RAF at Night, USAAF by Day. Who decided?

Spidge:
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Quote:
Originally Posted by adrian roberts
There were always reservations about this; neither side wanted to be first to deliberately bomb a city which is why when the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London rather than Fighter Command bases in the BoB, the Germans alleged that the RAF had bombed Berlin deliberately (a different debate!).

Adrian



Didn't they?
Probably! This has been debated before on this forum. I don't have enough detailed knowledge to put forward more than the popular view, so I chickened out and sat on the fence.

Kitty:
618 (Mosquito) after ships.
Did 618 ever become operational? They were an experimental unit formed to operate the "Highball" mini-version of the "Upkeep" bouncing bomb [or mine] from Mosquitoes, but I believe this project was cancelled and 618 disbanded.
Adrian

 

There is also the (small) one at the RAF museum at Hendon.


Man, Gnomey. That looks like a really cool museum! I see the wing of something really German in the background and it looks like you can get up pretty close to them.

 

The RAF had expertise (by the standards of the time) in night-bombing, going back to WW1. All through the interwar years, they had dedicated night-bomber squadrons. However, they knew that for accuracy in hitting specific targets day-bombing would be needed: at night they knew they were never going to be able to hit anything smaller than a city. There were always reservations about this; neither side wanted to be first to deliberately bomb a city which is why when the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London rather than Fighter Command bases in the BoB, the Germans alleged that the RAF had bombed Berlin deliberately (a different debate!).
As Gnomey and Morse say above, the RAFs daytime losses were terribly high, so the threshold of importance of a target which determined whether to bomb in day rather than night became progressively higher (83 squadron [Blenheims] was completely wiped out on one raid). But they never gave up daylight raids altogether, even using heavy bombers, e.g. the Augsburg raid by the then-new Lancs in April 42.

I have never heard that the USAAC gave much attention to night-bombing before WW2. Their main reason for having bombers was in case anyone threatened the Panama Canal; they became quite paranoid when Colombia acquired a single Curtis BT32 Condor. The B17 was originally produced to counter a potential enemy fleet that might threaten the coast line. And as far as US Naval policy for the Atlantic was concerned, the assumption until at least the mid-thirties was that Britain would be the aggressor! (So much for the Special Relationship!)

Adrian
Well come on Adrain, the Navy had to sell its importance. Who better to use as a naval threat than the RN? It's the only country that was considered superior or on par with the USN in those days. You can't get massive funding by saying you are worried about the French Navy!

 

My understanding that it was driven by pramaticism. As several pointed out the loss of daylight bombing without fighter escort are inherently tremendous. To the British, they didn't have production numbers to sustain it. The US did. The British did bomb in France during the day especially in tactical raids with heavies. Also the British attacked the Ploesti fields along with the USAAF 15th. That was target priority #1 in WWII.

The US had the capacity to endure the high losses though it was highly distressing to Hap Arnold and Doolittle. In late 1943 was the worst because the Luftwaffe was at its zenith and escort fighters were limited in their range and it took its toll. The introduction of drop tanks on the P-47 gave the first capacity to go all the way to berlin. Then came the P-51 which had the best range. As someone stated already, the Jugs and Spits were just not fuel efficent enough to escort bombers initially. Once the invasion began, then everyone could go further including the less effient fighters because they didn't have to start at England.

The trade off is they type of bombing you can do. At night it is very hard to do precision bombing as cities are blacked out and its hard to pinpoint a target. Daylight bombing allows you to target better and less chance of a wasted mission. In general precision targets were allocated to the US and area targets were allocated to the RAF. The net effect was impressive because the Germans got bombed around the clock. There was no rest for them and they were stretched. I have to believe this constant attacking took its toll on the German fighter pilots and helped wrestle away air supremacy.

Morse can probably quote bombing accuracy numbers as he is a bomber-head. He can probably make a comparison of the two.

But something to keep in mind. The RAF didn't skate through WWII. They had no exemption from flak (the bombers worst enemy).

Looking retrospectively, it does make sense to have day and night bombing. In that, the choices because of the numbers games was correct. The US lost a lot of bombers in bombing during the day. The problem is that they could not halt bombing until the fighters came along because then you surrender your gains giving the Germans time to rebuild.

