Damiano Couldn't ask for a more reasoned summary of the whole debacle and is a credit to your scholarship and learning of that action of those times - I have always considered that the first attack by the French would have been successful in cutting off the supplies to the enemy - unfortunately they were hauled back by Clark to rescue his 34th Division - thus perpetrating the horrors of the next three battles. Thank you for your posting Try and meet with Niccar when he gets there as he might need a bottle of Oxygen ! Cheers Couldn't agree more this is guy who has walked ALL the battlegrounds (when you go on a tour with him his passion for accurate research is paramount), he is thorough, accurate and precise in every detail. Good advice, Niccar drop Damiano a pm it'll be worth it ... (he mentioned to me the issue with getting access to that gate next to the entrance to polish cemetery), As we walked up to cemetery it was locked and i'm unsure if you can get the key, as i'm sure you know its parallel to the path in the second photo,,Damiano will be able to help, (he was speaking to one of the abbey tour gentleman ref some information whilst i was with him ..always helpful to know them in know). Derrick
Hi, As a follow up i have enclosed some pictures from up on Castle Hill. Hope they are ok.. the memorial is to those brave guys from the Essex Reg, god bless them.
Damiano Couldn't ask for a more reasoned summary of the whole debacle and is a credit to your scholarship and learning of that action of those times - I have always considered that the first attack by the French would have been successful in cutting off the supplies to the enemy - unfortunately they were hauled back by Clark to rescue his 34th Division - thus perpetrating the horrors of the next three battles. Thank you for your posting Try and meet with Niccar when he gets there as he might need a bottle of Oxygen ! Cheers Dear Tom, thanks a lot for your words, you are very kind. I know that after 67 years, we can have only a distorted idea of the hell of that time, but talking about it can be really important for don't forget; so from my point of view this debate is useful at different levels. Derrick, thanks again, you are a good friend! Your pictures are really nice, Thanks again for sharing them. Best wishes. D.
A while back I stumbled onto an article from October 1950 online (found in several US newspapers via Google News Archive, but originally eminated form Auckland, New Zealand, probably NZPA) in which Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger is having a go at General Mark Clark's comments in his then new book 'Calculated Risk' about Freyberg's decision to bomb the abbey. Kipp states that the decision to bomb the abbey was made in conference with Clark himself, implying the book was passing the buck when Clark was equally responsible. The footnote states that Freyberg himself had declined to make any comment on this due to his position as NZ's Governor General. Saskatoon Star-Phoenix - Google News Archive Search I don't know if it's helpful, but possibly relevant to the discussion.
Dave Doesn't surprise me in the least as that man did nothing wrong - it was always someone else's fault - the stuff was not known in those days but he was number one "Teflon" General.. Cheers
Giving this thread a bump simply because, as the result of a tip-off from Adam, I now have a free copy of Fred Majdalny's epic book on Cassino in my Kindle folder. It strikes such memories that I have difficulty in tearing myself away from his account. In particular I liked his summing up of the value of observation points and the scourge of sickness as a result of the continuing wet and cold that all troops in the area suffered. If you use Kindle, don't miss the offer, if you don't use Kindle then just get yourselves a copy of this first class book. Ron
The question about the bombing of the Abbey at Cassino is one which can be debated endlessly. There are other scandalous decisions associated with the attack which have not attracted as much attention, but are bound up with the decision to bomb the monastery. The issues about the value and morality of the bombing are still relevant. A couple of years ago I took a military group to the battlefield. This was a historic case study for a very current discussion about the impact of bombing targets which might or might not be harbouring innocent civilians. It is easier to take the moral high ground with the advantage of hindsight. (Though the Padre was most insistent that the discussion took place outside the Abbey itself) The Abbey was probably doomed from the moment that the Germans made the decision to fortify and defend the Gustav Line. It was nonsense to believe that the Abbey could escape damage, given that it was a major feature on important ground dominating the Rapido and Liri valleys. It was built as a fortress because it was on tactically important ground and had been destroyed and rebuilt several times in the past. Even assuming that the Germans honoured the 300m exclusion zone around the Abbey would not protect the Abbey from collateral damage. Of course the allies would place