Did the Navy win the Battle of Britain?

Discussion in 'The War In The Air' started by adrian roberts, Aug 25, 2006.

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  1. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    A fascinating letter, if only for the peculiar fact that the commander of the U-boat force did not know how many Type 9 boats he had in service at the time. He certainly did not have twelve.
    It is not a letter it is a clip from Dønitz's book "Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage". Why is it that I rely more on that information than yours?
     
  2. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    The REAL problem was....that sort of rubbish was put into official targeting policy! As late as May 1940, even AFTER Winston took over, we were STILL leafleting the Ruhr towns instead of bombing them :mad: Hence for instance the strange order NOT to bomb German shipping or targets actually IN ports...but targets in port roads' was okay! :lol:

    It was not simply a Conservative MP who opposed the bombing of private property, it was actually Sir Kingsley Wood, the Secretary of State for Air in the Chamberlain government.

    The full story (allegedly!) is that the suggestion was put to him that fire-bombing German forests would disrupt the production of timber. It is reported that he replied to the effect that 'Do you not realise that some of those woods are private property? Why, you will be asking me to bomb Krupps next'

    Total War, or What?
     
  3. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    Sorry to be picky, but:

    1). In Mid August 1940 the Luftwaffe had a maximum of 294 serviceable Ju87s, not thousands.

    How many end of September...?
     
  4. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    This doesn't rhyme very well with the diary of FM Alabrooke. He was, after all, CIC of the British home defence. In 1942 he was still worried.


    This would be the same Brooke who wrote, when in command of II Corps on 23 May, 1940, that 'Nothing but a miracle can save the BEF now' would it?

    You should not always assume that great men always get things right. More often than not, they don't.
     
  5. Roxy

    Roxy Senior Member

    Effingham,

    I'd be wary of lambasting one of our veterans - sapper did his bit and has the wounds to prove it. I'd suggest - although I know he is more than capable of speaking for himself - he was simply saying -NO, the RN did not win the Battle of Britain.

    Now, perhaps Fred and you can continue your discussion; I'm sure many on the forum are reading it with interest.

    Roxy
     
  6. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    Your figures for the destroyers and T boats are simply wrong, sorry, but you are correct about the Raubtier vessel which had slightly larger guns. That would surely have made all the difference..
    What is wrong? Which of these vessels were not available for Sealion?

    As to the M1935s and the S boats. You have got the whole argument the wrong way round. You have to produce evidence that they could have prevented the Royal Navy from disrupting the invasion convoys..
    One can put it that way. One can also put it the other way around...:)..

    Similarly, the S Boats were used for hit and run attacks against merchantmen, generally off the East Coast, and in September 1940 there were 15 operational at most.
    A military unit does what its mission is. During a Sealion their mission would be to protect the invasion fleets.

    As to sinkings of destroyers vis-a-vis S boats, sorry, not true.
    How is it wrong, please? Before radar.

    As to the speed of the barges, how fast do you imagine that a trawler towing two barges (one powered and one unpowered) in a tightly packed formation at night would have been moving? 25 Knots, perhaps?.
    Would you mind stating exactly where you have the figure 2-3 knots from. There is quite a difference between 2-3 and 25 knots.

    Have you really written a book containing this nonsense? Astonishing! Who is the publisher? I might buy a copy.
    You could send me your book and I could send you mine......Ooops, I forgot, you want to remain anonymous...Well, I could ask Jay to send me one.
     
  7. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    It is obviously more accurate than the list from 1947 you are using.....:rolleyes:.....

    The pink list is also "Admiralty" archives. Nonetheless it is not correct as to where the vessels actually were. It is only correct as to the bases of their mother units, but not for the vessels themselves. You are obviously doing the same mistake as I did myself when I first started looking into this. In 1940 Western Approaches Command was situated in Plymouth but its naval units weren't necessarily there. Sorry for crushing your illusions. Think about it!


    I do not understand your reference to 1947.

    I cannot be held responsible for your mistakes, but I am satisfied as to the accuracy of my own information. You have still not answered my earlier question, by the way. If the invasion threatened the British south coast, why would the Admiralty deliberately leave it unguarded?

