for George Patton for some reason or another. I remember that his tone when writing on Patton was rather harsh.

I still think that larger numbers of Pershings could have been available earlier had the right people had gotten behind it and started lighting fires under the butts of whoever needed to feel the heat. Look at how quickly the M4 got into production, not to mention other weapons, including aircraft. But if a frog had wings...

Hindsight is a lovely thing. Im with VP on this one. One thing getting 5 out there, another thing, getting crews trained, rear eachlon trained, supplies and spares, never mind replacements for a whole squadron(s)...

Was it worth the chance, Going on the British example with the centurion, they basically said "its not going to be ready in sufficent numbers to makes a difference so where really not going to bother", but instead make sure the stuff that wil lbe there is well supported. Was it worth the chance? No and the Centurion was great tank.

Another example. of the Panther tank. Ordered into the line before it was ready, it was disaster, its first showings where poor. Its just just not worth risking them crews.

Did I read it here that someone said you could get 3 Shermans on a boat for 1 Pershing.

Kev

[Slipdigit]

Yes, hindsight is almost always 20/20, except for the the revisionists who have a political agenda, like the holocaust deniers. I can look at tank development and wonder why in the heck could designers, theorist and leaders not see the "obvious". But then, I have access to information that they didn't.

If you throw out the battalions of M10s and later M36s, how many Pershings does that make room for in shipping? Those machines were a manifestation of a flawed theory. Each infantry division (ETO) had at least a TD battalion (as well as a tank battalion) attached through the NW European campaign. I guess the answer would still be zero, seeing as how the US didn't aggresively pursue the T-26 until late 1944. Would also the Pershing's ability to stand up better to the PzKw V and outclass the PzKw IV, make it less likely to be damaged/destroyed in the large numbers that would necessitated the use of increase amounts of shipping space to send replacement M4s?

We will never know and theories are like b***holes, everybody has one. We can always game Pershings in action but even those outcomes are totally dependant on the designers whims.

[Owen]

Anyone read this?

Amazon.com: Cutthroats: The Adventures of a Sherman Tank Driver in the Pacific: Books: Robert Dick

Any good?

[mollusc]

Originally Posted by Owen D

Going to pick you up on this.
You say the crew panicked, it was not the weapon that was at fault.
The 57mm aka 6 pdr could take out a Tiger if hit in the right place.
Therefore not an example of ineffective weapon system but a poorly trained crew member.

... and I'll pick you up on this!
It's nothing to do with a poorly trained crew member old chap. Yes a 6pdr could take out a Tiger if hit in the right place...

That right place was in the side of the Tiger, at about 600 yards or less, and at angles of less than 30 degrees. So, in your opinion then, the properly trained crew member would have kindly asked the Tiger's crew to "come-about 300 yards away please and nicely side on, thankyou"?

In vast majority of battle conditions, 6pdr versus Tiger 1 = not too much use.
Things got better after (limited) intro. of APDS.

[mollusc]

Originally Posted by Owen D

I'm fed up of this German tanks were great British tanks were rubbish.
This is from Churchill's Desert Rats (pages 53 & 54) by Patrick Delaforce (a 11th Armd Div Vet). Here is a quote about 5 RTR in 7th Armd at Op.Goodwood.



Norman Smith , 5 RTR wrote.



Hardly the stuff of five Shermans to one Tiger is it?
A myth, I think so.

Owen, you should be a in Government! Quoting one or two tiny examples that back up your theory, and ignoring the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Just listen to what SAPPER is saying, at the end of the day the rest of us just quote from books, he actually knows what he is talking about.