1st Burma Regiment plan to capture Winkadat, 21st/22nd May 1945

I have obtained some ephemera relating to the 1st Battalion Burma Regiment that came from a house clearance. Many of the items are hand written notes and include the detailed plan of attack for the village of Winkadat on the Sittang River. It would appear that both 'A' Coy and 'C' Coy were asked to submit a plan of attack for consideration. I have transcribed both plans verbatim and any mistakes are mine. They describe the plan of attack to capture one small Burmese village, of no particular consequence or strategic value, except that it held a garrison of some 60 or more soldiers of a retreating Japanese army. I have not looked at the War Diary so I do not yet know if the attack went ahead or was successful. I can find no Burma Regiment casualties around this date so it may be possible that the Japanese had withdrawn from the village when the attack went ahead.

I offer the transcriptions as an example of the planning necessary to capture one village during the Burma campaign. I imagine that there were hundreds of such plans drawn up during the 1944/45 advance into Burma. I wonder how many have survived,

 

‘C’ Syndicate. 1st Burma Regiment

Appreciation

Object: To ascertain strength of enemy in area WINKADAT and his disposition.

Objective: To destroy enemy in WINKADAT

Factors affecting

(i) Enemy.

Strengths unknown, although local reports state 60 Japs dig in temple area. His intentions are unknown & part of the object of the exercise is to discover his intentions. More detailed recces needed to ascertain strengths and dispositions.

(ii) Our Troops.

2 Coy with Regt 25 pdrs at call plus air strikes.

Troops available source insufficient - due to necessity holding the Battalion area. Either someone to take over Battalion area – or additional troops from 3/2nd Punjab.

(iii) Ground.

Open, flat, marshy with a river obstacle running across the front from West to East. Many river channels intersperse the area. Map unreliable as to tracks and river channels.

Day approach impossible owing to easy Japanese observation. Night approach over this country will be difficult, but possible. Recces of routes needed. River obstacle must be thoroughly recced for state of banks, width, depth and rate of flow. High Water must be known.

Time & Space

Area is large and it is estimated 3 ½ hours needed to transport boats and prepare them at the river for the crossing. Roughly 9 ½ hours of darkness – so should be possible to cross at High Water. Owing to ill-defined trenches evacuation of casualties and supply of ammunition would be very difficult.

Other Factors

Morale. Enemy: Low. Own Troops: Not high owing to repeated promises of increased rations and Leave not being fulfilled.

Weather.

Deteriorating rapidly, usually with rain at night. Moon ¾ full. Must be done quickly or area will be impassable.

Courses Open

(i) Detailed recces & then Arty & airstrikes on observed positions. (ii) Attack the village of WINKADAT.

The first course seems the more practical, but if the second is deemed advisable by higher command then outline plan as follows:-

(1) Night Attack

(2) One Coy assault with one Coy in immediate reserve astride river crossing place.

(3) River crossing at sufficient distance from enemy to ensure surprise and an unopposed crossing. Exact place dependent on recces, to this effect.

(4) No Arty – surprise, but with F.O.O in the forward Company. He will have Regt at call.

To the Adjt

Above find the appreciation and outline plan of C Coy syndicate.

Signed J.G.S Stowe. Major. 12.50 Hrs, 21 May ’45.

 

SECRET WINKADAT OPERATION No 1 Syndicate

Appreciation

Ground: Open paddy field or mud without cover for infantry. Villages thickly grown providing excellent cover for defence surrounded by open fields of fire easily covered with a minimum of weapons. To reach position, crossing of river by boat or foot to be carried out. Very great advantage to defence, none to the attack.

Space: Distance of objective from present positions too great for operation and return to be carried out on foot in one day.

Time: Owing to transport difficulties operation and withdrawal to be carried out within 24 hours, as it will not be possible to supply troops in occupation of the objective.

Weather: Further rain is anticipated but would not make the situation worse, as only bullock carts can be used forward of TAWGYI. Moonlight is nearing the full and lasts nearly all night, but may be obscured by rain clouds. State of tides not known but assumption is that it does not affect materially the crossings already recced.

Enemy: Intentions in area not known. May be presumed to be present in some strength in KYAUNGWA, KYIBINZU & THANATTAN*. Dispositions along river bank prevent surprise in crossing of river by day or night, except perhaps from SHANGAING area. It is assumed until receipt of further information that this crossing is not practicable. Enemy has shown a disposition to retire from a position isolated by troops, air-strafed & shelled, if the threat is sufficiently over-whelming. On the other hand, dummy “abandon ship” parties have been used during air strikes while a main force remains in the position, determined to fight it out. *From which directions counter attacks may be launched.

