British/French alliance/understanding prewar

I always like us to be positive in the face of adversity

 

Didn't know I had. My initial comment was that the offer of a Union was first and foremost a desperate 'made-up-on-the-fly' attempt to keep France in the war. Not for any reasons to do with saving/rescuing France but to keep 'France' in the war at all costs. The reason the UK needed France was because it lacked an Army big enough to tackle Germany and there was no realistic prospect of the UK ever raising such an Army. The UK did not need France to survive but it needed 'a France' to have any prospect of winning. Fortunately Hitler delivered the French substitute in 1941.
My term 'France' includes all of France and its Empire'

 

Made up on the fly: Agree
Desperate: Disagree
Keep France in the war: Agree in principle, in the sense they didn't want France to formally capitulate. However, the key point was to prevent France signing away as part of the terms of capitulation the Empire, the Navy etc.

The Union proposal had nothing to do with saving France. It's very premise was that (Metropolitan) France had gone as a geographical entity and its army was destroyed. Keeping France 'alive' was a paper exercise such that the French Empire became British controlled not German.

No. That is a wholly inaccurate understanding.

Yes, the pre-June 1940 joint strategy was Britain and France defeat Germany in 1942-43 with France providing the bulk of the ground troops.
No, the post-May 1940 British strategy was Britain defeating Germany 'alone' without France - but hopefully the Americans would step in to help out.

That's your opinion in a 'what if' scenario.

However, historically, the prevailing belief in London was that the Empire with the Dominions already signed up could/would do the job.

He did. And ask yourself why, if there was no hope of a British victory 'alone', why they stuck at it 'alone' for so long.

I try to be more clear when such distinctions need to be made.

 

I wonder if France would have Ministers of Parliament. They had roughly the same population as the UK, didn't they?

 

Would you like me to send you the two articles so you can read all about it yourself in more detail?

- Léon Noël (1956) Le projet d'union Franco-Britannique de Juin 1940
- Avi Shlaim (1974) Prelude to Downfall, the British offer of Union to France, June 1940

 

Yes, please. I'll message you.

 

Why should their strategy have aligned with French requirements? Because it made sense, that's why. France was the only other democratic great power in Europe, and hence Britain's only possible and only reliable major ally in the event of a war on the continent. In such a case, it would be foolish and self-defeating for two such allies to pursue contradictory or incompatible strategies. Of course allies in war must always compromise and reconcile their objectives to some extent if they are going to defeat the enemy; no party gets everything they want in such an arrangement. But the need for Britain and France to pursue a common strategy against Germany had been recognized in the Great War and even before it, when Britain agreed to send an expeditionary force to France in the event of war. The British failure to accept the necessary continental commitment prior to 1939 was unrealistic and counterproductive.

 

I don't see it like you do at all.

First, from my reading, the British and French had a joint national strategy (political, economic & industrial) and a joint military plan to defeat Germany (and Italy). There were singing from the same hymn sheet. The narrative that they were pursuing different goals or had misaligned strategies is a falsehood, a myth.

The key element that infuriated the French was that the British were not matching the numbers of boots on the ground that they had put into the field. The British were sending too few, too slowly.

But the joint plan didn't need the British to send 100 divisions. The two military staffs had created their joint plan and together they were supremely confident of success - viz deter, stop and hold - with what they had. They were supremely confident of ultimate victory 2-3 years down the line with what the British were offering by then.

The problem was, the French wanted to replace some of their divisions in the line with British ones so that they could demobilize a huge tranche of manpower back into industry, agriculture etc. The British troops weren't coming fast enough and the French thought that was unfair. Then, when the shooting started, they demanded Britain send everything it had. Which it was doing, but the French refused to accept it.

I feel that is an inaccurate conclusion to make.

It was not the lack of a 'continental committment' per se that caused the 'problem, it was a lack of trained troops and no equipment to arm them with.

To rectify that, Britain would have needed to have had a large, permanent conscript army (thus generating a huge pool of trained reservists too) throughout the inter-war period and have equipped it. Only that way would Britain have had 30, 40, 50 or more divisions ready in 1939-40 as the French would have liked.

In otherwords, it was not a problem of Britain choosing colonial policing over the so-called 'continental committment'; it was an issue buried deep in British societal mores (volunteer army not conscript through universal national service) and money (expensive equipment doesn't grow on trees) etc etc.

