Tom I wouldn't worry to much look at date the first post on this thread was made. 14-03-2005, 04:18 PM
Owen - seldom look at the dates - just get fired up at so little knowledge of the Italian campaign in general Cheers
Tom, have you seen or read FM Lord Carver's book on the Italian Campaign? It's part of the Imperial War Museum's collection of books on WW2 and it's mainly comprised of recollections from veterans which are stored in the IWM archives. It's a little light on analysis but a fine resource nonetheless.
Gomyway- yes I have read that account - and many others- but still I have to cling to John Ellis' Cassino - Fred Majdalany and Matthew Parkers versions as well as the Official account by the Canadian Lt.Col Nicholson as the best account of the whole campaign Cheers
I confess to being one of those nerds who is always dashing off letters to the Times. They rarely get published................. but nevertheless I keep them in an e-mail folder marked "Letters to the press" and occasionally browse through them to see what subjects have amused/annoyed me over the years. Such as this letter about Monte Cassino : Sir John Doughty’s salutary tale of his granddaughter asking “Who were the suffragettes” (Letters to the Editor 21st April) rang bells for me. I was recently round at a friends house, where I was paying my weekly visit to help him brush up his computer skills. He had a particular problem on his computer that needed a solution from the company that had sold him the system and I found myself, on his behalf, chatting on the phone with a British computer expert. When the expert proceeded to operate the PC by remote control, he was interested to see that the screen saver showed my friend visiting a war cemetery. I pointed out that the photo displayed was that my friend re-visiting the CWGC Cemetery at Cassino and mentioned that he and I had both served there in the same Light Ack-Ack unit . The conversation then went something like this: Expert: Where did you say that was? Me: Cassino Expert: Where's that? Me: May I ask how old you are? Expert: Thirty-nine Me: Are you seriously telling me that you've never heard of Cassino? Expert: No, where is it Me: Italy.... and tell me, did you not have any relatives who served in WW2? Expert: Yes, one in the Navy and one in the RAF, but they have both since passed away. I got him to promise me that he would look up "Cassino" on the internet after he had put the computer problem to rights and then when he eventually hung up my friend and I simply stared at each other. Please tell me that other people of a similar age group have heard of Cassino, or am I asking too much ? Ron Goldstein
'The further we look back, the further forward we can see,WS Churchill. The words of a Statesman. today's politicians have no desire to look back or for others to do so. An ignorance of history allows our less than illustrious leaders to revisit the same old mistakes. Simonides after the battle of Thermopylae: Go, tell the Spartans thou passest by, that faithful to their precepts - here we lay.
Wills and Ron. I run battlefield tours/studies to Cassino and Anzio and I can assure you that there is a lot of interest in both these key battles of the Italian Campaign. My crusade is to educate participants in how these battles were fought rather than to just have a delightful tour of the beautifually kept CWGC cemeteries. Whilst the cemeteries are very important, they do not tell the whole story. FdeP
Gomyway- yes I have read that account - and many others- but still I have to cling to John Ellis' Cassino - Fred Majdalany and Matthew Parkers versions as well as the Official account by the Canadian Lt.Col Nicholson as the best account of the whole campaign Cheers Thanks, I wondered what you thought of the book really. I used to have a book that dealt solely with Cassino (not by Ellis) but that's long since disappeared sadly.
Please tell me that other people of a similar age group have heard of Cassino, or am I asking too much ? Ron Goldstein Sadly Joe Public knows little outside of what they see on the television. So unless it's the Battle of Britain, D-Day or Arnhem (or the Nazi wunderwaffe) the events of WW2 are shrouded in the mists of time. Cassino, Kohima, even El Alamein, are only known to some and the details to but a small percentage of them.