Good question though.

 

To the British, they didn't have production numbers to sustain it.

The reason has more to do with the need to avoid unneccessary loss of aircrew rather than production figures.

All the major players on the british side had come through WW! and this did have an effect on their thinking about how to fight WW2.

 

At night it is very hard to do precision bombing as cities are blacked out and its hard to pinpoint a target.

However, the RAF did realize, after a time, that their bombing results were preet poor and so started to develop new navigational aids to help the bomber crews.

Also, we cannot forget that the RAF did have to conform to policies decided outwith its structures. A close study of these polices reveals what the intention of the bombing policy was to be.

It changed from one of only bombing "military targets" to all out war against, not only the military but the means of production and the german people.

Bomber Harris in his despatch wrote:

“3. The main task, therefore, laid upon the Command by the Air Ministry directif letter numbered S.46368/D.C.A.S., of 14th February, 1942, was "to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers."* This was to be achieved by destroying, mainly by incendiary attacks, first, four large cities in the Ruhr area and, then, as opportunity offered, fourteen other industrial cities in Northern, Central and Southern Germany. The aim of attacks on town areas had already been denned in an Air Staff paper (dated 23rd September, 1941) as follows •:—

" The ultimate aim of the attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To ensure this we must achieve two things ; first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction, and (ii) the fear of death."


4. My primary authorised task was therefore clear beyond doubt : to inflict the most severe material damage on German industrial cities. This, when considered in relation to the force then available, was indeed a formidable task. Nevertheless, it was possible, but only if the force could be expanded and re-equipped as planned, and if its whole weight could be devoted to the main task with the very minimum of diversions…”


Para 4 clearly states the reason of why they attacked the cites

 

Yeah it is a good museum and you can get really close (and touch sometimes). That is the FW-190S wing you can see in the background. Here is the website:http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/index.cfm (the memorial is at the London branch).

 

My understanding that it was driven by pramaticism. As several pointed out the loss of daylight bombing without fighter escort are inherently tremendous. To the British, they didn't have production numbers to sustain it. The US did. The British did bomb in France during the day especially in tactical raids with heavies. Also the British attacked the Ploesti fields along with the USAAF 15th. That was target priority #1 in WWII.
As i understood it it was the lack of aircrew, not the lack of aircraft that was the problem.

The trade off is they type of bombing you can do. At night it is very hard to do precision bombing as cities are blacked out and its hard to pinpoint a target. Daylight bombing allows you to target better and less chance of a wasted mission. In general precision targets were allocated to the US and area targets were allocated to the RAF. The net effect was impressive because the Germans got bombed around the clock. There was no rest for them and they were stretched. I have to believe this constant attacking took its toll on the German fighter pilots and helped wrestle away air supremacy.
May i point out, as Morse has already alluded to it, the precision bombing system of Oboe and Gee-H allowed more precise bombing at night when coupled with the PFF, and after D=-Day the Oboe stations moved forward with the front lines allowing ever more accurate bombing deeper into Reich territory.
Kitty

 

The trade off is they type of bombing you can do. At night it is very hard to do precision bombing as cities are blacked out and its hard to pinpoint a target. Daylight bombing allows you to target better and less chance of a wasted mission. In general precision targets were allocated to the US and area targets were allocated to the RAF.

Can I get this right. You are saying that one of the main reasons that the USAAF chose to bomb during the daylight hours and not at night, was the inaccuracy of night time bombing?

This indeed may have been one of the reasons. But in another thread you are telling us about the devestation that 'nightfighter' attacks had on German supply lines, implying that the flew out looking for oppertune targets and attacking them accuratly and effectivley in the dark.

So which do you think would be a more effective and accurate? Long range night time raids made on large area targets of known geographic location, aided by a dedicated navigator, static radio aids such as 'Oboe' and 'Gee-H'?

Or single aircraft mooching around at low level over France looking for oppertune targets that are identifiable as military, enemy and a target, in an army that moved in darkness, with good light dicipline or remained static, cammed up and dug in, again with good light dicipline?

