Lads, time after time I have stumbled upon references to the divided loyalties of the inhabitants of SE Asian countries, with most of the rural people loyal to the Allies (mainly Commonwealth), and many of those living in urban areas to the Japanese (or at least to the idea of independence from western countries). For example, in Burma you find that the Karens, Chins, Kachins, etc., mainly mountain or rather isolated peoples were on the Allied field from the beginning, while city folk sided with the Japanese even before the invasion took place, helping with countless fifth-column actions. Same applies to Malaya and Indochina (where even 20 years after their support for the French, the Hmong found themselves fierce backbone members of the US-backed CIDG's). Was it a matter of the "progressist" 20th century ideas of urban intellectuals finding a niche within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere vs. the fierce loyalties forged after years of colonial rule of ingenuous mostly uneducated rural people? Or something else?
Good question Alberto. As you know, prior to the war, the Japanese had worked hard to establish political links with its near neighbours and the governing elements of these countries. This is very much the case with Burma, where I have read that the Japanese invited the leaders of political parties over to Japan for talks and often further education. A good example of this is Aung San, who received assistance and military training from the Japanese in the months before Pearl Harbor. There can be no doubt that these more educated elites, had been working towards freeing their countries from the yoke of colonialism and were naturally drawn to the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. However, there might be something far more simplistic at work here. The peripheral peoples of Burma like the Kachins, did not like the Burmese of the towns and cities and had viewed the British in this instance, as their protectors and deliverers of fair play. Also, although the Japanese invaders did infiltrate all areas of the country during their occupation, their day to day presence in larger towns and cities made it far harder for the locals to do anything other than go along with what they wanted and act in a subservient manner. Whereas, if you only saw the odd Japanese patrol from one month to the next up in the Kachin Hills, you might be able to continue your preference and support towards the British. Best wishes Steve
I think there's a strong ethnic/cultural aspect as well, not just economic/educational. Most of these territories were far from being ethnically homogenous. Even today - there is a tendency for the urban/metropolitan elite to think they know what's best for the shires and that's likely to be worse if there's an ethnic element. Efficiency of propaganda may also come into it in the sense that it was probably far easier to sway the educated, particularly if it played to their egos. Winning over the yokels perhaps required more practical, time consuming methods; I'm thinking of a Japanese businessman's (actually an army officer) efforts to help build culverts and the like in rural (but strategically relevant) Malaya.
A matter of good timing, then? Was the independentist cauldron that SE Asia was in those hectic days, the perfect breeding ground for the "merchant of dreams" role that the Japanese played so perfectly? Even though I still can't believe (accept would be a more appropriate term) Britannia was caught so unprepared (militarily, politically, socially) when the initial onslaught came, so much political unrest would have been a sickness so deadly so as to overcome any measures employed by the Governors (if at all) to cure it. Well, I see your point here, and had it in mind as a possibility since me first post, but wasn't clear about how to put it until your answer came along: Thinking of the way the Filipino people in general (beyond the proverbial wealthy family thinking of how to keep the Pesos safe) behaved during the occupation, you wonder if maybe a stronger bonding element, like a religion different to Buddhism (Catholicism and Islam in this particular case), was able to overcome ethnic differences and become the reason why there was no sensible tilt of the loyalty scale there towards the Japanese. There was no such thing in Commonwealth territories, and in the NEI, Islam was the common cause AGAINST the Dutch way before the invasion.
To me, one of the great paradoxes regarding the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is that, whilst the colonised peoples of South East Asia may have been keen to throw off the yoke of European colonialism, they could clearly see that Japan was involved in its own colonial conquests in Korea and Manchuria. The myth that the Japanese were engaged in a struggle to free South East Asia from European colonialism for the benefit of the colonised is one of the great distortions of recent history. I have no doubt that the Japanese were fighting for an empire of their own and were not conducting a war of liberation.
Exactly....the SEA Co-prosperity plan was merely a carrot to deceive the British and Dutch colonial populations from the intent of Japanese foreign policy to extend their empire and ensuring that Imperial Japan had access to raw materials such as oil and rubber."Liberation" from the colonialists by Japan appears to have been attractive to the nationalist fractions, in particular the Dutch East Indies. In the late 1930s FDR saw the threat of the Japanese to Pacific political stability...... Seizing Manchuria and Korea, then aggression against China from 1937,he had increasingly tried to limit the Japanese access to oil supplies which eventually led to the irrational attack on Pearl Harbor.
I'm almost finished this book and not surprisingly, given the subject matter of forces operating in Japanese territory, the loyalties of native populations is a subject that crops up repeatedly, Some observations so far: the Netherland East Indies was an area in which finding natives willing to help the Allies was very rare and betrayal almost a certainty. Loyalties were often very changable within a certain area and it could often depend on which tribal group a unit met first as to how the mission went. As the war progressed it became easier to find natives willing to co-operate as the Japanese were very heavy handed in their occupation. Mostly it is pointed out that the native populations were caught in a difficult position as reprisals for helping the Allies, or even being suspected of helping the Allies, were harsh. It was often the case of looking out for their own families as best they could. Given these factors, it is heartening to see the number of times these people risked all to help Force Z, often for little more than a promise.
the books ive read it was the muslims in the arakan that were loyal while the others were pro jap for independence.
I love this line from Idler: 'Even today - there is a tendency for the urban/metropolitan elite to think they know what's best for the shires and that's likely to be worse if there's an ethnic element.'
Even though they deal only with military morale and discipline, the following pages from "The Retreat from Burma, 1941-42", are nevertheless interesting:
