Cassino

....The Americans performed incredibily in crossing the Rapido...

The Rapido was crossed with Amazon bridge was it not? It was 225 Field Company RE's bridge but completed by the pulling together of three Royal Engineer field companies, under intense bombardment, on the night of 12th/13th May 1944.

 

A couple of notes from my grandfather's memoirs (ex-225 Field Company RE):

May 1st. [1944] Extensive training with Bailey Bridging to gap 100’ carried out by day and night, rations increased by 2 ounces when on night work, time to build bridge reduced to 2 hours 40 minutes. Plans revealed for three bridges to be built over River Rapido. 7th Field Company to build “Congo”, 59 Field Company to build “Blackwater”, 225 to build “Amazon”, at three sites.



The 7th & 59 Field Companies were unable to build their bridges due to enemy fire and were withdrawn to assist 225 in building the Amazon bridge. Major Gabbett, OC of 225 was in command of the building of the bridge which was opened for tanks to cross at 0500 hours on the morning of May 13th... 225 [Field Company, RE] had 4 men killed and 10 wounded during the building of the bridge.

 

Owen
This from the Regimental Diaries of the 49th LAA Rgt relating to that period.
At the time my Bty was the 84th:
On 10 May the CO ordered that Major Bent would return to 90 Bty, 280 Bty was to be placed under command 38 Bde and would move with that bde to a cone area at Presenzano. This move took place on 11 May. At 2300 hrs that night the fire plan opened and assault boats left the east bank of R Rapido. On the 13th 84 Bty, which had been under command 12 AA Bde, came under regt command and BHQ and B and C Tps deployed on Route 6 and A Tp on another section of the route.
On 14 May orders came for 280 Bty to cross the river at 1530 hrs and defend the gun areas of 142 Fd Regt and 12 RHA.
On the 16th A and B Tps 280 Bty crossed the river in the afternoon ana went Into action on the West Bank. There were many movements of gun tps during this period which are almost impossible to follow without detailed maps. The regt generally was supporting the operations to isolate Cassino. One unusual task was the protection of the Cassino Task Force which consisted of bulldozers.
On the 18th Rear RHQ crossed R Rapido and A and B Tps 84 Bty crossed the start line at S Vittore for an unknown destination. On the (T5tf)RHQ moved with HQRA 78 Div to M Vertecchi 90 Btv_encountered some enemy shelling andjhere_were casualties^ Ju 88s were over the area dropping bombs. On the 23rd 1 Cdn Dw attack on Pontecorvo began.
Late on the 23rd the Co was informed that when Aquino was taken rapid advances might be made and that LAA would be needed well forward in case the enemy used aircraft to hinder a swift follow up.
Late on the 25th.A/240 was with 165 Fd Regt H. Bty was to defend gun areas of 132 and 17 Fd Regts and 66 Med Regt with A, B and C Tps respectively. 90 Bty was to move to defend Aquin… 138 Fd Regts with B(A^nd C Tps, respectively. These moves ttyl. place on the 26th.
On the 27th 84 Bty was ordered to use all three tps to defend Route 6 from Aquino to MelnTBridge.
On the 28th all btys were informed that their tps would continue to move with affiliated fd regts.
On the 29th RHQ moved with HQRA to Ceprano, about 15 miles SSE of Frosinone. 84 Bty deployed tps to defend the two bridges over R Liri at Ceprano. There was enemy air activity at this time but not sustained attacks.

 

Paul (I think) was refering to 36th (Texas) Division and their attack in January '44, .
General Walker's Story of the Rapido Crossing

Yes, indeed. Slaughter on a WW1 scale in places.

 

Paul –
Ancient history now but you may recall the first Battle for Cassino – Christmas – early January was when the 34th US Div went in a short right hook just behind the Monastery from the N.E. – as the French divisions went in a further right hook towards Altina to try and cut Highway six – until Clark called them back to assist 34th US Div – at that point the attack failed.

Meanwhile British 5th and 56th Divs with 201 Guards Brigadede were over the Garigliano and heading for Minturno - further North 46th Div.failed in their attack in to the Liri valley. – but a bridgehead was established past Minturno – and held all through 2nd and 3rd Battles while the US corps with the French essentially rested up for a while.

