I've read much about RAF and USAAF bomber targeting policy and target selection in NW Europe but is there some accessible source on Luftwaffe targeting over Britain? How were targets selected? Was there any targets of opportunity policy? Or was every raid 'scripted' (even if they didn't always go to script)?
for info Luftwaffe Bombing Tactics on the U.K. during World War 2 German Operation Steinbeck 1944 'Mini Blitz' https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/med...andsociety/bombing/THE_BOMBING_OF_BRITAIN.pdf
Thanks - but I'm looking for something more precise. For examplle a factory making engineering parts was bombed in Worcester, apparently by a single bomber. How would that target have been selected and by whom? What was the sort of criteria that made it chosen rather than another similar sized factory making machine tools for aircraft manufacture not far away? Where did the Luftwaffe get its intelligence from? Many factories bombed had not been in war production before Beaverbrook started dispersing manufacture in October 1940. There must have been some method for drawing up the target list for each day/night and then allocating aircraft and crews to the targets - but what was it? Also were alternative targets given?
a bit more here about targeting London Map revealing Germany's WWII bombing targets is discovered | Daily Mail Online https://www.bristol.ac.uk/Depts/History/bristolrecordsociety/publications/bha085.pdf
Another source for part of the question is here: Luftwaffe Aerial Archive of Great Britain & Ireland 1939 - 1942 - Nigel J Clarke Publications. "Luftwaffe Aerial Archive of Great Britain & Ireland" 1939 - 1942 Nigel Clarke Publications - Luftwaffe as aerial reconnaissance played a large role in target selection and the problems with photo interpretation caused some of the issues the Luftwaffe faced. See also here: Luftwaffe Air Intelligence During the Battle of Britain HyperWar: The Battle of Britain--A German Perspective [Addendum/Appendices] which has an overview on Target Selection For a more detailed study see here: Numbered USAF Historical Studies 151-200 scroll down to 186 for the following study which can be downloaded in pdf format for free: The System of Target Selection Applied by the German Air Force in World War II, by Paul D. Deichmann (1956)
Further it should be remembered that Military Attaches were at every opportunity discharging the role of collecting intelligence in the host country gleaning it from any source available. Prewar, the British SIS had an intelligence conduit from intelligence officers masquerading as "Passport Control Officers" within the diplomatic service. Just as the Germans had prewar plans for air attacks on GB,the SIS from their intelligence sources had plans envisaged for attacks on the German electricity networks,rail,road, port communications,naval installations and industrial centres.When war was declared and entered the phase known as the phoney war,the RAF were restricted to raiding naval installations and not the German mainland...an official policy from Kingsley- Wood,Minister for Air, at the time,... was that German industry was "private property" As far back as 1937,the Air Ministry recognised the importance of German dams,principally the Mohne and the Sorpe but had not a weapon developed to destroy them.The Germans for their part,in 1940, had also dams in mind for planned targets and considered attacking the Derwent and Howden dams. Intelligence on such civil engineering projects and other infrastructure developments such as power plants of long standing were not classified and would be published in engineering publications and the like.All part of the understanding of the industrial heart that would contribute to the potential enemy's war economy.
None of which answers the question -how did the Germans target factories that were not in existence in Sept 1939?
I would assume as Harry has pointed out and the use of a spy network to identify the likely buildings used as the war progressed plus pot luck on many occasions.
Germany did not have a spy network in Britain - all their agents were turned. See The Double Cross System
Dolfa Thrile continued his spying in the UK throughout the war and it only came to light in the 1990s when he died. He used 19th century maps like the one below to pin point his targets
Mostly they did not. The fact that bombs fell on a factory in Worcester making important components does not mean that:- The bomber aimed for that target. or that The Germans knew what was the factory made. E.g. A US bombing raid in late 1943 imposed a significant delay on the V1 cruise missile program through damage caused to the factory that manufactured gyroscopes. The bombers were not aiming for that factory, nor did they know its significance.
