Did the Navy win the Battle of Britain?

...which has more to do with the quite reasonable maintance of defence preparations.

After all, the Germans had carried out a number of small amphibious operations in the Baltic in 1941 - with their new prahms and assault boats...and as late as 1945 proved willing (and able!) to carry out raids on "Allied" territory...

Granville Raid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

...exactly the sort of raid that the British feared for at least nine months after the outbreak of war! A sudden descent in force on a coastal target and away again before reserves posted too far from the coast (so that they could react to events on too long a coastal frontage....or the reserves were too weak themselves!) could be brought up.

 

Hi, Leccy!

If the Germans thought they was no problem and well within their margins why did they have to move the barges and shipping further away due to raids, why were they worried about having more losses..
Because the operation was postponed, I suppose.

I consider the area that was originally for Sealion Ramsgate to Portsmouth to be fairly wide frontage 110 miles from end to end, Normandy landings were Cambourg to Carentan was 72 miles wide..

Why do you use the original plan as an example? The final planned landing area was from just west of Folkestone to just west of Newhaven. Sure, a considerable front but the invasion convoys were not to advance on such a broad front. Most books on the subject show the general route. That said, the first-day Sealion landings approximated those of Normandy.

How long were the barges going to be at sea then as you keep saying they would have crossed by daylight.....
I have never said they would be crossing by daylight, because that was not the plan. The crossing would take place during night. S-time (the hitting of the beaches) was dawn. As for your question, according to the departure port, the invasion convoys (transport fleets) would start assembling outside the ports in earnest in the afternoon (those with the longest distance to cover). Those coming from Rotterdam and Antwerp earlier.

Raeder wanted to cross during daytime but the army wanted to land at first light to have a day to consolidate themselves ashore. The army won through with its wish. Interesting question, BTW. What would have been preferable from a tactical POV - day or night crossing?

...maybe in the narrowest part (Calais to Dover) but at around 6 knots maximum speed of the tow vessels (which the Navy said they did not have the manpower for) not counting tidal..
I would be interested to know what are your sources for the max. speed of the tugs and the Navy's manpower statement.

...flow or currents or including the drag of towing barges behind them. The only figures I have seen put the furthest crossings at around 24 hours...
What if the current was going westwards...?........It changes every 12th hour, you know. This is quite funny when discussing Sealion. The invasion convoys always have the current and winds against them......

...Hence I presume why the Navy said the next crossing could not be made until 48 hours after the first crossing. A long time to be cut off..
Not really and it would depend a lot of what resistance was offered. In the German planning the S-day forces were supposed to not expect any reinforcements during the first 3 days. The first consolidation line was not to be pierced untill the 8th day. Those were the basic principles. Knowing some of the commanders of the S-day units I suspect they would be hard pressed to hold back on this........

You keep saying there were no ships larger than Patrol craft (which we already established had much better weaponry than you knew about) yet the German recce aircraft counted over 30 destroyers in the Southern and South Eastern Harbours by mid Sept.
I have not seen that established. Depends on what sort of Patrol Craft. The British units operating across the Channel were not impressed by their own watchdogs...

What do you mean by Southern and South Eastern harbours, please? If so, that would indicate approx. 15 destroyers on each side of the Channel (landing areas). Am I correct?

 

I have not seen that established. Depends on what sort of Patrol Craft. The British units operating across the Channel were not impressed by their own watchdogs...

What do you mean by Southern and South Eastern harbours, please? If so, that would indicate approx. 15 destroyers on each side of the Channel (landing areas). Am I correct?

Actually, IIRC you've had it pointed out to you several times in the course of this thread alone, and even the British sources you DO use for your book, such as Fleming, note the existence onstation of the destroyer flotillas at Portsmouth and Harwich. Or, as I suggested on AHF, you could look at Lavery's treatment of this.

Why do you use the original plan as an example? The final planned landing area was from just west of Folkestone to just west of Newhaven. Sure, a considerable front but the invasion convoys were not to advance on such a broad front. Most books on the subject show the general route.