    Furthermore how is it that every naval historian since 1945 more or less agrees on the situation in September, 1940, yet you alone have discovered that it is all a big lie?

    As to your comment regarding Western Approaches Command, if you mean that every vessel controlled by it wasn't permanently tied to the quay in Plymouth dockyard then you are correct. However, nor were ships from Western Approaches Command to be found boiler cleaning in Sydney or patrolling the Yangtse. You must have seen a ship once or twice in your life, surely you have realised that they move about, and in the case of destroyers move about rather quickly. If you are arguing that a Western Approaches destroyer patrolling off, for example, Cherbourg, should not be considered part of the RN anti-invasion forces because the ship was not actually in its home port then I fear you will secure little support for your views.

    Would you, for example, claim that, once the Home Fleet left Rosyth on patrol it ceased to exist because it wasn't at its home base? I find your reasoning rather peculiar.

    As to crushing my illusions, I am sure other people on this site can assess for themselves whose views are based on reality, and whose on illusion.
     
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  8. Effingham

    Effingham Member

  9. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    It is not a letter it is a clip from Dønitz's book "Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage". Why is it that I rely more on that information than yours?


    I really don't know. Perhaps you are selective in what you want to believe. I only know that the Doenitz 'statement' was factually incorrect, and I can list the number and operational status of every Type 9 built prior to September 1940 to prove it.

    Your assumption that great men (and I use the term very loosely with regard to the late unlamented second fuhrer) are always correct in what they say and always tell the truth is quite touching but rather immature in someone of your age.

    Records and archives rarely lie, people frequently do.

    Have you really written a book putting forward ideas like this? Who is the publisher, I might buy a copy and I haven't found it on Amazon?
     
  10. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    Effingham,

    I'd be wary of lambasting one of our veterans - sapper did his bit and has the wounds to prove it. I'd suggest - although I know he is more than capable of speaking for himself - he was simply saying -NO, the RN did not win the Battle of Britain.

    Now, perhaps Fred and you can continue your discussion; I'm sure many on the forum are reading it with interest.

    Roxy

    I agree and apologise. I am sure Sapper can defend himself and did not intend to hurt.

    I only wish my own family member survived in the same happy condition, which is why I defended his service, as he cannot.

    Still, no more of this and back to the point
     
  11. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    What is wrong? Which of these vessels were not available for Sealion?

    One can put it that way. One can also put it the other way around...:)..

    A military unit does what its mission is. During a Sealion their mission would be to protect the invasion fleets.

    How is it wrong, please? Before radar.

    Would you mind stating exactly where you have the figure 2-3 knots from. There is quite a difference between 2-3 and 25 knots.

    You could send me your book and I could send you mine......Ooops, I forgot, you want to remain anonymous...Well, I could ask Jay to send me one.


    You seem to be asking me for a lot of information, yet providing none of your own.

    Sorry, but what does the last paragraph mean?
     
  12. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    You seem to be asking me for a lot of information, yet providing none of your own.
    It's all in my book. It can be bought here....:

    Fred Leander
     
  13. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    I really don't know. Perhaps you are selective in what you want to believe. I only know that the Doenitz 'statement' was factually incorrect, and I can list the number and operational status of every Type 9 built prior to September 1940 to prove it.

    Please do.
     
  14. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    One or two points you may wish to consider:

    1). There were no armoured flight deck carriers with the Home Fleet at the time. The Admiralty, not Forbes, held the Home Fleet at Rosyth, with the intention that it should not move south unless heavy German ships appeared in the southern part of the North Sea. We now know that the only heavy ship available to the Germans at the time was Hipper, which herself had defective engines, but this was not known at the time and an Atlantic breakout was a possibility, hence the presence of Repulse and a carrier at Scapa. The Admiralty considered, rightly, that the forces between the Nore and Plymouth were more than capable of dealing with any invasion. Forbes even felt that some of these could have been detached on escort duty, and recalled when/if an invasion force appeared. Forbes was right too, even if disagreeing with Pound & Churchill cost him his job.


    This is quite correct; Brian Lavery confirms that the three destroyer "flotillas" weren't retained as groups as such, as Fleming might indicate, but were parcelled out to other duties - nightly patrolling coastal convoy escort, several even to deep Atlantic cpnvoy escort - but none of the designated ships were ever allowed more than seven days' steaming from the UK during the period, and the vast majority were within 24 hours' at most from their ports if CROMWELL was issued.

