Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

Resolved by Charley

Anyone here have access to the book ‘The North African Campaign 1940-1943’ by William G.F. Jackson, pub. 1975?

It is not part of the Official History of the campaign that was published later. It is not in any of the UK libraries I can access locally or online.

Stewart's book does not have footnotes and it could be three separate quotes. I am interested in his general comments on Deir el Shein and the decisions around 1/7/1942.

 

Careful use of search should get you there without open access:
https://archive.org/details/battlefornorthaf0000jack/page/250/mode/2up?q=18th&view=theater

 

Cheers Charley. That has clarified Adrian Stewart's quotation, two are from Jackson and one is his. I have amended Post 276 to show the correct author for the quotations.
Jackson also some information that needs to be assimilated!

 

I have a much later book by William Jackson, who has a certain writing style and enjoyed reading this one. A number of items to be added to the research paper.


‘The North African Campaign 1940-1943’ by William G.F. Jackson[1], pub. 1975.

Taken from: https://archive.org/details/battlefornorthaf0000jack/page/250/mode/2up?q=18th&view=theater

The online book was checked, not all pages were available and relevant information was extracted. I have added to the page number subject headings and footnotes to explain – Wikipedia is used as an initial reference.

Pg. 130 Jock Columns

This task fell to Brigadier ‘Jock’ Campbell[2], who had taken over 7th Support Group when Gott was promoted to command 7th Armoured Division in Creagh’s place. Under his dynamic leadership the ‘Jock’ columns came into being. These were small mixed forces of about a battery of field guns, a troop of anti-tank guns, a troop of anti-aircraft guns and a company of motorised infantry, whose task it was to provide a defensive screen in the vast no man’s land of the Western Desert. ‘Jock’ columns had strict limitations. They could not hold ground against a determined attack and had to depend on their mobility to ride such blows; nor did they have the strength to do more than raid or ambush when required to act offensively.

Pg. 146 Norrie takes command 30 Corps

Cunningham decided to group his armoured forces under Lieutenant-General Pope’s 30 Corps[3] which was raised for the purpose. Pope[4] had been the War Office’s Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles. He was killed in an air crash shortly after taking over and was replaced by Lieutenant-General Norrie[5] from 1st Armoured Division which was arriving in Egypt.

Pg. 213 The 150th Brigade Box behind Rommel’s rear

Had it not been for the 150th Brigade Group[6] Box between the two Trighs, Rommel would have been able to re-supply his striking force at will.[7] As yet, he was unaware that this Box existed in his rear. The box was attacked 30-31/5/1942 and finally overrun on 1/6/1942 by 15 Panzer and 90 Light divisions.

Comment: Could this experience explain why the Afrika Korps, commanded by Rommel’s subordinate, decided to attack the 18th Indian Brigade “box” @ Deir el Shein?

Pg. 234 Norrie & 30 Corps HQ leave the frontline

On the 18 June Auchinleck flew to Eighth Army Headquarters, which was at Solium, to decide future tactical policy. …. Norrie should go back with his 30 Corps HQ to Egypt where he was to set about forming a new mobile striking force as resources became available.

Pg. 250 Norrie & 30 Corps HQ returns to the frontline

Norrie had reached El Alamein with his XXX Corps HQ on 26 June. He made his own corps responsible for the northern half of the front. Apart from the prominent mound of Tel el Eisa, a few miles west of the El Alamein Box, his sector was flat and featureless, although closer acquaintance gave tactical significance to the Miteirya and Ruweisat ridges and the shallow depressions of Deir el Shein and Deir el Abyad. Norrie appreciated that Rommel would probably try to repeat his Tobruk and Mersa Matruh manoeuvres by thrusting around the southern face of the El Alamein Box to cut the coast road behind it. He gave Pienaar’s 1st South African Division the task of holding the El Alamein Box and of blocking Rommel’s way round between El Alamein and Ruweisat Ridge. He decided to defend Ruweisat Ridge itself with a new box constructed in Deir el Shein and manned by 18th Indian Infantry Brigade Group from Syria. Pienaar’s method of carrying out his task was to organise his division into three brigade artillery columns as Auchinleck had ordered. He made his 3rd South African Brigade responsible for holding the El Alamein Box, while he disposed his other two brigade columns to block Rommel’s potential out-flanking route: 2nd South African Brigade with his own divisional HQ at Alam Onsol, and 1st South African Brigade on the northern side of Ruweisat Ridge forming an artillery trap. When 1st Armoured Division finally disengaged on its way back from Matruh it was to withdraw with 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades into the South African sector to give tank support.