You can't bomb accuratley on a planned mission or you can cause devestating strategic damage with night interdiction. I'll give you one, or the other, but you can't have both.

 

Para 4 clearly states the reason of why they attacked the cites

This tends to support the view that bombing German civilian populations was Churchill's decision rather than Harris's - but of course it's Harris writing!
The idea of bombing whole cities started with the Germans in the WW1 airship raids, and was formalised in the book "Command of the Air" by the Italian General Douhet in the 1920's, which made the "the bombers would always get through" claim. Harris, and all the senior commanders of all European nations, would have been aware of this book. Whether they were happy about the morality is another matter, but as military commanders they had to match the enemy's perceived capabilities and intentions.

Adrian

 

Jimbo

Man, Gnomey. That looks like a really cool museum! I see the wing of something really German in the background and it looks like you can get up pretty close to them.

I was there myself just the other day - the RAF Museum is the largest aviation museum in the country, and being a Government organization admission is free! They don't like you touching the exhibits but in most cases you could if you tried.

The 8th AF memorial is under a B25J. The German wing on the right is, as Gnomey says, a FW190S - in fact the only two-seat example in existence. The German endplate rudder in the left background is an HE162 jet.

No P47's I'm afraid! (though I've only been to the Hendon branch; there may be at Cosford or another branch)

Adrian

 

No P47's I'm afraid! (though I've only been to the Hendon branch; there may be at Cosford or another branch)

None at Cosford!

 

There was a P-47, in RAF Far East colours, on display when I visited Hendon last September. It's still listed on the website so perhaps it was being renovated or in the process of being moved? Aircraft are sometimes moved between Hendon & Cosford, e.g. when I visited Hendon the Bomber Hall was closed as the Valiant was being dismantled in order to move it to Cosford & the website says that the Liberator has gone the other way.

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/london/collections/aircraft/aircraft_info.cfm?aircraft_id=63

 

Gibbo is right there is a P-47 in Far Eastern Colours at Hendon (at least it was in February). Pic:

 

That is one beautiful looking plane. The P-47 was to me one of the most beautiful looking aircraft of the war!! Great Pic Gnomey

 

when I visited Hendon the Bomber Hall was closed as the Valiant was being dismantled in order to move it to Cosford & the website says that the Liberator has gone the other way.



Yhe Liberator is now at hendon. i remember seeing her when I was at Cosford many years ago!

 

this split was formalised at the Casablanca Conference between Churchill & Roosevelt in January 1943. Churchill went to Casablanca intending to try & persuade Roosevelt that the USAAF should join the RAF in night bombing but USAAF generals Eaker & Arnold made a presentation that convinced Churchill of the merits of round the clock bombing. From then on, it was official Allied policy that the 2 air forces should pursue different but complementary bombing strategies.

Anyone suggest a good reference citing this conference and decision?

thanks.

cheers,
phil

 

The USAAF did day bombing because they thought it was more accurate (for the precision bombing) and because they thought the bombers could protect themselves (which as we know they couldn't).

The overrating of the Norden bombsight had a lot to do with the choice of tactics; it sure was good hardware, but when coupled with some other misconceptions (does anyone remember the "Who's afraid of the big bad wolf?" episode, in 8th AF barracks all over England?), it was responsible for the deaths of many young americans.

Aaahhh, industrial America!

 

Anyone suggest a good reference citing this conference and decision?

thanks.

cheers,
phil

Winged Victory, Perrett, Random House, 1993 pp 243-244.

pg 244

"Besides resolving the protracted debate over night versus day bombing the Casablanca Conference had other important consequneces for the air war."

In the paragraph above that line:

"Eaker handed Churchill the single sheet of paper and watched intently as Churchill, lips moving, read: the Eighth was equipped and trained to fly by day . . . time would be lost retraining and reequipping . . . there wasn't enough air space over eastern Britain for two big bomber forces to assemble safely at night . . . finally, 'If the RAF continues night bombing and we bomb by day, we shall bomb them round the clock and the devil shall get no rest.' Churchill savored the last sentence. He reconsidered the matter with Roosevelt. The Eighth should be given more time to show what daylight bombing could do."

 

Thanks Jeff.
Hope all is well with you.
phil