Did Hitler intend to invade France And Britain?

All this does not prove that on 11 august,the negociations about the Molotow-Ribbentrop pact had started,as there was no certainty (from the German POV) that Poland would remain resolute and continue to say no to Hitler's demands,the M-R pact was not YET needed .



Moving on -

In the context of further economic discussions, on May 17, the Soviet ambassador told a German official that he wanted to restate "in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia and that therefore there was no reason for any enmity between the two countries." Three days later, on May 20, Molotov told the German ambassador in Moscow that he no longer wanted to discuss only economic matters, and that it was necessary to establish a "political basis", which German officials saw an "implicit invitation."
On May 26, German officials feared a potential positive result to come from the Soviets talks regarding proposals by Britain and France. On May 30, fearing potential positive results from a British and French offer to the Soviets, Germany directed its diplomats in Moscow that "we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union." The ensuing discussions were channeled through the economic negotiation, because the economic needs of the two sides were substantial and because close military and diplomatic connections had been severed in the mid-1930s, leaving these talks as the only means of communication...

....On June 8, the Soviets had agreed that a high ranking German official could come to Moscow to continue the economic negotiations, which occurred in Moscow on July 3. Thereafter, official talks were started in Berlin on July 22


Sourced to Nekrich, Ulam, and Freeze(1997), "Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941" P.114.

Only July 18, Soviet trade representative Yevgeniy Barbarin visited Julius Schnurre, saying that the Soviets would like to extend and intensify German-Soviet relations. On July 25, the Soviet Union and Germany were very close to finalizing the terms of a proposed economic deal. On July 26, over dinner, the Soviets accepted a proposed three stage agenda which included the economic agenda first and "a new arrangement which took account of the vital political interests of both parties." On July 28, Molotov sent a first political instruction to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin that finally opened the door to a political detente with Germany.

Germany had learned about the military convention talks before the July 31 British announcement and were skeptical that the Soviets would reach a deal with Britain and France during those planned talks in August. On August 1, the Soviet ambassador stated that two conditions must be met before political negotiations could begin: a new economic treaty and the cessation of anti-Soviet attacks by German media, with which German officials immediately agreed. On August 2, Soviet political discussions with France and Britain were suspended when Molotov stated they could not be restarted until progress was made in the scheduled military talks.

On August 3, German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop told Soviet diplomats that "there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us." The Germans discussed prior hostility between the nations in the 1930s. They addressed the common ground of anti-capitalism, stating "there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies," "neither we nor Italy have anything in common with the capitalist west" and "it seems to us rather unnatural that a socialist state would stand on the side of the western democracies." They explained that their prior hostility toward Soviet Bolshevism had subsided with the changes in the Comintern and the Soviet renunciation of a world revolution. Astakhov characterized the conversation as "extremely important."

In August, as Germany scheduled its invasion of Poland on August 25 and prepared for war with France, German war planners estimated that, with an expected British naval blockade, if the Soviet Union became hostile, Germany would fall short of their war mobilization requirements of oil, manganese, rubber and foodstuffs by huge margins.Every internal German military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality. On August 5, Soviet officials stated that the completion of the trading credit agreement was the most important stage that could be taken in the direction of further such talks.

By August 10, the countries worked out the last minor technical details to to make all but final the their economic arrangement, but the Soviets delayed signing that agreement for almost ten days until they were sure that they had reached a political agreement with Germany. The Soviet ambassador explained to German officials that the Soviets had begun their British negotiations "without much enthusiasm" at a time when they felt Germany would not "come to an understanding", and the parallel talks with the British could not be simply broken off when they had been initiated after 'mature consideration.' On August 12, Germany received word that Molotov wished to further discuss these issues, including Poland, in Moscow.


In other words - it was ONLY the military issues and the question of Poland....the "Hidden Clauses"...that were not discussed until after August 11th, everything else had already been negotiated and decided on.


It was also not certain that the negociations would succeed.


That's not why you enter negotiations with someone! You do it to find solutions to ongoing problems and issues if possible. Negotiations fail as often or not - even the above should reveal that the German-Soviet negotiations proceeded BECAUSE the British-French-Soviet ones failed!

 

IMHO,the military issues and the question of Poland were the only important thing,the rest was irrelevant:no deal about Poland,meaned no attack on Poland .
In this case,the negociations had to succeed:all was depending on an agreement with the SU,and on 11 august,no one could be sure there would be an agreement with the SU about Poland .

