Did the Navy win the Battle of Britain?

I even recall the Conservative MP standing up in Parliament saying: "It is a crime to bomb the German arms factories. They are private property"... I am Dead serious!



The REAL problem was....that sort of rubbish was put into official targeting policy! As late as May 1940, even AFTER Winston took over, we were STILL leafleting the Ruhr towns instead of bombing them Hence for instance the strange order NOT to bomb German shipping or targets actually IN ports...but targets in port roads' was okay!

 

The fact is those pilots did not stop a German invasion as myth portrays.

How in all sincerity can you offer this statement to support your hypothesis. This act of the "more than a few" in turning back all that Germany could send time after time did affect any possible move on any land invasion of the English coast because it did occur. This is a fact! The "myth" is of your making as it is impossible to prove and it is not "the fact" as you propose.

It may not have been the only deterrent but it was the main proven element.

The navy and army did that.
If an invasion was intended or not, the RN and the Army were already in the equation when all the landing barges were assembled in French ports. While waiting for any decision, up to 20% of all those barges, preparing for the "may or may not" invasion, were destroyed by RAF aircraft.

The Navy did not turn a propellar and the army did not fire a shot. The only confrontation was in the skies.

Everything else was hypothetical.

 

Unfortunately, the RN never EVER gave a categorical guarantee that they would discover that an invasion fleet had left port. Nor did the RAF....
What happened on the night of the great invasion scare (6/7th September) is quite interresting. What triggered it was seemingly the heavy traffic of invasion vessels westwards along the Continental coasts. If I remember correctly a destroyer force (3-4) was incidentally in the Channel and was ordered to investigate. The weather was bad and as nothing was discovered along their route they were ordered back to their own side as dawn approached (another interresting item) not to be attacked by the Luftwaffe.

No further RN investigations were made during the day (for the fear of enemy aircrafts), but the next night a cruiser and some destroyers (3-4) were sent out again, not to find anything of value. So, this was all the RN put up even if an invasion was suspected. Incidentally, the cruiser hit a mine and had to limber back to its base.

If the invasion had been on, the Kriegsmarine on Sept 27th (the last eventual S-day) would have had available on the western side 9 of their large destroyers and 20 light destroyers. On the Eastern side were the S-boat units - approx. 20 were available, absolutely deadly in a night fight where the enemy still did not have the advantage of radar. Spread among the 4 invasion convoys were 19 of the well-respected M35 minesweepers pluss dozens of converted artillery ships and Patrol Boats. My guess is that the main body of the invasion force would be ashore even before the RN came to grips with it. If they did.

Alanbrooke was not impressed by the Royal Navy's willingness to act decisively at first sight, but feared they would behave more in the style of Dowding. It is in his diary.

Admiral Dønitz in his diary pledges 44 U-boats could be made usable for the invasion effort.

 

There never was a serious plan to invade the UK..... Everyone knew it was a propaganda ploy...... An attempt to take us out the war... And there were senior MPs that wanted to make peace with the Enemy at that time...
This doesn't rhyme very well with the diary of FM Alabrooke. He was, after all, CIC of the British home defence. In 1942 he was still worried.

 

If I remember correctly a destroyer force (3-4) was incidentally in the Channel and was ordered to investigate.


The RN actually did a LOT of nighttime patrolling; be interesting to see the downtime rate for getting boilers cleaned etc..

So, this was all the RN put up even if an invasion was suspected.


Actually, that's a bit of a assumption;
1/ it ONLY at best shows what was sent to patrol the area they expected to find traffic in;

2/ it only accounts for part of that night's regular patrolling.

If the invasion had been on, the Kriegsmarine on Sept 27th (the last eventual S-day) would have had available on the western side 9 of their large destroyers and 20 light destroyers. On the Eastern side were the S-boat units - approx. 20 were available. Spread among the 4 invasion convoys were 19 of the well-respected M35 minesweepers pluss dozens of converted artillery ships and Patrol Boats. My guess is that the main body of the invasion force would be ashore even before the RN came to grips with it.