At the start of the 4th battle the French took off from the Minturno /Garilgliano bridgehead toward Pico and Longo – then the Aurunci Mtns and US 2nd corps along the coast through Fondi and Terracino.

You might know that the Rapido comes down basically from the N.E to join the Liri coming from the North before joining the Garigliano which then proceeds Westwards to the Sea.

It was hereabouts that Brit 4th Div ran into trouble with their bridges over the Rapido and in losing both Blackwater and Congo but did manage to erect the Amazon, at the same time the 8th Indian Div had better luck in building their Cardiff – London – Oxford - Plymouth Bridges not without massive casualties and so were able to make progress the easier than 4th British ! This then allowed the Canadians ( with gerry’s 25th tanks) – 6th Armoured – 78th Div – and the others to batter away at the Gustav and Hitler lines and the Poles to finally enter the Monastery as the French ran mad over the undefended Aurunci’s and Clark to gain his signpost !
Cheers

 

Paul - I should also add thast both 5th & 56th went on to Anzio after establishing the bridgehead at above Minturno !

 

Tom - all good stuff and nice to see you posting here again.

 

Owen
This from the Regimental Diaries of the 49th LAA Rgt relating to that period.
At the time my Bty was the 84th:
On 10 May the CO ordered that Major Bent would return to 90 Bty, 280 Bty was to be placed under command 38 Bde and would move with that bde to a cone area at Presenzano. This move took place on 11 May. At 2300 hrs that night the fire plan opened and assault boats left the east bank of R Rapido. On the 13th 84 Bty, which had been under command 12 AA Bde, came under regt command and BHQ and B and C Tps deployed on Route 6 and A Tp on another section of the route.
On 14 May orders came for 280 Bty to cross the river at 1530 hrs and defend the gun areas of 142 Fd Regt and 12 RHA.
On the 16th A and B Tps 280 Bty crossed the river in the afternoon ana went Into action on the West Bank. There were many movements of gun tps during this period which are almost impossible to follow without detailed maps. The regt generally was supporting the operations to isolate Cassino. One unusual task was the protection of the Cassino Task Force which consisted of bulldozers.
On the 18th Rear RHQ crossed R Rapido and A and B Tps 84 Bty crossed the start line at S Vittore for an unknown destination. On the (T5tf)RHQ moved with HQRA 78 Div to M Vertecchi 90 Btv_encountered some enemy shelling andjhere_were casualties^ Ju 88s were over the area dropping bombs. On the 23rd 1 Cdn Dw attack on Pontecorvo began.
Late on the 23rd the Co was informed that when Aquino was taken rapid advances might be made and that LAA would be needed well forward in case the enemy used aircraft to hinder a swift follow up.
Late on the 25th.A/240 was with 165 Fd Regt H. Bty was to defend gun areas of 132 and 17 Fd Regts and 66 Med Regt with A, B and C Tps respectively. 90 Bty was to move to defend Aquin… 138 Fd Regts with B(A^nd C Tps, respectively. These moves ttyl. place on the 26th.
On the 27th 84 Bty was ordered to use all three tps to defend Route 6 from Aquino to MelnTBridge.
On the 28th all btys were informed that their tps would continue to move with affiliated fd regts.
On the 29th RHQ moved with HQRA to Ceprano, about 15 miles SSE of Frosinone. 84 Bty deployed tps to defend the two bridges over R Liri at Ceprano. There was enemy air activity at this time but not sustained attacks.

Hi Ron Tom and all thought I would like to add a few comments on the subject of whose contribution was the most significant in the four battles for Monte Cassino it is like saying who had the most troops killed or who had the worst possitions in the various battles it was a joint effort for all concerned and it besmirches the memories to all those that fought in that hell hole niccar

 

i don't think any of the senior commanders came out of it with any credit. Wilson, Alexander, Clark and Freyberg were too inflexible and each had his own agenda, although I understand the pressure that Anzio put them under. Juin was the only one who had the Big Picture in my view and was in the best position to push home a successful strategy but was largely ignored by the British and Americans. My Dad who was there with the 2 Cameron Highlanders always said the Ghurkas deserved the most credit in terms of bravery and spirit but he admired the Poles for 'finishing it'.