 

There was enough money to equip the RAF with lots of aircraft that were unfit for purpose.

The British govenrment had swallowed whole the strategic bombing myth, and made Bomber Command its highest priority. From the mid 1930s there was a huge investment in the air defence of Great Britain and in modernising the Royal Navy. The Army was a poor third.

Cabinet was reluctant to consider a Continental Expeditionary Corps - with Basil Liddel Hart as special adviser to the War Minister. Only at the end of 1938 did the Cabinet agree to forming one.

On top of this were some ludicrous claims about the level of mechanisation of the British Army that might have led the French to believe that the BEF of 1939 might compare with that of 1914 - well armed, well trained and ready to fight.

Nor did the British commit as high a proportion of their regular troops as in the First World War. In 1914 territorial soldiers replaced regular troops in India and other colonial garrisons. This did not take place in 1939. There were two regular divisions in Palestine and a second armured division.

As with the investment in the air defence of Great Britain it can be argued that its a good job we didn't waste more resources in support for France. But that supposes that the allied defeat was inevitable. Had the allies won the Battle of France or stabilised German advances to somewhere in Flanders, there would not have been a battle of Britian nor might Mussolini have joined in.

 

Correct.

The French invested heavily in the Maginot Line, the British in naval and air power. The key determiner being The Channel.

Britain didn't need a big army to defend the homeland, they believed. They were not wrong.

True.

And the word 'corps' has a delicious variety of nuanced meanings. Corps as in body of men making up a fighting force of unspecified size or corps as in an army corps HQ of two or three divisions or ... ...

Based on the longstanding Cardwell system, the British Army had, on paper, a reserve force totalling 5-6 divisions available for deployment wherever: Europe, Africa, India, Mars, etc. From that pool, the inter-war policy was to have up to five available to deploy as a field force: four infantry and one cavalry (later mobile) divisions. In 1939, they could only, just about, manage to field four infantry divisions in quick order.

The 'problem' (viz the French complaints) was not that HMG policy wouldn't commit to a 'continental' role but that that the numbers were so small for a country with such a population. Were HMG to have had a robust policy of 'continental committment' throughout the inter-war period, there would be no more troops landing no quicker in France than they historically did.

The French saw the issues through their own gallic prism.

12 Territorial battalions were due to go to India to replace 8 regular battalions to return to the UK. This was due to occur in May or June 1940 but was called off due to the Germans deciding to attack when they did.

The two regular divisions in Palestine were not equipped for a continental battle. A large number of them were battalions supposedly in the UK (as per Cardwell) but had been sent out on 'Short Tours' in an emergency. All were on lower establishments due recruitment issues. This was an issue dating back to 1935 or 36 and, between then until 1939, it was thus decided that since it was becoming a semi-permanent garrison, they needed some semi-permanent solutions. One was the (immediate) raising of four more regular battalions - more were asked for but vetoed by the Treasury (Chamberlain?). Another was the decision for those two divisions to form the nucleus of a second strategic reserve. That latter decision was formed around the idea that it would have colonial responsibility whilst the UK based reserve moved to (sole) European responsibility

What ifs are nothing but a recipe for disagreement.

Until about 17 or 18 May 1940, the British and French were still supremely confident in the ability to check the Germans, hold them, then march them back to Berlin 2 or 3 years later.

The French had little (if any) issue with RAF rearmament; they wished the RAF had more aircraft to deliver more effect! The French accepted the need for the RN to win the long war by controlling the seas. The French were comfortable with the size of the Army offered when fully mobilized for the assault come 1942-43. The French did not have a problem with British strategy. They had a problem with how slowly the Army was arriving because it didn't suit their own domestic political and economic agenda. From 20ish May onwards, the French were becoming quite exercized that the 20 odd Territorial divisions promised were not in France, in the line, and not being destroyed in the way the French ones were.

 

An excellent book was written for the 60th Anniversary of the Fall of France and currnetly available for less than the price of a pint of beer in a London pub.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B00KC3LIPQ/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1
Brian Bond edited contributions from a range of British military historians covering many of the topics covered in this thread.

Brian Bond's opening summary is in itself an answer to your question.

Peter Caddick Adams' analysis of Anglo French co-operation during 1939-1940 adds more detail. There may have been some high level agremeents between governments but they did not compensate for the lack of a multi national HQ or the liaison organisation established durign the First World War and allowed to decay between the wars.

