General Mark CLARK

Discussion in 'Italy' started by harribobs, Feb 4, 2005.

  1. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    There are various versions of the quote online...

    "general dobey" - Google Search

    I read a few of them, but in terms of sourcing an anecdote, it was a bit like a trail of breadcrumbs in a wood... jokes and anecdotes etc.

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    William Dobbie - Wikipedia

    "general dobbie" sunday - Google Search

    DOBIE GENEALOGY : Biography of Sir William George Shedden Dobbie
     
    Last edited: Dec 6, 2022
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  2. dbf

    dbf Moderatrix MOD

    A few threads, all with same title and discussion, merged, This thread now includes contributions from Tom & Gerry, veterans of Italian campaign. Fixed as many of the quotes as I could in the older posts.
     
    Last edited: Dec 6, 2022
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  3. Gary Tankard

    Gary Tankard Well-Known Member

    That is the line James Holland takes - that the failure of the Rapido attack was due to the divisional commander not providing the correct artillery support.
     
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  4. Andreas

    Andreas Working on two books

    The idea that there was a single point failure that can be pinned on Walker seems... spurious, but it wouldn't surprise me at all if that's Holland's key argument.

    Page 52 onwards of this 1984 analysis is worth reading:

    Battle Analysis: Rapido River Crossing, Offensive, Deliberate Attack, River Crossing, January 1944

    Background reading on events here: HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Salerno to Cassino [Chapter 19]

    This is also interesting: https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p4013coll3/id/2846/download

    My emphasis.

    All the best

    Andreas
     
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  5. minden1759

    minden1759 Senior Member

    Gary and Dave.

    James Holland clearly does not understand how artillery support works. Artillery is used to suppress the far bank where the enemy is deployed in trenches and dugouts and, through counter battery fire, is used suppress the enemy gun positions themselves so that they cannot bring fire down on the advancing troops.

    With no other diversionary attacks going on in support of 36 US Inf Div's assault, all German guns within range of the crossings could bring down fire. Hidden away and well spread out in the mountains, with the Allies unable to find them through ground locating or aerial recce, the counter battery plan was never going work. That left the Germans free to shell the advancing troops as and when they wanted - which they did.

    Suppressing the far bank kept the infantry in their trenches and dugouts, but it was artillery, not the infantry, that did most of the killing. The Germans did not even need to expose their artillery observers because all access routes cleared and white mine taped by US Engineers in the days before the attack, had already been marked by the German gunners. The gun line merely fired on those marked targets.

    Clark is the incompetent one here. He gave II (US) Corps, and 36 US Inf Div in particular, an unachievable task. Clark's senior commanders had pointed this out to him a few days earlier whilst up on Monte Trocchio but the man was not for listening.

    I understand Clark's point about desperately needing to draw German attention away from the landings at Anzio, but Germans in well dug in positions behind a major river obstacle, were not going to be distracted or intimidated by two Inf Bdes in the assault with no reserve. It was all rather pathetic. He most certainly did not apply the first Principle of the Offence which is concentration of force.

    Regards

    Frank
     
    Last edited: Dec 7, 2022
  6. Andreas

    Andreas Working on two books

    It's another one of a long list of things he does not understand, in my view, such as the reason for the difference in bombload between a night-fighter conversion of a medium bomber, and a heavy bomber.

    In terms of Clark wheeling this rather flimsy excuse for his command failure out, i) does that mean that he expected Walker to be able to work out the artillery portion just with 36 ID's divisional artillery and, even if so, ii) why did nobody look over the fireplan beforehand and pull Walker up by the short and curlies for not having done the job he was supposed to do properly?

    All the best

    Andreas
     
  7. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    There is a German term Fingerspitzengefühl literally finger-tip-feel or more loosly translated as situational awareness. It is a much prized quality among military commanders. Unlike wargamers or armchair strategists, commanders have to deduce what is happening on the battlefield and project forward the likely situation in 12 to 48 hours from fragmentary and conflicting information.

    Its the right stuff for Generals. Rommel, Guderian, Manstein and Patton had this in bucket loads. Even Carlo D'Este acknowledged that Montgomery could read an attritional battle well. But while these chaps had the right stuff, Mark Clark did not.