The bulk of Holme’s[8] 10 Corps[9] was to have gone straight back to the Delta when it broke out from Matruh, but its 50th Division[10] was stopped and formed into three artillery columns alongside Auchinleck’s Eighth Army HQ on the eastern end of Alam Haifa Ridge fifteen miles behind the front.

Comment: A 50th Division brigade was supposed to join the 18th Indian @ Deir el Shein, it never did. Begs the question whether the ‘columns’ were only artillery and had limited infantry.

Pg. 252 Rommel’s preparations to attack

Rommel took greater care with his preparations for the assault on the El Alamein position than he had done at Matruh, possibly because he too had been impressed by BBC propaganda about the strength of the El Alamein ‘Line’. Air photography showed the El Alamein Box and ‘Kaponga’ but not much else. His reconnaissance troops reported that an Indian Division was holding Deir el Abyad, possibly through mistaken map reading for 18th Indian Brigade Group’s Box seven miles further east in Deir el Shein. His radio intercept service correctly gave the northern half of the position to Norrie and the south to Gott. It put 50th Division in the El Alamein ‘box’

Pg. 253 Rommel’s attack

Rommel’s first idea seems to have been to attack through the southern sector as he directed the Afrika Korps in that direction from Fuka. He changed his mind and decided to attack, as Norrie expected, between the El Alamein Box and Ruweisat Ridge. Once he was through the British front he hoped to fan outwards, sweeping north to cut the coast road behind El Alamein and south to attack Gott’s XIII Corps from the rear. 90th Light and the Afrika Korps would make the breach. The former would drive on as it had done at Matruh to cut the coast road, and the latter would carry out the drive southward. The three Italian Corps would hold the shoulders of the breach and follow up the German thrust. The Afrika Korps would start moving to its assembly area opposite the northern sector at dusk, and the advance would start at 0300 hours on 1 July.

Rommel seems to have been in a jubilant mood on 1 July. He did not expect Deir el Shein to hold the Afrika Korps up for long and so he sent warning orders to the Italians to be ready to pursue the British by evening.

Pg. 254 Attack on 18th Indian Brigade

Nehring’s attack on Deir el Shein was also launched in swirling clouds of dust, which helped rather than hindered his infantry and sappers as they tried to breach the mines and wire around the Indians’ perimeter. It was 18th Indian Brigade’s first battle, but it withstood the Afrika Korps’ attacks all day. Unfortunately, like 150th Brigade Group at Gazala, no-one realised that it was in serious trouble until too late. Misunderstanding and plain muddle led to the brigade being over-run by the Afrika Korps as darkness fell. Nevertheless, the Indians’ defence of Deir el Shein and the action of the South African and 1st Armoured Division artillery on 1 July was an unnoticed turning point in the North African Campaign. The British retreat from Gazala was over; the battles of El Alamein had begun.

…..one column of 7th Motor Brigade[11] actually reached Fuka[12], causing momentary alarm amongst the…??? Probably the Germans or Italians?

Comment: Fuka was the planned objective of a column to be formed from the 18th Indian Brigade, ordered on 30/6/1942.


[1] See: William Jackson (British Army officer) - Wikipedia Served in WW2 and became a historian, including writing Official Histories.

[2] See: Jock Campbell (British Army officer) - Wikipedia He died in February 1942 in an accident and was a highly regarded commander – including by the Germans.

[3] Formed in September 1941. See: XXX Corps (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia

[4] See: Vyvyan Pope - Wikipedia He was killed in an air crash on 5/10/1942.

[5] He took command of 1st Armoured Division in the UK and was ordered to move the division to Egypt in November 1940. From: Willoughby Norrie, 1st Baron Norrie - Wikipedia

[6] See: 150th Infantry Brigade (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia

[7] Part of: Battle of Gazala - Wikipedia

[8] See a slim bio: William Holmes (British Army officer) - Wikipedia

[9] The 10 Corps had been involved in the Mersa Matruh battles, but escaped. From: XXX Corps (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia There is no pre-July 1942 information on: X Corps (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia

[10] See: 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division - Wikipedia

[11] Part of 1st Armoured Division, infantry and artillery units.

