Japanese agression: French Indochina vs. Dutch Indonesia

Discussion in 'War Against Japan' started by MarcPh, Feb 15, 2020.

  1. MarcPh

    MarcPh Member

    In September 1940, the Japanese military took advantage of the German occupation of France to occupy French Indochina without a military conflict.

    Why didn't the Japanese take advantage of the German occupation of the Netherlands in order to occupy Dutch Indonesia so that they could grab the oil reserves there?
     
  2. Robert-w

    Robert-w Banned

    Because they feared that it would provoke war with the USA for which they were not yet ready - hence Pearl Harbour.
     
  3. MarcPh

    MarcPh Member

    Robert,

    Thank you for your response.

    So if I'm understanding you correctly, the Japanese were thinking that by taking over Indochina that the US would either not react or react limitedly (although, incorrectly since the US imposed the crippling oil/steel embargo which led to the unwise decision to attack Pearl Harbor) but if they took over Indonesia that the risk of the US seeing that as a casus belli was too high. Correct?

    Marc
     
  4. Robert-w

    Robert-w Banned

    The Dutch East Indies are much closer to the Philippines in strategic terms.Dewpite protestations to the contrary the USA was also an imperial power.
     
  5. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    MarcPH,

    Whilst the Japanese did occupy French Indo-China they - from memory - left the Vichy French regime in place and did not disarm the French military. I think the Japanese occupation was limited to strategic places, airfields in particular. See: Japanese invasion of French Indochina - Wikipedia
     
  6. Roy Martin

    Roy Martin Senior Member

    The French, and the Thais, didn't resist; the Dutch in the East Indies were much more determined.
     
  7. smdarby

    smdarby Well-Known Member

    Good question. The French Vichy government collaborated with Germany and ordered the handover of French Indo-China to Japan. The Dutch government in exile did not collaborate and was still at war with Germany even after The Netherlands surrendered. Therefore, the political situation was different i.e. Japan would have to start a war and escalate the situation in order to take over the Dutch East-Indies, possibly leading to the intervention of the UK and USA, whereas it could just walk into French Indo-China in 1940 without any serious repercussions.
     
    Last edited: Feb 16, 2020
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  8. Robert-w

    Robert-w Banned

    Whilst the bulk of Britain's oil came from Iraqi and Persian oil fields this was Arabian Light which is sour (high sulphur) and lacks some aromatics. Good enough for making fuel for ships and tanks but less so for aircraft. Oil from the Dutch East Indies was high in aromatics and could be used in blending to bring up the octane content. A threat to this would certainly have brought about British intervention.

    By December 1941 Britain had become much more reliant on Texas Light than on Dutch supplies
     
  9. Harry Ree

    Harry Ree Very Senior Member

    The Japanese road to war arises from the fact that they were prisoners of their own history from the early 20th century.It was similar to Hitler's vision as expressed in his Mein Kampf for Lebensraum,a popular topic in Germany from before the Great War. The motivation was that the Japanese thought that they were unable to support a population which was increasing annually.They started their living space expansion in 1910 when they annexed Korea,then Manchuria in 1931 and when other world powers became aware of the risk of war,they set about expanding their empire in China in 1937.

    When Yamamoto became C in C of the Japanese Navy in 1939,the motivation to expand was at a peak and became an obsession with the Japanese leadership.It would be sold to the nations overrun who were anxious for independence from the Western colonialists as the South East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere...a common good to all in the area it declared.It would also fulfil the Japanese foreign policy of evicting the Western colonialists from the Asian Pacific,a long standing Japanese ambition.

    When France and the Holland were overrun, expansion became feasible policy and the deep military thinking became rooted.By June 1940,the Japanese had started Operational Research into driving into Malaya,the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines even though the outcome would result in war with the US, Britain and Holland (government in exile.) By July 1940 this was accepted but there was a question in Yamomoto's mind.He was aware of the huge US programme of naval construction and the threat from the eastern flank to the Japanese expansion of the US fleet based at Pearl Harbour,a threat that he did not accept as potential against the Japanese homeland. Yamamota shared his thoughts with Admiral Kosokia,a close friend, "If we are ordered to fight the US,we might be able to score a runaway victory and hold our own for six months or a year " then he thought, in the second year the US would increase its strength and there was only one way to secure the eastern flank for expansion and that was to destroy the US fleet at Pearl Harbour before it left its base.