    Perhaps this situational awareness is the mark of a born leader, but great commanders tended to have a lot of experience of intermediate levels of command. Rommel had four years of experience as a combat leader from platoon to battalion commander in the Great War and developed as an outstanding divisional commander in France in 1940. Patton commanded a tank battalion and then a brigade in 1918, at the dawn of tank warfare. contributed to the development of US Armored Forces then commanded a division and corps in combat before taking command of an army. Montgomery spent WW1 in staff roles at brigade, division and corps HQ and in WW2 commanded a division and corps before taking command of an army

    Mark Clark was a bright staff officer and trainer of soldiers, but had little command experience before he found himself in command of an army.
     
    Last edited: Dec 8, 2022
  8. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    I hate to be nit-picky, but will be anyway. :D

    Patton may have commanded a tank battalion and brigade in WW1 but not for long in combat! And he didn’t command a division in combat in WW2.

    For Salerno, neither Clark nor his two Corps Commanders had much command time in their roles, nor did Clark’s staff. Not sure about Dawley’s staff though. I assume most of McCreery’s staff had served under Horrocks before in North Africa.

    Regards

    Tom
     
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  9. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Re Patton, True that he did not command tanks for long - but he did command in the field. Mark Clark's only command higher than a company was the temporary command of 3rd Battalion 11th Infantry, an appointment lasting two days and ended with Clark becoming a casualty, wounded in the Toul area - geographic location not body part...

    Richard McCreery had quite a bit of experience, a light armour expert, he commanded 2nd Armoured Brigade in France in 1940 and was GOC 8th Armoured Division 1940-42. He was sent to the Middle East as the RAC adviser (and ignored by the Auk), but joined Alexander's staff as CGS Middle east and 18th Army Group. Brooke reckoned that McCreery's contribution was under valued. I don't know who was on X Corps staff.
     
    Last edited: Dec 9, 2022
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  10. JohnB

    JohnB Junior Member

    Which brings into question of who put him in command of such numerous nations. It would have been better for the Allies and Clark, I think, had the multi-nation troops carried on in 8th Army which was always an army of many nations.
    5th US Army really should have been on the eastern, and less important half, of Italy and left relatively homogenous.
     
  11. Andreas

    Andreas Working on two books

    Rome is on the western side though, so...

    All the best

    Andreas
     
  12. Dave55

    Dave55 Atlanta, USA

    He also commanded a squad and was in a fire fight in Mexico when he was a second lieutenant.
     
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  13. minden1759

    minden1759 Senior Member

    Mark Clark would never have allowed his Fifth Army to be relegated to the Adriatic. Capturing Pesaro just does not have the same ring to it.

    His great friend Eisenhower would have blocked any British attempt to push Fifth Army to the Adriatic coast - and away from the political prize of Rome.

    By the Fourth Battle of Cassino, Eisenhower is no longer the top man in the Med so Clark has less control of his destiny.

    Regards

    Frank
     
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  14. Cpl Hadaway

    Cpl Hadaway Active Member

    Mark Clark: a man of many flaws perhaps, but his 1951 autobiography Calculated Risk is a great read. This is one of my favourite passages, in which he recounts his arrival in Britain in 1942:

    We were almost half-way across the ocean from Gander when weather forced us to turn back. The next day we tried again and landed at Prestwick, but flying conditions were so bad we had to take the night train down to London. We were quartered at Claridges and quickly got down to work, the main result of which was a recommendation by Eisenhower, Arnold, and myself that an experienced officer who was familiar with Washington's new plans for action in Europe should replace the US general then in command in the United Kingdom.

    The next most important thing about the trip--or, at least the thing that sticks in my mind most firmly--was our meeting with General Bernard L Montgomery, who was then the officer in command of the British Army in the south east of England. This was known early in the war as the 'invasion coast' because it was there that the German invasion had been expected for so many months. Montgomery was then engaged in maneouvres which had the code name of 'Tiger', a nickname that was often applied in those days to the dapper and hard-driving little General himself. An invitation was extended to Ike and myself to watch the maneouvres, and we drove down to Montgomery's headquarters, where we were shown into a small office lined with war maps to await the arrival of the distinguished soldier.

    He came in briskly, was introduced and promptly began to give us our bearings with a crisp lecture on the progress of the manoeuvres. There were several other officers in the room, and everybody gave their full attention to Montgomery's remarks. After a while Ike decided that he would like to smoke a cigarette. He quietly fished about in his pocket, pulled out a packet and offered one to me. I declined with a shake of my head, but Ike lighted up. He had taken about two puffs when the lecture broke off in the middle of a sentence. Monfgomery sniffed the air without looking round and in a loud voice asked, 'Who's smoking?'