[12] Fuka was an airfield and the location of the 29th Indian Brigade being overwhelmed on 29/6/1942. See: Battle of Mersa Matruh - Wikipedia

 

Some comments:

1) I doubt it. Keep in mind that Rommel thought that it was Deir el Abyad that was occupied. It simply had to go as you cannot leave it behind your lines when you don't have the forces to invest it.
2) They normally were very weak in infantry. On 3 April 5 Indian had three columns in the field, consisting of a company of infantry, a battery of 25-pdrs and 1 or 2 troops LAA each. Keep in mind that the infantry companies would have been well below strength at this point. The real power of these columns were the 25-pdrs.

All the best

Andreas

 

James M. Szpajcher just posted a book review on H-Wars on Glyn Harper’s The Battle for North Africa: El Alamein and the Turning Point for World War II. I am bringing this up as his post goes beyond what a usual book review would address and had a rather long bit about the 18th Indian Brigade. I have posted that section below, but the complete review can be read Szpajcher on Harper, 'The Battle for North Africa: El Alamein and the Turning Point for World War II' | H-Net I felt this could be of some small interest.



“…Three of the authors—Harper, Barr, and Lucas Phillips—describe an important action around the box position held by the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade and supporting units on July 1, 1942, the action that stopped the advance of the Axis forces. Lucas Phillips did not identify the battalions that made up the infantry brigade.[3] Harper writes of the action, noting: “Most of 18 Indian Brigade managed to escape, but it had to leave behind close on 1,000 casualties” (p. 42). Barr gives the most detailed account of this action, taking several pages to present the details of this crucial confrontation, and he does it well. Unfortunately, he does not identify any of the battalions of the 18th Indian Brigade, and the one battalion that he does name was not in the battle, having passed through earlier to take part in another important action in the coming days.[4] There were two battalions of the Essex Regiment in the Eighth Army at this time, serving with different brigades. Barr misidentifies a battalion of the 18th Indian Brigade, which was overrun and destroyed, as 1/4th Essex, which was with the 5th Indian Brigade at the time.[5] The battalion he describes was 2/5th Essex, fighting its first battle: its only battle. The 2/5th Essex, together with the 4/11th Sikh and the 2/3 Gurkha battalions, three field artillery regiments and some scattered forces thrown into the fray, were responsible for saving the British position at El Alamein. Barr writes, “The sacrifice of the brigade had bought critical time. Although few, if any, observers recognized it at the time, the resistance of the 18th Indian Brigade had stemmed the tide.”[6] Regrettably, the Essex regimental history gives no breakdown of casualties, nor any roster of personnel of this doomed battalion.[7] Both the 2/5th Essex Battalion and the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade were disbanded after the battle and disappeared from the British and Indian armies. Only Fennell identifies the 2/5th Essex, noting the scale of the casualties, but without any context for the battle.[8]

The discussion of 2/5th Essex brings into focus the issue of casualties incurred in combat units during the individual battles and over the campaign…”

[3]. C. E. Lucas Phillips, Alamein (London: Heinemann, 1962), 47, 48.

[4]. Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 75–82.

[5]. Barr, Pendulum of War, 75–82; and Col. T. A. Martin, The Essex Regiment: 1929 to 1950 (1952; repr., Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval and Military Press, n.d.), 263.

[6]. Barr, Pendulum of War, 80.

[7]. Martin, Essex Regiment, 439-73.

[8]. Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 251.

 

Jwsleser,

Thanks for the post. the three named authors I have used and those in the footnotes. It took awhile to spot that Lucas Philips had actually been there on the day! Which as I recall he actually never wrote in his books. He was 2iC of 121 Field Regt., 18th's own regiment - though not at 100% strength, having been in combat beforehand.

One of the remaining gaps is the extent of the 2/5th Essex's casualties that day. Very few are officially commemorated and less than a dozen made it out. There are various accounts that some or many were taken prisoner. It is something that puzzles me, so their museum's records have no post-war comments and Charley has looked through many issues of their regimental journal.