    As for a strike against the Dutch East Indies,it would have been a difficult task for the Japanese in terms of logistics with the European powers presence in the area and the US in the Philippines, although the US at the time did not wish to go to war to protect European colonial possessions. Meanwhile the Japanese had clearly shown their intentions as early as April 1940 with a move by the Japanese 4th Fleet to the Palau Islands in the Western Pacific (formerly a German possession but mandated to Japan after Versailles by the League of Nations) in order to move against the Dutch East Indies and to prevent any power taking the Palau Islands.

    There was a great deal of diplomatic activity taking place between the US and Japan at the time with Great Britain and France not in a position to resist the demands of the Japanese.In June 1940,France was instructed to close the road from Hanoi to China and Britain was ordered to close the Burma Road where 3000 tons/month were being supplied from Lashio in Burma to Chungking in China which represented a lifeline for Chinese resistance against the Japanese invader.This was in addition to the demand by the Japanese to close the border between Hong Kong and China with the threat that failure to close off the Burma Road would result in the Japanese seizure of Hong Kong.

    In early July 1940,the Burma Road was closed despite WSC appealing to Roosevelt to intervene...the US naval strength was such that they could not afford to come to the aid of Britain with a presence of the Pacific fleet in Singapore and leave the door open to the Japanese in the Pacific. WSC realised that the Japanese were not bluffing and thinking that Britain could not afford a war on two fronts,acted and on 12 July 1940,the Burma Road was closed.

    Overall the Japanese could not take the Dutch East Indies in the assessment by Yamomoto unless they first eliminated US naval power in the Pacific.Then as Yamamoto thought,it would be a short term gain until the US economy was transformed for war.It was a gamble which started to stall when the Japanese expansion peaked midway through 1942.History went on to prove Yamamoto was correct.
     
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  10. Robert-w

    Robert-w Banned

    You've missed the most important factor of all - the stalemate in China. The big territorial gains were supposed to be there. The early overwhelming victories and sweeping territorial gains had ceased. The weakness in Japanese logistics was making itself felt. The IJA was reporting that merely to hold what they had taken much less gain more would take a major input of material resources. However US sanctions in response to the China adventure meant that Japan had access to less resource through trade. The only option was to take a leaf out of the German book and loot conquered territory. Japanese expansion from Dec 1941 was about resources not land -tin and rubber from Malaya but above all oil from the Dutch East Indies.Land was available in China if they could gain the materials for conquest.

    What has always struck me as odd is the seemingly complete lack of an end game. For Japan to win or even avoid complete defeat the USA would have to be brought to the negotiation table and yet nothing in Japanese policy seems to have been aimed at bringing this about. Even Hitler had ideas about how the Allies might be brought to negotiate. As the war continued they became increasingly unrealistic and improbable but he had some. The Japanese appear to have had none. Even if Pearl Harbour or Midway had taken out the carriers as well - an invasion of the US mainland could not be realistically threatened, Japan could not isolate the USA, seriously threaten her commerce or threaten to rain down wonder weapons. How did they expect to end the war?
     
    Last edited: Feb 16, 2020
  11. Harry Ree

    Harry Ree Very Senior Member

    Now why is this "the most important factor of all...the stalemate in China".You have obviously misread the original question as Post #1.
     
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  12. timuk

    timuk Well-Known Member

    I agree with Harry's #9. At this time Japan had no further interest in expanding it's territorial gains in China and here was more worried about the reaction of the Soviets.
    Japan, seriously short of natural resources conceived the plan, under the disguise of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Scheme to expand south with the prime aim of obtaining the oil and other resources in the Netherlands East Indies. Japan realised that their only chance of success was to make lightning strikes at the British in Malaya and Singapore and to disable the US Pacific Fleet. The occupation of French Indo-China was to reduce the distance and be able to establish bases and manpower closer to Malaya. Malaya's rubber and tin resources were a secondary aim and a bonus to the prime aim of obtaining oil. There was never any intention at this time to occupy the NEI. In fact as they occupied French Indo-China they were in negotiation with the NEI (probably a devious and misleading diversion) for the supply of oil.
    The end game was that having carried out their lightning strikes, which they achieved quite spectacularly, there would then be a lull in which they could build up the defences of their occupied territories. By then they assumed/hoped that the US and Britain would abandon their interest in the area (the Dutch now being out of the equation) and come to a peace settlement.

    Tim
     
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  13. Robert-w

    Robert-w Banned

    What is your evidence for this?
     
  14. MarcPh

    MarcPh Member

    Great discussion. Here is the original question below for everyone. Perhaps I phrased it poorly.