 

IMHO,the military issues and the question of Poland were the only important thing,the rest was irrelevant:no deal about Poland,meaned no attack on Poland .



Problem is - you're looking at a very small picture; you're not taking into account that all the OTHER agreements reached prior to that date formed in effect a total reorientation of German-Soviet relations, that it was the culmination of a year-long process after Munich that saw the Soviets totally disenchanted with the British and French capacity and will to do anything about Hitler.

Prior to Munich - the USSR had played ITS part in the hemming-in of Germany with mutual defence pacts - its own with France, and the two successive ones WITH Poland after the Revolution. Once the Soviets realised that the net of interconnected treaties and pacts was pointless if the Western Allies weren't going to play their part - THAT was when their POV on relations with Germany changed. It's important to realise how big a change it was for both parties to reach even the economic agreements with each other - and that the political ones wouldn't have even been begun if the others hadn't!

 

Well,I think we are dissenting here.
First I would remark the following :I do not give much importance on the disenchantment of the SU after Munich ,because I doubt this existed .While the alliance between France and Russia(before WWI) was much important,the French-Soviet pact of 1936,had no importance,because a Soviet Army advancing on Germany had to pass through Poland,and we know that this was impossible .
There also is the question:why would the SU be disappointed about Munich? Czechoslovakia was no neighbour of the SU,and the willingness of the SU to intervene in behalf of CS is much questionable ..I am convinced that the disappointment of the SU mainly is an excuse to justify the MR Pact.
Now,after Munich,it was obvious for any one that the next act would be played Dantzig .Would the risk of war about Danzig be bigger than about the Sudeten ?
Yes and ...no
Yes,because it was very unlikely that the Polish government would yield to Hitler's demands,as was doing the Czech government .
No,because,without a deal with/consent of the SU,a German attack on Poland was impossible .
The question was (in november 1938) what should the SU do, if Hitler was knocking at the door of the Kremlin to make a deal with the SU(at the expense of Poland)?
The SU had three choices :
1) making a deal with Hitler
2)remaining neutral
3) making a deal (if POSSIBLE) with the West
We know that the SU chosed the first one.The "why" is (here) irrelevant,but,my point is,that the choice of the SU was made...only at the end of august(for a lot of reasons:it was not certain what would be the attitude of the West,of Poland,of Hitler:would he deny his principles and knock on the door of the Kremlin?)
From what I have read (a.o.from A.Taylor),I am convinced that the Soviet decision was made only at the end of august,and that the preliminary rapprochements (started by the Germans /Russians) do not prove that already a decision was made .

 

I do not give much importance on the disenchantment of the SU after Munich ,because I doubt this existed .


Actually, it's well-recorded fact.

While the alliance between France and Russia(before WWI) was much important,the French-Soviet pact of 1936,had no importance,because a Soviet Army advancing on Germany had to pass through Poland,and we know that this was impossible .

It was a DEFENCE pact - it wasn't about Soviet armies advancing through Poland againt Germany....it was for mutual support in the event GERMAN armies marched east or west!

There also is the question:why would the SU be disappointed about Munich? Czechoslovakia was no neighbour of the SU,and the willingness of the SU to intervene in behalf of CS is much questionable

They were disappointed about the behaviour of Britain and France in relation to their previous promises on supporting the Czechs. If they couldn't keep those promises, what ones could they be expected to keep??? The ones that afforded some degree of protection to the USSR?

The question was (in november 1938) what should the SU do, if Hitler was knocking at the door of the Kremlin to make a deal with the SU(at the expense of Poland)?
The SU had three choices :
1) making a deal with Hitler
2)remaining neutral
3) making a deal (if POSSIBLE) with the West
We know that the SU chosed the first one.The "why" is (here) irrelevant,but,my point is,that the choice of the SU was made...only at the end of august(for a lot of reasons:it was not certain what would be the attitude of the West,of Poland,of Hitler:


If you look back at what I've already posted - the Soviets DID enter discussions with Britain and France on the military/political issues....WHILE they were changing their position on relations with Germany in other areas.