Gomyway- yes I have read that account - and many others- but still I have to cling to John Ellis' Cassino - Fred Majdalany and Matthew Parkers versions as well as the Official account by the Canadian Lt.Col Nicholson as the best account of the whole campaign Cheers Thanks to you and others on here for pointing me towards reading material re: Cassino. Always grateful for being pointed towards accurate reading material - theres so much cr@p in print these days. :p
Reme - It's not the print that I worry about - as they don't seem to read books anymore- it's the rubbish that spews out of the Tv and games that does the damage to history - a man gets killed - next frame - he is up again and firing a million bullets without re-loading ...... MINDEN - It's exactly how and why those battles were fought - that filled those beautiful cemeteries -try to read Stan Scislowski's account of his "Return to Cassino" before your next tour .... Cheers
Back on topic, a bit. Difficult to blame Clark for what happened during the battles for Monte Cassino. It was, after all, a perfect position for the Germans to fortify and hold against anything the Allies chose to throw at them. The Anzio landing might have successfully outflanked the German defences south-east of Rome but a combination of Allied caution and the rapidity of the German reaction put paid to that. Clark's conduct of the final breakout is, at best, questionable and his subsequent promotion to command 15th Army Group one of the the least justifiable in military history.
GOMYWAY YOU might think it's difficult to blame Clark for the battles for Cassino - BUT I certainly don't - it was Clark who set the British Xth Corps into the suicidal advance through the Mignano Gap - it was Clark who nearly destroyed his own 36h Texas Division at San Pietro en Fine - it was Clark who brought back the three French Divisons from nearly cutting the Hwy 6 beyond Cassino to help out his 34th Divison which was too close to the Monastery- and thus set the scene for the next three battles- then it was the Kiwi's and 4th Indians turn to have TWO battles for Cassino- before the whole of 8th Army moved over to finally do the job-and therein lies another myth - misconception - half truth- whatever you want to call it rather than the allied caution- meaning 8th army caution through the Liri valley. That is the most insulting comment I have heard in years and I still object to it as I recall the originator- Gen Juin of the French Corps.....let me set the scene - his four Divisions set off from the Xth Corps bridgehead over the Garilgliano River - over the basically UNDEFENDED Arunci Mountains - and were very fast in covering the distance to the head of the Lirl Valley - to complain that the 8th Army were very slow. Now that slow 8th Army at that same time consisted of the 6th Armoured Div - 4th Inf div -78th Div -8th Indian Div - 1st Canadian Div with 25th tank bde - Polish Div - all butting their heads on the strongest part of that whole Gustav Line which consisted of the Rapido river - with NO bridges - and two main lines of very strong defences in depth - this took time to overcome ! Now if you know anything about warfare - you might appreciate that it is much easier to run through an open door- rather than be faced with umpteen doors which are double locked- bolted and barred - question of time really Clark should have been fired for his disobedience at Anzio but as someone said - he was smotherd in Teflon Clark did not mastermind the spring offensive which ended the war on the Po river - but Gen. Mcreery of the 8th army - so think again about this mans actions Cheers
Cheers Tom, it's been a while since I looked at the Cassino battles in any real detail so I can only relate my impressions from what I remember. None of the 'major players' seem to emerge with much credit. Alexander seems to have been more 'hands on' than he had been since the disastrous Burma campaign and was about as effective. Neither Clark nor Leese seem to have shown much imagination and the corps commanders appear to have been content to slug it out. In my opinion the terrain and the German defences pretty much guaranteed that it was going to be a slog and historically few leading commanders have demonstrated an ability to get around such situations. Which is not to say that Clark was anything like 'a leading commander', his conduct of the Anzio breakout up to the capture of Rome arguably cost the Allies thousands of killed and wounded as German troops slipped away northwards. Had Alexander been a more forceful general Clark might have paid a penalty for his insubordination but the administrative skills that Alex possessed (and that made him and Montgomery such a good team) didn't extend to giving an American subordinate the kind of dressing down he deserved. McCreery was a very competent commander as was Truscott. Clark might have been fortunate to have them leading his armies compared to what Alex had to deal with in the first half of 1944.