All of which STILL makes them inferior to the forces availble to the RN in the Channel.

P.S. you here and in other locations place a very large confidence on the makeshift "artillery ships" - of what use were Army gun crews using direct-fire AA weapons firing AP going to actually be??? IIRC they weren't there as makeshift combat vessels, but as offshire artillery support for the landings.

Alanbrooke was not impressed by the Royal Navy's willingness to act decisively at first sight, but feared they would behave more in the style of Dowding. It is in his diary


More in the style of the man who, though he made certain mistakes, won the Battle of Britain? Is that actually supposed to be derogatory???

P.S. These M35s?

The 1935 design was unsuccessful and the 1937 was little better. These ships were designed as a larger more seaworthy torpedo vessel rather than a more balanced mini destroyer.
The requirements for the 1935 class included a maximum "declared" displacement of around 600 tons in order to come within a clause in the Washington Naval Treaty, and higher speeds than the older 1923 and 1924 classes. In reality these ships came in overweight at around 900 tons standard displacement. To achieve this, high pressure turbines were used but these were unreliable and difficult to repair and maintain in the restricted space of the hull. The low displacement made them unseaworthy which was only partially resolved by 1940 and this reduced the effectiveness of the class as minelayers. There was an even greater concentration on torpedoes, with a single 10.5 centimetre gun and minimal anti-aircraft protection.


The only person I know of who regards them as "well respected " is, well....you.

 

Admiral Dønitz in his diary pledges 44 U-boats could be made usable for the invasion effort.



Wow - things MUST have been bad then! I didn't realise HOW battered and bruised the Uboat fleet was by Summer 1940.

Eight...about 10% of the September '39 fleet...were sunk during WESERUBUNG, and the rest had been at sea continuosuly, patrol after patrol, since the 1st of September 1939; immediately after the Armistice they were recalled for rest and repair. If only 44 could be scraped up....!

 

Fred Leander

River Wide, Ocean Deep, Operation Sea Lion - F. Leander | eBay

Has anyone read this book ??

 

James, I too would be interested to see any reviews.

 

What happened on the night of the great invasion scare (6/7th September) is quite interresting. What triggered it was seemingly the heavy traffic of invasion vessels westwards along the Continental coasts. If I remember correctly a destroyer force (3-4) was incidentally in the Channel and was ordered to investigate. The weather was bad and as nothing was discovered along their route they were ordered back to their own side as dawn approached (another interresting item) not to be attacked by the Luftwaffe.

No further RN investigations were made during the day (for the fear of enemy aircrafts), but the next night a cruiser and some destroyers (3-4) were sent out again, not to find anything of value. So, this was all the RN put up even if an invasion was suspected. Incidentally, the cruiser hit a mine and had to limber back to its base.

If the invasion had been on, the Kriegsmarine on Sept 27th (the last eventual S-day) would have had available on the western side 9 of their large destroyers and 20 light destroyers. On the Eastern side were the S-boat units - approx. 20 were available, absolutely deadly in a night fight where the enemy still did not have the advantage of radar. Spread among the 4 invasion convoys were 19 of the well-respected M35 minesweepers pluss dozens of converted artillery ships and Patrol Boats. My guess is that the main body of the invasion force would be ashore even before the RN came to grips with it. If they did.

Alanbrooke was not impressed by the Royal Navy's willingness to act decisively at first sight, but feared they would behave more in the style of Dowding. It is in his diary.

Admiral Dønitz in his diary pledges 44 U-boats could be made usable for the invasion effort.

Forgive me for asking, but where on earth did you get hold of the drivel you have posted above?