Fred, don't forget that an invasion force such as this has TWO "fronts" - depending on the POV of the defenders. The "front" perceived by the defenders ON LAND would indeed be Folkestone to Newhaven...

...but AT SEA, to RN destroyers coming up or down the Channel - what would be in front of them would be several lines of shipping 18.5 kms long.

 

And a minor P.S.....

I would be interested to know what are your sources for the max. speed of the tugs and the Navy's manpower statement


Given that you've researched and written so widely and authoritatively on the subject, I'd have thought you would have been capable of replying to his statement with your own sourced and referenced figures...

 

Hi, James.

Fred can you show me one document which says the British knew the date and time of "Cerberus" ?".........
No. And I dont think I have said they knew the date and time. I have written they knew they were coming. At least, that is what I meant.

Just like Sealion, they knew it was coming but not when.

The gatekeepers to the Channel were a submarine and a maritime patrol aircraft , both missed the German Squadron, this was to have been the early warning - technical failures.".........
I know. Which were the gatekeepers September 1940?

The British did not know the date or the time - "Fuller" was a plan which was to be activated if the Brest Squadron tried to make home waters via the Channel, the difference you miss is that which exists between "if and "when".".........
See above.

....it failed because the Germans did not do what was expected of them - they appeared in daylight ....the date and timing of the operation not being known to the Royal Navy & Royal Air Force , it all kind of threw plan "Fuller" into a state of disarray.".........
"...it failed because the Germans did not do what was expected of them..."

Did the RN and RAF know what was to be expected in September 1940? After all, 3 heavy ships should be much easier to keep track on than more than 3.500 vessels of various sizes.

Had the details been known the timing of the "reception" would have been better arranged and there would have been quite a few more "guests bearing gifts".........
It was arranged. Doesn't matter how well it is arranged if your are not able to execute the arrangement. They blew it.

Here is an interesting quote from a publication issued by the General Staff of War Office, MI14, January 1942 - “Notes on the German preparations for invasion of the United Kingdom”

L: Choice of unexpected course of action: …if there are three courses of action open to the enemy he will choose the fourth, is particularly applicable to German methods…

 

Fred.
No. And I dont think I have said they knew the date and time. I have written they knew they were coming. At least, that is what I meant.

Well then do not imply that by "knowing" that they were coming that they knew the route.
In fairness Cerberus put the ball at the feet of the Kgm. and they played it very well , lots of activity to say they would be going elsewhere.
The British also had plans made to deal with the other options, "Fuller" was but one and it failed because the Germans did not do what they were expected to do and they played their hand well.

Just like Sealion, they knew it was coming but not when.

They knew it was a potential, which is not the same as knowing "it was coming" , and they planned accordingly - no different from "Cerberus".
The difference is "Sealion" remained a "what if" , "Cerberus" became "reality".
Drawing parallels between two completely different operational options which have really nothing in common is no basis to draw any reasonable conclusions.

"Cerberus" was designed to pass through making no challenge on British waters , "Sealion" would have had to have mounted a sustained challenge on British waters and her shores there are no parallels to draw.

I know. Which were the gatekeepers September 1940?

Aircraft, ships and shore watchers.
By September 1940 Hitler was not really focused on Invading GB . He knew it was a high risk operation , the navy were less than happy about it , the Luftwaffe had still not defeated the RAF and both knew they could not defend the invasion force nor could they supply it as required.
The transport ability of the Luftwaffe was not up to the job and any landing would have sustained losses and resupply was going to be a major problem .
In July 1940 Hitler had started looking east , he had always wanted to wage war there he saw it as his major military and political purpose.
Had the right circumstances existed he would have invaded GB but the circumstances never existed nor did the resources and for once he made the right decision.
As far as 1942 goes - well nothing wrong in having a pipe dream.

After all, 3 heavy ships should be much easier to keep track on than more than 3.500 vessels of various sizes.

"A target rich environment". Once again there are no sensible or parallels to draw between Cerberus and Sealion, you may of course draw them but don't expect me to argue them , "what if" only goes so far.
Could the Germans have attempted a landing - absolutely they certainly could could an element of surprise been achieved - possibly would the invasion have failed - well it would not have succeed, it might have caused a few anxious moments but it would have been a disaster.
AH was not going to risk disaster which was why he didn't invade - a world of difference between "knowing it was coming"- it never came which sort of takes the "knowing out of knowing".

