Britain's Struggle to Build Effective Tanks During the Second World War

Discussion in 'Research Material' started by CL1, Dec 12, 2020.

  1. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

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  2. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Sadly, the UK has had a troubled history since 1945 when procuring armoured vehicles, not Main Battle Tanks and somehow we still have an APC in service that predates everyone who uses it now. Systemic failures abound in peacetime.
     
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  3. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    WW2 Tank Production Comparison Between Combatants

    Has...

    "I very much wanted to include UK tank data, but what I found had a weird format and decided to skip including it." ;-) *

    Edit: This "We Have Ways" podcast was quite recent too... on tanks used during 2nd WW...

    213. Nicholas Moran

    Nicholas Moran is one of the world leading experts in tank warfare during the Second World War. He joins Al and James to reveal what he thinks to be the best tank used during the war.

    Edit #2 - * - British armoured fighting vehicle production during World War II - Wikipedia
     
    Last edited: Dec 12, 2020
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  4. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    The impression I get is that many post-45 British MBTs have been good but a few have been plagued with problems - well, really just specifically Conqueror and Chieftain had reliability issues?
     
  5. jonheyworth

    jonheyworth Senior Member

    Interesting ... but ... Britain was a funny old place . We had far superior aircraft to the Germans in so many cases for much of the war , we had good artillery, a superior rifle for much of the war , vastly better ships , better or as good as soft skins, better equipment and uniforms , better battle rations , but generally the Germans did have better AFVs and better fuel cans ! But look at the range of effective specialized armour we developed
     
    Last edited: Dec 13, 2020
  6. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    It is an area I had never looked into in depth and did not realise the problematic tank issue the UK had in WW2
    As it stated the Sherman was in abundance so it covered a hole
     
  7. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    Depends too on what one defines as an "effective tank"...

    The 'Funny' Tanks of D-Day

    There were instances where the axis captured allied tanks and apparently found them effective and of use, and where allies captured German tanks and put them on a range for target practice ;-)
     
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  8. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    I possibly had the rose tinted specs view that all the UK industry cracked on building at pace (which they did) but gave no thought to poor blueprint design at the start of a project

    It has been well established that British tanks during much of the war were troubled by issues of being unreliable or having inadequate firepower and being unsuitable for ‘Blitzkrieg’ style warfare. Many of these published arguments have come from a generally negative attitude towards the British experience in producing tanks and based upon limited research carried out in The National Archives in Kew and the Tank Museum in Bovington

    https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10291/19214/1/kokusaibukiitenshi_5_3.pdf
     
  9. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    These are currently on the Iplayer...

    - Cold War, hot jets -
    BBC Two - Cold War, Hot Jets

    "How the invention of the jet engine transformed Britain after the Second World War and came to capture the imagination of a generation and define how the Cold War was fought."

    When competition was rather more vs. the USSR and thinking about the next battlefield/possible war.

    The march of progress always being the need to innovate and design and build the next item, to cross the next hurdle.

    I can well understand an argument that the "Sherman" and its variations was a war winning tank, I can't see that the same can be said for the Tiger. Although the Russian tanks, also have a claim to be war winning.

    It's the "lack" of the UK that has a reference as a post-war sort of 'sign post'. If the war had not have ended in Europe when it did, the UK might have had UK built tanks on which more favourable comparisons might have been made, and then I guess the assessment moves on to Cold War era British tanks.*

    This is my picture of a British tank... I think it looks formidable :)

    FB_IMG_1601905646061.jpg

    The one the IWM shows has, I think, a far less flattering angle :-(

    large_000000.jpg

    Edit: * - https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/coldwar/UK/british_cold_war_tanks.php
     
    Last edited: Dec 13, 2020
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  10. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    I believe that the air force and navy had priority in funding over the army during the inter-war years.