Don't rate the contribution of the Commanders except Juin. NZ Corps, especially 4 Ind Inf Div and more especially 1 Royal Sussex seem to have paid the highest price though.

 

Before getting all carried away with how Gen. Juin and his French North Africa troops did in winning battles - it should be noted that the worth of any organisation be it boy scouts -WVS - salvation Army -or any other -is predicated on their behaviour- now the behaviour of the French North African troops under Gen. Juin - was quite frankly appalling.

In their first battle - they did very well in fighting their way past Monte Cairo and were heading towards Altina and might have cut Highway 6 had it not been for the idiot Clark hauling them back to bail out his 34th Division who were too close to the Monastery and thus the stage was set for the other battles -

what is invariably forgotten is the appalling behaviour of Juin's troop in their raping and pilliging ALL the villages in the area North East of Cassino - this did nothing for their reputation - they then retired to the Bridgehead fought and maintained by the BRitsh Xth Coprs over the Gariligliani.

This was their jumping off point in the Operation Diadem when they virtually ran over the Arunci mountains way ahead of the 8th Army which caused Gens. Juin and Clark to very caustically remark that - "nce again- the 8th Army are dragging their feet"
totally ignoring the fact that while they were running over the almost totally undefended Arunci's- the 8th SArmy was fighting the best Germany had in super defence works in the various defensive lines which had been set up for months - as I pointed out in a previous posting - there is one hell of a difference in running through an open door - and trying to undo various bars- locks- chains etc holding a very strong door CLOSED !
WE were therefore very pleased - in a sense - that those four French North Africa troops were then taken away for the landings in the South of France where no doubt their raping and pilliging would be overlooked -

so lets not hear any more about how good they were and give great thanks to both the Kiwi's and 4th Indians who bore the brunt of the horror that was Montecassino..
Cheers

 

Dear Tom,
I'm completely agree with you, I live in the Liri Valley and here are still life the violences of the CEF soldiers (Corp Expeditionnaire Francais) on the unarmed civilians, women, kids, men, animals (nothing distinction) of the Esperia village! This facts in italian, are called "marocchinate".
During my researches, a old woman that I've interviewed, told me that while the CEF soldiers plundered the village and raped the people, the priest was tied to an tree and was forced to see! After the violences, at the end, the priest was raped and killed!
It's necessary to understand that the people waited the allied, the liberators for to end the war that was from 5 months in the Valley: the hunger, the fear, the death and the destruction! Instead at may 1944 the people welcomed something even more terrible!
About the responsability of this, it's clear that is of the french command, the soldiers was been autorized from the superiors; in those time between italians and frenchs there was not good relationship (don't forget the breach of non-aggression treaty) but the story is most intricated and can not be simplified and understood easily.
In the berber culture, as in every primitive culture, is normally plunder a village where you take possession but not is normal and human that the civilized and refined French commanders, or someone have allowed these barbarism 65 years ago!
I'm sorry for my harsh words (and for my bad english) but here there is still most anger, I'm born in a place risen from the ash.
In the 1946 Alberto Moravia wrote a historic novel, "La Ciociara" inspired to this events, it was published in the 1954; in the 1960 Vittorio De Sica, realized a film (interpreted from Sophia Loren) tract from the Moravia's novel and with the same name.
I suggest you of to read the novel and watch the film.


Best regards, Gurjdieff.

 

Gurdji
exactly my point and well expressed with the facts- as we knew them at the time- the French North Africans were less than animals, and their French Commanders were no less guilty in those atrocities !
Cheers

 

Thanks Tom, thank for your contribute and presence, in this forum, but especially for your sacrifice, and of your mates dead in battle!

Cheers, G.