Later I will post up the casualty chart.

 

Attached is a Roll Call document, I have removed all the footnotes for brevity.

 

Thanks to Charley F. I have a few pgs. from the Spring 1992 edition of ‘Eagle’, the regimental journal of the Essex Regiment (then part of the Royal Anglian Regiment), there was an announcement of an event to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the battle of Deir el Shein, on Saturday 4th July 1982.[1]

A digest of comment and opinion was included. This included cited text by Lt. General Norrie, General Alexander, Lt. General Tuker, General Rommel, (in 1942 Major) Michael Carver and a quote – with an explanation - from Captain Peter Lake (a 2/5th Essex company C.O.)

Lt. General Norrie in his foreword to Ch. 7[2] of the regimental history stated:

‘As Commander of 30th Corps at the time the action took place, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of recording my high appreciation of the gallant part played by 2/5th Battalion, The Essex Regiment, who bore the brunt of the enemy attack.’

Norrie sets the scene:

‘On the 27th June the battalion arrived at El Alamein, and in forty-eight hours despite extreme handicaps – such as lack of transport, shortage of all R.E. stores, mines, and wires, the Essex Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel K.F. May, converted by indomitable work a piece of bare desert into a reasonable defended locality. The position was in the shape of a saucer, with good observation points on the edges, but digging on the ridge itself was very difficult owing to its rocky nature, though there were some patches of sand.

The 1st July was a hot and very unpleasant day, with a heavy sandstorm blowing. In fact, the “fog of war” became so intense that troops ordered to support the Brigade lost themselves in the maelstrom’.

‘The Battalion put up a very stout fight all day against overwhelming odds, but the 18th Indian Brigade was eventually overrun after stalwart resistance, yet the fighting spirit of the 2/5th Essex was outstanding to the end.’

He concluded:

‘I am proud to have had troops of the calibre of the 2/5th Battalion The Essex Regiment under my command. I congratulate Colonel May, his officers and men. They did their duty and did it right well.’

The events of 1 July 1942, were summarised in the dispatch[3] by General Auchinleck (then 8th Army Commander and Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces):

‘On the morning of the 1st July, the enemy unsuccessfully attacked the 1st South African Division which was holding the fortifications round El Alamein itself. At the same time he launched an infantry attack with strong artillery support against the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade Group, holding the Deir-el-Shein defensive locality. This attack was beaten off. But the Brigade had just arrived from Iraq and suffered from inexperience and from the difficulties of having to take up a defensive position at very short notice.

When a further attack, strongly supported by tanks, developed late in the afternoon under cover of a dust-storm, which undoubtedly favoured the attackers, the Brigade was eventually overrun, after five hours of stalwart resistance. Only one infantry battalion survived the attack, but the stand made by the Brigade certainly gained valuable time for the organisation of the El Alamein line generally.’

Lt. General Tuker’s book, in July 1942 the Commander of the 4th Indian Division in North Africa, ‘Approach to Battle’ is cited:

‘Then in broad daylight, seeking to circle round Deir el Abyad which they believed to be occupied, the Afrika Korps ran plumb into the newly arrived 18th Indian Brigade at Deir el Shein. With nine Matilda tanks, this unfledged brigade, in process of reorganisation, in half finished defence and short of ammunition stubbornly held the Afrika Korps from 9am to 7pm that evening, and completely dislocated the enemy plan. The Germans lost eighteen tanks that day; but we lost the whole of a valuable infantry brigade and its supporting arms.’

Rommel’s own account of the Battle is cited[5]:

‘At about 0900 hours the 21st Panzer Division ran up against the strong point Deir-El-Shein, which was stubbornly defended by the 18th Indian Division (this was of course an error – it was the 18th Indian Brigade), fresh from Iraq. Once again extensive enemy minefields caused great difficulty. The Division’s advance came to a halt and violent fighting flared up….At 1600 hrs a report came in from Nehring (Commander of the Afrika Korps) saying that the Afrika Korps had stormed the greater part of the Indian strong point Deir-e-Shein. In the evening the battle at this point was over.’