    Perhaps I also misunderstood some of your kind responses. I don't see how the different political situations between Vichy and the Dutch government in exile could have made any difference. Both countries were occupied and that is all that matters regarding this question. The Germans would not have lifted a finger to help the Japanese at this time of the war. In fact, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan rather screwed each other over in their relations with the USSR (Soviet/Japanese Non-Aggression Pact 1941, Ribbentrop/Molotov treaty 1939). Could the reason that that Dutch were able to keep the Dutch East Indies out of Japan's clutches before Pearl Harbor (where France failed) be simply a matter of determination? Both the French and Dutch military positions were equally hopeless in Asia. Please correct me if I'm understanding your comments incorrectly.


    In September 1940, the Japanese military took advantage of the German occupation of France to occupy French Indochina without a military conflict.
    Why didn't the Japanese take advantage of the German occupation of the Netherlands in order to occupy Dutch Indonesia so that they could grab the oil reserves there?


    Cheers

    Marc
     
  15. Harry Ree

    Harry Ree Very Senior Member

    Tim,

    It's interesting to look up the diplomatic overtures between the US and Japan.The final Japanese demand on 20 November 1941 arising from the Japanese Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941 caused Secretary of State Cordell Hull to declare "It was an ultimatum......the commitments we should have to make were virtually a surrender".His reaction was to work out a counter proposal and offer a three month modus vivendi which would tide both parties over while talks continued.

    Hull's proposal was that Japan should withdraw from southern Indo China and reduce her forces in northern Indo China to 25000 men.In return,the US would agree to a limited resumption of trade...petroleum but for civilian use only,food, medical supplies and raw cotton (other information refers to oil,iron ore,rubber and scrap steel) Meanwhile all US restrictions on Japanese imports would be lifted. Further, Hull through the State Department would urge Britain,Australia and the Dutch East Indies to adopt similar measures.

    Chiang Kai-sheck was outraged by the Burma Road being closed but even more at the Hull proposals. As it was it would never be known if the Japanese would be open to the proposition.
    The Chinese leader took both FDR and WSC to task over the proposal and even the British Cabinet showed signs of unease.Dalton recorded in his diary....a Munich in the Far East.
    There was also a violent meeting in Washington between T V Soong,Chiang Kai-sheck's brother in law,the Chinese Ambassador Professor Hu Shih and FDR who alarmed and attempting to cool the meeting said to Soong "Don't take your shirt off "

    During the Pacific war there were many occasions when the Japanese had a sounding for peace.After Midway some Admirals began to think about a negotiated peace but in the army such thoughts were rarely entertained.The Navy went as far as instructing Admiral Tagaki to conduct a survey of the war in the summer of 1943.He concluded that Japan must sue for peace if US forces took the Solomons. The islands fell by the end of 1943 but Tagaki still could not release his findings in writing for fear of defeatism or worse still, treason.His verdict on the adverse status of the war was spread by word of mouth to individuals.
     
    Last edited: Feb 17, 2020
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  16. timuk

    timuk Well-Known Member

    To elaborate on answers already given to your question.
    The Vichy Government was at war with Britain. The Vichy French fought the British elsewhere, notably in Syria (1941) and later the British and Americans in North Africa (1942). The Vichy French were almost told by the Germans to allow the Japanese into French Indo-China. Not so with the NEI. Despite the Netherlands being occupied there was still a Dutch Government in exile firmly on the British side and the Dutch still had a sizable army defending Borneo, Sumatra and Java. Royal Netherlands East Indies Army - Wikipedia The Japanese could not simple walk in to the NEI as they did in Indo-China. It would have meant a sizeable invasion with the British on one flank and the US on the other - they simply were not ready for such an undertaking.

    Tim
     
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  17. MarcPh

    MarcPh Member

     
  18. MarcPh

    MarcPh Member

    Hey guys,

    Thanks for the great conversation. I think that I have found at least part of the answer to my original question by accident. I happen to be listening to Antony Beevor's Second World War book on youtube (some 36 hours long). And Beevor just happened to talk about this exact topic; why the Japanese took over Indochina and not Indonesia before Pearl Harbor.

    Beevor says that the Japanese were motivated to closing off supplies to the Chinese Nationalists and taking over French Indochina did that in part. This makes sense because at this point the main Japanese military efforts were in China and they were frustrated by how long it was taking due to unforeseen Chinese resistance. Beevor also mentions that the Japanese wanted to gain a base in southern Asia for a possible southern thrust which they ended up doing.

    I also know that they were interested in the rubber and rice that they could procure from Indochina as well.

    I've ordered Beevor's book from the library so I'll follow up with the exact quotation with page number later if anyone is interested.

    Cheers

    Marc
     

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