Firstly, it was not simple co-incidence that RN forces were at sea. RN patrols were as sea in the Channel on every night in September. For example, on the night of 7/8 September, 2 MTBs were patrolling off Calais, and 2 off Boulogne. The Boulogne pair withdrew because of bad weather, but the Calais pair reported shipping movements, and four destroyers of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, already on patrol, were sent to reinforce them. Furthermore, when Churchill issued the infamous 'Cromwell' alert, Admiral Drax at the Nore brought his cruisers and destroyers to a state of readiness, intending that they should operate off Dunkirk & Ostend. On the night of the 6th, he had already despatched the cruisers Aurora and Cardiff, supported by the destroyers Wild Swan and Wivern, to search for enemy shipping. Neither this force, nore the forces at sea the following night, found any trace of invasion forces at sea.
On the following night (8/9 September) the cruisers Galatea & Aurora, with destroyers Campbell, Garth, Vesper, Hambledon, Holderness and Venetia, sailed in two striking forces, whilst the 1st Destroyer Flotilla (Atherstone, Berkeley, Beagle, Bulldog, and Fernie, patrolled from Le Touquet to Cap d'Antifer, and a force of MTBs from Harwich patrolled closer inshore. Again, no German invasion forces were detected. Certainly, on her way home, Galatea was mined in the Thames estuary, and put out of action for a month.

Surely you do not believe that the RN wouls send all seventy plus British & Allied cruisers and destroyers dedicated to anti-invasion duties to sea on the strength of a rumour?

As to the forces available to the Germans late in September, there were seven destroyers, eight Mowe/Wolf class torpedo boats ( comparable to early V & Ws in armament) and seven or eight early, and rather unimpressive, T boats, each armed with one 105mm gun facing aft!

As to the S boats, certainly these were impressive vessels and were to achieve some success against coastal convoys, but their normal action when faced with a destroyer force was avoid action, prudently using their higher speed to escape.

As to the M1935s, they were capable of some 21 knots, and armed with 2 105 mm guns, their chances of engaging an RN destroyer successfully were slim, to say the least, and I have never come across any account of an M1935 achieving anything against such a foe.

Your artillery ships (converted coasters) and patrol vessels would have needed to have survived the initial assault of the RN destroyers and cruisers, and the survivors would then have encountered the several hundred RN support vessels following on behind. These ranged from 4 inch gun armed minesweepers to armed trawlers and gunboats.

As the speed of advance of the German barge trains would have been some 2 to 3 knots ( assuming the sea was calm) then, despite your guess, the likelihood of any serious organized invasion force getting ashore would have been remote, and the chances of subsequent resupply minimal.

As to Doenitz and his U-Boats, in order to make up the number 44 he would need to include older boats used for training and new boats working up to get anywhere that number.

In any case, have you any conception of the problems involved in operating submersibles in the Channel area? Had Doenitz tried, there would certainly have been a 'Happy Time' but for the RN anti-submarine forces.

The fact is that Raeder knew from day one that his forces were totally outmatched, and the eventual cancellation must have been an enormous relief.

Finally, I see that you have written a book. If some of the nonsense you have written above forms part of your argument, then you must have very sympathetic (or gullible) publishers!

 

Surely you do not believe that the RN wouls send all seventy plus British & Allied cruisers and destroyers dedicated to anti-invasion duties to sea on the strength of a rumour?
He-he - coming to the rescue...........?

I'd be very interested in you listing those seventy plus RN vessels dedicated to anti-invasion duties.....:p....and being in the vicinity of the Channel...

Or to better it. Since the last practical S-day would have been Sept. 27th (10 days after Sept. 17th) I would like you to list RN destroyers available for anti-invasion duties between the Thames Estuary and Portsmouth on this date. Using the Pink list of Sept. 16th 1940 and naval-history.net I found only 10 destroyers (exclusive of the French) on each side of the planned German invasion areas. Oh, yes - I am sure naval-history.net can have some flaws, for all I know the number could be too high.

The ninth heavy KM destroyer arrived in the Channel Sept. 27th. (The tenth in October). Yes, I know, in the OTL some of the nine returned to Germany before this for routine overhaul as the invasion was postponed but this would hardly have taken place if the invasion was on.