Own Troops: Will be required in sufficient force to advance on broad but strong front in approach to village, and from different directions. Village fighting also demands large reserves. Supporting fire must be heavy and immediate to call.



Conclusion: Preliminary concentration of forces will be required in ZIBYUGON & KYONYE. Crossing of river to be carried out without opposition, only possible in area SQ 2707 or SHANGAING. Approach to village to be done at night. It is essential to seize a foothold in the village attacked at all costs, from which cover can be obtained for subsequent attacks and evacuation of casualties. The use of the crossing by boats in SQ 3108 can only be contemplated after the clearing of WINKADAT, when it would provide the main L of C. Clearing of the village to be done in daylight. Subsequent withdrawal across boat crossing. Evacuation of casualties very long and slow business.

An airstrike preliminary might have the effect of reducing the enemy garrison by evacuation, to the extent of possible complete evacuation. Generally, (i) the attack might be dodged by the enemy, the result of the operation being occupation and then evacuation of an empty village. (ii) or the enemy may remain to resist the attack, the result of the operation may then be (a), clearing of the village in close fighting, involving elimination of the enemy garrison at the expense of many infantry casualties or (b) failure to gain foothold in the village, involving withdrawal with casualties over the country to the original crossing, and possible exposure to counter attack from the south making withdrawal across the river very difficult.

Plan

1st Phase: Concentration of 1 Burma on bullock cart basis with 1 Coy at KYONYE and remainder ZIBYUGON, by 1100 hrs D-1. Rest during day. Assault boats brought up during day. Airstrike on WINKADAT at 1600 hrs, followed by artillery concentration for 10 minutes on same place foe 10 minutes.

2nd Phase: 3 Coys cross at SQ2707 at 2000 and occupy KALAZU. Harassing fire normal during night on WINKADAT & KYWESAGYET up to 0300 hrs, on WINKADAT up to 0400 hrs, D Day.

3rd Phase: 1 Coy & mortar platoon to area 305 085 at 0400 hrs with assault boats.

3 Coys advance from KALAZU, occupy KYWESAGYET and advance and occupy South WINKADAT from SOUTH. No movement before 0300 hrs, South WINKADAT to be occupied by 0500 hrs. South WINKADAT being all village South of E.W. Grid Line 068.

4th Phase: Clearing of village WINKADAT, commencing at 0515 hrs with artillery support on call, and mortar support.

5th Phase: Withdrawal from WINKADAT to ZIBYUGON via crossing SQ3108 using folding boats, covered by Coy at 305 085. To be completed by 1700 hrs D Day. No Coy at KYONYE night D/ D+1.

Admin: F.S.M.O. with packs. 1 day’s (light Scale) rations to be carried on man. Coy reserve ammunition to move with Mortar Platoon. RAP with Mortar Platoon. All kit? On bullock carts.

Intercom: 2 FOOs with attacking Coys & Mortar Officer, all with w/t. 48 sets all Coys & Mortar Platoon. Tac HQ with attacking Coys, Main H.Q. with Mortar Platoon. Line to ZIBGUYON & Main HQ.



AJT 1 Burma. H.M. Gray. O.C. ‘A’ Coy.

 

I have marked the villages mentioned in 'A' Coy's plan in yellow and have outlined the proposed movements with red arrows. Unfortunately, I only have vertical and horizontal arrows so a certain amount of artistic licence was necessary. The map used was Burma 94 C/15. Pegu and Thaton Districts. 1 inch, second edition 1944.

 

I love this level of detail when I am researching something and you sometimes find it in the War Diaries (although some only record the comings and goings of officers as if that was the only thing that mattered!). Good to see someone preserving it.

On EBay in the last few days there was a lot of papers from a Lieutenant in the Ilford Home Guard that included plans of the defences of the Electricity Plant which again is of a level of detail that is often not found or preserved.

 

I try to save as many documents and photographs as I can and have built up an interesting collection over the years. There is a 15 page document of Unit Serials for emplaning for transport by air, dated 26th April 1945, that goes into tremendous detail about the weight of every item from a jeep to the weight of Compo rations.

 

I should have posted this document first but I transcribed the hand written notes before the typed ones. It gives information that leads up to the Syndicates appraisals and plans being drawn up.

Information – Enemy

Since arrival this area constant local reports have been received of a concentration of Japs in area WINKADAT 3006. The strength was variously estimated at 1000, 500, 700, 400.