    A lot of problems stemmed from fundamentally from the choice of available engines. e.g. the Liberty used in the Crusader was a WW1 airplane engine, and for a long time had reliability problems. The engine in the Churchill used to produce all the specialized armour was, not spectacular but it was solid, and as you say a great deal of excellent specialized armour was developed using that as a basis. But the post-Dunkirk crisis meant that initially the Churchill was rushed into production, and it was so unreliable that it could not be sent overseas. A rework programme eventually fixed the problems in the early Churchill tanks and those going forward. All the later good British armour - I mean Cromwell and Comet - depended on the Meteor engine derived from the Merlin.

    The article mentions how in 1943 they tried to change Valentine and Crusader production over to Cromwell. There was an issue of whether there was enough supply of the other components (tracks, engines, etc) which would be needed to make Cromwells. The supply of Meteor engines was a real limiter. Some of these factories were allowed to revert to civilian locomotive production because there was no foreseeable way they could be used to make more useful tanks.
     
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  11. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Would be nice if the article had an author attached. I have some thoughts on who wrote it, but as there's a few possible IWM types that could have, it can only be speculation.

    A tiny tad contradictory after this point:
    "However, the need to keep production running at full tilt meant that Matildas, Valentines and Churchills were churned out in large numbers, at the cost of other more promising tanks then in development."
    Though it's a complex business. and it's a not entirely unreasonable summary; there's a slight gloss there over just how hard it was to shift to newer types, particularly when the design/testing process wasn't complete. I might call it 'a Beale view' of UK armour work, that (obviously) hasn't the scope to consider the difficulties more fully in such a piece. 'In Development' is a world away from 'ready to deploy'.

    I still stand by the point (often made, I know), that these were serious men pursuing serious business. They went from Tilly 1 to Comet & Centurion in just a few years, while attacked, & dogged by a multitude of factors.


    IMG_20200816_142602080.jpg
     
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  12. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War Kindle Edition
    At the outbreak of war in 1939 British tank crews were ill-equipped, under trained and badly led. As a consequence the lives of hundreds of crewmen were wasted unnecessarily. This was due not only to the poor design and construction of British tanks, but also to the lack of thought and planning on the part of successive pre-war governments and the War Office. Death by Design explores how and why Britain went from leading the world in tank design at the end of the First World War to lagging far behind the design quality of Russian and German tanks in the Second World War. This book is a much-needed warning to governments and military planners: a nation must always be prepared to defend itself and ensure that its soldiers are equipped with the tools to do so.
     
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  13. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    This point by CL1:
    One that until the dispatch of a UK formation to Saudi Arabia, for Gulf War One, required the then BAOR to be stripped down to ensure an armoured division could be sent. I am not saying BAOR was a "paper tiger", just that war fighting was neglected. Familiar tale.
     
  14. idler

    idler GeneralList

    So what did the Tankies want that they did not get? They got cruiser, infantry and light tanks. They got radios in every tank. They got free elevation for firing on the move. They had weapons and ammunition developed specifically for them, e.g. the close support mortar/howitzer and smoke rounds. They didn't get things foisted on them that they didn't want, like HE. All, presumably, in line with their requirements. If the War Office and industry weren't providing what they wanted, what and where were the un-met specs and the un-made designs?

    The RTC/RTks ought to take some responsibility for the state of British armour. Instead, they've managed to deflect the blame onto everyone else.
     
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  15. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

  16. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    Last edited: Dec 13, 2020
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  17. AB64

    AB64 Senior Member

    I've just picked up a British Forces ID Card to Lt Col Sykes of the RAC, attached is his OBE recommendation which talks about his efforts to improve efficiency of several models, I think its worth a look - it would be interesting to know what his ideas were
     

    Attached Files:

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  18. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    There's this pdf online... (527pages)

    Google Scholar

    The Management of Change - Mechanizing the British Regular and Household Cavalry Regiments 1918 -1942
    Roger Edward Salmon DMS., BA (Hons).