    2). RN destroyers did not have deck armour, but they had considerable speed and manouevrability. You only need to read what Dinort said about the problems of dive-bombing destroyers with sea room in which to operate to understand the problems the Luftwaffe faced.


    Quite correct; as well as events later proved off Crete I.E. if ships in the combat area had enough AA munitions and sea room they could manouver and stand off air attack...NORWAY had proved that only recently; Lavery contains considerable detail on this recent 1940 experience.

    Furthermore, how effective would the Luftwaffe have been at night, when the barges were intended to cross?

    Mentioned above ;)

    3).The Germans, in terms of operational warships, lost far more than a quarter of their major vessels in Norway. In terms of Sealion, they were down to one heavy cruiser and three light cruisers.


    The caveat there is quite correct; however - the British did not appreciate the level of damage they had actually caused off Norway ;)

    The did actually lose half of their destroyers. ten of twenty.


    I aprpeciate the correction; several years ago I'd crunched the numbers as 22, but 20 does make it an even more respectable result off Norway :)

    4). The British actually sent four full armoured regiments to North Africa in August 1940, including virtually all the operational Matilda II infantry tanks. Given the desperate shortage of AFVs in Britain at the time, perhaps Churchill had a more realistic view of the prospects for a German invasion than many subsequent Sealion enthusiasts.


    Newbold lists the War Office files containing the minutes of the various meetings; while the above is a possibility, the Chiefs of Staff simply came to the conclusion - based on the various analyses of just when the Germans could realistically mount an attack - that what they planned in late July to send abroad in late August would have been replaced by new builds from the factories by the 2nd-3rd week of September.

    5). I assume your reference to Poland, France, Holland, Belgium and half of the USSR is facetious as well as irrelevant. Last time I checked, none of the above were, in 1940/1, protected by a wide stretch of water guarded by the most powerful navy on earth

    I was answering Bayman's comment...

    "Now look at the German army. Top class front line tanks used as a battering ram, which took all by surprise, with backup supply by horses, with the following infantry marching with the horses. This slow manpower and horse intensive setup was to conquer the south east of the England? Not likely..."

    ...and drawing to his attention (pity he hasn't returned!) that thisdefinition that what WE know as "blitzkrieg" worked in many other campaigns for the Germans in the first three years of the war.
     
  15. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    Fred...


    P.S. These M35s?

    No, these..

    ...exactly, those M35s ;) To that, let's ALSO look at what German Naval History says...

    Despite the successful design, several factors prevented that a large number of ships were build during the war. The boats were very expensive and complicated to build, therefore a more simple design had to be developed (which later got the Minensuchboot 1940). The engines were difficult to maintain and needed specially skilled personal which was not available in the required numbers. Since the Mboot35 had oil fired boilers, they also suffered from the oil shortage in the later years of the war.


    I've also seen several comments that they were designed (literally) to be used in flotillas - when used individually they were easily picked off during the war.
     
  16. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    Please do.


    By the end of 1940, 22 Type 9s had been commissioned. The following is a list of numbers, commissioning dates, and status as of mid September, 1940:

    Type 9a.

    U37 Commissioned pre-war, Operational.
    U38 Commissioned pre-war, Operational.
    U39 Commissioned pre-war, Sunk by surface warship, 14.09.39.
    U40 Commissioned pre-war, Sunk by mine, 13.10.39.
    U41 Commissioned pre-war, Sunk by surface warship, 05.02.40.
    U42 Commissioned pre-war, Sunk by surface warship, 13.10.39.
    U43 Commissioned pre-war, Operational.
    U44 Commissioned Nov. 39, Sunk by surface warship 20.03.40.

    Type 9b.

    U64 Commissioned Dec.39, Sunk by HMS Warspite's Swordfish, 13.04.40.
    U65 Commissioned Feb 40, Operational.

    Type 9c.