No sorry that's specious In your example the factory was in an industrial complex that got bombed - in my example the raid was made by a single bomber on a factory not in an industrial complex. I can find similar examples
As pointed out the (Masterman's) Double Cross system resulted in that German spies were in control of the British and to satisfy the Abwehr investment there were deceptions arranged where it was necessary to illustrate that "sabotage" was being carried out.(I would think that an unarrested spy would have been in a position to blow the Double Cross system with to be expected communication with his Abwehr controllers.) Additionally the aircraft shadow factories were planned before the war in 1938 and these locations were not unknown to the general public... the shadow factory at West Bromwich was subject to a Luftwaffe raid in September 1940 but little damage was done while the main Spitfire factories at Woolston and Itchen were hit hard.The Southampton area would be well known for its Supermarine association with the Schneider Trophy. It might well be that the single factory hit by the Luftwaffe was a lone raider with no planning focus on the factory.Any raider brought down in the area might point to the operation detail of the raid.If the factory was known to the Germans to have some strategic value, then it would be expected that there would be more than one bomber involved to the target. To follow on in the same vein of question...how did the Luftwaffe bomb airfields which were not laid down at the start of the war?...the answer is that up to date intelligence depended equally on aerial surveillance and and the advantage of any examples of a lax approach to interrogation of POWs... RAF POWs giving titbits of information that could be built up to create a portfolio of use to the enemy, beyond name, number and rank.
Grasping at straws I think. Have you any evidence that German agents under British control actually gave away targets? I suspect not. Given the dates of some of the raids I am interested in it would seem very doubtful that enough intelligence was gathered from downed RAF aircrew for targeting. And the raiders were not brought down. It was not Luftwaffe policy to send out aircraft looking targets of opportunity unless someone has real evidence to the contrary - hence my original question. .One possible source occurs to me - Soviet agents were definitely at large in Britain - the Cambridge ring being just the top end and prior to mid 1941 the USSR was actively assisting Germany but I wouldant a lot more evidence before claiming this as more than a speculation.
Dilip Sarkar’s take on the MECO raid with his view on why it was selected New theory reveals how bomber 'deliberately targeted' Meco factory in World War Two
I refer you to my remarks. There was no automatic relationship between cause and effect. Just because bombs hit something important it did not mean that the enemy either aimed for that target or knew it was there. Plenty of people were killed when a bomber jettisoned its bombs or aimed at as a target of opportunity when they could not find their objective. Plenty of Britons were casualties from AA splinters and at least some of the casualties allegedly from German strafing were the misses from British fighters engaging a low flying bomber. When exactly was this factory targeted? What was its location? Let us see if we can connect it to a known raid.
I was referring to Dolfa Thrile and discounting any input from a German intelligence gatherer,just as I would for any connection with a Soviet network which you now put forward..Masterman ensured that captured German agents were isolated from each other and any communication from them with the Abwehr was through the British playing their wireless game. If you research the background to the experience of RAF POWs and the instances of information given to their interrogators through idle chatter....the first line of approach was the supposed Red Cross form to fill in. exchanges which interrogators were able to surprise subsequent POWs with squadron personality detail such as the identity of the home airfield the squadron commander and the even naming of a favourite local pub.That was a reference to intelligence on any military infrastructure built after the state of the war.From this threat to military security, the RAF in particular ensured that aircrew were briefed on the pitfalls of falling into interrogation traps,especially immediately after capture where their vulnerability could be easily exploited.(Have a good read of Guy Gibson's "Enemy Coast Ahead" of the interrogation of RAF POWs and the ensuing propaganda generated from it...and that took place early in the war when he was on No 83 Squadron at Scampton) Orwell's post provides revealing information on the target by mentioning the company Meco. It was widely known that industry was compelled to be drawn into the war economy and directed as required to its need. Meco immediately drew my attention for I am aware that they were the manufacturers of the coal cutting machine,the Meco Moore...well known in mining circles,requiring a team to operate it. Meco had been in business manufacturing mining equipment well before the war and had a world wide market.The important aspect of this is that commercial information about the firm would likely to be held in trade journals associated in mining equipment..,Germany had and still does have a large coal industry and it might be that Meco had commercial sales to German colliery owners....a useful source of information on an enemy's heavy industry. Perhaps it may contributes to any notion of targeting by the enemy of a factory involved in the war economy.Strange that Meco is not referenced by advertisement in The Colliery Year Book,Coal Trades Directory 1944.