 

While I agree with the assessment of the input by the Kiwi Corps including the 4th Ind Inf Div of which the Camerons were a part and cannot condone the actions of French N African troops (if it be so) and am aware of the behaviour of Italian troops in Somaliland etc etc, I still say Juin and perhaps Freyberg to a lesser degree, in terms of commanding troops were the only senior officers to gain any credit. Many, many lives were lost or damaged for no good reason at Cassino simply through poor and pig-headed generalship typical of English officers of the General Staff. If Alexander and Wilson couldn't control Clarke then they failed in their duty but why send in Infantry at all? Continuous bombardment would have occupied the German defenders well enough and allowed non-contested advances elsewhere. I can't abide this apparent adulation of the General Officer Class. To Alexander, human life was obviously cheap and thus he is every bit as bad as marauding troops on the ground.

 

Herosson
while you are very much entitled to your opinion - I object to your apparent rejection of my statement vis a vis the conduct of the French North Africans - at Cassino -( if it be so) especially when we have Gurdijeff - a native of the area with first hand confirmation of my statements or didn't you bother to read his #32 and #34 postings - it's there in black and white - there is therefore no need to question anything I wrote on that conduct - as for the rest of your posting - it is obvious that you have never been involved in a battle so you have no way to judge the perfomance of any leader - good or bad.
Regarding controllng Clark - Alexander was quite aware of the relationship between the American / British armies and also the fact that very soon the British would be junior partners and thus he issued orders - they were dis-obeyed - what exactly would you have done ?

 

I apologise, Tom, if my choice of phrase upset you and assure you that I have read every post on these pages. I believe an officer or any other member of the armed forces who disobeys orders may be subject to Court Martial? I also understand the politics of the situation but it is surely a little naive to condemn troops who 'punished/exploited' the conquered when History tells of so many such occurrences in every war.
As to my own experience, it was enough to live my entire life with a man for whom the mis-management and moral cowardice of certain individuals cost him, literally, an arm and a leg. There were no claims for compensation in those days and 6 of us children had to be brought up on a disability pension, yet he was proud of his sacrifice. I only suggest that it may have been unnecessary.

 

herosson-
I can accept your apology wholeheartedly however I still beleive that the atrocities of the French North Africans near Cassino was a return to bestial times and condoned by allegedly civilised leaders - and at the same time realise that all wars are the same return to madness.

I too grew up with a disabled soldier from the first war as did my wife but at no time did we hear of any talk of mis-management by leaders, and their tragic decisions are also well known - but again - what can you do about it - no use complaining about the Old Boys network - but now it is also slowly changing.

What General Clark did at Anzio was completely unforgiveable and caused great casualties for all afterwards - but Court Martial ? you obviously don't know why he was promoted to lead both Armies in Italy - then on to Korea to lead there - and finish up as Commandant of the Viriginia Defence Academy before final retirement !
Cheers

 

Although napalm was developed in 1942, it was not used operationally until July 1944 in France and during the invasion of Tinian. This is quite a few months after the bombing of the monastery.

I wonder if they even had any in the Italian theatre up to mid 1944.

my father was a cassino veteran (64 Anti tank regt RA) so as a youngster I read quite a few books on his journey with the 8th Army

I can remember reading about a bombardment of ships tied up in a harbour - as part of the supply route to Cassino. During an air raid, some of the soldiers dived / fell into the harbour and when the came back on land they were suffering from hives and blisters.

 

Oh, found it - Google is a gem for thick people

Bari 'little pearl harbour' Italy December 1943

Air Raid on Bari - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Bari had inadequate air defences; no RAF fighter squadrons were based there, and the fighters within range were assigned to escort or offensive duties, not port defence. Ground defences were inadequate and inefficiently organized.
Little thought was given to the possibility of a German air raid on Bari, as it was believed that the Luftwaffe in Italy was stretched too thin to mount a major attack. On the afternoon of 2 December 1943, Arthur Coningham, commander of the RAF First Tactical Air Force, held a press conference where he stated that the Germans had lost the air war. He said, "I would regard it as a personal affront if the Luftwaffe should attempt any significant action in this area." This was despite the fact that German air raids had successfully hit the Naples port area 4 times in the previous month and attacked other Mediterranean targets.
Thirty ships of American, British, Polish, Norwegian, and Dutch registry were in Bari Harbor on 2 December, and a civilian population of 250,000 occupied the adjoining port city. The port was lighted on the night of the raid to expedite the unloading of supplies supporting Allied forces engaged in the battle for Rome and was working at full capacity.