    A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Wolverhampton for the degree of Doctor of
    Philosophy October 2013

    Abstract
    The mechanization of British Cavalry regiments took place between the two World Wars and on into 1942. This thesis describes the process by which horsed cavalrymen were re-trained in armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and the experiences of some of the regiments managing this change. Extensive use has been made of the oral testimonies of many of the soldiers involved, a number of whom are still living, as well as regimental and War Office archives. The reason given for the delay in cavalry mechanization, cited in some military histories, much influenced by Sir Basil Liddell Hart, was resistance from the cavalry to parting from their horses. This thesis refutes this assertion regarding the cavalry as a whole, but details the exceptions of two regiments that lobbied on their own behalf. The principal reason for the protracted process of mechanization, argued in the thesis, was the lack of suitable and sufficient AFVs. Examination of the Vickers papers have revealed that tank production was taking place during the mid-1930s, but for overseas clients. These tanks could, speculatively, have been procured for British units. Why this did not happen is examined, and the following factors considered: the influence of an Army Council member regarding the future usefulness of tanks, the pressure of public opinion, in which the Britain by Mass Observation archives have been illuminating, and the economic priorities of inter-war British Governments. Following the abandonment of the ‘10 Year Rule’ in 1932, a defence policy was formulated that gave the army the lowest priority for rearmament of the three services and this also impacted on cavalry mechanization.
     
    Last edited: Dec 13, 2020
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  19. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    When I researched my book on 50th Div, I turned up some really rather shocking comments by RAC personnel about the infantry. Michael Carver was particularly harsh. It reminded me of the way Medieval knights used to view foot soldiers. I think Fuller and Liddell-Hart encouraged this kind of arrogance and insularity.
     
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  20. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    I generally agree with Idler and TTC. The text Idler is quoting is from Peter Beale of 9RTR, I think. But was Beale also indicting the top level officers responsible for doctrine?

    You also will see the Tank Museum talk about how there were problems with British tanks but not (I think?) talk about problems with British doctrine or command.

    I am not sure if the tankies can be said to have wanted three types of tanks. I think it came from a lack of consensus on the role of the tank. Reconnaissance? Infantry support? Breakthrough?

    British light tanks turned out to not have sufficient armour or weaponry if they were forced to fight German armour. As a result they basically disappeared. (Yes, there was the Tetrarch, but it didn't see much service, and the Harrry Hopkins, which saw none.) But the Light Tank itself - its size and weight and so on - was a result of between-the-wars budgetary limits. If it hadn't been so small it could maybe have mounted the 2-pounder gun and had some offensive power against enemy armour, even if its larger machine gun had an armour piercing round.

    Again though, if engines (and budgets) had been better - in this case I mean more horsepower - conceivably cruisers might have had the two pounder gun and more armour (or speed). Once the Germans put more armour on some of their tanks in North Africa, they could penetrate British tanks at greater distances than the British could penetrate them.

    But even the two-pounder gun was really (it seems to me) the result of not very solid thinking: that the main target of the tank was another tank, and it basically didn't need a high explosive round for dug-in infantry, or anti-tank guns. We can also look at the close support tanks and their smoke rounds and generally very small supply of HE. I am not sure how the specifications for these weapons or their ammunition were made. Did the tankies lay out what they wanted, or did the general staff decide? Certainly the GS would (at least based on records from during the war) have discussed and agreed on any tank specification - including putting 2-pounder guns in most of the infantry tanks, which again doesn't seem to match their role.

    The idea that fast movement was protection against enemy fire and therefore shoulder-braced guns were better was... just not based on reality. I mean being able to fire on the move was fine but the idea that a cruiser tank would be hard to hit because it was moving so fast was false.

    But yes, the doctrine of Fuller and Liddel-Hart was absolutely wrong. Tanks could not operate effectively without the other arms. Whatever arrogance this might have bred, it got men killed and lost battles.
     

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