It was arranged. Doesn't matter how well it is arranged if your are not able to execute the arrangement. They blew it.


Some wise man said no plan survives first contact with the enemy.....which brings me back to your "knowing" they didn't know, they planned for an eventuality - that is not remotely like knowing.

L: Choice of unexpected course of action: …if there are three courses of action open to the enemy he will choose the fourth, is particularly applicable to German methods…

So taking the ships out of water and transporting them home by dry land might have been option "4" ?

 

fredleander

Originally Posted by leccy
If the Germans thought they was no problem and well within their margins why did they have to move the barges and shipping further away due to raids, why were they worried about having more losses..

Because the operation was postponed, I suppose.

They were worried before it was postponed.

Why do you use the original plan as an example? The final planned landing area was from just west of Folkestone to just west of Newhaven. Sure, a considerable front but the invasion convoys were not to advance on such a broad front. Most books on the subject show the general route. That said, the first-day Sealion landings approximated those of Normandy.

It was a handy plan at the time I replied and covers the whole area they wished to invade on originally. Even the later plans were still a considerable distance from flank to flank and you said

More than 3.500, actually. Not really a very wide front, either. If it was a wide front they would be easier to discover but harder to fight.

Originally Posted by leccy
How long were the barges going to be at sea then as you keep saying they would have crossed by daylight.....

Er you did read the above post didn't you

I have never said they would be crossing by daylight,

I would be interested to know what are your sources for the max. speed of the tugs and the Navy's manpower statement.

Well I could say you actually use the figure of 6 knots in your book reference to the barges (which by the way is about the max speed of the barges designed and in use during the period, many were slower, when I collated the speeds of various Rhine and Ruhr self propelled river barges I ended up with a speed of 3.9 knots average) . The tugs and trawlers speeds I used British tugs and trawlers of the period again averaging out the speeds (came to around 6 1/2 knots). These figures are of course their published speeds when new built, operating in their designed enviroment. Alot of these vessels that were to be used by the Germans were not new, were peacetime commercial owned (ie not always in very good condition).
To all this speed you have to add that alot of the barges were not self propelled, I also used the speeds of trawlers and tugs with power ratings of 350Hp and above, the Germans were down to commandeering and using vessals above 250Hp

The manpower requirement as I said I read one paper about it, but you can think along the lines that the kreigsmarine had to suddenly man 3500 extra vessels from motor boats to cargo vessels, average them out to 6 men per vessel and you get 21000 men required. The paper I read said the navy could scrape up 16000 by employing all trained and partially trained personnel in training establishments and boats, stripping the fleet of manpower (so other vessels would be undermanned), all reserves called up.

What if the current was going westwards...?........It changes every 12th hour, you know. This is quite funny when discussing Sealion. The invasion convoys always have the current and winds against them......

The Channel does not just have tides going to and from the beaches, it has tidal flow along its length, it has savage rip currents off the beaches in lots of places.

Originally Posted by leccy
You keep saying there were no ships larger than Patrol craft (which we already established had much better weaponry than you knew about) yet the German recce aircraft counted over 30 destroyers in the Southern and South Eastern Harbours by mid Sept.


I have not seen that established. Depends on what sort of Patrol Craft. The British units operating across the Channel were not impressed by their own watchdogs...

What do you mean by Southern and South Eastern harbours, please? If so, that would indicate approx. 15 destroyers on each side of the Channel (landing areas). Am I correct?

You dismissed the AS/MS RNPS ships as being armed with nothing more than lewis guns, that shows you did little research into these vessels, they were backed up by lots of smaller vessels for close inshore work which were armed with smaller weapons normally Oerlikon and or the lighter MG's of various types.

The Destroyers were noted by German recce aircraft in the area of the South and South Eastern Harbours, the report did not say how many and in which ones they were in. That would put them somewhere around the landing zones, for all I know they saw them all in Dover, Folkstone, Margate. This was what the Germans reported in mid September.