the lives of their soldiers (and their morale) over the cultural value of some old building or paintings. Despite political opposition at the highest levels (from Churchill), the Allied commanders did not hesitate to bomb targets in France that would result in heavy civilian casualties among the population they were planning to liberate. It says much about Mark Clark's personal priorities that he subsequently claimed that He would have refused a request from a US subordinate. The process by which the decision was made is an interesting illustration about how military decisions are really made as opposed to how we imagine them to be made. The simplistic view is that a commander makes a plan, with the aid of his staff which is then implemented. Hence the post war finger pointing to find the man responsible for the act of destruction. However the saga of the bombing of the Abbey is a good example of the way military and business decisions are made, with incomplete and uncertain information, subject to the institutional habits and inter personal politics. This is all "Essence of Decision" stuff. Tuker may have advocated the bombing of the Monastery, not to strengthen the fire plan to further an argument that he should not be attacking the Monte Cassino feature at all. He, and Juin, appear to have been advocating an attack further up the valley towards Atina. The main thrust of his critical memo points out he had no equipment in his division capable of breaching the walls of this medieval fortification he was expected to seize. This might have been awkward were the Germans to have decided to occupy the Monastery. The institutional politics of the USAAF converted a call for a precision strike by fighter bombers with 1000lb bombs co-ordinated with an attack by ground forces into a "precision strike" by heavy and medium bombers as defined by the 15th USAAF at a time convenient to the Air force. No one at any intermediate level picked up on this, asked searching questions or called a sudden halt to what became a military fiasco and a PR disaster. The personalities of Alexander and Clark and their relationship have a lot to do with the conduct of the battles on the Gustav 1943-44. Clark had a fixed idea that the main attack would be made down the Liri valley with the IInd US Corps. The disjointed January battles with the attacks by the French, the British X Corps and the US II Corps were ill co-ordinated and in insufficient strength to dislodge the Germans, even though, according to von Senger und Etterlin they were on the ropes against X Corps and the French. Another example of personal politics getting in the way of military efficiency was to mount the attacks in February on the strongest part of the Gustav line by Freyburg with an improvised corps staff. When the NZ Div and 4th Indian Divisions were brought across from 8th Army to mount the Feburary attacks, the logical step would have been to have brought a Corps HQ across from 8th Army to plan the attack. British wartime doctrine (see Army Training Memorandum Sept Oct 1943) was that deliberate offensive operations would be planned and co-ordinated at Corps level, which was established with staff officers and supported by Artillery and other specialists (AGRAs) to make the best use of firepower for deliberate attacks. However, Clark refused to have a second British Corps HQ in his army as he would then have as many British as US subordinate HQs. As a result Freyburg had to step up a level and improvise a staff to do the work of two HQs! The consequences of this decision were that Freyberg, who had demonstrated that he was a great commander of the NZ Division was put in a position where he demonstrated that he wasn't such a great Corps commander. His division, which did great things when led by Freyberg, didn't do quite as well when someone else was in command. The other effect of stretching commanders is that there is far less redundancy in the event of casualties. So, at a time when the NZ division HQ is taking on the job of a Corps HQ two other key commanders, Kippenberger and Tuker are removed from their appointments. It is possible for units to improvise a command level up, but in peace time it is only practiced as exercise to stretch and test the commanders and staff officers. It was criminally negligent not to have deployed the best team. . With a stronger team and everyone doing their right jobs the operations in February and March would have turned out better. The saga of the Monastery bombing reeks of sloppy staff-work Had the bombing been co-ordinated with a ground attack, and taken quickly there would have been less fuss than the pointless pulverization unconnected to ground forces. Had Freyburg and Tuker been in command of their Divisions they might have said no to some of the less well through plans. The poor command and management of the operations around the bombing is a far greater scandal than bombing the monastery, and cost un-necessary lives. That is something which should be laid at Clark and Alexander's door. Clark for putting his reputation over the allied cause, and Alexander for letting him get away with it.