 

About the French-Soviet pact:all pacts are defensive,I never heard of an aggressive one.But,whatever,to help the French,the SU has to go through Poland.And to help the SU,..well,a German attack on the SU presumed the Germans going through Poland;as both possibilities were improbable,the pact was,IMHO,meaningless .Thus,the willingness of the SU to sign the pact with France,cannot be explained as a willingness to cooperate with B+F against Germany .I doubt also there was any willingness of B+F to cooperate with the SU against Germany .
The existence of Poland (due to the Versailles Treaty) excluded (any interference from) the SU from the business of Central Europe,and there only were few people who were sorry for it .This interference only was made possible by Hitler who eliminated the corner-stone of the Cordon Sanitaire against the SU:Poland .
About Munich and the Soviet disappointment
1) There never was a British commitment on behalf of the Czechs
2) I should not consider Stalin and his bunch as naive :they never were thinking that the West should risk any soldier for the protection of the SU,as Stalin and his bunch would never risk any moezjik for the protection of the interests of the City .
About the 'negociations" between F/B and the SU in the summer of 1939:this also was a puppett theatre:B+F wanted no alliance with the SU,such alliance was also not possible(because of Poland),such alliance only would be useful(but not possible because of Poland)if there was a war,but B+F wanted to use the negociations only to intimidate Hitler and so avoid a war and preserve Poland with its borders of the time:this was not in the interest of the SU:it did not wanted to be used as a bad dog to deter Hitler,the SU wanted a real partnership that would preserve its interests and increase its influence,but,as the interests of Poland and the interests of the SU were opposing each other,..the whole thing(=the negociations) were senseless and also were not influencing Hitler to knock on the door of the Kremlin .

 

It is well known through the records of history of the happenings of the summer of 1939 that Hitler and Stalin carved up Poland beween them.The ocupation of the western half of Poland was agreed to by Stalin,who in turn was given a free hand by the Germans in the future of the three Baltic states.Stalin looked on his share of Poland as a buffer territory in regards to any intention by Hitler to march east.This philosophy continued after the war with the setting up of the eastern satellite states and the grip on Germany almost up to Hamburg that Russia had with the GDR.

As regards the emergence of Poland,"the bastards of Versailles" as Hitler referred to the country,the main point about the recreation of borders from Versailles was that Russia and Germany were not involved in any part in the ongoings.Further, referring to the Munich Crisis,Czechoslovakia was not involved in the negotiations or requested for submissions on the ultimate proposals for its future.

As regards pacts,it is very hard to support a partner country well removed geographically from each other.Hence it was almost impossible to aid Poland direct from Great Britain and France in 1939,not that two two western allies had sufficient resources to take on a well armed Germany.Russia was in the same position from the summer of 1941 until supply routes could be established at a time when it was essential to keep them in the war.

For adjacent countries,it comes down to trust.When Germany invaded Poland without a declaration of war in September 1939,there was a 10 year non agression pact between the two,not that a piece of paper would interfere with Hitler's territorial ambitions as Russia was soon to find out, less than two years into the future.

 

Molotov Soviet German Non Agression Pact

 

http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/general/16372-would-hitler-really-have-invaded-britain.html

Knew we'd discussed this before and yes.......I still think he originally intended to but was forced to change his mind because of circumstances.

Ron

 

Phylo R-King.
I presume you mean that t1t Pat Buchanan - as opposed to the original poster of this thread? I've dealt with Buchanan's grasp on WWII history before

Shudder indeed..... IMO he writes for the internet generation which is consumed by conspiracy type theory rubbish.
When AH called concluded his pact with Stalin he promptly redeployed his naval forces from Baltic waters to those around GB and France.
I wonder why ?
AH did want a "limited war" he had been denied one at Munich and he craved one with Poland.

Europe was a constant sea of changing interests and relationships and Hitler's diplomacy sooner or later was going to kick off a conflict.
Rhineland , Austria, Sudetenlands , remainder of the Czech State ( no Germans here to "bring back to the Reich" ) , Poland.... Poland was but one demand and this from the man who said that "Danzig is no longer the issue but that of living space for the German People" - had it not been Poland it would have been the next demand he had to make....and every demand would "be my final demand".
His gift for brinkmanship simply ran out..... and with it any illusion that Hitler was a man of peace.
After Munich he declared " I have seen our enemies at Munich , they were little worms" , he failed to understand Munich and misread Chamberlain whom he saw as an old fool.
History has not always been kind to Chamberlain and AH's taking of the Czech State was a catalyst towards war.

Smudger. (OMIB )
Hitler made a mistake. Some may say the first of many.

He said to Goring when asked why we must invade Poland "I have always gone for broke" apart from which he felt the hand of providence on his shoulder his self fulfilling prophecy of being "the great man" his own personality and ego drove him towards war and " leading Germany into battle".
Kershaw said that Hitler had a genocidal personality , I can't say he was far off the mark.