 

Calling Adrian Roberts
you might by now have a few answers

just a reminder of his query
Did the Navy win the Battle of Britain?
This theory is being touted as the latest controversial bit of revisionism - below is the Daily Telegraph's report on it:

The Battle of Britain was not won by the RAF but by the Royal Navy, military historians have concluded, provoking outrage among the war's surviving fighter pilots.

Challenging the "myth" that Spitfires and Hurricanes held off the German invaders in 1940, the monthly magazine History Today has concluded that it was the might of the Navy that stood between Britain and Nazi occupation.

advertisementThe view is backed by three leading academics who are senior military historians at the Joint Service Command Staff College teaching the future admirals, generals and air marshals.

They contend that the sheer numbers of destroyers and battleships in the Channel would have obliterated any invasion fleet even if the RAF had lost the Battle of Britain.

The idea that a "handful of heroes saved these islands from invasion" was nothing more than a "perpetuation of a glorious myth," the article suggests.

"Many still prefer to believe that in the course of that summer a few hundred outnumbered young men so outfought a superior enemy as solely to prevent a certain invasion of Britain. Almost none of which is true," reports Brian James, the author.

Dr Andrew Gordon, the head of maritime history at the staff college, said it was "hogwash" to suggest that Germany failed to invade in 1940 "because of what was done by the phenomenally brave and skilled young men of Fighter Command".

"The Germans stayed away because while the Royal Navy existed they had not a hope in hell of capturing these islands. The Navy had ships in sufficient numbers to have overwhelmed any invasion fleet - destroyers' speed alone would have swamped the barges by their wash."

Even if the RAF had been defeated the fleet would still have been able to defeat any invasion because fast ships at sea could easily manoeuvre and "were pretty safe from air attack".

While admitting it was an "extremely sensitive subject", Dr Christina Goulter, the air warfare historian, supported the argument. "While it would be wrong to deny the contribution of Fighter Command, I agree largely that it was the Navy that held the Germans from invading," she said.

"As the German general Jodl put it, so long as the British Navy existed, an invasion would be to send 'my troops into a mincing machine'." Any challenge to the long-held theory that the 2,600 pilots of Fighter Command defeated the might of Germany would be subject to "more than a modicum of hostility", she added.

The Battle of Britain was "a sacrosanct event" for the RAF, like Waterloo for the Army and Trafalgar for the Navy.

It inspired Churchill to say: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."

Although six destroyers were lost during the evacuation of Dunkirk in May 1940 this was due to them being stationary as they picked up troops.

Tackling capital ships would have been an even greater task because at the time the Luftwaffe, unlike the Japanese during the destruction of the fleet at Singapore, did not have armour-piercing bombs, the article says.

It has been argued that German minefields strung across the Dover Straits would have prevented the Home Fleet, based at Scapa Flow, from destroying slow troop barges.

But Dr Gordon disputed this saying that Britain had 52 minesweepers and 16 minesweeping trawlers arrayed against four German minelayers.

The disparity between the navies was huge with Britain having 36 destroyers close by and a similar number two days away. The Navy also had five capital ships on hand, whereas the Kriegsmarine had lost or had damaged their battleships.

"Anyway, in an emergency, the Royal Navy steams straight through minefields as they did when pursuing the Scharnhorst," Dr Gordon said. "They have a drill, following line astern. 'Each ship can sweep one mine' is the rather grim joke."

Can you imagine the RN's targets? An invasion fleet of Rhine barges, moving at about two knots over the water, with a freeboard of a few feet. . . an absolute field day for our navy. So that was the nightmare for the German navy. They knew it just couldn't happen."

Prof Gary Sheffield, the JSCSC's leading land warfare historian, said while some Germans might have got ashore it would have been near impossible for them to be re-supplied with the Navy so close by.

The article also argues that while the RAF had 644 fighters to the Luftwaffe's 725 at the beginning of the battle by October 1940 Britain was far out-producing the enemy.

It also said that after the defeat in France in early 1940 it was vital for Britain to have a victory to reassure the public it was winning the war and the RAF fighter pilots were an obvious choice. "In 1940, the total acceptance of the story's simple broad-brush strokes was very necessary," the historian Richard Overy said.