My information is that the KM had 12 T35's ready for Sealion, all that were built of that class. None of these 12 were sunk during the war due to enemy surface action in spite of their single main gun.

Of the 8 Raubtier/Raubvogel class light destroyers one had 12.7 cm. guns.

As for the M35's, their design speed was actually 18 knots, even if some performed better. Captain Basil Jones spoke highly of them in his book. Even if they were in constant use as escorts none were sunk by surface action untill 1943. Then by MTB's.

Which takes me to the S-boats. Before radar became commonplace on RN destroyers I believe more destroyers were sunk by S-boats than the other way around.

 

....and the rest had been at sea continuosuly, patrol after patrol, since the 1st of September 1939; immediately after the Armistice they were recalled for rest and repair. If only 44 could be scraped up....!

On August 6th, 1940, Dönitz wrote:

“If no losses occur during the next weeks the following boats are available for the operation:

12 large - Type IX
12 medium - Type VII
7 small Type II – front boats
13 small Type II – training
In all: 44 boats.

This is the highest total number and can only be achieved if none need repairs, which is not expected. U-2 - U-6, 11, 17, 24 and 29 are not ready for frontline service due to technical and personnel-related reasons. Two boats are on their way back with engine trouble. These are not included in the setup. During the preparations (14 days) for the operation, and eventual repairs which undoubtedly are necessary, all training has to be postponed except on those boats just now under phase-in. Ten new boats shall therefore have to wait for their crews as long as it takes to get back the training boats. These drawbacks must be accepted in view of the importance of the operation. The boats shall be positioned in the Channel, concentrated outside the areas where the British reinforcements are expected to arrive, and at the east coast south of Cross Sand and Hoofden. If the conditions in the Channel shall prove too crowded a number of boats shall be stationed by the Orkneys with a view to attacking targets in connection with the execution of the diversions. To be able to operate in the western Channel it must be arranged for proper openings through the western minefields. Bases to supply fuel and torpedoes: Lorient, St. Nazaire, Brest, Cherbourg, den Helder and Vlissingen.”

 

P.S. These M35s?

No, these:

 

As the speed of advance of the German barge trains would have been some 2 to 3 knots ( assuming the sea was calm)
Exactly where have you got these figures from...?

 

Wow - things MUST have been bad then! I didn't realise HOW battered and bruised the Uboat fleet was by Summer 1940.

Eight...about 10% of the September '39 fleet...were sunk during WESERUBUNG, and the rest had been at sea continuosuly, patrol after patrol, since the 1st of September 1939; immediately after the Armistice they were recalled for rest and repair. If only 44 could be scraped up....!

By the end of September 1940, Germany had either built, or in one case requisitioned, a total of 90 boats, but during the same period 30 had been sunk.

Of the remaining 60, 31 were the small Type 2s. 8 of these had been classified by Doenitz as unfit for front-line service, 13 were with training flotillas, 3 were new boats working up, leaving 7 operational boats.

18 were the larger Type 7s, 1 of which was a training boat 4 were working up, and 13 operational.

10 were the long range Type 9s, of which 3 were working up and 7 operational.

The 60th was a boat which was being built for Turkey in a German yard and requisitioned at the start of the war. This boat (UA) was refitting in September, 1940.

In September, 1940, the large boats of the Type 9 class were withdrawn from any involvement in Sealion and sent off on other duties, and two other boats were undergoing refits.

This left Doenitz with 18 operational boats, 7 new boats working up, and 14 training boats.

Given the problems involved in attempting to operate submarines in the channel, I suspect that the Royal Navy would have been delighted to have found themselves opposed by older boats with trainee crews, new boats not worked up to operational efficiency, and a small number of efficient boats.

Just for interest, in September 1940 the average number of U-Boats at sea on any one day was 13.

 

He-he - coming to the rescue...........?

I'd be very interested in you listing those seventy plus RN vessels dedicated to anti-invasion duties.....:p....and being in the vicinity of the Channel...

