Look at Ger throwing out a Ten Dollar Word like he uses in everyday language.:p My esteeemed colleague from across the oceans has obviously never heard my ruminations on a veritable cornucopia of subjects. Why, it is my belief that one should engage in discourse on a plethora of subjects.........sorry!!
Look at Ger throwing out a Ten Dollar Word like he uses in everyday language.:p "I never use a word like Metropolis, when for the same money, I can use City" (Hope I've quoted Mark Twain correctly) Some scans from David Kahn's 1968 book The Codebreakers, might be of interest: http://www.********.co.uk/WW2talk/kahn598.jpg http://www.********.co.uk/WW2talk/kahn599a.jpg http://www.********.co.uk/WW2talk/kahn599b.jpg
Quote by GH; "BTW, there's nothing wrong with A-58's post. It is a "what if" scenario, an extremely well-worded one at that but still, one nonetheless. A-58 feel free to call it as you see it." Thanks for the support Ger. Glad to help out. Some of us "regular Joe's" are behind you all the way!
Afternoon chaps, Deleted some bickering. Carry on, no more discussion of that required - I believe Yamamoto was the theme. Hohum, ~A
I admit I haven't read each and every post on this subject, but it is my understanding that the Yamamoto mission was only "bumped" up the chain of command all the way to FDR due to one concern. Should we go ahead with this operation, and risk alerting the Japanese to the fact we had broken their latest version of JN25-B ? If they tumbled to this, would they alter their codes so drastically we wouldn't be able to break them again? It helped in the decision when it was discovered through the British intercepts at Blechley Park that the Nazis were shipping a number of Enigma machines to Japan. Those machines never arrived in Japan before the war was over, but the Germans were willing to share them if asked. This seemed to imply that the risk was worth taking, and removing Yamamoto wasn't simply a "commander" removed either. It would be a psychological blow to the people who felt he could do no wrong, and was invincible. They Japanese had voiced concern (rightly so) that the allies had broken their military codes, but they never tumbled to the fact we had also broken their diplomatic code before Pearl Harbor. Too bad they didn't talk about the attack on Hawaii in that code! At anyrate, it wasn't just that killing Yamamoto might be questionable, or that a better man might replace him. It couldn't be illegal, nor an assassination under the rules of war as any officer in uniform on the field of contest is fair game. That the replacement for Yamamoto might be a better or worse man didn't come into play. He too would have been dealt with in turn. I believe it was the risk of alerting the Japanese of their code vulnerablitiy that caused the consternation in the Pacific command structure. None really wanted to take this possible action and loose their code intercept ability on their own. With an "OK" from FDR, they themselves were cleared. Like it or not CYA is and always has been SOP.
It helped in the decision when it was discovered through the British intercepts at Blechley Park that the Nazis were shipping a number of Enigma machines to Japan. Those machines never arrived in Japan before the war was over, but the Germans were willing to share them if asked. Great answer and thank you. As a follow up, why did this help with the decision? Thanks, Bob
Great answer and thank you. As a follow up, why did this help with the decision? Thanks, Bob I would think that the knowledge that the Japanese might change to the Enigma machine if they suspected their own codes had been broken made the decision easier. That would be because they would drop a code they suspected we (allies) had broken, for another which was also broken. In addition, to ensure that the Japanese didn't figure out that we had broken one of their codes, combat patrols continued to be flown over the area after the shoot down, so the Japanese would believe it to be coincidence that he (Yamamoto) met up with a flight of P-38s! Fortunately, the Japanese did not believe that the inspection information came from a Naval JN-25 B intercept. Unknown to the American code breakers, apparently, some of that same information was also sent in a low level Japanese Army code which the Japanese themselves thought was the source of the inspection information. The continued "scouting flights" and the use of the low level Army code put the HQ of Japan at ease, and JN-25 B remained in use, and the Enigma machines were only sent at the end of the war and never used. The first news of Yamamoto’s demise was published in Time magazine’s May 31st, 1943 edition, with no mention of how he was intercepted. See: World Battlefronts: CASUALTIES: Thank You, Mr. Yamamoto - TIME Of course as it was a "war time" publication, he (Yamamoto) is a rather maligned personage, and mis-represented as anti-American. This wasn’t wholly true, Yamamoto admired the American people and had advised to not attack them. When his advice was suppressed and/or ignored he (as a good soldier) devised the best plan he could for the attack, but warned the Japanese militarists that he could only foresee about six months of successes, and if the war wasn’t concluded by then it would be lost.
This wasn’t wholly true, Yamamoto admired the American people and had advised to not attack them. When his advice was suppressed and/or ignored he (as a good soldier) devised the best plan he could for the attack, but warned the Japanese militarists that he could only foresee about six months of successes, and if the war wasn’t concluded by then it would be lost. I just read that he was disappointed in the results of Pearl Harbor and felt that Nagumo should have launch another wave to hit the fuel facilities, the repair facilities and the submarine docks. Apparently he realized where Japan was headed immediately after Pearl Harbor while the rest of the country went bonkers with emotion. Yamamoto realized that we still had our carriers and the fuel for them to sail. He knew the potential of aircraft carriers while most of the upper level Naval staff, including Nagumo, still believed in battleships. And of course, the battleships were not really sunk, were they? How correct he was!
Bob G., one must remember that the two men disliked each other intensely. Anything Yamamoto said about Nagumo after Pearl Harbor must be taken with a HUGE helping of salt. For a short essay on their history; goto: Nihon Kaigun: Chuichi Nagumo There were messages between the two which showed they not only didn't trust one another, they thought the other might have ulterior motives in the suggestions.
I know this thread is old, but I found a fairly good paper about the moral aspects of the decision to kill Yamamoto. http://www.wou.edu/las/socsci/history/kittel499paper.doc
I admit I haven't read each and every post on this subject, but it is my understanding that the Yamamoto mission was only "bumped" up the chain of command all the way to FDR due to one concern. Should we go ahead with this operation, and risk alerting the Japanese to the fact we had broken their latest version of JN25B? I would have thought they might have gotten wise to our code breaking after the Midway battle.
I would have thought they might have gotten wise to our code breaking after the Midway battle. I think you are correct on this assumption.Never ever run the risk of highlighting the fact that you have knowledge of the enemy's thinking by taking advantage of an insight to his intelligence for anything but strategic advantage.Always ensure that any advantage you take is worth the risk of the relevation of your intelligence source.I am sure that was the thinking behind the decision to take advantage of removing an outstanding military enemy opponent. Subordinates may have potential but that potential is only revealed if they are thrust into a higher position.Some are sucessful,some not but the prosecution of war involves the elimination of the leadership in order to negate the enemy's effectiveness.The successors are put into the leadership focus when they attain leadership and not as subordinates.As leaders they make the strategic decisions,something that subordinates are not enpowered to initiate.
