Nature of German actions after Veritable

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Chris C, Jan 6, 2022.

  1. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    I was going to write "operations" rather than "actions"... but anyway.

    The general impression or conception I have is that after the Battle of the Bulge and the fighting during February the Germans had very little armour left. Am I right in thinking they shifted after that to more defensive operations like they conducted in Italy? i.e. repeated defences followed by fading back at night etc, but with no counter-attacking? Or did they continue to perform counter-attacks, whether small or large scale? With or without armour?
     
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  2. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    I am not very familiar with operations in that stage of the war, but the counter-attack was a standard part of German doctrine and from what little I know they continued to practice it with whatever means were available--the problem of course being that by that stage of the war their means were very limited. The Allies faced some German counter-attacks in PLUNDER, I don't know in what strength but obviously not strong enough to make a difference. People often criticize VARSITY as an unnecessary operation but it was undertaken at least in part to take some bridges whose seizure could block German counterattacks. This would protect the PLUNDER bridgehead, and in terms of this objective VARSITY was successful. The Germans did mount some pretty serious counterattacks against the Remagen bridgehead, using all of part of three panzer divisions. These divisions were all weak, though, so once again the attacks got nowhere. By the way, even after the Bulge the Germans threw away much of what remained of their armor in a futile counteroffensive at Lake Balaton in Hungary. After that I don't think they mounted anything you could call a general counteroffensive, but smaller scale counter-attacks continued right up to the end. (Hitler was of course still demanding such attacks from Steiner and Wenck when the Soviets closed in on him.)
     
    Last edited: Jan 6, 2022
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  3. ltdan

    ltdan Nietenzähler

    Angriff ist die beste Verteidigung

    Since mid-44, operations had been severely limited by the lack of fuel. Later, the lack of personnel and equipment also had an ever increasing effect. But whenever somehow an opportunity arose, one still tried to intervene on the offensive
    As prominent examples I cite the Battle of Lauban in Silesia (March '45) and the "counteroffensive" of the XXXIX Panzer Corps at Brunswick (April '45).
    In both cases, these corps had the strength of one or two mechanized brigades, yet they were entrusted with (sometimes highly ambitious) operational tasks against enemy forces on Army level. The logistic base was so desolate that the units literally had to live out of the country
    In both cases, very limited temporal and local successes could still be achieved, but they had only tactical value.
    Quantitatively, this was long since no longer worth mentioning, considering the mass of enemy formations.
    But when 150 armored vehicles with fuel for 100km account for more than 50% of the heavy equipment still available at all of an entire Army group to form a operational center of gravity.....

    regards
    Olli
     
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  4. alberk

    alberk Well-Known Member

    Yes, "Varsity" helped to protect the bridgehead gained by 15th Scottish Division in "Operation Plunder". And it deepened the brigdehead within a few hours. But this tactical success came at a very high price for the two airborne divisions.

    As to German counter attacks: Most bridges across the Issel river were seized by the airborne, but one located at a farm called "Gervershof" was outside the area covered by "Varsity". This bridge was supposed to be taken by troops of 15th (S) Div. They encountered stiff resistance - the attempt in the evening of March 25th failed, the Germans held their ground west of the Issel. A German counterattack by infantry was attempted in the morning hours of March 26th - the troops belonged to "Kampfgruppe Norkus" which had marched towards the Allied bridgehead on March 24th. During the night of 25th/26th March they approached the Issel and were exposed to heavy Allied artillery fire shielding the Issel - driven by this they rushed across the rivulet and concented west of the Issel. At first covered by their own machine gun fire they started a frontal assault before dawn - accompanied by shouts of "hooray" - against the men of 6 KOSB. Juming from shell hole to shell hole they advanced. But when daylight came they were increasingly exposed to hostile fire coming from various directions - then Allied artillery fire increased again. At 7.30 AM this fire slackened and the attack was continued. There reportedly was fighting at close quarters. The fighting lasted for several hours and 6 KOSB again failed to take the bridge at Gervershof. However, they took 132 Germans as prisoners. In the afternoon of March 26th three companies of 6 RSF attacked the area held by the Germans, managed to overcome them and cross the Issel. "Kampfgruppe Norkus" had about 100 men killed on the 26th.

    This gives you an example what German counter measures looked like - mostly holding ground and then attempting desperate frontal attacks with little or no support by heavy weapons. The "hooray"-style attacks were a show of bravado and many of the (often very young and inexperienced) enlisted men were forced by their superiors at gun point to go along... More of this would have happened if the airborne units had not captured the other bridges. But it would not have changed the outcome.

    All this is based on eye witness accounts of former soldiers of "Kampfgruppe Norkus" which a local historian collected - I summarized what he wrote about it.
     
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  5. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    The SRY War Diary is littered with numerous references such as "the enemy counter-attacked" - in 1944 however by 1945 it is rather more that the enemy was "encountered", or has the SRY attacking and "counter-attacking" the Germans. Presumably counter-attacking an established position albeit possibly also counter-attacking a German attack.

    There is this though - 29th March 1945

    A Sqn at dawn moved up to support 5th Seaforths who had established a bridge head across the river Aa. Owing to bogging and mines they had difficulty in working through. 2 troops however succeeded in crossing and arrived in time to beat back a counter attack against the 5th Seaforths and recapture from the enemy their colonel and adjutant. B Sqn with 2 troops supported at first light 5 Cameronians who reached their objective during the night. Remainder supported the 2nd Seaforths who cleared the northbank of the ISSEL up to T-roads map ref 105617. 8th Armd Bde prepared to carry out operation Forward On. A and B Sqns concentrated in square map ref 0857, RHQ remained with 153 Bde with L.O. at 152 Bde. C Sqn during the afternoon placed in support of 154 Bde who were to attack DINXPERLOO that night. The recce troop were attached to C Sqn. No personnel or tank casualities during the day.
     