Or to better it. Since the last practical S-day would have been Sept. 27th (10 days after Sept. 17th) I would like you to list RN destroyers available for anti-invasion duties between the Thames Estuary and Portsmouth on this date. Using the Pink list of Sept. 16th 1940 and naval-history.net I found only 10 destroyers (exclusive of the French) on each side of the planned German invasion areas. Oh, yes - I am sure naval-history.net can have some flaws, for all I know the number could be too high.

The ninth heavy KM destroyer arrived in the Channel Sept. 27th. (The tenth in October). Yes, I know, in the OTL some of the nine returned to Germany before this for routine overhaul as the invasion was postponed but this would hardly have taken place if the invasion was on.

My information is that the KM had 12 T35's ready for Sealion, all that were built of that class. None of these 12 were sunk during the war due to enemy surface action in spite of their single main gun.

Of the 8 Raubtier/Raubvogel class light destroyers one had 12.7 cm. guns.

As for the M35's, their design speed was actually 18 knots, even if some performed better. Captain Basil Jones spoke highly of them in his book. Even if they were in constant use as escorts none were sunk by surface action untill 1943. Then by MTB's.

Which takes me to the S-boats. Before radar became commonplace on RN destroyers I believe more destroyers were sunk by S-boats than the other way around.



Actually, I could list every operational British and Allied warship of minesweeper size and upwards in Home Waters (or, come to that, world wide), in September1940.

I am sorry to observe that you have used naval-history net. It is useful but not wholly accurate. My own information is from the Admiralty archives, and I would respectfully submit that the Navy would generally have some idea where its ships were. Perhaps you would care to name the ten destroyers, and I will be able to help you identify those you have missed.

More generally, in September 1940 the British had identified the German shipping concentrations, and knew where an invasion, if it came, would assault. Why would the Admiralty remove from the Channel the very ships which should have spearheaded their anti-invasion forces? Are you suggesting incompetence or mass-treason?

Your figures for the destroyers and T boats are simply wrong, sorry, but you are correct about the Raubtier vessel which had slightly larger guns. That would surely have made all the difference.

As to the M1935s and the S boats. You have got the whole argument the wrong way round. You have to produce evidence that they could have prevented the Royal Navy from disrupting the invasion convoys. In the real world, the survival of the M1935s was attributal to the way they were used, generally escorting convoys hugging the French coast and creeping from port to port. Such convoys (unlike the British coastal collier convoys, which were vital and which, be it noted, the Kriegsmarine rarely dared to attack ), were well down the list of British strategic priorities. I might as well state that HMS Victory was a major British asset in WW2 because the German Navy never touched her during the whole of the war. The survival of a warship often depends upon the manner in which it was used. Can you, for example, describe any occasion when an M1935 was used in offensive operations against the RN? I doubt it.

Similarly, the S Boats were used for hit and run attacks against merchantmen, generally off the East Coast, and in September 1940 there were 15 operational at most. If you are to convince anyone of your arguments, you must prove that these boats could have kept the Royal Navy away from the troop carrying barges. As to sinkings of destroyers vis-a-vis S boats, sorry, not true.

As to the speed of the barges, how fast do you imagine that a trawler towing two barges (one powered and one unpowered) in a tightly packed formation at night would have been moving? 25 Knots, perhaps?

Have you really written a book containing this nonsense? Astonishing! Who is the publisher? I might buy a copy.

 

On August 6th, 1940, Dönitz wrote:

“If no losses occur during the next weeks the following boats are available for the operation:
12 large - Type IX
12 medium - Type VII
7 small Type II – front boats
13 small Type II – training
In all: 44 boats.