GOMYWAY You appear to have forgotten that Alex was sufficiently "forceful" in saving the Army in Burma -and the BEF- but when asked what he was to do about Clark's disobedience - he very angrily asked 'What can I do" you must recall that Clark was very well connected all the way to George Marshal.....Alex was not Alanbrooke who could sort out Marshal and Eisenhower - and did - often. Alex and Monty didn't make a team in the desert- Monty told him what he wanted - Alex arranged it.. You are right that Clark was better served with Truscott and McCreery than Alex was with Leese- a great Corps Commander - but Clark had never even commanded a Corps Cheers
I hadn't forgotten Burma, Alex wasn't exactly competent, trying to hold what blatantly couldn't be held and in the end being bailed out by some particularly good subordinates. He made a good team with Montgomery because he was an excellent administrator and an accomplished diplomat whilst Montgomery was a superb field commander who struggled when dealing with issues outside that - each was strong where the other was weak, a key element in a team. If Brooke could 'sort out' Eisenhower and Marshall (and that's a big 'if') then Alex could have appealed to him. Since the US Army believed that any changes in command had to come from two levels higher than the one being changed it would have had to come from Marshall. When Montgomery was considering the position of Courtney Hodges during the Battle of the Bulge he knew that any decision would have to come from Eisenhower, not for political reasons but because that was how the chain of command operated.
GOMYWAY - No IF or Ands about it - Alanbrooke did sort out both Marshal and Eisenhower- read Gen.David Fraser's - "Alanbrooke" by June '44 Alex knew he couldn't do anything about Clark - as no one could as it was alleged that Clark was a relative of Marshal's - there may be truth in that .. Cheers
Gomyway. The failure of Cassino 1 is entirely attributable to Clark. It was rushed and ill considered. Clark liked the broad front approach and he adopted this at Cassino 1 at a time when he did not have the manpower for such an approach. X (BR) Corps broke through on the coast on 17 Jan 44 and established a sizeable bridgehead over the River Garigliano. However, instead of reinforcing success by throwing in 36 US Inf Div to maintain the momentum, he chose to commit that Div much further inland just below Cassino at the entrance to the Liri valley on 20 Jan 44. In this action alone, he failed to apply two of the five principles of the offence - maintenance of momentum and concentration of force. If he had immediately committed 36 US Inf Div or 34 US Inf Div on the Garigliano when X (BR) Corps had achieved their success, it is likely that the bridgehead could have been expanded before Kesselring's two mobile reserve Pz Gren Divs reached the scene. When the breakthrough did come in May 44, it was at precisely this location down on the coast that the Gustav Line was cut first. Also, during Cassino 1, even after the failure of 46 BR Inf Div to seize Sant Ambroglio on 19 Jan 44, he still insisted that 36 US Inf Div attack across the Rapido. They did as ordered but were observed from both their flanks. Clark made a series of catastrophic tactical errors at Cassino 1. FdeP
Tom. MINDEN - It's exactly how and why those battles were fought - that filled those beautiful cemeteries -try to read Stan Scislowski's account of his "Return to Cassino" before your next tour .... Interestingly, he is continually referred to in James Holland's 'Italy's Sorrow' which I am reading at the moment. Stan S's book is next on my list. FdeP
GOMYWAY - No IF or Ands about it - Alanbrooke did sort out both Marshal and Eisenhower- read Gen.David Fraser's - "Alanbrooke" by June '44 Alex knew he couldn't do anything about Clark - as no one could as it was alleged that Clark was a relative of Marshal's - there may be truth in that .. Cheers I know Brooke was instrumental in persuading the Americans to postpone their plans for an invasion of France in 1942 and again in1943. Come 1944, which is where we're at, Brooke's, and Britain's generally, influence over the course of the war was diminishing, much to Brooke's frustration, hence my 'big if'. Clarke was no relative of Marshall to my knowledge. What I did discover, reading through the references to Clark in 'Brute Force' by John Ellis, was that the decision to promote Clark was largely a British one as, following the death of Dill, Wilson took over from Dill leaving Alexander to be promoted to his place. Clark was the British preferred choice for promotion to command of 15th AG. The failure of Cassino 1 is entirely attributable to Clark. It was rushed and ill considered. Clark liked the broad front approach and he adopted this at Cassino 1 at a time when he did not have the manpower for such an approach. Hmmmmm, I'd have to question this. Carver points to the disorganised nature of Alexander's HQ and the informal manner in which he exercised his command responsibilities. A 'broad front' approach would require Alexander's permission suggesting that either a) he was at least as responsible as Clark or b) he was either unwilling or unable to exercise his authority again making him at least equally responsible. Ellis doesn't distinguish between Clark, Alexander or Leese when talking about the aspects of the Italian campaign all three men were involved in. All that said I do need to read up on the Cassino and Anzio battles so take the above as more of a question than a definitive statement.B)