 

£25 then?

Regards

Tom

 

Wonderful to see this thread kick off after such a long time.
After reading extensively about the political background to the era two major factors need to be considered.
Most politicians in both France and Britain lacked the will to stand up against the Nazis until it was almost too late in Britain’s case and too late in France’s case. Indeed we know that Petain was only too ready to surrender and Halifax was of a similar tendency.
Secondly Influential people especially in Britain hoped for a German Russian Armageddon and only woke up to reality when the Non Agression Pact was signed.
Military arrangements were last minute and France never had the heart for it. Look how they would not accept Churchill’s proposal to mine the Rhine in case the Germans retaliated.
Also read Spear’s description of the low morale of the French army.
The allies got off to a bad start but perhaps losing France was not as big a disaster as first thought.

 

I find it difficult to believe that a multinational HQ to coordinate or unify activities - when the 10 British divisions were wholly under the command of the French - would have changed things for the better. It may well have had merit once the British had got themselves up to 30 or so divisions and had the scale to take themselves out of direct French command.

Comms was rotten throughout. Not really a problem of poor liaison, more the product of an assumption that the war would be mostly static and thus quite incapable of dealing with the unexpected German deep penetrations.

Still, nobody can truely dismiss an academic cudda/wudda been better if only....

 

Read Peter's Article and then comment.

 

Comment 1: I have no need to read it again thank you.

There was/is nothing that stood out in Peter Caddick Adams' text that explained how a multuinational HQ or how the better liaison organisation he imagines would make any difference at all. He did not achieve what he sets out to do. He writes about a series of woeful decisions, events and outcomes and handwaves a cudda/wudda been better if only blah blah - and assumes that is enough to make it true.

Perhaps you could suggest how a multinational HQ would have overcome the German deep penetration tactics, how it could have overcome the failings of the very same individual commanders that it presides over, how it could overcome the repeated changes in political leadership and so on. Peter Caddick Adams gave no help in understanding those elements.

 

For those interested, here is Peter Caddick Adams' text.



Note what he claims to be the purpose of his effort: "I will argue that had there been more effective liaison, or a dedicated multi-national staff, it would have made a vast difference to the outcome of the campaign."

So not just a tweak in battlefield results, but a full blown "... vast difference to the outcome of the campaign." That's as close as saying, if they did it my way, they would have beaten the Germans - without actually saying it.

But where in the text does he explain how that scale of difference is to be achieved by his if only suggestion?

How does more effective liaison or a dedicated multi-national staff change the dynamics of the German concept of war: deep penetration, superior combined-arms doctrine and battlefield implementation, far superior OODA loop effort etc etc etc?

How does more effective liaison or a dedicated multi-national staff change the dynamics of the poor leadership and command traits and decisionmaking of the historical commanders between or over whom this liasion or staff will act?

How does more effective liaison or a dedicated multi-national staff change the dynamics of the repeatedly changing political leadership? I presume the Supreme War Council remains above Adams' dedicated multi-national staff in the higher direction of the war or do you think it would operate independent of political leadership?

 

Thank you Adaministrator for purging and unlocking the thread.

Circling back to the original question(s) from 2009 and subsequent. These were answered many moons ago in the official histories. Of course, these books are nowadays pretty unfashionable as they are not a very 'entertaining' read. Nevertheless, these 'dry', factual narratives are by far the best read for anybody interested in good understanding of history - as opposed to those desirious of being entertained by history.

The topic of British preparation for WW2 was covered extensively in the first two volumes of the 'Grand Strategy' series. They cover the politics, national strategy, economic policy, industrial policy, military strategy, plans and preparation and the nature and basic details of the alliance with France (MarkNote: small 'a' on alliance) in response to German aggression. What more can you want?

Reading the entirety of the book(s) is advised in order to gain the fullest understanding. However, I appreciate the modern reader seems more interested only in the shortest of reads, so I'll post here the four chapters from the two volumes covering the 'Army' aspect of the topic.

From HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR Grand Strategy, Volume I : Rearmament Policy by N.H. Gibbs. HMSO 1976, Chapter XII

Enjoy!



Part 1 of 4

 

Part 2 of 4

From HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR Grand Strategy, Volume I : Rearmament Policy by N.H. Gibbs. HMSO 1976, Chapter XIII

Enjoy!