Field Marshal Lord Carver, book ‘Out of Step’[6], a 30 Corps Staff Officer in July 1942, has an account[7]:

‘The brunt of Rommel’s attack was taken by the gallant 18th Indian Brigade[8] in its first battle.. They held up Nehring’s Afrika Korps all day…But the pressure on the 18th Indian Brigade was too great, and, by the time darkness fell they were overrun… Their sacrifice was not in vain. It was the turning point of the whole campaign, a tribute to Norrie’s perception in choosing the position and to their gallantry in defending it, 2/5th Battalion of the Essex Regiment and 4/11 Sikh Regiment deserve the highest praise[9]. The Afrika Korps starting the day with only 55 tanks, could muster only 37 fit for action next day.’

Finally a few words from Captain Peter Lake[10] who took part in the Battle:

‘The day began with Arthur Noble and ended with Rommel’.

This was a reference to the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble[11] and other members of the 4th Battalion[12] withdrew through Deir-el-Shein[13] on their way to their new position on Ruweisat Ridge, from where they later witnessed the events of the day.

Comment: Not convinced the 1/4th would see much from Ruweisat Ridge during the sandstorm most of the day. Although I have read about the action on Ruweisat Ridge on 2/7/1942, and a company of 1/4th were there (I have not examined the action in detail).

The reference to Rommel stems from the fact that, in keeping with his normal practice, he was well forward during the attack on Deir-el-Shein and was therefore seen by Captain Lake and others as they passed through the German positions following their capture.

Comment: Lt. Col Gray, Brigade CO, was taken to see Rommel after the surrender and refused to give more than the required details. That is the only reference to Rommel being there that day. From my reading Rommel was with the 90th Light's attack until the late afternoon and had to take shelter with his staff group when under fire. He could have seen the officer POW passing or visited the Afrika Korps at Deir el Shein, so after the surrender.




[1] Provided June 2024 by Charley Fortnum and the copied pgs. have been retained by the author.

[2] The author has a copy of the regimental history section on the battle, which is section VI. Query to Charley Fortnum to check his book.

[3] The actual dispatch is not in Auchinleck archive held at Manchester University, nor a book of his dispatches. The last sentence appears in a post-war Indian report (found and part copied from the South African Archives): The Historical Section (India) report ‘18th Indian Infantry Brigade at Deir El Shein 28 June – 2 July’, which cites Auchinleck’s Despatch No.2 (1/11/41-15/8/42) pg. 92.

[5] The original book ‘The Rommel Papers’ edited by Basil Liddell-Hart was published in 1953 and the passage can be found on pgs. 245-246 in an online copy: https://ia600901.us.archive.org/22/items/THEROMMELPAPERS/THE ROMMEL PAPERS_text.pdf

[6] ‘Out of Step: the memoirs of a Field Marshal’ was published 1989, the cited passage is on pg. 123.

[7] The passage is in sections from pgs. 121-124 and can be viewed via Out of step : memoirs of a field marshal : Carver, Michael, 1915- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

[8] For details of the brigade and short history. See: http://bmh.uk.webeasy.slightlydiffe...4/2018/05/18-Indian-Infantry-Brigade-1942.pdf

[9] Note the 2/3 Gurkha battalion is not mentioned at all, nor supporting units and nothing is mentioned about the alleged retreating behaviour of the 4/11 Sikhs.

[10] B. 1912. Commissioned London Gazette 24/5/1939 as a Second Lt., 5th Essex. See: https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/34641/supplement/4448/data.pdf POW till end of WW2. In 1981 he was the High Sheriff of Essex, T.D., D.L. See: http://essexpolicemuseum.org.uk/the-law-archive/n_8409lw.pdf and full name is Peter Buchanan Lake. See: High Sheriff of Essex - Wikipedia The Essex Regt. Museum ER5314 has a manuscript by him on 2/5th for Rev. Smith to use at a Deir el Shein service.

[11] He remained in command till WW2’s end. See: 39065 Colonel Sir Arthur NOBLE, KBE, CB, DSO, TD, DL, MiD*, Essex Regiment

[12] This was a Territorial Army battalion, forming two battalions just before WW2. A short history of them is on: 4th Battalion Essex Regiment and 1/4th Bn Essex Regiment

[13] Rooney refers to 1/4th passed through a checkpoint on 29/6/1942.