From what I have read about the bombing of the Abbey, it was well publicised to the civilian Population in the area and apparently led to many viewing the spectacle like an opera. It is rather unfortunate, to say the least, the the poor ground troops Close to the Abbey / Monastery were not informed and suffered terribly under the bombing and collateral damage. Perhaps this is another theme on the same subject that can be debated. Regards Tom
Hi ! For starters, please note that my comment is not in reference to any of the above postings but indirectly addressed to all. When one reaches a certain age group, it is very easy to repeat oneself, rather than spend an inordinate amount of time looking for previous comments on the same subject.. Yes....I know it is a failing on my part and that I could legitimately be accused of laziness, but I console myself by saying after penning some 5000 odd postings one could, or should, be forgiven a little repetition. However, there is one statement that I have made innumerable times and for which I make no apologies whatsoever for it's repetition and it goes something like this. In the period between 1939 & 1945 the participants, which group includes myself and anyone at any level who was involved in the hostilities, did not have the benefit of that wonderful product called hindsight. There..... I've said it again Ron
I would like the book as I don't have Kindle but can only find earlier editions of the book. Does anyone know if this new edition is only available on Kindle?
It's a same book, only its now available in electronic form for Kindle. I saw several other old publications which were now available for Kindle. And you can download Kindle for PC. http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie=UTF8&docId=1000426311
Niccar, I am leading the equivalent Leger tour in October. Last year we shuttled people up the hill to the Polish memorial and then down to Massa Albaneta in a mini-bus. Some then went on to the Sherman memorial in the mini-bus. If the format for the day remains the same you shouldn't need to walk any major distance, though the steps up to the Polish memorial could be tough for you. Enjoy your tour with Paul. Perry Rowe
Perry, Niccar died back in 2011. See this thread. http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/33727-rip-don-carter-niccar/
Perry For your information our dear friend and Veteran " Niccar " died of a massive Heart attack two days after returning from Cassino - no doubt happy in the knowledge that he had said his goodbyes to his comrades of the 78th Division who had fought at that place during the 3rd an 4th Battles - despite having the knowledge that he would have a reaction to the crippling disease of C.O.P.D. May he rest in peace Tom Canning
That's embarrassing - I didn't check the posting date as the thread showed as active. I'm glad he got there first. RIP.
This link could be posted on any number of threads, so forgive me if it has turned up previously, but it contains a lot that is interesting and (in the latter sections) a lot of original documentation: THE KING'S ROYAL HUSSARS [SIZE=26pt]Exercise Cassino Hawk 2015 [/SIZE] [SIZE=26pt]Study Guide [/SIZE] http://www.krh.org.uk/uploads/4/5/0/9/45090939/ex_cassino_hawk_study_guide.pdf
No fan of Freyberg but he was entirely justified in requiring the monastery to be bombed, it was war and soldiers lives were at stake. If it was in German interests to use it does anyone really think that they would not have? They regularly used church towers for lookouts and sniping. The other point is, do ruined stone buildings really provide better cover than intact buildings for defenders? This seems to be one of those unchallenged contentions which I think should be challenged. Anyway, battering away there has always seemed to be a bit unimaginative, have the alternatives been discussed here before? EG bypass Cassino and circle the monastery around from the left to cut it's supply lines.
General Juin commanding the French Expeditionary Corps and Francis Tuker commanding 4 Indian Division both advocated to Freyberg that going around Cassino by driving up the Atina basin would have been a much better option than headbaging against Monastery Hill and Point 593. Unfortunately, Juin was not trusted at the time - he had been on the losing French side against the Germans and had then switched from Vicky France to de Gaulle France mid war. At the same time, Francis Tuker got a terrible bout of rheumatoid arthritis and had to been evacuated to hospital in Caserta. As a result, Freyberg opted to go for the attritional, frontal assault. To be fair to Freyberg, whom Tuker described as having 'no brains and no imagination' he, Freyberg, sincerely believed that the Germans were at the end of their tether and ripe for collapse. We now know that this intelligence assumption was completely false and that the Germans were in good shape, but Freyberg did not have this luxury at the time. The big failing with the bombing of the Monastery was that the massive impact was not immediately followed up by Indian troops rushing the site and, in doing so, securing their left flank for any subsequent assault on the vital ground: Point 593. This did not happen because Mark Clark's Fifth Army HQ did not tell HQ II (NZ) Corps who, subsequently, were unable to tell the troops of 4 Indian Division to prepare to follow up and rush the site once the bombers had done their job. With their left flank exposed, any assault on Point 593 by moving along Snakeshead Ridge was ultimately doomed to failure. Regards Frank
