British Tank Development.

The difference from May 1948 and the panic of June 1940.

 

As an amusement I have been designing a notional WWII Allied army. It is mainly along British lines but with some significant differences in equipment and organization. Designing mid-or late-war formations is fun and fairly easy because there is some good or at least adequate stuff to choose from. When I come to 1939-40 I can design the infantry and artillery satisfactorily but the armor is my despair. There is just so damned little available that is any good. The choices for cruiser/medium tanks (A13, Char B, etc.) are so poor that I have just about decided to throw up my hands. OK, let's say X does not get a real armored division organization until 1941 because it isn't until some way into that year that acceptable types appear in any numbers (US M3 Light, Crusader Mk II). Up to then X has to get by either with nothing but infantry tank brigades or with an armored division TOE with Matildas and Valentines instead of proper cruisers or mediums. Oh well, the Soviets fought the Germans for quite a while with brigade-sized armored forces.

 

I also create WW2 formations as an intellectual exercise . Recently, this included a British heavy division, using inspiration from the larger German formations, such as GrossDeutschland.

The A10 was an outstanding tank at the beginning of the war. You can safely ignore claims of unreliability by 3RTR, because they were given clapped out tanks. The A13 could do 800 miles before mechanical defects started to appear, but the A10 could do 1000-1100 miles without issue. Even so, when 3RTR received A10's from the 5RTR, to take to Greece, they had done around 2000 miles, without proper servicing, and there were no spare parts to do so. It's no wonder they broke down.

Regarding 1AD in France, M Gen R Evans was less than kind about British cruisers, but the Bartholomew report, which had dozens of high ranking officers, said the RAC should have heavy cruisers. That means the A10.

https://ia600803.us.archive.org/8/i...be learnt from the operations in Flanders.pdf

 

Was he? I haven't seen any particularly strong criticism from him. He was certainly very dubious about the assumptions of the Royal Tank Regiment.

 

Have a look at a British Lt. Col. who reported on German tank design: 108997 Lieutenant-Colonel Aubrey PERSHOUSE, General List

 

I'm now annoyed, not with you, but with my recollection.

I have a memory of R Evans complaining about the tanks he had. There were three elements. The first was that they were unreliable, the same faults as listed in The Great Tank Scandal. The second was that they were slow. The third was about flotation, ie tracks were too thin. The latter may have merit.

I have my uses, but "The Devil is in the Detail" is yours.

 

This from a letter by Roger Evans to Lt. Gen. Robert Haining, C.B., D.S.O. when he was recently appointed Vice Chief, Imperial General Staff, dated 4 June 1940:

Source: WO 199-3185 General de Gaulles operation at Leon and General Evans reports on France 1940

 

Thank you. It's not the quote I was looking for, there were three bullet points, but it does suffice.

 

Perhaps you were thinking of Roger Evans' "Report On The Equipment Of The 1st Armoured Division" of 26th June 1940.Quotes from this are used in P.M. Knight's Technical History of the A13 Cruiser Tank (pp.263-5) but it isn't cited as a separate document (that I can see) in the References.
The three bullet points aren't included, but it does criticize the A13's track as not giving good grip on wet ground.
There is also a letter (letters?) from John Crocker (then a brigadier) to Percy Hobart criticizing both A10 and A13 tracks?

 

There is a private letter by Brigadier Pope, 26.5.40, that outlined the problems faced by 1 AD (The Tanks v2, Liddell Hart, p34-35). He considers the A13 ok for speed, when in fact, with 24 bhp/ton and 32 mph top speed, was much faster than a Pz III or IV. However, some of his conclusions do appear wrong, such as a high road speed requirement. OTOH, extra armour, more powerful guns, and a more durable power train are right on the money.

He does state that breakdowns, not combat, are the main cause of inoperable tanks, 75%.

 

Liddell Hart (The Tanks in both volumes) says the A10 had a top speed of 16 or 18 mph, depending on chapter. I'm wondering if this was a governed top speed, just as the A9 was limited to 25mph, since the latter would shake apart at its actual maximum top speed of 32mph?

 

Damn, I'm going to have to buy that book now . The children can eat next month.

 

The book arrived, but damaged. I rang up for a replacement, but they didn't have another. I was refunded, and able to keep a serviceable book, damaged, but free . In these times, I consider that a win .

 

If there's any part of it you can't read, I'm sure some kind person would post a photo . . .

 

Nope. The covers are marred heavily, unacceptable in a new book normally, but the written contents are undamaged . Given I don't buy books for show, but to learn, that's a win .

 

Did you ever get to the end of the Dick Taylor book vp?

 

Good stuff!

 

I've now read it as well - but I'll wait for vP's review to see what he thinks - I haven't quite made my mind up yet.
Dry is fine with me, as long as it's well-researched and well-argued. What does concern me is the willingness to quote Smithers (both "A New Excalibur" AND "Rude Mechanicals") - and a lot of the nitty-gritty "nuts-and-bolts" details are supported by references to Osprey titles - a bit strange coming from a book with a foreword by the Archive Manager at Bovington saying that the author had the run of all the lovely primary source material held there.