Dr Gordon added: "The RAF's was a substitute victory - a substitute for the certain victory over Sealion, had the Germans been mad enough to attempt invasion."


The story attracted a huge amount of comment on the on-line Telegraph. One of the first comments was that it was not a new idea at all - a book had been written by an RAF Wing Cgr in the 1950's saying that the Royal Navy had been largely responsible for preventing invasion.

My own feeling is that is probably a flawed theory, but not one to be dismissed out of hand. If it remained at its July 1940 strength, the Navy could certainly have prevented a seaborne attack. But if the RAF had been eliminated, the Navy would have been gradually worn down by the Luftwaffe and by Uboats and Eboats. If the RN concentrated in the channel to attack the invasion fleet, they would have been easy targets for all of these. By then, British Skua divebombers had sunk the Konigsberg, and the Luftwaffe had sunk the Lancastria, so it was proven to be possible for air attack to sink large ships. Apparently the Luftwaffe did not have armour piercing bombs - but there was only a small proportion of RN ships where AP bombs would have been necessary, i.e the Battleships; the armour on cruisers could be penetrated by ordinary bombs, and destroyers had no armour. The Battleships would have had to be tackled by Uboats - the Bismarck and Tirpitz were not yet available, and the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were smaller than the British BBs.

However, it may well have taken the rest of the summer and autumn to wear down the Navy, so the invasion would have had to be postponed to the next year. And then it would have depended on whether Hitler had made a priority of invading the Soviet Union or Britain.

The fact is we needed both the RAF and the RN, and if the invasion had got ashore we would have needed the Army. The RAF pilots made better propaganda for Churchill; its much easier to be an individual hero in a flying service than in the depths of a ships engine room or shell room where you do your job anonymously, where you would never know what happened if you got blown up, and everyone has to work as a small but vital cog in the machine.

Adrian


for heathen heart that puts its trust in reeking tube and iron shard
all valiant dust that builds on dust and guarding, calls not thee to guard
thy mercy on thy people, Lord (Kipling

 

Given that you've researched and written so widely and authoritatively on the subject, I'd have thought you would have been capable of replying to his statement with your own sourced and referenced figures...

Problem is, what sources I have doesn't tell me what his are. It isn't just a question of contradiciting what others claim but to learn of sources which might be more correct than my own.

 

"...it failed because the Germans did not do what was expected of them..."

Did the RN and RAF know what was to be expected in September 1940? After all, 3 heavy ships should be much easier to keep track on than more than 3.500 vessels of various sizes.

1/ You've already been shown in detail that the RAF was obbserving the buildup of barges in the Channel ports by the first week of september;

2/ if you ever bother to read Newbold you'll know (as you've been told) that the British were reading whatever the Luftwaffe sent by radio about Sealion

3/ the British actually expected MORE than the Germans actually planned to send; they expected that the KM surface units they couldn't see were in the Batic working up for Sealion - they didn't realise they were in the Baltic getting fixed!

Because the operation was postponed, I suppose. They were worried before it was postponed

They were ALSO worried about the economic effects; IIRC this was raised three times with Hitler.

Which were the gatekeepers September 1940?


RAF Spitfire and Hudson photo recce patrols of coastal ports three times daily; Coastal's daily patrols, Lavery includes a map of Coastal's fixed patrol sweeps; the Auxiliary Patrol Picket; the RN destroyer patrols and coastal craft nightly sweeps; ten Chain Home Low stations with naval liaison officers and an alert system in place, with 14 more planned.

Talk of CERBERUS reminds me I'll have to check into RN submarine patrols and standing port watches in the period...

It isn't just a question of contradiciting what others claim but to learn of sources which might be more correct than my own.

Don't you think that seventy years after the events under discussion, and with all the research you did...that your facts/data should hev been complete BEFORE going into print?