On the 19 May questioning of a local considered fairly reliable gave a str. of 400 Japs in WINKADAT with 2 mortars, type unknown. Positions taken up in the village were mainly around Kg area N.E corner. In this area there is a tank, where both mortars and 4 LMGs were mounted. There were about 100 Japs in this area alone. A police post with a mortar was maintained in the houses sq. 3107, consisting of mortar crew and 8 men who were changed daily.

A patrol to the NORTH bank of the CHAUNG could see Japs at WINKADAT and directed arty shoot.

On 20 May a local rep was received that bulk of Japs had marched SOUTH during the night and are now at KYIBINZU. Only about 60 left who are concentrated in Kg. area EAST side.

A patrol sent out to observe results of air strike on this area at 1000 hrs 20 May. 9 Japs ran EAST towards ALOK 3208, 13 ran WEST towards KYWESAGYET 2906. After strike some movement seen area NE Kg. WINKADAT and noise at exploding ammunition heard.

On the 20/21 May patrols sent during night to recce a crossing place reported the water at the WEST end 2707 abought waist deep, at the EAST end 3007 over 6ft.

A recce patrol send (sic) across in the WEST reported JAP post of 4 men established in KALAZU 2706 and that patrols move EAST and WEST along the SOUTH bank of CHAUNG.

OWN TROOPS – 1 BURMA plus supporting arms.

INTENTION.- (i) to ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy in WINKADAT. (ii) to destroy those enemy by (a) night (b) day.

NOTES

1. Folding boats can be made available.

2. Bullock carts are available.

3. It may not be possible to alter present dispositions except to a small extent.

4. Arty is available as for own recent ops.

5. Air strike might be arranged by day.

6. Any further recces which may be required can be carried out. I.O. must be informed.



REQUIRED – As Comd. 1 Burma, appreciation and plan by 1600 hrs 21 May.

Syndicates:-

1. A Coy officers & GCOs

2. B Coy officers & G.C.Os, HQ Comd. and T.O.

3. C Coy officers & G.C.Os, Adjt & I.O.



Field. A.S. Lewis. Lt-Col Comd. 1 Burma Regt.

21 May 45 - 0900 hrs

 

Excellent work High Wood. Thanks for taking the time to transcribe and share.

 

You are welcome and there is plenty more to come. The village of Winkadat is approximately six miles south east of the Sittang Bridge of 1942 fame. When planning the attack on the village the 1 Burma Regiment were based at Pannyo five miles north of Winkadat.

 

'B' Syndicate's plan.

SECRET

Appreciation of the situation by the “B” Coy Syndicate. Pannyo. 21.5.45

Ref. Map BURMA 94/C15.

1. Object

To ascertain the strength and dispositions and destroy the enemy in WINKADAT.

2. Factors

(a) Enemy strength

Local reports have varied between 1000 and 60 Japs occupying the village WINKADAT. The latest local information received morning 21.5.45 was 60. A post is known to have been established in the houses SOUTH bank of the river. sq. 3107.

From local reports the areas Kg. on the EAST appears to be a strongpoint.

Both KYWESAGYET and ALOK are apparently occupied.

Own strength

One Coy is involved occupying ZIBYGON which leaves the rifle coys, Pl. M.M.Gs and Bn 3’ Mortars. In support Fld Regt., Bty 3.7s (will have to move if to be used), Air support.

(b) Ground

Suitable for infantry on foot and bullock carts. Providing NO rain, Jeeps and tanks, with some difficulty. may approach to the river bank. Route recce will be essential if jeeps and tanks are to be used.

The river presents the main obstacle and tides will have to be considered.

(c) Time

Day-light from 0500 hrs to 1900 hrs approx. otherwise does not affect the issue.

Space

Nearest held position by own troops 3000yds from WINKADAT

(d) Weather

Monsoons about to break – probable rain

(e) Moonlight from 1800 hrs to mid-night but clouds may obscure.

(f) Commn.

Line laid to ZIBYUGON. Wireless good. L. of C. by bullock carts and jeep tracks.

3. Courses.

(i) For the approach to be made from the EAST depends on crossing of the chaungs SOUTH of SHANGAING and a further crossing of the chaung EAST of ALOK being possible. The village of ALOK will have to be taken first so losing possibly surprise.

(ii) The approach from the WEST is shorter but the villages KALAZU and KYWESAGYET will have to be mopped up enroute causing delay. The capture of KYWESAGYET would cut off the enemy and prevent their escape to the SOUTH and if KYSAGIT was held one may presume that WINKADAT would be untenable.

(iii) To attack from the NORTH is the shortest possible route and the best ground. It would be possible to carry boats to the river bank (or use bullock carts). There are no preliminary objectives apart from establishing a bridge-head.