    U103 Commissioned July 40, Operational.
    U104 Commissioned Aug. 40, Working Up ( 1st war patrol Nov. 1940).
    U105 Commissioned Sept. 40. Commenced Working Up 10.09.40.
    U106 Commissioned Sept. 40. Commenced Working Up 10.09.40.
    U107 Only Commissioned Oct. 1940.
    U108 Only Commissioned Oct. 1940.
    U109 Only Commissioned Dec. 1940.
    U110 Only Commissioned Nov. 1940.
    U111 Only Commissioned Dec. 1940.

    U122 Commissioned Mar. 40. Sunk 21.06.40 - Cause unknown probably mine
    U123 Commissioned May 40. Operational.
    U124 Commissioned June 40. Operational.

    Thus, when Doenitz was writing in early August, 1940, he had seven operational Type 9s, assuming that U124 had completed working up. Where did he get the total twelve from? With so few boats to deal with, one would have expected the Admiral to have been able to keep track of those he had, surely?

    Didn't the Kreigsmarine have a document as useful as the Royal Navy Pink List in use?

    Perhaps, given the size of their fleet, they could have called it the Pink Halfsheetof paper!

    I am happy to add to your education, which seems to have been sadly defective where naval matters are concerned.
     
  17. Effingham

    Effingham Member

    Fred Leander

    River Wide, Ocean Deep, Operation Sea Lion - F. Leander | eBay

    Has anyone read this book ??

    I have just had a look at the above, and at Mr. Leander's site.

    Reading the chapter introductions my first conclusion was that it was intended to be some sort of amusing spoof, but then it dawned upon me that he has really convinced himself that what he says has some credibility.

    No wonder it isn't on Amazon, it is clearly self-published, I doubt a publisher would touch such foolishness with the proverbial barge pole. I wonder, however, if he submitted the text to any for consideration.

    No wonder he hasn't answered any of the questions I have addressed to him.

    Conclusion: Oh dear, how sad!
     
  18. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    I am happy to add to your education, which seems to have been sadly defective where naval matters are concerned.
    I might not be perfect in naval matters but you are sorely missing in military matters. When Dønitz made his list he knew his U-boat launch program months ahead and when he wrote:
    "....all training has to be postponed except on those boats just now under phase-in. Ten new boats shall therefore have to wait for their crews as long as it takes to get back the training boats. These drawbacks must be accepted in view of the importance of the operation. The boats shall be positioned in the Channel, concentrated outside the areas where the British reinforcements are expected to arrive, and at the east coast south of Cross Sand and Hoofden......"

    ....he meant exactly that. This went for all types. And should give him 12 IX's in September. He decided this, work-up or not. As a matter of fact, the new-commisioned boats could be better fighting units than older boats because experienced intructors could be put onboard together whith the assigned crews. In the German Navy, like any other navy, it was not like when a new boat was launched a completely fresh crew suddenly entered it. Many had followed the last stage of the technical finishing at the wharf and of the new crew there was always a cadre of experienced people.

    How he would use his boats is another matter.

    For the IX-boats you state were taken completely out of the operation I don't know what his intention was. One thing I am pretty sure of, they were not to be laid up and their crews sent to Germany for a Kraft durch Freude trip in the Baltic.....;)....
     
  19. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    I've also seen several comments that they were designed (literally) to be used in flotillas - when used individually they were easily picked off during the war.
    Well, they weren't picked off easily. As a matter of fact the first one sunk by enemy action was in 1942, then by aircrafts. The first one sunk by enemy surface action was in 1943, by MTB's. At that time radar had been generally introduced in the RN. I don't think any M35's got radar untill 1944.

    As for flotillas......yes, minesweepers operated in flotillas. It was inherent in the mission. As the war progressed the M35' were used more and more in the escort role. That said, during Sealion they were to operate in flotillas.

    One poster here is missing numbers on destroyers sunk by M35's. Well, I don't have any and there might be a perfectly good reason for it. The destroyers probably stayed off and let the MTB's take the s***. Destroyers often operated as back-up for the RN MTB's hunting the German convoys along the French coast.
     
  20. fredleander

    fredleander Senior Member

    I have just had a look at the above, and at Mr. Leander's site. No wonder it isn't on Amazon, it is clearly self-published,!
    Is this the worst you can think of in your life.... :D....

    Conclusion: Oh dear, how sad!
    No switch of books, then.....:unsure:....?
     

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