 

PKRR
2/ if you ever bother to read Newbold you'll know (as you've been told) that the British were reading whatever the Luftwaffe sent by radio about Sealion

If memory serves me right the Luftwaffe were extremely sloppy in their use of codes and this sloppy approach accommodated the first Allied inroads into Enigma traffic.
The section I am transcribing from "The U Boat War 1939-1945" ( see thread of the same name) illustrates how seriously the Kgm took their responsibilities.

 

Don't you think that seventy years after the events under discussion, and with all the research you did...that your facts/data should hev been complete BEFORE going into print? ...

That, I find, was a very immature remark.

 

That, I find, was a very immature remark.
[/INDENT]

What is immature about it? It seems a perfectly valid statement to me.

If anything is immature, I would respectfully submit that it is writing a book, and then trying to confirm the supposed 'facts' in it afterwards.

 

PKRR

If memory serves me right the Luftwaffe were extremely sloppy in their use of codes and this sloppy approach accommodated the first Allied inroads into Enigma traffic.
The section I am transcribing from "The U Boat War 1939-1945" ( see thread of the same name) illustrates how seriously the Kgm took their responsibilities.

I am sure your memory is correct. The Luftwaffe attitude to communications security seems to have been lax, to say the least.

The classic example concerns Directive 16. When it was issued, it was regarded as so secret that it was sent to the three C-in-Cs only. Goering promptly passed it on to his Air Fleet Commanders, by radio!

 

Is there an Order of Battle for units (Army(ies), Corps, Divisions) assigned to U.Seelöwe? This would show the number and type of divisions would bem employed, and the degree of motorisation of the infantry (= lesser motorisation » more horserisation).

 

Is there an Order of Battle for units (Army(ies), Corps, Divisions) assigned to U.Seelöwe? This would show the number and type of divisions would bem employed, and the degree of motorisation of the infantry (= lesser motorisation » more horserisation).
There is but the OOB for Sealion is not typical as horses were to be much exchanged by motor transport (Halder). The regular units were also to be reinforced with Pioniers (Engineers). The Home Army was to assign (if I remember correctly) 18 engineer battalions to the Sealion force in addition to the regular engineer units (Halder).

 

There is but the OOB for Sealion is not typical as horses were to be much exchanged by motor transport (Halder).


Why on earth ? There are several accounts of mounted units swimming canals and rivers in Belgium & France and the channel's not much more of an obstacle than the Meuse.

 

Why on earth ? There are several accounts of mounted units swimming canals and rivers in Belgium & France and the channel's not much more of an obstacle than the Meuse.

And think about all the greeny grass of England....

 

There is but the OOB for Sealion is not typical as horses were to be much exchanged by motor transport (Halder). The regular units were also to be reinforced with Pioniers (Engineers). The Home Army was to assign (if I remember correctly) 18 engineer battalions to the Sealion force in addition to the regular engineer units (Halder).


All right, so where can I find the OOB?

As for exchanging horses for motor transport, that looks like a logistically monumental task off the cuff, right? Reorganizing entire vehicle parks, maintenance and refuelling subunits, etc, etc. I only read snippets of Halder Kriegstagbuch, so I can't confirm, but this entire exercise looks very much like a back-of-an envelope operation. You can't expect having the hundreds of motor vehicles that a single infantry division requires to be transported over riverine low-freeboard barges, and have them jump overboard on their own free will when they hit the beach. Over a port yes, but where were the RoRos?

That's why I was asking for the OOB, to see what Infanterie Divs (mot) were assigned.

Why on earth ? There are several accounts of mounted units swimming canals and rivers in Belgium & France and the channel's not much more of an obstacle than the Meuse.

Don't be ridiculous, the French had to invent the aeroplane to do just that!

Here is M. Blériot using his Demoiselle d'Avignon to snoop other people's phone messages!

 

Is there an Order of Battle for units (Army(ies), Corps, Divisions) assigned to U.Seelöwe? This would show the number and type of divisions would bem employed, and the degree of motorisation of the infantry (= lesser motorisation » more horserisation).

Hi Za

Don't leave out the 'horseisation' of their quartermaster corps and artillery. Moving all those horses and the huge amount of hay and oats they needed across the channel under fire was always a nonstarter, in my amateur opinion.

Dave