This is the highest total number and can only be achieved if none need repairs, which is not expected. U-2 - U-6, 11, 17, 24 and 29 are not ready for frontline service due to technical and personnel-related reasons. Two boats are on their way back with engine trouble. These are not included in the setup. During the preparations (14 days) for the operation, and eventual repairs which undoubtedly are necessary, all training has to be postponed except on those boats just now under phase-in. Ten new boats shall therefore have to wait for their crews as long as it takes to get back the training boats. These drawbacks must be accepted in view of the importance of the operation. The boats shall be positioned in the Channel, concentrated outside the areas where the British reinforcements are expected to arrive, and at the east coast south of Cross Sand and Hoofden. If the conditions in the Channel shall prove too crowded a number of boats shall be stationed by the Orkneys with a view to attacking targets in connection with the execution of the diversions. To be able to operate in the western Channel it must be arranged for proper openings through the western minefields. Bases to supply fuel and torpedoes: Lorient, St. Nazaire, Brest, Cherbourg, den Helder and Vlissingen.”

A fascinating letter, if only for the peculiar fact that the commander of the U-boat force did not know how many Type 9 boats he had in service at the time. He certainly did not have twelve.

The last sentence is particularly revealing. Who exactly was going to arrange for the openings in the minefields?

Interesting also to note that the positioning of the force would not have affected RN anti-invasion operations, because the vast majority of the anti-invasion force was between Plymouth and Sheerness already.

 

Well a lot of these arguments are thought up by different people for publicity to sell books. Now if the RAF had lost control of the skies I can't see that the naval aircraft like the their Swordfish defeating the Germans ion the Air.

Now with a string of U Boats lined up in the North Sea would have taken a heavy toll of the British Fleet making its way down to the Chanel. Mines were also laid by U Boat and Aircraft, let alone the E Boats which would have taken their toll on the ships heading south.. Then there was the Luftwaffe who have controlled skies could turn around well over a thousand JU87 on these ships and being so close to France would have got quite a few sorties in per day.
Now we all know what happened to the Prince of Wales Battleship along with the Repulse. In those narrow confines of the channel it would have been a shooting gallery for the Germans, and when you think of the heavy land based guns they could bring into action I think the Navy would have taken a pasting.

Sorry to be picky, but:

1). In Mid August 1940 the Luftwaffe had a maximum of 294 serviceable Ju87s, not thousands.

2). The Germans had a total of 20 operational Type 2 and Type 7 U-Boats in Mid September, 1940.

3). Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by torpedo bombers. The Luftwaffe had a handful of seaplanes capable of launching torpedoes, and all based in Norway.

4). The shore guns hit precisely nothing during the whole of WW2, what makes you think they would have been effective in September, 1940?

5) The Luftwaffe had its chance at Dunkirk, and only managed to sink four destroyers, all when stopped. How effective would they have been over the Channel, especially at night when the barges were to have crossed in order to attempt a dawn landing, and the destroyers were moving at 20+ knots?

The question regarding the Battle of Britain is badly phrased. Had it been 'How important was the Battle of Britain in the prevention of a German invasion?' then that would have been rather more interestng.

 

The problem is - the ranges of RAF fighters in 1940 - both types of which were not yet able to carry extended-range or droptanks.

Stationing Hurricanes and Spitfires out of effective LW range means well up into Twelve Group north of the Thames; this means a 70-mile flight to get over the coast, and a 70-mile return leg to refuel/rearm. The Spitfire/Hurricane of 1940 ONLY had a range of ~600 miles, there's 140-160 miles lopped off their duration already!



Adm.Forbes specifically refused to sortie any capital ships of Home Fleet further south than Great Yarmouth in the event of an invasion.



Exactly how much deck armour did RN destroyers have?



Entirely and absolutely WRONG; the RAF's tactical force had been greatly impacted by the losses to the AASF in France and Belgium; only a handful of Blenheim and Battle squadrons were available - why do you think the RAF had to plan Operation BANQUET?



I think you

1/ need a map, and

2/ need to read some of the standard works on Sealion.



O good lord - see point 2/ above Barges made of concrete??? Do you seriouslhy think that's what's meant in the descriptions??? Their keels/bilges were filled with concrete for ballasting and for deck reinforcement for heavy vehicles - the sides and bows were NOT made of concrete!!!