    'I am,' Ike said meekly.

    'I don't,' Montgomery said sternly, permit smoking in my office.'

    Ike put out his cigarette and the lecture proceeded. At the conclusion of that first meeting between Montgomery and Eisenhower we got a good laugh out of the incident, but not until we were well out of Montgomery's hearing.

    Calculated Risk, pp 28.
     
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  15. JohnB

    JohnB Junior Member

    May well be a lot of truth in that. It's quite strange that the planning for the invasion of Italy, the Allies landing on the Continent in 1943, seems to have escaped from much scrutiny, both then and since.
     
  16. JohnB

    JohnB Junior Member

    I seem to recall from Monty's 1958 Memoirs a sketchmap showing the intention of 8th Army to threaten Rome from the north and east. :)
     
  17. minden1759

    minden1759 Senior Member

    Yes, he intended to reach Persaro, turn left down Route 5 to Rome. Eighth Army was stopped at the Sangro and that was the end of that.

    Regards

    Frank
     
  18. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Clark was put in charge of many nations because Italy was a side show. He thought he was there to capture Rome for America.

    The campaign was seen by many American senior officers as a distraction from what they saw as the main business in France. The 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions were transferred to France, and replaced by the raw 85th, 88th and 91st Divisions. Furthermore Italy was somewhere to deploy black Americans (92nd Infantry Division), mountain warfare units such as 10 Mountain division and the multi-national Special Forces (Devils) brigade, Japanese Americans, Brazilians, New Zealanders and South Africans.

    Clark was adamant that his army was the US Fifth Army. He resisted the introduction of British Corps HQ which he thought might dilute the American nature of his command - hence the nonsensical creation of the "New Zealand Corps" for the Feb-March 1944 battles of Cassino.

    Having decided to deploy the US Fifth Army in Op Avalanche at Salerno and the British at the toe in Op Baytown. The British were always going to be on the eastern side of Italy and the Americans on the west. Crossing over armies causes all sorts of logistical problems.
     
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  19. JohnB

    JohnB Junior Member

    From a military POV there was nothing that important about Rome except all the roads (and rail) running to it. Northern Italy is where they should have been thinking of.

    At one of the planning conferences on the invasion of the mainland de Guingand declared "If Avalanche is a success, then we should reinforce that front for there is little point in laboriously fighting our way up Southern Italy. It is better to let the enemy decay there or let him have the trouble of moving himself up from the foot to where we are concentrated."

    I don't think the then 8th Army HQ would care two farthings if Clark and the Americans were the first into Rome.
     
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  20. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    The item below has a bit on "Recollections of advance towards and round Rome"... near to the start of Reel 10 around 11mins...

    MARTIN, GEORGE (Oral history)

    Object description - British officer served with 2nd Lothian and Border Horse in North Africa, Italy and Austria, 1943-1945; served with Army Education Corps in Italy, 1945-1947

    Reels 10 & 11 - cover some details for early June 1944, North of Rome.

    REEL 10 Continues: stragglers from Welsh Guards; story of success in locating and destroying German command post; German shellfire; personal morale. Recollections of advance towards and round Rome, 6/1944: question of German tanks; hilly terrain and restriction of tanks to roads; absence of German aircraft; close escape from being attacked by Hurricane; question of German mines; orders to suspend fast advance towards Rome and move to east; story of passing through lines of Free French artillery unit; situation; circumstances of being hit by C Sqdn tank, question of Sherman flammability and baling out; taking over corporal's tank; subsequent meeting with C Sqdn NCO who fired shot; issued of tank cannibalised from salvaged turret and hull; checking gun accuracy; rest periods including German shellfire and recreations.
    REEL 11 Continues: terrain in Monte Redondo sector; concentration of fire on German troops moving out of factory buildings; replenishing ammunition under German harassing shellfire; story of advance to previously reconnoitred ridge reported as clear of German troops including action against German troops in slit trenches, taking prisoners, success in clearing concealed German troops waiting to ambush British infantry, casualties amongst Headquarters Troop caught on forward slope, opening fire on German observation post and German shellfire during retirement; nature of advance; reception from Italian civilians in Narni, 17/6/1944; continued advance; story of taking up concealed position overlooking road and stories of intercepting German traffic; story of clearing burning debris from back of Sherman after being hit by German shell; rest periods; letter contact with GB.
     
    Last edited: Dec 22, 2022

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