(iv) An attack from the WEST and the NORTH appears to be the best course providing more infantry can be placed under comd. Failing this, to attack from the NORTH.

Owing to the very open nature of the ground a pure daylight crossing would prove costly. An attack by night would entail the loss of close Arty. support and air-strike. Therefore the establishing of the bridge-head before first light and the completion of the operation by day light would enable the greater part of the approach to be made at night and still have the support of Arty. and Air. for the actual destruction of the enemy in WINKADAT.

4. PLAN

To concentrate at ZIBYUGON on the evening prior to the attack. One platoon to form a bridge head at 305075 by first light supported by mortars from NORTH bank if necessary. Two Coys to attack from NORTH. If tanks are able to reach NORTH bank to be employed neutralising KYWESAGYET.

(One Coy to clear WEST of track and excl track. One Coy EAST incl. tracks that run NORTH to SOUTH.

Fire plan.

H.E. during river crossing on WINKADAT (ARTY).

At first light plus 60 minutes, air strike.

Fire as directed by F.O.O.S. with both assaulting coys.

In the event of trouble from KYWESAGYET anticipated – smoke screen by Fld. Arty.

 

There is an interesting addition to 'B' Coy's plan in that the original typed notes are held together by a thorn from a Burmese shrub. Clearly stationary supplies were at a premium.

 

As mentioned in post 9, Winkadat is in close proximity to the Sittang bridge.

 

This map shows that the Japanese were building a crossing point north of the original Sittang bridge which had been blown up in 1942 with disastrous consequences for the troops on the east bank.

 

This much used IWM picture is usually shown the wrong way up but here is the correct orientation.

 

Many thanks for this. Love the detail and maps.

For a history of the 1st Battalion, The Burma Regiment see: 1st Burma Regiment

Rothy

 

As to the question posed, did the planned attack go in on Winkadat (Winkadet in the war diary)?, the answer appears to be that the option chosen was to hit the village with an airstrike. The war diary (WO 172/7801) confirms the summary transcribed by High Wood beginning "I should have posted this document first but .....". Extract from the war diary below:

19th May 1945:-

1000: B Coy patrol moved out to area Ferry at 3108 to investigate many local reports of enemy in Winkadet 3107.
1130: B Coy’s patrol reported by wireless that enemy had been seen in Winkadet 3107 – F.O.O. with patrol conducted arty shoot on village

20th May 1945:-

10:00: Airstrike went in on Winkadet 3107. D Coy patrol prepared to move out to investigate result of strike on Winkadet.
13:00: D Coy’s patrol returned and reported that enemy ran out to east and west of Winkadet during strike.
16:00: D Coy briefed to send patrol to recce chaung crossing to Winkadet.

21st May 1945:

05:30: D Coy patrol to investigate chaung crossing to Winkadet 3107 reported west end of chaun waist deep. (2) Each edge of chaung over 6ft. deep (3) Enemy post n Kabzaw 2706 of 4 men. (4) South bank of chaung patrolled by night.
11:30 Locals reported ….. 10/12 enemy killed in airstrike on Winkadet previous day.

Rothy

p.s. High Wood - are the maps you've used available online to download? I struggle to find maps at small enough scale sometimes. What scale are these please?

 

Rothy,

many thanks for supplying the War Diary details for me. I am pleased to know that no allied lives were lost in recapturing Winkadat.

The maps are from my own collection. This particular map is 1:63.360 or one inch to one mile. If you need copies of any maps, please let me know what you need and, if I have one of the area, I can get it copied for you.

Simon.

 

Simon,

Yes I agree entirely with the feeling of relief at there being no casualties. "This must have been a strange time for the officers and men of the Battalion. On the one hand, they were engaged with a desperate enemy who was prepared to fight to the death rather than surrender. On the other, the Japanese in Burma had been beaten decisively, the end of the war was fast approaching and sightseeing trips to Rangoon were being organised for the Battalion leave parties." Not a time to take unnecessary risks.

Thanks for letting me know about your maps. There is one area I'm interested in at the moment. I'll review and get back to you if I may. Thank you.

Steve

 

Steve,

do you have a copy of the 1st battalion Burma Regiment's War Diary for 1945 as there are some daily orders for 29th April 1945?

Simon.

 

Simon

Yes I do, photographed as jpegs. Unfortunately, it seems at some time before or at the time the file for 1945 (WO 172/7801) was submitted for archiving, nearly all the appendices were weeded out. Only the diary pages themselves remain.

Would you like a copy or an extract? I would appreciate seeing those orders also, please.

Steve