The basic argument made by this book is that the primary enemy of the Axis powers in the Second World War was the combination of Britain and the USA (who are referred to as the "Anglo-Americans") and this pertains as much to the war against Germany as that against Japan. This thesis is based on the fact that throughout the war the overwhelming majority of German war production was directed westwards rather than eastwards, especially in terms of such "big ticket" items as aircraft, surface ships, submarines, reinforced concrete structures, anti-aircraft guns, ballistic missiles and radar. Not only did the Western Allies receive the bulk of German war material in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality such that, for example, they always had to deal with the latest German aircraft, including jet and rocket planes. The Soviets, on the other hand, only had to take on a minority of German aircraft, these usually being of obsolescent types. Indeed the quantity and quality aspects were united, in that the hi-tech war against the Western Allies was necessarily extremely expensive, and was a constant drain on German capital. Aircraft alone occupied the lion's share of production for the UK, USA, Germany and Japan, and for both the UK and Germany it absorbed over 50% of war production. Land based equipment on the other hand was comparatively cheap, and even the most expensive land weapons (i.e. tanks) came nowhere near the investment needed for air and sea weapons. This in turn meant that the material and economic destruction meted out by the land war was comparatively minor compared to that consumed by the struggle in the air and on the sea. The author argues that the land war has therefore been over-privileged in the historiography, primarily because it provides an engaging narrative of "turning point" great battles that apparently shift the momentum of the war. In fact, these great battles only consumed a puny amount of German and Japanese equipment and war material, and did almost nothing to dent their fighting prowess. The air-sea war therefore constituted a "super battlefield" that stretched for thousands of miles, whose very extent stretched Axis resources to the utmost, and it was here that the Anglo-Americans were the supreme force. The author posits that there were only two critical campaigns in the struggle to overcome Nazi Germany. The first of these was the Battle of the Atlantic, which represented the only opportunity in the war for the Germans to seriously write down Allied equipment, and the Combined Bomber Offensive over the Reich. With regard to the latter, he submits that although strategic bombing never achieved the ambitious promises of the airmen themselves, it had second order effects that seriously impaired German production, for example in workers being pulled off assembly lines to effect repairs. By late 1944, 80% of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were engaged in defending the Reich, these aircraft in themselves representing an enormous portion of German war production, even before anti-aircraft guns and reinforced concrete defences are taken into account. The Germans themselves saw the strategic bombing offensive as their primary campaign, and the consequent absence of the Luftwaffe from over the battlefield also facilitated the Soviet and Anglo-American armies to sweep into the Reich. The author describes the destruction meted out by the Western Allies to Axis production as occurring in three phases - pre-production (destroying or blocking the transport of raw materials), production (i.e. bombing factories), and deployment (bombing goods in transit or on the battlefield). In contrast, the USSR destroyed a comparatively negligible portion of German war material and thereby wrote off very little German capital. Although the author takes pains to explain that he does not want to denigrate the Soviet war effort, he inevitably does so by default. The Soviets in this book tend to come across much like the Chinese against the Japanese - they usefully hold down a lot of enemy personnel, but are not critical to the outcome. What this book therefore tends to suggest is that a lot of what we discuss on this site was much less important than we tend to think. Tanks and artillery were comparatively unimportant while great land commanders such as Guderian, Montgomery, Eisenhower and Zhukov were far less relevant than their reputations suggest. The most important movers and shakers were more obscure figures such as Ernest King, Charles Portal, Dudley Pound, and above all others, William Leahy. Regarding negatives, as usual with "big picture" historians, there is plenty to quibble about regarding technical details - for example Mr. O'Brien states that the A6M2 Zero fighter came into service in 1937 which would have represented quite some going by the Japanese. He also states that the Soviets did not have a fighter as advanced as the Zero until the Yak-3 of 1944, which is I think a very dubious judgement. However the author is correct in pointing out the relative toothlessness of the VVS considering its extensive size. Readers will also need a magnifying glass to read the ludicrously small graphs. So what do I think of it? In the famous words of Zhou Enlai it is too early to say. The author's perspective is so novel and so at variance from my previous understanding of the war that this book will take me a long time to absorb. That being said, I would recommend that everybody read it, and if a consensus emerges as to its validity, then we will all end up thinking about the war within a new, and very different, paradigm.
I think it's very very much fundamentally flawed. As the Russians are finding out right now. Ultimately you have to kill the will or the ability (or both as they are related) of the other side to resist. Against Hitler's Germany the only way to do this was to actually go up and kill German soldiers in sufficient numbers. That's what the Red Army did. He's got a point, but he is taking it way too far and then some distance beyond that. All the best Andreas
Sounds interesting, I may have to get this one. Recently finished Richard Overy's Why the Allies Won and of the eight points he brings out as leading to victory, the battle for the Atlantic and Pacific, the bomber offensive, allied mass production and technology are, he considers, key. He does also stress the importance of Stalingrad and Kursk. Edit: Ordered. Damn you Amazon - you make it too easy
I have to say I found the book quite a bit more plausible than I was expecting. I thought I would read it quite sympathetically but at the end think "nah", but I ended up thinking "hmmm".
He certainly makes a strong case for reconsidering the balance between the attrition of weapons, ships, tanks, aircraft, etc and the attrition of personnel. I also think he takes it too far, but perhaps not "way too far"! I've seen criticism that he didn't take into account the sector of the German economy devoted to equipping the land forces with every they needed other than weapons (helmets, clothing, boots, food, etc) and pointing out that its not just all about weapons, ships, tanks, aircraft, etc. Overall though, I thought it an interesting reappraisal which also made me think "hmmmmm". Regards Tom