    Last edited: Jan 6, 2022
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  6. P-Squared

    P-Squared Well-Known Member

    I’m not sure where that general impression comes from. As far as I know, the Wehrmacht did not commit every tank it had to the Ardennes offensive. There were those involved in Op Norwind, for starters, though the two offensives overlapped each other. It was in the nature of the Wehrmacht (and it’s predecessors) to counterattack whenever possible. Also, tank production continued, despite the efforts of the bombers: for example, nearly 400 PzKpfw IVs, over 400 Panthers and approx 110 Tiger IIs were accepted into service in 1945. Many of those undoubtedly went to the Eastern Front, but I can’t believe that numbers didn’t go west.
     
  7. Juha

    Juha Junior Member

    After Battle of Bulge Germans transferred much of their armour and air force to the East. In early March they launched the Operation Spring Awakening in Hungary, using some 650 tanks and some 700 aircraft. The troops incl 6th SS Panzer Army, incl 1., 2., 9. and 12. SS-PzDivs.
     
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  8. JDKR

    JDKR Member

    While researching my book I came across many examples of counter-attacks mounted by German forces during April 1945:

    1-3 April - numerous infantry counter-attacks in the Ibbenbueren area against units of VIII Corps.
    4 April - Haltern 'counter-attack'. Although ordered by Hitler this attack was stillborn as there was insufficient fuel and ammunition for the assigned forces, however the intent was there.
    6 April - Kampfgruppe Schulze's counter-attack with Tigers and Panthers in the Lahde area on the Weser.
    6 April - Kampfgruppe Tischler counter-attack with dismounted infantry in the area of Leese on the Weser.
    10-11 April - Counter-attacks against 1 Cdo Bde's bridgehead on the right bank of the Aller at Essel. Mainly by marines but included support from Tiger F01.
    10 April - counter-attack by marines against 1/5 Welch at Rethem on the Aller.
    13/14 April - night and day counter-attacks by marines against 71 Inf Bde on the Aller's right bank.
    15-18 April - Panzerdivision Clausewitz counter-attacks using armour and infantry in the Uelzen area. This was arguably a meeting engagement set within the context of a counter-attack.
    19 April - counter-attack by marines against Guards Armoured Division units at Visselhoevede.
    21 April - infantry counter-attack in the Wistedt area against Guards Armoured Division units.
    26 April - counter-attack at Vahrendorf against 7th Armoured Division units. Attack included at least one StuG.

    The Germans often remained a determined foe to the last and rigorously applied their doctrine of mounting counter-attacks. This is a quote from a 19 April INTSUM in the Guards Armoured Division war diary:

    There is no doubt that these sailors fight like fury, and this afternoon’s battle in Visselhövede was a tough one at close quarters…The manner in which the marines that are still organized in properly controlled units have fought us during the last two days shows clearly enough that the Germans will remain formidable enemies as long as there are troops to lead and officers to lead them. This will hold good no matter how hopeless the situation may be, as few operations could have been more senseless and more costly in the sacrifice of soldiers than today’s counter-attack.
     
    Last edited: Jan 6, 2022
  9. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    Thank you everyone!
     
  10. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

    The Rhineland Campaign (Feb/March 45) saw some of the last major German armoured counterattacks in the West:

    1. Counterattack of 47 Panzer Korps (116. Pz Div & 15. Pz Gren Div) on 11 & 12 Feb 45 to restore the situation along the eastern fringe of the Reichswald - VERITABLE 1945: 15th Scottish & 43rd Wessex Divisions in the Reichswald battle

    2. Counterattack 116.Pz Div to retake the lost feature of the Eselsberg by 116. Pz Div on 14 Feb 45 - VERITABLE 1945: 15th Scottish & 43rd Wessex Divisions in the Reichswald battle

    3. Counterattack against the Goch - Calcar road by 116.Pz Div & Panzer Lehr during the night to 20 Feb 45- VERITABLE 1945: the Canadian finale (Moyland Wood & Goch-Calcar road)

    4. Counterattack by 15.Pz Gren Div against the Rees bridgehead at Speldrop/Klein Esserden & Empel in the early morning of March 24th, 1945 - RHINE CROSSING 1945: The Rees bridgehead (30 Corps in operation 'Turnscrew') resp. RHINE CROSSING 1945: The Rees bridgehead (30 Corps in operation 'Turnscrew').

    In general these counter-attacks were purely defensive in nature. They were aimed at restoring the own defensive line or spoiling attacks. The depleted German formations by that time were too weak to make the attacks successful. Most turned counter-productive in a way. They were quickly smothered by Allied fire superiority and therefore very costly for the attacking forces. However, as long as they had the means, the Germans stuck to the tactics of the quick counterattack.
     
    Last edited: Jan 6, 2022
  11. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    I did say after Veritable, stolpi :)
     
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  12. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    Hi alberk, I just wanted to say thank you again (very much!) for this post. I am now looking at the activities of 99th Battery of 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment after they crossed the Rhine. Their Archers supported a column sent to capture a bridge, and I just looked up the map reference of that bridge - it was in fact the one at Gervershof!

    Actually I think we discussed this two years ago and I forgot!
     
    Last edited: Sep 8, 2022
  13. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Of course it came at a high price. How many airborne operations in WWII were cheap in casualties? Such operations were undertaken with the understanding that particular objectives were so critical that they were worth the cost.
     
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