 

Thanks to help from three offline helpers with the biography of the C.O. of 2/5th Essex, Lt. Col. Kenneth Ferguson May, below is what has been assembled. There is a photo of his medals - on display at the Essex County Museum. Yet to find a photo of him.

Lt. Col. Kenneth Ferguson May, b. 15/8/1898 @ Enfield, London, d. 3/1/1977 @ Enfield, and with the nickname ‘Steve’. From Essex County Museum records and https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/1:1:QVCP-DV71.

Today I found he was recorded at his public school @ Stamford, Lincolnshire in the 1911 Census. From: https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/1:1:QVCP-DV71

Captain Lake’s notes in Chelmsford Museum (Essex County Museum) states he was posted to the Devonshire Regt. before the Essex Regt., this could not be verified by online research. In 1938 he was promoted to Major. From: http://www.stamfordschoolsarchive.c...name=Stamfordian1938_Vol010_Iss006_Summer.pdf

In the Spring 1992 ‘Eagle’ the journal of the Essex Regt. refers to him being the Adjutant of the Territorial Army 6th Battalion (which became the 64 Searchlight Regt. on 1/11/1938). From: 6th Battalion Essex Regiment 1930 - 1940

He commanded A & D companies of the 1st Essex in the Iraq campaign, as part of ‘Habforce’. From: Iraqforce His scrapbook (Chelmsford Museum, Essex Regt. Museum) refers to him serving with Kingcol in the Iraqi campaign and taking command of 2/5th Essex on 10/10/1941. He attended an officer’s dinner for 2/5th in January 1961. From: http://royalanglianmuseum.org.uk/Ra...uments/Wasp and Eagle Serial 08 June 1961.pdf

With a small group of officers he escaped from Piacenza prison camp after 8/9/1943 and got to Corsica in February 1944. He later wrote an account of his wartime experience "Toothpaste for the Ass", or "Toothpaste for the donkey" (published in 1968). Starting his war experience from 1942 in the El Alamein desert, to captivity and the partisan war in Liguria. Extracts from the book (In English) about his time in Italy are available via: http://www.valdaveto.net/pdf/2010/Toothpaste_for_the_Ass__by_Lt_Col_Kenneth_F_May.pdf

He served 1944-1946 with another regiment, Army No. 15338. From: https://royalleicestershireregiment.org.uk/entity/107402-may-kenneth-ferguson-obe Later CO 1/5th Leicester’s 1944-46.

Lt. Col. K. F. May (1908-13) is retired and lives at Nazeing, Essex. An entry in his old school magazine Summer 1958. From: http://www.stamfordschoolsarchive.c...Name=SJ1958sum.pdf&origFilename=SJ1958sum.pdf

He had no children and did marry whilst in India (The British Library have offline records for this)..

His book is available the Essex Rgmt. Museum, with very little information about the battle. They have a number of documents attributed to him: ER21629.1 a scrapbook on 2/5th; ER21629.6 an account of the action; ER21629.7 Report on the action 12/4/1944; ER21629.8 Map of the battlefield 1/7/1942; ER21629.10 2/5th moves 9/6/1942 to 1/7/1942; ER3882.3 Typewritten report with sketch map about the action dated 12/4/1944.

His dress uniform tunic was sold in August 2023 (shows medal ribbons): https://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/255848660767?hash=item3b91c4bf1f:g:5EAAAOSwYLBjgr~2 (Link gone 4/7/24, presumably after being sold).

His trousers were on sale and has a long, detailed biography. See: https://picclick.co.uk/WW2-British-Army-Essex-Regiment-Officers-Trousers-Lt-255853522425.html (Link gone 4/7/24 presumably after being sold).

His Indian Army file is IOR/L/MIL/14/16758, 71 Folios and held at the British Library. Due to a cyber attack late 2023 I have been unable to access this to date.

His medals are displayed in the Essex County Museum, Chelmsford. Attached is a copy of a photo taken by the museum staff, who have been very helpful.

Oddly for me I learnt he was known as "Steve" which was mentioned in a report in Eagle No. 43 on the 50th anniversary event on 4/7/1992 and is on his Essex County Museum database entry (copy from with author).