Beach obstacles??? I think you'd better read David Newbold's thesis and find out exactly what these comprised...



Strangely enough - it worked in Poland, in France, in Holland, in Belgium, in half of the USSR...



Wrong - just under half their destroyers, and a quarter of their major surface units were lost in WESERUBUNG



Also wrong; they sent a LOT more; see David Newbold's thesis. And they didnt send them BECAUSE they knew they weren't going to loose an invasion - they sent them because they had just enough intelligence (in the military sense) to decide that they could probably be replaced with new builds before Sealion would be launched. We actually sent half our front-line tank strength abroad...


One or two points you may wish to consider:

1). There were no armoured flight deck carriers with the Home Fleet at the time. The Admiralty, not Forbes, held the Home Fleet at Rosyth, with the intention that it should not move south unless heavy German ships appeared in the southern part of the North Sea. We now know that the only heavy ship available to the Germans at the time was Hipper, which herself had defective engines, but this was not known at the time and an Atlantic breakout was a possibility, hence the presence of Repulse and a carrier at Scapa. The Admiralty considered, rightly, that the forces between the Nore and Plymouth were more than capable of dealing with any invasion. Forbes even felt that some of these could have been detached on escort duty, and recalled when/if an invasion force appeared. Forbes was right too, even if disagreeing with Pound & Churchill cost him his job.

2). RN destroyers did not have deck armour, but they had considerable speed and manouevrability. You only need to read what Dinort said about the problems of dive-bombing destroyers with sea room in which to operate to understand the problems the Luftwaffe faced. Furthermore, how effective would the Luftwaffe have been at night, when the barges were intended to cross?

3).The Germans, in terms of operational warships, lost far more than a quarter of their major vessels in Norway. In terms of Sealion, they were down to one heavy cruiser and three light cruisers. The did actually lose half of their destroyers. ten of twenty.

4). The British actually sent four full armoured regiments to North Africa in August 1940, including virtually all the operational Matilda II infantry tanks. Given the desperate shortage of AFVs in Britain at the time, perhaps Churchill had a more realistic view of the prospects for a German invasion than many subsequent Sealion enthusiasts.

5). I assume your reference to Poland, France, Holland, Belgium and half of the USSR is facetious as well as irrelevant. Last time I checked, none of the above were, in 1940/1, protected by a wide stretch of water guarded by the most powerful navy on earth

 

Take care crossing the airfield runway. There is a flight of Corvettes. with a destroyer pathfinder just about to take off, on bombing mission over Peenemunde,to stop the rockets from arriving. BIG GRIN.

It demeans the courage and sacrifices of those brave young men.

If you are unable to make sensible comments, may I respectfully submit that a period of silence on your part might be appropriate.

A member of an earlier generation of my family served in one of the Nore based V & W Class destroyers during the invasion scare period, hence my interest in the perod.

He later died on escort duty in the Atlantic in 1942, far away from any air cover.

Your gratuitous insults, seemingly based on contempt for the Royal Navy rather than any substantial or even relevant views on the matter under discussion,

DEMEAN HIS COURAGE AND SACRIFICE!

 

Actually, I could list every operational British and Allied warship of minesweeper size and upwards in Home Waters (or, come to that, world wide), in September1940.

I am sorry to observe that you have used naval-history net. It is useful but not wholly accurate..
It is obviously more accurate than the list from 1947 you are using..........

My own information is from the Admiralty archives, and I would respectfully submit that the Navy would generally have some idea where its ships were. Perhaps you would care to name the ten destroyers, and I will be able to help you identify those you have missed....
The pink list is also "Admiralty" archives. Nonetheless it is not correct as to where the vessels actually were. It is only correct as to the bases of their mother units, but not for the vessels themselves. You are obviously doing the same mistake as I did myself when I first started looking into this. In 1940 Western Approaches Command was situated in Plymouth but its naval units weren't necessarily there. Sorry for crushing your illusions. Think about it!