The raid

On the afternoon of 2 December, Luftwaffe pilot Werner Hahn made a reconnaissance flight over Bari in a Me 210. His report resulted in Albert Kesselring ordering the raid. Kesselring and his planners had earlier considered Allied airfields at Foggia as targets, but the Luftwaffe lacked the resources to attack such a large complex of targets. Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen, who commanded Luftflotte 2, had suggested Bari as an alternative. Richthofen believed that crippling the port might slow the advance of the British Eighth Army. He told Kesselring that the only planes available were his Junkers Ju-88 A4 bombers, and he might be able to muster 150 such planes for the raid; in the event, only 105 Ju-88s were available.
Most of the planes were to fly from Italian airfields, but Richthofen wanted to use a few aircraft flying from Yugoslavia in the hope that the Allies might be fooled into thinking the entire mission originated from there and misdirect any retaliatory strikes. The Ju-88 pilots were ordered to fly east to the Adriatic, then swing south and west, since it was thought that the Allied forces would expect any attack to come from the north.
The attack opened at 7:25pm, when two or three German aircraft circled the harbour at 3000m (10,000 feet) dropping chaff to confuse Allied radar. They also dropped flares, which were not needed due to the harbour being well illuminated.
Hits on two ammunition ships caused detonations which shattered windows 11 km (seven miles) away. A bulk petrol pipeline on a quay was severed and the gushing fuel ignited. A sheet of burning fuel spread over much of the harbor engulfing otherwise undamaged ships.
Seventeen merchant ships laden with more than 34,000 tonnes (34,000 tons) of cargo were destroyed, three of which were later salvaged. The port was closed for three weeks was restored to full operation in February 1944. All Bari submarines remained undamaged, their tough exteriors able to withstand the German attack.


The John Harvey

One of the destroyed vessels, the US Liberty ship John Harvey, had been carrying a secret cargo of 2,000 M47A1 World War I type mustard gas bombs, each of which held 30-35kg (60-70 lb) of sulfur mustard. This cargo had been sent to Europe to retaliate if Germany resorted to chemical warfare. The destruction of the John Harvey caused liquid sulfur mustard from the bombs to spill into waters already contaminated by oil from the other damaged vessels. The many sailors who had abandoned their ships for the safety of the water became covered with this oily mixture which provided an ideal solvent for the sulfur mustard. Some mustard evaporated and mingled with the clouds of smoke and flame.[3] The wounded were pulled from the water and sent to medical facilities which were unaware of the mustard gas. Medical staff focused on personnel with blast or fire injuries, Little attention was given to those merely covered with oil. Many injuries caused by prolonged exposure to low concentrations of mustard might have been reduced by simple bathing or a change of clothes.
Within a day, the first symptoms of mustard poisoning had appeared in 628 patients and medical staff, with symptoms including blindness and chemical burns. This puzzling development was further complicated by the arrival of hundreds of Italian civilians also seeking treatment, who had been poisoned by a cloud of sulfur mustard vapor that had blown over the city when some of the John Harvey's cargo exploded. As the medical crisis worsened, little information was available about what was causing these symptoms, as the US military command wanted to keep the presence of chemical munitions secret from the Germans. Nearly all crewmen of John Harvey had been killed, and were unavailable to explain the cause of the "garlic-like" odor noted by rescue personnel.
Informed about the mysterious symptoms, Deputy Surgeon General Fred Blesse sent Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Francis Alexander, an expert in chemical warfare. Carefully tallying the locations of the victims at the time of the attack, Alexander traced the epicenter to the John Harvey, and confirmed mustard gas as the responsible agent when he located a fragment of the casing of a US M47A1 bomb.
By the end of the month, 83 of the 628 hospitalized military victims had died. The number of civilian casualties, thought to have been even greater, could not be accurately gauged since most had left the city to seek shelter with relatives.
An allied destroyer escort , HMS Bicester, though lightly damaged picked up survivors from the water during the raid and put out to sea; during the night members of the crew went blind and developed chemical burns. The destroyer had to return to Taranto harbour.